Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought

by

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Dedicated to
Dr. B. C. Law, M.A., B.L., Ph.D., D.Litt.
as a token of friendship,
respect and gratitude.

एकाकी दुर्गमे घोरे विषमे पथि सञ्चरन् ।
प्रार्थये स्खलितेष्वत्र पूर्वाचार्यपदाश्रयम् ॥

PREFACE

This volume was originally intended to serve as an introduction to the Yuktidīpikā. But my long absence from Calcutta delayed its publication. In the meantime, almost all the copies of the Yuktidīpikā were exhausted and a thoroughly revised edition is now under preparation. As the portion of the introduction which is already printed cannot for different reasons be held up for an indefinite period till the publication of the proposed edition, it was decided to enlarge the contemplated introductory volume by incorporating into it elaborate discussions on some of the fundamental topics of Sāṃkhya and thus to issue it under a separate title. The revised edition of the Yuktidīpikā will not contain any separate introduction ; it will be furnished with a summary of the text, notes in important places and textual comments where necessary. In this connection I beg to point out the fact that the readings of the quotations from the Yuktidīpikā appearing in this volume are adopted entirely on the basis of the proposed revised edition, and so these will be found to vary slightly in some instances.

An attempt has been made in this volume to trace the origin of Sāṃkhya and specially the development which the system underwent in the different stages of its growth and evolution. The vast literature of this system with its numerous schools is almost lost to us and what has survived in the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is only a skeleton of it. However, I have spared no pains to present before the scholars a picture of early Sāṃkhya as I could draw up from the evidence of the Yoga-bhāṣya and specially the Yuktidīpikā. Besides these two source books of immense help, I have also utilised various stray references to the views of ancient teachers of Sāṃkhya as far as I could pick them up from the ancient literature of India. Amongst numerous topics of Sāṃkhya that are discussed here, special mention may be made of the doctrine of plurality of *prakṛti* by Paurika and its criticism

by the author of the Yuktidīpikā. Discussions on the five vital breaths and the five springs of activity (*karma-yonis*) also contain several new materials. The chapter on the evolution of embodied beings (pp. 278-314) will rouse further interest on the study of Sāṃkhya. The doctrine of '*ṣaṭ-siddhi*' appearing in this connection is entirely new to the ordinary students of Sāṃkhya. Then again, proper attention has been paid to the views of Pañcâdhikaraṇa, Patañjali (who is different from the author of the Yoga-sūtra), Vārṣagaṇya and his followers, Vindhyavāsin, Mādhava, and the like. Very little has been said here which is not supported by quotations from original texts. Except in a few instances, the present Sāṃkhya-sūtra and the school of Vijñāna Bhikṣu have been generally ignored.

The hostile criticisms of the Buddhists, Vaiśeṣikas and specially of Uddyotakara (who is found to refute a school of Sāṃkhya which is other than that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa) and their counter criticisms from the standpoint of Sāṃkhya are not dealt with here. This is reserved for a subsequent publication.

A detailed treatment of the various schools of Sāṃkhya cannot be expected at this stage for lack of sufficient materials. Further light may, however, be obtained if some of the manuscripts of Sāṃkhya that are listed in the different catalogues could be thoroughly examined. For instance, notice is made of one "Sāṃkhya-ṣaḍvidha" by Indra in Bülher's "Catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts contained in the private libraries of Gujrat, Kathiavad" etc. Then again, Rai Bahadur Hiralal in his "Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakṛit manuscripts in the Central Provinces and Berar" (1926) acquaints us with the names of some unknown manuscripts of Sāṃkhya. These are :—Sāṃkhya-dīpikā by Kaiyaṭa (No.6368), Sāṃkhya-śāstra-śākhā (No. 6369) and Sāṃkhya-sūtra by Pañca-śikhâcārya (No. 6371). It is needless to state here that the titles of these manuscripts are indeed alluring to the students of Sāṃkhya. Recently at the National Museum in New Delhi, Sri Fatehchand Belany organised an exhibition of some of the important manuscripts belonging to the Jesalmere Bhandars. Amongst them, there were two old manuscripts of two unknown commentaries on the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa—one of them was copied in V. S. 1173 (A. D. 1116) and the other in V. S. 1200 (A. D. 1143).

In fact, some of the privately owned manuscipt libraries of India possess such treasures as are still unknown to the scholars. And if an extensive search be undertaken, the result is sure to be fruitful to a certain extent. I am expressing here my gratitude to my friend Lalsaheb Kumar Sri Prafulla Chandra Bhanj Deo, M.A. (Cantab) at whose initiative and encouragement I am intending to visit some of the private libraries of Central India for the purpose of examining the contents of some of the important manuscripts deposited therein. And if my mission be fulfilled, I shall not be failing in my duty of reporting the result of my search to the scholars in due time.

I am greatly indebted to my teachers MM. Jogendranath Vedantatirtha, Professor of Indian Philosophy, Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, and Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, head of the department of Sanskrit, Calcutta University, for the help and encouragement which I have always received at their hands. My thanks also go to my colleague Prof. Kishori Mohan Maitra, M.A., for his constructive criticisms in some important places. I am also to thank Pt. K. Sankar Sarma, assistant librarian to the Asiatic Society, for some technical assistance.

CALCUTTA
7th. November, 1951.

PULINBIHARI CHAKRAVARTI

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SĀṂKHYA—WHAT DOES IT MEAN ?

By Sāṃkhya the system of Kapila is generally meant, but its meaning in different stages of Sanskrit literature deserves special attention. The term occurs for the first time in the *Śvet. Up.* (VI. 13.) and there it is stated that the supreme reality is to be achieved by *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga*. In the *Mahābhārata* (*Mbh.*) Droṇa is said to breathe his last by having recourse to the supreme *Sāṃkhya*.[1] From the context it appears that in both the places the term has been used in the sense of spiritual discipline. Śaṃkara in his commentary on the *Viṣṇu-sahasra-nāma* quotes a verse from the *Vyāsa-smṛti* which defines Sāṃkhya to be the knowledge of the true nature of the self.[2]

Grammatically speaking, the term is derived from *saṃkhyā* which usually means 'number'. Hence, some try to maintain that the system of Kapila is called Sāṃkhya as enumeration plays an important part in it ; for in the history of Indian philosophical speculation the system of Kapila for the first time is found to enumerate its different categories. This view is based upon conjecture and we are not inclined to attach sufficient weight to it. The theory of number as set forth by Pythagoras cannot throw any light upon this point which is discussed by Dr. Keith[3] and others, hence it need not occupy us here.

Again *sāṃkhya* if derived from *saṃkhyā* (number), would naturally mean something pertaining to number, and in this sense it is used even in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali[4]. The term thus

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1 द्रोणोऽपि शस्त्राण्युत्सृज्य परमं सांख्यमास्थित:, Mbh, VII. 192. 49.

2 'शुद्धात्मतत्त्वविज्ञानं सांख्यमित्यभिधीयते', इति व्यासस्मृते:—Hall's Sāṃkhyasāra, p. 5.

3 Keith—The Sāṃkhya System, p. 76.

4 लैङ्गा: सांख्याश्च विधयो न सिध्यन्ति—Mahābhāṣya, 2. 2. 24. under Vārttika 8, and also see—सांख्येष्वप्युक्तं कर्मादीनामनुक्ता एकत्वादय इति कृत्वा सांख्या भविष्यन्ति, Vārttika 9.

derived may well serve its purpose in grammatical speculations. But it has very little to do with any philosophical enquiry.

Apart from denoting 'number' the term *saṃkhyā* has got other meanings also. In the Sulabhā-Janaka episode of the *Mbh.* XII. 320, *sāṃkhya* is mentioned as one of the essential requisites of a sentence and Sulabhā defines it as the principle which establishes by proof the defect and merit of a particular aspect in a sentence[1].

Amara in his lexicon states that the term *saṃkhyā* is used in the sense of discussion and investigation[2]. Patañjali uses the term *prasaṃkhyāna* in his *Yoga-sūtra*[3] in the sense of supreme knowledge. In the *Yoga-sutra*-bhāṣya[4] also we find the same term used in the same sense. Kauṭilya in his *Arthaśāstra* mentions both Sāṃkhya and Yoga, and describes them to be the *ānvīkṣakīs, i. .e,* the systems which try to establish defects and merits of something by means of reasonings.

Further light is thrown upon the point if we examine the sense of the term *sāṃkhya* in which *Caraka* uses it in his medical treatise. In order to make the point clearer, we quote the following lines from *Caraka* where the term is used :—

सांख्यैः संख्यात-संख्येयैः सहासीनं पुनर्वसुम् ।
जगद्धितार्थं पप्रच्छ वह्निवेशः स्वसंशयम् ॥ (Sūtra, XIII. 3)
षड्धातुजस्तु पुरुषो रोगाः षड्धातुजास्तथा ।
राशिः षड्धातुजः सांख्यैराद्यैः संपरिकीर्त्तितः ॥ (Sūtra, XXV. 10)

यथा वा आदित्यः प्रकाशकस्तथा सांख्यवचनं प्रकाशकमिति । (Vimāna,

1 दोषाणां च गुणानाञ्च प्रमाणं प्रविभागतः ।
कञ्चिदर्थमभिप्रेत्य सा संख्येत्युपधार्यताम् ॥ XII. 320. 82.

2 चर्चा संख्या विचारणा—*Amara*, I. 5. 2.
Also see, विद्वान्...संख्यावान् पण्डितः कविः...II. 7. 5.

3 प्रसंख्यानेऽप्यकुसीदस्य सर्वथा विवेकख्यातेर्धर्ममेघः समाधिः—*Yoga-sūtra*, IV. 29.

4 विषयदोषदर्शिनः प्रसंख्यानबलात्...वैराग्यम्—*Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya*, I. 15.
Also see, प्रसंख्यानाग्निना दग्धबीजकल्पान्...II. 2.

VIII. 6. 28.) From the context it is evident that everywhere the term *sāṃkhya* stands as an epithet to the teachers well-versed in medical science, and has very little to do with the particular system of philosophy. In the above-mentioned places *sāṃkhya* means one who is possessed of *saṃkhyā i. e.,* perfect knowledge. But in the following couplets of Caraka, the term *sāṃkhya* stands for the particular system of philosophy :

अयनं पुनराख्यातमेतद् योगस्य योगिभिः ।
संख्यातधर्मैः सांख्यैश्च मुक्तैर्मोक्षस्य चायनम् ॥ (Sārira, I. 150.)
सर्वभावस्वभावज्ञो यया भवति निःस्पृहः ।
योगं यया साधयते सांख्यः सम्पद्यते यया ॥ (Śārira, V. 15.)

It is interesting to note that the term *yoga* is also used here side by side with *sāṃkhya.*

In conclusion, we intend to maintain that 'Sāṃkhya' which passes for a philosophical system is derived from *saṃkhyā* that means knowledge, contemplation, examination, discussion, investigation, discrimination etc. The system of Kapila is called *sāṃkhya* as it is more or less endowed with all these attributes.

Guṇaratna in his commentary on the *Saḍ-darśana-samuccaya* suggests a peculiar significance of *sāṃkhya.* He says that the name of the system in accordace with the ancient tradition is also read with a palatal ś (*śāṃkhya*), for it is associated with the name of the seer Śaṃkha. But this view does not seem to be trustworthy, for everywhere we find the name of the system written with a dental s. The *Mbh* in one place mentions two different sages named as *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga*[2]. But we do not find any reasonable ground to connect the Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems with the name of so called sages.

1 यद्वा तालव्यादिरपि सांख्यध्वनिरस्तीति वृद्धाम्नायः । तत्र शङ्खनामा कश्चिदाद्यः पुरुषविशेषस्तस्यापत्यं पौत्रादिरिति गर्गादित्वात् यञ्प्रत्यये शाङ्ख्यास्तेषामिदं सांख्यं शांख्यं वा, Guṇaratna's commentary, p. 22.

2 सांख्ययोगौ नारदश्च दुर्वासाश्च महानृषिः—Mbh, XIII. 150. 45.

ORIGIN OF SĀṂKHYA

[*Sāṃkhya and the Vedas*]

The origin of the Indian philosophical systems is almost enveloped in darkness. Sāṃkhya also shares the same fate. Probably the system of Kapila was formulated at an age when the performances of the Vedic sacrifices were in full swing and the popular belief was that the correct performances of a sacrifice in accordance with the prescribed injunction would surely lead the performer to heaven. To the Vedic priest heaven was the *summum bonum* of life. But Sāṃkhya offers a challenge and comes forward to show that heaven cannot be regarded as such and along with it points out the defects of the Vedic sacrifices. The verse beginning with 'दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः' in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* (kā. 2) bears testimony to this. Though the *Kārikā* cannot be regarded as a work of high antiquity, yet it preserves the tradition of the ancient authorities ; for it explicitly mentions at the end that the topics that are treated in the seventy distiches are those of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*—divested of parables and doctrines of other teachers (kā, 72). This Ṣaṣṭitantra is regarded as the first systematic work upon Sāṃkhya. The *Ahirbyudhna-saṁhitā* of the *Pañcarātra* school furnishes with a list of the sixty different topics of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* and there we find that the *ānuśravika-kāṇḍa* forms one of them.[1] The Kārikā-verse which we have referred to above, while criticising the *ānuśravika* (Vedic means) states that they are impure in character ; for several beasts are to be slaughtered in the *soma* and other similar sacrifices and as a result of this the performer is sure to bind himself with some degree of sin. This is further echoed in a

1 See, आनुश्रविककाण्डञ्च दुःखकाण्डमतः परम्—*Ahirbyudhna*, 12. 17.

fragment[1] quoted in the *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya* (II. 13) and it is attributed to Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati. The idea in the said fragment is this : the Vedic sacrifices can bring about good result, but owing to the slaughtering of beasts the result is attended with some degree of evil however trivial it may be and if some sort of penance is not performed to wipe away this evil, it would cause some misery even in heaven.

Again, the Vedic sacrifices can certainly bring about heaven. But when the fruits of merit will be exhausted, the performer is sure to return from heaven and will have to share again the miseries of the world. Further, all the sacrifices do not produce equal merit. For instance, the *Horse-sacrifice* leads one to heaven whereas by the *Vājapeya* the agent achieves sovereignty in heaven. Hence the Vedic means cannot be regarded as absolute and final. In his *Śata-śāstra,* Āryadeva also refers to the same attitude of the Sāṃkhya towards sacrificial performances in a quotation from a Sāṃkhya work.[2] Hence, it will not be unjustified to maintain the view that Sāṃkhya came out as a reaction against the practice of Vedic rituals.

Further result may be obtained from the *Kapila-Syumaraśmi* episode of the *Mbh.*,[3] where we find Kapila making a reflection upon the Vedic sacrifices. Though this Kapila is not explicitly mentioned there as the propounder of the Sāṃkhya system ; yet he is praised there as one ever observant in sastric duties, always engaged in restraining his senses, possessed of true know-

1 यत्रेदमुक्तम्—'स्यात् स्वल्पः सङ्करः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्षः, कुशलस्य नापकर्षायालम् । कस्मात् ? कुशलं हि मे बह्वन्यदस्ति यत्रायमवापं गतः स्वर्गेऽपि अपकर्षमल्पं करिष्यति' इति ।

2 ...as it is said in the sūtras of the Sāṃkhyas that the *dharma* of sacrifice is impure, in as much as it has the characteristic of non-eternity. And, of superiority and of inferiority, therefore it must be abandoned.—*Śata-śāstra* of Āryadeva as translated by Tucci from the Chinese source, p. 18.

3 See, *Mbh*, XII. 268-270.

ledge, firm and ever directed towards truth etc. These factors lead one to believe that he may be even that Kapila with whom the Sāṃkhya system is associated. The kernel of the narrative is this :—In days of yore god Tvaṣṭṛ came to the palace of Nahuṣa and the latter to observe the duties of hospitality in accordance with the Vedic injunctions was attempting to slaughter a cow. Beholding the cow in a pitiable position, Kapila uttered the following words—'Alas, ye the Vedas', meaning thereby what cruelty do the Vedas sanction. On hearing these words, the sage Syumaraśmi entered into the body of the cow through his *yogic* power and challenged Kapila for passing such an opinion against the Vedas. A discussion follows between the two and Kapila observes that he does not mean to abuse the Vedas. But there are two ways prescribed in the Vedas—one advocates works and the other renunciation and he prefers the latter. By the performances of *karma* the body is purified whereas renunciation leads one to liberation.

Though from some stray references one Kapila is found to be associated with the Vedas, but there is no such conclusive evidence as to regard this Kapila as the propounder of the Sāṃkhya system. To make the point clearer, we are pointing out the places which refer to Kapila as mentioned above.

In the Ṛgveda occurs the following :

दशानामेकं क पि लं समानं तं हिन्वन्ति क्रतवे पार्याय ।
गर्भं माता सुधितं वक्षणास्ववेनन्तं तुषयन्ती बिभर्ति ॥
(X. 27. 16.)

Here one Kapila is mentioned and Sāyaṇa thinks that this is the name of a great sage (एकं मुख्यं कपिलमेतन्नामानं प्रसिद्धमृषिम्), but here we cannot rely upon his interpretation. For from the context, this Kapila appears to be one of the Maruts. The term 'Kāpileya' also as found in the expression स ह वै देवरातो वैश्वामित्र आस, तस्यैते कापिलेय-

बाभ्रवाः······of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (VII. 17.) does not reveal anything in connection with the propounder of the Sāṃkhya system. These Kāpileyas are the clans of Kapila, but who was the original Kapila, we cannot know ; for the text does not supply us with any further data. In his article on the Śākhās of the Yajurveda, Dr. Raghuvira acquaints us with one *Kapila Śākhā* that was studied in the Āryāvarta.[1] But we do not know anything else as regards the Kapila with whom the said branch was associated. Further in the *khilas* of the Ṛgveda,[2] one Kapila is mentioned along with some other sages. But the account of all these Kapilas is very meagre and hence cannot be much estimated in discussing the attitude of Sāṃkhya Kapila towards the Vedas.

Though the Sāṁkhya vehemently criticises the Vedic sacrifices, but thereby it does not totally set aside the validity of the Vedas. In that case it is sure to fall under the category of the *nāstika* philosophy and could not exercise so much influence upon the orthodox minds ; for it is well known that most of the branches of orthodox literature are more or less replete with the praise of Sāṁkhya. It criticises *karman* to be the final means of liberation and emphasises upon the knowledge of Prakṛti and Puruṣa as the means of final beatitude which is not the heaven as the Vedas maintain but the complete cessation of pains.

The *Māṭhara Vṛtti* and the Chinese version of Paramārtha throw further light upon the orgin of Sāṃkhya. Both the texts depict the circumstances under which Āsuri was initiated by Kapila. Before his initiation, Āsuri was a staunch advocate of the sacrifices ; for both the texts characterise him with the epithet 'वर्षसहस्रयाजी' *i. e.*, one who has sacrificed for a thousand years.[3] This fact also

1 कपिल आर्यावर्तदेशे—Journal of Vedic Studies, Vol I. part II.

2 अगस्तिर्माधवश्चैव मुचुकुन्दो महामुनिः ।
कपिलो मुनिरास्तिकः पञ्चैते सुखशायिनः ॥—*Bālakhilya* hymn, 2. 9.

3 See commentary on Kā, I.

suggests that the first disciple of Kapila was initiated at an age when the Indian atmosphere was surcharged with Vedic ritualism. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* mentions one Āsuri[1] who is held there as an important teacher of sacrificial performances. But there are no data left to us which help to identify the said Āsuri with the disciple of Kapila.

Scholars have attempted to trace the origin of Sāṃkhya in the Vedas, but so far without any satisfactory result. Paramārtha in his *Chinese version* refers to the doctrine which Kapila imparted briefly to Āsuri and there we find that in the beginning there was *tamas* and in that *tamas*, *kṣetrajña* appeared for the first time. *Tamas* is said to be the Prakṛti and *kṣetrajña* the Puruṣa. This is clear from the following statement of Paramārtha[2]:—

> "Le sage Kapila l'expliquait à Āsuri brièvement comme suit : 'Au premier commencement il n'y avait que de l'obscurité. Dans cette obscurité il y avait un 'champ de connaissance'. Ce 'champ de connaissance' était le *Puruṣa*[3]. Le Puruṣa existait, mais aucune connaissance n'existait. C'est pourquoi on appelait (le Puruṣa) 'champ'. Après vinrent l'évolution et la modification; anisi naquait la création primordiale par évolution, etc., jusqu' à la délivrance finale (kā, 1)".

Māṭhara and the *Jayamaṅgalā* also echo the same statement. To make the point clearer we quote below the corresponding lines from *Māṭhara* and *Jaya*.

Māṭhara—तन्त्रमिति व्याख्यायते—'तम एव खल्विदमग्र आसीत, तस्मिंस्तमसि क्षेत्रज्ञोऽभिवर्तते प्रथमम्', तम इति उच्यते प्रकृतिः, पुरुषः क्षेत्रज्ञः।

Jaya—तस्मै शिष्यायानुकम्पया संक्षिप्य दत्तवान्—'तम एव खल्विदमग्र आसीत्, तस्मिंस्तमसि क्षेत्रज्ञ एव प्रथमः'। तमः प्रधानम्, क्षेत्रज्ञः पुरुष उच्यते (Kā, 70)

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1 See, वद ह्योवाचासुरिः—*Śatapatha*, I. 5. 2. 26. p. 419.

2 Takakusu—La Sāṃkhya Kārikā, p. 147.

3 See notes of Takakusu :—'obscurité', 'tamas', un des noms de la matière originelle. 'Connaissance-champ', semble correspondre à 'Kṣetrajña', un des noms de l' Āme.

As all these commentators in one voice speak this to be the doctrine of Kapila, it appears therefore that they might have received it from a common source. The idea of this *tamas* which is regarded here to be the first existing principle, reminds us of the *Nāsadīya* hymn of the *Ṛgveda*[1] where also *tamas* is held to be the only entity that existed in the very beginning of the creation. But it is difficult to assert whether the *tamas* of this hymn has been used in such a sense as to convey the idea of the *prakṛti* of *Sāṃkhya*. Most probably it means darkness as we understand in the ordinary sense of the term. *Kṣetrajña* is conspicuous by its absence in the Vedas. A similar cosmogonical account occurs in the *Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad* (V. I). It speaks that in the beginning there was *tamas*, and it further states how from *tamas* came out *rajas* and from *rajas* came out *sattva*. Again, it is interesting to note that the same expression also acquaints us with the conception of the *kṣetrajña*. But this text is regarded as the work of a later period and hence sufficient weight cannot be attached to it in discussing the origin of the Sāṃkhya system.

Some important result may be obtained from the following passage of the Ṛgveda—

द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिष्वजाते।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति।

(I. 164. 20.)

It speaks of the two birds residing in the same tree. One of them tastes the sweet *pippala* fruit and the other watches it without eating. Various commentators have explained it in various ways, but there are such ideas in it as may be taken to be the precursors of the Sāṃkhya thought. The two birds in the aforesaid couplet correspond to the *buddhi* and the *puruṣa* of Sāṃkhya. Like the bird that tastes the *pippala* fruit, the *buddhi* of Sāṃkhya

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1 तम आसीत् तमसा गूढमग्रेऽप्रकेतम्—*Ṛgveda*, X. 129. 3.

also reap the harvest of the merit and demerit acquired by itself. The *puruṣa* is like the second bird—it is the witness, it is not the agent, it is indifferent and hence not to be overcome by the action of the *buddhi* though through delusion the achievement of the *buddhi* is ascribed to it. This interpretation of the two birds as signifying the *buddhi* and the *puruṣa* of Sāṃkhya is further corroborated by the account of the *Paiṅgirahasya Brāhmaṇa* which Śaṅkara refers to in his *Bhāṣya* on B. S, 1. 2. 12. Śaṅkara while discussing on the individual and the supreme self also refers to this verse in his support. But the opponent urges that this verse cannot be the subject matter of the individual and the supreme self as it has been explained otherwise in the *Paiṅgirahasya-Brāhmaṇa*[1]. In the opinion of this text, the expression **'तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति** signifies the *sattva* and **'अनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति'** stands for the *jña* (the puruṣa). This *sattva* and the *jña* are nothing but the *buddhi* and the *puruṣa* as conceived in the Sāṃkhya literature. This is clear from the very statement of Śaṅkara who apparently to strengthen the version of the opponent states that *sattva* and *kṣetrajña* as it is well known denote the *antaḥkaraṇa* and the individual self respectively, for the said text itself explains them as such—"*sattva* is that which dreams and that which is the individual self—the knower, is the *kṣetrajña*". Thus we find that even an early authority like the *Paiṅgirahasya-Brāhmaṇa* is keen to maintain the idea of the *buddhi* and the individual soul in the said Ṛgvedic verse. Again in B. S. 1. 3. 7., Śaṅkara refers to this text in the same connection, but names it as *Paiṅgi-upaniṣad.* The *Brāhmaṇas* also are found to deal with cosmogony here and

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1 See, अपर आह—'द्वा सुपर्णा' इति नेयमृगस्याधिकरणस्य सिद्धान्तं भजते, पैङ्गिरहस्य-ब्राह्मणेनान्यथा व्याख्यातत्वात्। 'तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्तीति सत्त्वम्, अनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीतीत्यनश्नन्नन्योऽभिपश्यति ज्ञः—तावेतौ सत्त्वक्षेत्रज्ञौ' इति। सत्त्वशब्दो जीवः क्षेत्रज्ञशब्दः परमात्मेति यदुच्येत, तन्न—सत्त्वक्षेत्रज्ञशब्दयोरन्तःकरण-शारीरपरतया प्रसिद्धत्वात्। तत्रैव च व्याख्यातत्वात्—"तदेतत् सत्त्वं येन स्वप्नं पश्यति, अथ योऽयं शारीर उपद्रष्टा, स क्षेत्रज्ञः ; तावेतौ सत्त्वक्षेत्रज्ञौ" इति।

there, but these cosmogonical speculations are to a great extent coloured with ritualistic interest and hence they do not reveal anything as regards the origin of the Sāṃkhya thought.

Sāṃkhya ideas in the Upaniṣads

In the upanishadic speculations, the monistic tone is predominant and the central interest lies upon the *brahman* or the *ātman.* The seers try to find out the ultimate reality in various ways and in their discussions we meet with here and there such ideas as may be taken to be the four-runners of the Sāṃkhya thought. Sāṃkhya is a system based upon two distinct principles : one *prakṛti* and the other *puruṣa*, and the germ of this dualistic tendency can be traced even in the monistic speculations of the ancient prose Upaniṣads. In the *Bṛ. Up.*, (I. ii. 5) we find the idea of the food and the eater of the food and further it is the *puruṣa* who is mentioned there as the eater of the food. Sāṃkhya also treats *prakṛti* to be the enjoyed (*bhogya*) and the *puruṣa* to be the enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*) and this idea of the 'enjoyer and the enjoyed' has got a clear resemblance with the idea of the food and the eater of the food as mentioned above. The *Kaṭha Up.*, explicitly mentions *ātman* to be the enjoyer (I. iii. 4.) and both the terms *bhoktṛ* and the *bhogya* are to be met with in the *Śvet. Up.* (I. 12).

The *guṇa* theory is another distinct achievement of Sāṃkhya and most probably Sāṃkhya adopted the idea from the tripartite scheme of the *Ch. Up.* (VI. 4). The said *Upaniṣad* boldly declares : The red colour of the fire is the colour of brilliance, its white colour is the colour of water and its black colour is the colour of the food. The fire loses its fireness, the modification is but a name, the three colours are the reals. So also is the case with the *vāyu*, *āditya* and the like. The advocates of Sāṃkhya also explain

the universe by *prakṛti* which is said to have the three *guṇas* as its constituents and all the objects other than the self are only particular formations of the *guṇas* and hence in reality are not different from them (सर्वमिदं गुणानां सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रमिति परमार्थतो गुणात्मानः—*Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*, IV. 13). This is further proved by the following verse:

गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति ।
यत्तु दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम् ॥

which is quoted in the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya* (IV. 13.) with the remark 'तथा च शास्त्रानुशासनम्' and Vācaspati states this to be a verse of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*. The verse states that the real form of the *guṇas* does not come within the range of vision, what does come within visual range is altogether insignificant like illusion. Again, it is interesting to observe that the terms *lohita* and *śukla* as we have pointed out in the tripartite scheme of the *Ch. Up.* also find their place in the verse अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां etc. of the *Śvet. Up.* (IV. 5) where *ajā* stands for the unborn *prakṛti* and the three colours most probably refer to the three *guṇas*: redness (*lohita*) taken to be the symbol of *rajas*, whiteness (*śukla*) to be that of *sattva* and blackness (*kṛṣṇa*) to be that of *tamas*. This we shall discuss in detail in our examination of *Śvet. Up.* The term *guṇa* is explicitly mentioned for the first time in the *Śvet, Up.*, and in one place it even mentions the term *triguṇa* (V. 7).

The Sāṃkhya theory of causation (*satkāryavāda*) is hinted in the *Ch. Up.* (VI. 2. 1-2.) where the theory of existent coming out from non-existent is overthrown and the doctrine of one absolute real existing in the beginning is maintained.

Now we come to the categories of Sāṃkhya. The *Brahma-sūtra* as well as the *Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara throw some light in finding out some of the passages of the Upaniṣads where Sāṃkhya idea can be traced. Sāṃkhya is the chief opponent of Vedānta. As a result of this we find that some of the *sūtras* of Vedānta are directed against

Sāṃkhya. The *sūtra* 'न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि, नानाभावादतिरेकाच्च' (B. S. 1. 4. 11) also constitutes one of them and it reflects upon a passage of the Upaniṣad where Sāṃkhya—the opponent, is accustomed to show his own doctrine. Here Śaṅkara refers to the verse:

'यस्मिन् पञ्च पञ्चजना आकाशश्च प्रतिष्ठितः ।
तमेवमन्य आत्मानं विद्वान् ब्रह्मामृतोऽमृतम् ॥ (Bṛ. Up., IV. 4. 17)

where Sāṃkhya finds its doctrine of the twenty-five categories, for the expression 'पञ्च पञ्चजनाः' means 'five' multiplied by 'five' and this comes to twenty-five.[1]

The term *prakṛti* is conspicuous by its absence in the ancient prose Upaniṣads. But the Bṛ. Up., asserts that in the beginning the universe was unevolved (IV. 7) and this idea possesses some similarity with the *prakṛti* of Sāṃkhya. For, Sāṃkhya also explains the origin of the manifest from the unmanifest, that of the evolved from the non-evolved. *Buddhi*, the first evolute of *prakṛti* may be partially treated as *vijñāna* which is referred to here and there in the ancient Upaniṣads. The advocates of *Nyāya* hold *jñāna* to be a synonym of the *buddhi*, but Sāṃkhya maintains it to be a *sāttvika* modification of the same. *Ahaṃkāra* as mentioned in the expression...अथातोऽहङ्कारादेश एवाहमेवाधस्तादहमुपरिष्टादहं पश्चादहं पुरस्तादहं दक्षिणतोऽहमेवेदं सर्वमिति, (*Ch. Up.* VII. 25. 1) tallies to a considerable extent with the Sāṃkhya conception of the same. *Manas* and *saṅkalpa* are described side by side in the ancient Upaniṣads and are regarded as two separate principles, but Sāṃkhya holds *saṅkalpa* to be the function of the mind. The ten organs along with their respective functions are referred to in the Bṛ. Up., II. 4. 11 and IV. 5. 12. The ancient Upaniṣads do not men-

1 See,.. पुनरप्यस्मान्मन्त्रात् सांख्यः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते—'यस्मिन् पञ्च...ब्रह्मामृतोऽमृतम्' इति । अस्मिन् मन्त्रे 'पञ्च पञ्चजनाः' इति पञ्चसंख्याविषयाऽपरा पञ्चसंख्या श्रूयते, पञ्चशब्दद्वयदर्शनात् । त एते पञ्च पञ्चकाः पञ्चविंशतिः सम्पद्यन्ते; तया च पञ्चविंशतिसंख्यया यावन्तः संख्येया आकाङ्क्ष्यन्ते, तावन्त्येव च तत्त्वानि सांख्यैः संख्यायन्ते ।......प्राप्तं तावत् श्रुतिमत्त्वमेव प्रधानादीनाम्—*Śaṅkara-bhāṣya*, I. iv. 11.

tion the *tanmātras*, but the word *bhūtamātrā* occurs in the Kauṣ. Up. III. 5; and it is difficult to ascertain whether the *tanmātra* doctrine is adambrated there. The Praśna Upaniṣad speaks of *pṛthivī* and *pṛthivīmātrā*, *apa* and *apomātrā* etc. (IV. 8.) and thereby it hints on the *tanmātra* doctrine, but it is not regarded to be so old as the other prose Upaniṣads, *viz*, the Chāndogya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Aitareya, Taittirīya and Kauṣītakī. The Mbh. also in its exposition of the Sāṃkhya doctrine does not generally speak of the *tanmātras* and mentions the five sense-objects in their place. This fact indicates that the *tanmātra* theory is a later modification of the Sāṃkhya system. The five sense-objects viz, the *śabda*, *sparśa* etc. are referred to in the Br. Up. (II. 4. 11 and IV. 5. 12). The expression 'पञ्च महाभूतानि पृथिवी वायुराकाश आपो ज्योतींषि, of Aitareya Up. (V. 3) contains clear reference to the five gross elements.

The Praśna Upaniṣad which can be regarded at the head of the second stage of the prose Upaniṣads furnishes in IV. 8 with a list of numerous entities, both physical and psychical. It contains the five gross elements together with their subtle forms, the ten organs, mind, intellect, individuation, thought, light and the breath. It is interesting to observe that except the last named three entities, the remaining twenty-three constitute the different categories of Sāṃkhya. *Prakṛti* is excluded from the list. With regard to the last three entities we may say that 'thought' (*citta*) holds a very important place in the Yoga system. But it has got no separate existence apart from the mind, individuation and the intellect. With regard to 'light' the Upaniṣad speaks 'illumination' to be its function. But the classical Sāṃkhya does not hold 'light' to be a separate category and illumination is regarded as the function of the quality of *sattva* (सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकं kā, 11). Breath is said to be the common function of all the organs (सामान्या करणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च. kā, 29). The *Tattva-samāsa* also speaks of the five breaths in the *sūtra* 'पञ्च वायवः'. Again these five vital

breaths find an important place in some of the treatises of the ancient Sāṃkhya teachers and this we intend to discuss later on. But the tone of the Upaniṣad is everywhere vedantic and no where it offers any clue which helps to point out the existence of Sāṃkhya as a different system.

For the first time in the Upaniṣadic speculations, clear reference to some Sāṃkhya tenets is to be found in the *Kaṭha*, which though not so old as the ancient prose Upaniṣads[1] that we have already examined still deserves to be regarded as the foremost of the second stage of the metrical Upaniṣads. In I. iii. 10-11, it is stated that beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, beyond the intellect there is the great self, beyond the great there is the unevolved, beyond the unevolved there is the *puruṣa*. Beyond the *puruṣa* there is nothing; it is the termination, it is the highest goal. These two verses not only speak of the Sāṃkhya categories, but it is interesting to observe that the categories are mentioned according to their graded heirarchy. This doctrine differs in some respect with the classical Sāṃkhya; for the objects are regarded as higher than the senses, egoism is ignored, *buddhi* and *mahān-ātman* are treated as two separate principles where as in the classical Sāṃkhya *mahān ātman* is described as a synonym of the *buddhi*. The same doctrine with some modifications is again repeated in the *Kaṭha*, II. iii. 7-8 which has every possibility of being regarded as a later addition and there it is found that 'beyond the senses is the mind, beyond the mind is the highest *sattva*, higher than the *sattva* is the great self, higher than the great is the highest unevolved. Beyond the unevolved is the *puruṣa*—all-pervading and without any distinctive mark, by knowing whom the being is liberated and attains to immortality'. Here mind is regarded as greater than the senses and not than the objects as were previously

1 Most probably, the *Praśna* is not older than the *Kaṭha*.

done. Egoism is still ignored. *Sattva* which takes the place of *buddhi* is still regarded as a separate entity from the *mahān ātman*, but in the classical Sāṃkhya *sattva*, *buddhi* and *mahān ātman* are regarded as synonyms.[1] The epithet *aliṅga* is given to *puruṣa* but in the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya* (II. 19) it is regarded as an attribute of the *prakṛti*.

In 'ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम्' B. S. I. 1. 5. *aśabda* is refuted to be the ultimate cause and here Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* treats *aśabda* to be a synonym of *pradhāna* which is held by the Sāṃkhya to be the cause of the universe. But *aśabda* as a synonym of *pradhāna* is not to be found in the school of Sāṃkhya as represented by the *Kārikā* and its commentators. But we find the term occurring in the expression 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं' etc. of the *Kaṭha* (I. 3. 15). Further in his *Bhāṣya* on 'वदतीति चेन्न प्राज्ञो हि प्रकरणात्' (B. S, I. 4. 5) Śaṅkara quotes this very *Kaṭha* verse where Sāṃkhya the opponent, finds *pradhāna* as the object of knowledge (ज्ञेयत्ववचन). The *Tattvasamāsa-sūtravṛtti*[2] which is the oldest among the existing commentaries on the *Tattvasamāsa-sūtra*, refers to the following verse in connection with the definition of *pradhāna* :

[3]अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं
तथा च नित्यं रसगन्धवर्जितम् ।
अनादिमध्यं महतः परं ध्रुवं
प्रधानमेतत् प्रवदन्ति सूरयः ॥

But it is nothing but the Kaṭha-verse as already referred to and the line 'निचाय्य तं मृत्युमुखात् प्रमुच्यते' of the *Kaṭha* is replaced by the line 'प्रधानमेतत् प्रवदन्ति सूरयः'. Moreover the Kaṭha-line 'अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवम्' clearly speaks of the *pradhāna* ; for *pradhāna* is also without any beginning or end and it is higher than the *mahat*.

1 See,···महत्तत्त्वं तस्मिन्नेते सत्तामात्रे महत्यात्मन्यवस्थाय···, *Yoga-sūtra Bhāṣya*, II. 19.

2 It is also called *Krama-dīpikā*.

3 See the *sūtra*, 'अष्टौ प्रकृतयः'.

These facts tend to show that a definite idea of *pradhāna* is maintained in the *Kaṭha*-verse.

The first book of the *Kaṭha* (I. i-iii) which is decidedly older than the second, deviates from the method as followed in the ancient prose Upaniṣads. *Brahman* forms the main subject of investigation in them and the seers in order to find it out search it even in various psychical and physical entities. But here the syllable '*Om*' is regarded as *brahman* (I. ii. 15-16) and the central interest lies upon finding out the self. Moreover, an effort is made here for the first time to differentiate it from the physical body which is a peculiar feature of the classical Sāṃkhya. This is evident from the verses where the self is described as 'unborn, eternal, everlasting, ancient, it is not slain, though the body is slain' (I. ii. 18) ; 'if the slayer thinks that he slays, if the slain thinks that he is slain, they do not understand ; for this one does not slay, nor is that one slain' (I. ii. 19) ; 'the self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among the changing things' (I. ii. 22) etc.

The *Bhagavad-gītā* in its second chapter throws further light on the point. Arjuna is perplexed and in course of dispelling his ignorance, the Lord vividly describes the characteristic of the soul and at the same time is very keen to differentiate it from the physical body. Thus, states the Lord : 'the soul is unborn, unchangeable, eternal 'and ancient ; it is not slain upon the body being slain' ; (II. 19) ; 'it is incapable of being cut, burnt drenched or dried up' ; 'it is unchangeable, all pervading, stable, firm and eternal' (II. 24). It is interesting to notice in this connection that the *Kaṭha*-verses I. ii. 18-19 are almost taken verbatim in the *Gītā*, II. 19-20. Thus we find that the teaching of the particular section of the *Gītā* and the *Kaṭha* is similar. But in the *Gītā* the Lord states that His answer to Arjuna proceeds from the standpoint of Sāṃkhya (II. 39) ; where as the term 'Sāṃkhya' is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the *Kaṭha*,

though *yoga* finds its place here and there. In I. ii. 12 of the *Kaṭha*, it is stated that the highest object of attainment is to be recognised by *adhyātma-yoga*, but the sense of the expression as offered by the commentators does not seem to be convincing. In II. iii. 11, *yoga* is described as the firm concentration of the senses; but the explanation of *adhyātma* is still ignored. Towards the end it is mentioned that Naciketas became fiee from passion and death and obtained *brahman* by receiving this knowledge as well as the entire rules of *yoga*; thus it will be with another also who knows *adhyātma* (II. iii. 18). Hence it is evident that the *Kaṭha* emphasises upon *adhyātma-vidyā* and *yoga* as the means of apprehending the supreme reality. This being the case, the expression *adhyātma-yoga* of I. ii. 12 may be treated as a *dvandva* compound meaning thereby *adhyātma* and *yoga*. Now, what does this *adhyātma* mean? The *Kaṭha* only speaks this to be a sort of knowledge (विद्यामेतां योगविधिश्च कृत्स्नम् II. iii. 18) and in the *Gītā*, the Lord declares Himself to be the *adhyātma-vidyā* among the *vidyās* while proclaiming His own glory.[1] But the meaning of the term is not still clear. Literally *adhyātma* means 'relating to self' and hence *adhyātma-vidyā* means 'self-knowledge.' The *Mbh.* throws further light on the point. In the *mokṣadharma* section of the twelveth book, some chapters are found to deal with *adhyātma*[2], but the explanation of *adhyātma* as found in those chapters contain nothing but the principal tenets of Sāṃkhya. Further in XII. 351. 6, the sage Kapila is said to have expounded his doctrine on the basis of *adhyātma*[3]. In XII. 310. 10, while explaining Sāṃkhya, Yājñavalkya also states that those who

1 'अध्यात्मविद्या विद्यानां वादः प्रवदतामहम्', *B. Gītā*, x. 32.

2 Vide chapters 194, 247 and 285.

3 'उत्सर्गेणापवादेन ऋषिभिः कपिलादिभिः ।
अध्यात्मचिन्तामाश्रित्य शास्त्राण्युक्तानि भारत' ॥

contemplate upon *adhyātma* speak of eight kinds of *prakṛti*[1]. Hence it appears that the knowledge which does not differ from that of Sāṃkhya was maintained as the *adhyātma-vidyā* in the ancient philosophical circle. Further, *Bṛ. Up.* in IV. 5. 11, furnishes with a list of the numerous sources of knowledge[2] and in this list *Vidyā* and *Upaniṣad* are enumerated side by side with the *Ṛgveda*, *Yajurveda* etc. This *Vidyā* must be different from the Upanisads, otherwise there is no necessity of reading them separately. But in the absence of sufficient data the relation of this *Vidyā* with the *adhyātma-vidyā* cannot be definitely ascertained.

It has been already pointed out that the earlier portion of the *Kaṭha* is to a great extent saturated with Sāṃkhya ideas and further we have tried to show that *adhyātma* does not differ from Sāṃkhya. Taking all these points into consideration we hope that it may not be unjustified to call the first book of the *Kaṭha* which comprises the first three chapters to be an Upaniṣad of the earliest Sāṃkhya school.

The *Śvet. up.* explicitly mentions the term 'Sāṃkhya' (VI. 13) as well as the name of the seer Kapila (V. 2) who is held to be the reputed propounder of the Sāṃkhya thought. It also furnishes us with an account of Sāṃkhya, much more developed than what we have noticed in the *Kaṭha*. For instance, the series of numbers as are found in the following verses may be interpreted as the enumeration of principles common to the Sāṃkhya system :

तमेकनेमिं त्रिवृतं षोड़शान्तं शताद्धारं विंशतिप्रत्यराभिः ।
अष्टकैः षड्भि र्विश्वरूपैकपाशं त्रिमार्गभेदं द्विनिमित्तैकमोहम् ॥
पञ्चस्रोतोऽम्बुं पञ्चयोन्युग्रवक्रां पञ्चप्राणोर्मिं पञ्चबुद्ध्यादिमूलाम् ।
पञ्चावर्त्तां पञ्चदुःखौघवेगां पञ्चाशद्भेदां पञ्चपर्वामधीमः ॥ (I. 4-5).

1 'तत्र तु प्रकृतिरष्टौ प्राहुरध्यात्मचिन्तकाः' ।

2 See, अस्य महतो भूतस्य निश्वसितमेतद् यदृग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्वाङ्गिरस-इतिहासः पुराणं विद्या उपनिषदः श्लोकाः सूत्राण्यनुव्याख्यानानि.

The expression *ekanemim* literally means the wheel with one circumference and this perhaps means the wheel of metempsychosis, for the simile of the wheel is applied in this connection here and there in the Sāṃkhya-yoga literature[1]. It may even mean the wheel of *brahman* as the commentator suggests, for a little after we come across the expression '*brahmacakra*'[2]. The *brahman* is also read as the synonym of *prakṛti* by some ancient commentators of Sāṃkhya[3]. *Trivṛtam* stands for the three *guṇas*. *Ṣoḍaśāntam* refers to the sixteen *vikāras* (modifications) of Sāṃkhya and they are the ten organs, *manas* and the five gross elements; but in the Sāṃkhya accounts of the *Mbh.* and the *Caraka-saṃhitā* the five objects of the senses are mentioned as modifications and these sense-objects are maintained as the outcome of the gross elements. *Śatārdhāram* means the fifty spokes and they refer to the fifty psychic states of the *buddhi*[4]. These are the five kinds of error, the twenty-eight kinds of infirmity, nine kinds of contentment and the eight kinds of perfection. *Viṃśati-pratyarābhiḥ*—the twenty counter spokes stand for the ten organs and their functions. *Aṣṭakaiḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ* means the six sets of eight and they probably refer to (1) the eight-fold *prakṛti* (*prakṛti, buddhi, ahaṃkāra* and the five subtle-elements or in the opinion of the *Mbh.* and *Caraka*, the five elements; for these texts do not speak of the *tanmātras*), (2) the eight modifications of the *buddhi* (righteousness, knowledge, renunciation, power and their opposites), (3) the eight perfections (kā, 47), (4) the eight-fold *daiva-sarga* (kā, 53), (5) and (6) the eight-fold *tamas* and *moha* (kā, 48). Besides these, in the *Yoga-sūtra* we find the eight sub-divisions

1 See 'प्रवृत्तमिदं षडरं संसारचक्रम्', *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*, iv. 11.

2 'तस्मिन् हंसो भ्राम्यते ब्रह्मचक्रे', *Śvet. up.*, i. 6.

3 Vide commentaries of Māṭhara, Paramārtha and Gauḍa on *Kārikā* 22.

4 See 'तस्य भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत्', *Kā*, 45.

of *yoga* and further Aśvaghosa in his *Buddha-carita* and Caraka in his medical treatise mention another group of eight which causes to bind the self. This group is enuumerated and explained by them in connection with their brief exposition of Sāṃkhya[1]. Under these circumstances it is difficult to ascertain the particular sets of eight which were meant by the seer of the Upaniṣad. The expression *viśvarūpaika-pāśam* probably refers to the *prakṛti* which also assumes manifold forms like an actress and thus binds the *puruṣa*. *Trimārga-bhedam*—possessing three kinds of path and these paths probably refer to the three kinds of emancipation as mentioned in the *Tattva-samāsa*[2] (*TS.*). The said text also mentions other different sets of three—such as the three typs of sorrow, the three types of bondage etc.[3] and the expression under discussion may even mean any one of these groups. But it should not be confounded with *trivṛtam* which refers to the three *guṇas* as has already been discussed. It may even refer to the three entities—the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the director as mentioned in the text (I. 12). Further, Aśvaghoṣa mentions another group of three under whose influence the soul travels in the cycle of metempsychosis and this group comprises 'ignorance, action and hankering'[4]. The expression *dvinimittaika-moham* is difficult to interpret. Literally it means (the cycle) 'having one delusion as the result of two.' The commentator here speaks of the 'merit and demerit' or 'happines and misery' as the two. Though these two are certainly the causes of rebirth, they cannot be

1 'विप्रत्ययादहङ्कारात् संदेहादभिसंप्लवात् ।
अविशेषानुपायाभ्यां सङ्गादभ्यवपाततः ॥' *Buddha-carita*, xii. 24.
and 'मोहेच्छाद्वेषकर्ममूला प्रवृत्तिः, तज्जा ह्यहङ्कार-सङ्ग-संशया।भिसंप्लवाभ्यवपात-विप्रत्यया।विशेषानुपाया-स्तरुणमिव . . . न सत्तामतिवर्त्तते, Caraka on *Śārīra*, v. 12.

2 'त्रिविधो मोक्षः', *Ts.* 20.

3 'त्रिविधं दुःखम्', 'त्रिविधो बन्धः', 22 and 19.

4 'अज्ञानं कर्म तृष्णा च ज्ञेयाः संसारहेतवः', *Buddha-carita*, xii. 23.

maintained as the cause of delusion. Perhaps the expression refers to the identity of the *buddhi* and the *puruṣa* which brings forth delusion and as a result of which the individual soul fails to free itself from the realm of the *prakṛti*.

Let us now turn our attention to the second verse. Here the subject matter of discussion is ignorance (*avidyā*) and it is compared to a river. The water consisting of the five streams (*pañcasrotas*) probably refers to the five objects of the senses, for we meet with the expression *viṣaya-srotas* here and there in the Sāṃkhya-yoga literature[1]. The five springs (*pañca-yoni*), five breaths (*pañca-prāṇa*) and the five kinds of determination (*pañca-buddhi*) are mentioned in the *TS*[2]. The expression *pañca-buddhi* may even refer to the five organs of sense which are called *buddhīndriyas* in the Sāṃkhya literature. The five whirl-pools (*pañcāvarta*) probably stand for the five *doṣas* which as we know from the statement of the *Mbh.* were admitted by the followers of Kapila.[3] The five-fold miseries (*pañca-duḥkha*) are those which are experinced in earning, saving, spending, attachment and killing[4]. They may even refer to the five-fold *kleśas* of

1 See 'वैराग्येण विषयस्रोत: खिलीक्रियते', *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*, I. 12 ; also compare 'पञ्चस्रोतसि य: सत्रमास्ते वर्षसहस्रिकम्' and 'पञ्चस्रोतसि निष्णात:', *Mbh.* xii. 218. 10-11. Further, *Yuktidīpikā* quotes a fragment from an old work upon Sāṃkhya with the remark 'एवं हि शास्त्रम्' and there the expression 'पञ्चमुख्यस्रोतसो देवा:' has been used to mean the five kinds of *viparyaya* of the *kārikā* 47, (see, p. 152. 12). Hence it is difficult to ascertain precisely the sense of the expression *pañca-srotas*.

2 See *T's.*, 'पञ्च कर्मयोनय:', 'पञ्च वायव:' and 'पञ्चाभिबुद्धय:'.

3 'पञ्च दोषान् प्रभो देहे प्रवदन्ति मनीषिण: ।
मार्गज्ञा: कापिला: सांख्या: श्रृणु तानरिसूदन ॥' *Mbh.* xii. 301. 54.

4 Cf. अर्जन-रक्षण-क्षय-भोग-हिंसादोषदर्शनहेतुजन्मान उपरमा: पञ्च भवन्ति, *Tattva-kaumudī* on kā, 50.

the *Yoga-sūtra*.[1] The term *kleśa* in its technical sense is found even in the ancient Buddhist texts. The *Ṣaṣṭitantra* list of the *Ahirbyudhna* also speaks of *duḥkha-kāṇḍa*[2]. The *T's.* mentions only three types of miseries. *Pañcāśadbhedām* stands for the fifty psychic states of the *buddhi* as we have already mentioned in course of examining the previous verse. *Pañca-parvā* refers to the five-fold ignorance and in his commentary on the kā. 47, Vācaspati attributes the expression '*pañcaparvā avidyā*' to Vārṣagaṇya.[3] This is further corroborated by the statement of Aśvaghoṣa who also in his *Buddha-carita* refers to the five-fold ignorance.[4]

We have tried to read the tenets of Sāṃkhya in the two verses, but scholars may differ from us in certain points. But terms and expressions of these *Śvet.* verses discussed above at once remind us of the doctrine of Sāṃkhya. Even the commentators who are strictly Vedantists explain some of the expressions, such as *ṣoḍaśāntam*, *śatārdhāram* etc. in the light of Sāṃkhya ; for they cannot be explained otherwise. Hence it appears that the seer of the Upaniṣad has referred in these verses to the principal tenets of Sāṃkhya. Johnston has examined these two verses in detail in his paper on 'Some Sāṃkhya and Yoga conceptions of the Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad'[5] ; but in some cases I have tried to offer different interpretation.

1 'अविद्याऽस्मिता-रागद्वेषाभिनिवेशा: पञ्चक्लेशा:', *Yogasūtra*, ii. 3., also see 'क्लेशकाण्डानि पञ्च च' of the *Ṣaṣṭi-tantra* list of the *Ahirbyudhna-saṃhitā*, xii. 25.

2 'दु:खकाण्डमत: परम्', xii. 27.

3 अत एव 'पञ्चपर्वा अविद्या' इत्याह भगवान् वार्षगण्य:, *Tattva-kaumudī* on *kā*, 47.

4 'इत्यविद्या हि विद्वांस: पञ्चपर्वा समीहते', *Buddha-carita*, xii. 33.

5 J. R. A. S., 1930, pp. 855-878.

The conception of the *prakṛti* of Sāṃkhya is contained in the verse *ajām ekām* etc. (*Śvet.* IV.5). Speaking in a broad way, it means one she-goat with three colours, red, white and black and producing many offspring of its own form. There is one he-goat that enjoyes her in love and the other he-goat forsakes her whom it has enjoyed. The underlying idea is this : the one she-goat is nothing but the *prakṛti*, for Sāṃkhya also holds it to be one and unborn (*ajā*). Elsewhere also the Upaniṣad mentions the term *ajā* which as it is clear from the context stands for the *prakṛti*, for she-goat does not form the subject matter of discussion anywhere. Again, *prakṛti*, as it is well known, has the three *guṇas* as its constituents and they are represented in the said verse by the three colours—red, white and black. In the *Purāṇas* also redness is held to be the symbol of *rajas*, whiteness to be that of *sattva* and blackness to be that of *tamas*. In the opinion of Sāṃkhya, *prakṛti* with its three *guṇas* goes on changing in every moment resulting in innumerable modifications which are the particular formations of the *guṇas* of the *prakṛti* and in fact do not differ from them.[1] Hence the unborn *prakṛti* also is said to be producing many offsprings of its own form. In the second hemistich, the he-goat is the *puruṣa* ; for it is also held to be *aja* (unborn). The term *aja* in this sense may be traced even in the Vedas. The expression 'अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते' speaks of the *puruṣa* who is not yet liberated from the fetters of *prakṛti* and 'जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः' signifies the other *puruṣa* who is liberated and is thus free from the yoke of the *prakṛti*. The Upaniṣad elsewhere explicitly mentions the terms *prakṛti* and *pradhāna* (IV. 10, VI. 16). The term *guṇa* also finds its place here and there and in one place it is interesting to observe that the term *triguṇa* is even mentioned (V. 7). But the specific names of the *guṇas* as *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* do not occur until in the *Maitrāyaṇī* (II. 5, V. 2). Besides these, the *Śvet. Up.* mentions such

1 See p. 12.

other terms as have got a very distinct place in the Sāṃkhya literature. For instance, we find terms and expressions like *vyaktāvyakta* (I. 3), *jña* (I. 19, VI. 2 and 17), *bhoktā* and *bhogya* (I. 12), *saṃyoga-nimitta-hetu* (VI. 5) etc. Further, it does not ignore the name of the seer Kapila who is held to be the reputed propounder of Sāṃkhya. More interesting is to observe, that it mentions the term 'Sāṃkhya' along with 'Yoga' for the first time and expressly suggests them to be the means of attaining to the supreme reality. From these facts, the *Śvet. Up.*, appears to be the Upaniṣad of the Sāṃkhya school, But a careful examination of the entire text reveals some doctrines which are distinctively Vedantic and warns us not to treat them as Sāṃkhya.

The enquiry begins with *brahman*[1] and the classical Sāṃkhya does not speak of such an entity. Emphasis is laid upon the three principles : the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the director whose knowledge brings about *brahman*.[2] In the classical Sāṃkhya also *puruṣa* is called the enjoyer and *prakṛti* to be the object of enjoyment ; but the advocates of Sāṃkhya generally hold *prakṛti* to be independent and hence discards the idea of a separate director. Again in the classical Sāṃkhya *puruṣa* is held to be the *jña*, the knower ; but here we find the *jña* to be the lord. In another place *jña* is taken as an epithet to the supreme being, who is the maker of everything who knows all, who is self-caused (स विश्वकृद् विश्वविदात्मयोनिर्ज्ञः, VI. 16) etc. But the *puruṣa* in the classical Sāṃkhya is never maintained as the maker of anything.

Again, though this Upaniṣad as we have previously remarked is so much saturated with the Sāṃkhya ideas, yet absolute monism is maintained everywhere. One supreme being is emphasised in and through the Upaniṣad and the independence of *prakṛti* is

1 किं कारणं ब्रह्म······I. 1.

2 भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारञ्च मत्वा सर्वं प्रोक्तं त्रिविधं ब्रह्ममेतत्, I. 12,

emphatically denied. The supreme being is maintained as the lord of the *pradhāna* and *kṣetrajña*; he is the lord of the *guṇas* (VI. 16), he directs the *guṇas* to perform their functions (**गुणांश्च सर्वान् विनियोजयेद् यः**, V. 5), his knowledge, power and action are inherent (VI. 8). He is the generator of the sage Kapila, he beholds him born and transmits knowledge to him for the first time (V. 2); but the classical Sāṃkhya always maintains him to be the first among the wise and holds his knowledge to be innate. Not only this, the Upaniṣad in one place even discards the separate existence of the *prakṛti* and speaks this to be an illusion; the great lord is the magician and he creates the universe, his self-power is enveloped in his own *guṇas*. But it is curious to notice that the Upaniṣad suggests Sāṃkhya and Yoga as the means of apprehending the supreme lord. Now the question arises, whether the Upaniṣad speaks of a different school of Sāṃkhya other than what is represented in the *Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa or it makes an attempt to reconcile the conflicting doctrines of the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta.

With regard to the first alternative, we may say that Sāṃkhya underwent doctrinal changes in its different stages of growth. This point we intend to discuss in detail later on. If this be the case, then it would not be proper to hold what does not tally with the *Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is not Sāṃkhya at all. Now in our Upaniṣad the enquiry begins with *brahman* which is ignored in the *Kārikā*. But elsewhere in the brief exposition of Sāṃkhya we find that *brahman* is not ignored and a place is assigned to it. In the *Mbh.*, Āsuri in the assembly of the followers of Kapila is found to explain *brahman* who is one and immutable and seen in diverse forms.[1] Attempt is made to explain

1 'यत् तदेकाक्षरं ब्रह्म नानारूपं प्रदृश्यते ।
आसुरिर्मण्डले तस्मिन् प्रतिपेदे तदव्ययम् ॥' *Mbh.* xii, 218. 14.

brahman even in the *Janaka-Pañcaśikha* episode.[1] Aśvaghoṣa as well as Caraka in their brief exposition of the Sāṃkhya speak *brahman* to be the ultimate stage[2]. Caraka elsewhere uses the term in the sense of the inner self[3] and in this sense it is also used in a verse as quoted by the author of the *Yoga-bhāṣya* from some ancient *Sāṃkhya* or *Yoga* treatise. There we find that 'the cave in which the eternal *brahman* rests is the modification of the *buddhi* which does not look different from it, thus the sages point it out'[4]. Prabhākara in his *Bṛhatī* states the advocates of Sāṃkhya to be the knowers of *brahman*[5]. Even Bhojarāja in his commentary on the *Yoga-sūtra* treats the Sāṃkhyaites to be the *śānta-brahmavādins*[6]. Some important light is thrown upon the point by the *Ahirbyudhna-saṃhitā* of the *pañcarātra* school which supplies us with a list of the sixty different topics of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, the first systematic treatise on Sāṃkhya; and it is

1 'न यत्र साध्यं तद् ब्रह्म नादिमध्यं न चान्तवत्', *Mbh.* xii. 221. 18 (Southern recension).

2 'एतत् परमं ब्रह्म निर्लिङ्गं ध्रुवमक्षरम् ।
यन्मोक्ष इति तत्त्वज्ञाः कथयन्ति मनीषिणः ॥' *Buddha-carita*, xii. 65.
also 'अतः परं ब्रह्मभूतो भूतात्मा नोपलभ्यते
निःसृतः सर्वभावेभ्यश्चिह्नं यस्य न विद्यते, Caraka on *Śārīra*, i. 99.
विपापं विरजः शान्तं परमक्षरमव्ययम्
अमृतं ब्रह्म निर्वाणं पर्यायैः शान्तिरुच्यते, *ibid*, v. 19.

3 'तस्य पुरुषस्य पृथिवी मूर्त्तिः . . . ब्रह्मान्तरात्मा', *ibid*, v. 34.

4 'गुहा यस्यां निहितं ब्रह्म शाश्वतम् ।
बुद्धिवृत्तिमविशिष्टां कवयो वेदयन्ते ॥' *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*, iv. 22.

5 'अत्रापरे ब्रह्मविदः कर्त्रभिधानात् स्मृतेरिच्छातश्च महदादिभूतपर्यन्तात् शरीरादतिरिक्तमात्मानमुपलभामहे इति प्रतिपन्नाः', *Bṛhatī*, I. 1. 5, p. 120.

6 'शान्तब्रह्मवादिभिः सांख्यैः', iv. 22 and also 'शान्तब्रह्मवादिभिः सांख्यैरात्मनः सदैव संसारदशायां मोक्षदशायाञ्चैकरूपत्वमात्मनोऽङ्गीक्रियते', iv. 23.

curious to notice that the first topic of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* constitutes that of the *brahman*.[1] From these evidences it appears that the pre-kārikā Sāṃkhya did not ignore *brahman*. But it is difficult to determine precisely the sense of the term ; for we find it somewhere used in the sense of one universal soul, somewhere it is identified with the stage of liberation and elsewhere it means the inner self.

Though the term *brahman* is conspicuous by its absence in the *Kārikā*, yet the early commentators do not leave it untouched. *Yuktidīpikā*, the newly discovered commentary on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* states *brahman* to be the ultimate stage.[2] Paramārtha, Māṭhara and Gauḍapāda hold the term to be a synonym of *prakṛti* (Kā. 22). But elsewhere Māṭhara mentions Sāṃkhya as imparting the knowledge of *brahman*.[3]

Then comes the question of the director. Our Upaniṣad insists upon three principles : the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the director (I. 12). But the school of Sāṃkhya as represented in the *Karikā* and its commentaries does nowhere speak of any director of the *prakṛti* or *puruṣa*, for *prakṛti* is regarded as independent and functions out of its own accord for the liberation of the *puruṣa* (Kā. 57) and hence it does not require any separate director. Thus it appears that our Upaniṣad intends to speak of the theistic school of Sāṃkhya, otherwise there is no necessity of introducing the director.

Patañjali in his *Yoga-sūtra* speaks of *īśvara* (I. 24), but neither in the *sūtra* nor in the *bhāṣya* this *īśvara* is maintained as

1 'तत्राद्यं ब्रह्मतन्त्रं तु द्वितीयं पुरुषाङ्कितम्'—*Ahirbyudhna*, XII. 20.

2 एतत् परं ब्रह्म ध्रुवममलमभयमत्र सर्वेषां गुणधर्मीणां प्रलयः, p. 173 ; सत्तारामो... परं ब्रह्मोपपद्यते, p. 129 ; एकाग्र....परस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रत्यनन्तरो भवति, p. 113.

3 आसुरिगोत्रं....ब्रह्मोपदेशविषया....वाचमित्युवाच, Māṭhara on Kā. 1, p. 2.

the director. Bhojarāja in his commentary on the *Yoga-sūtra* states that the conjunction of the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* cannot happen without the will of *īśvara*,[1] but sufficient weight cannot be attached to his version as he is not regarded as a very early authority on the subject. Haribhadra also in his *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* speaks of a school of Sāṃkhya which admits *īśvara*,[2] but the function of this *īśvara* is not distinctly stated by him anywhere. Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattva-saṃgraha* acquaints us with a school of Sāṃkhya which insists upon the joint activity of the *prakṛti* and *īśvara* in the matter of creation.[3] This is further hinted in a *sūtra* which Kamalaśila quotes in the introduction to his commentary on the *Tattva-saṃgraha* and ascribes it to the lord Buddha[4] The said *sūtra* which criticises the theory of causation of other teachers urges : 'the sprout does not come out of itself, nor it is created by both *prakṛti* and *īśvara* nor it is created by God, nor it is evolved from *prakṛti*' etc. The buddhist *sūtras* in their sanskritised form though not so ancient as the Pali canons, yet cannot be placed very later than the first century A. D. From this it appears that there had been a school of Sāṃkhya as early as the beginning of the Christian era which maintained both *prakṛti* and *īśvara* as the cause of creation. But our Upaniṣad is not still content. It speaks that the power of the Lord is supreme (VI. 8.) and in another place, it is stated that the self-power of the Lord is enveloped in its own *guṇas* (I. 3) and hence it does not intend to offer a prominent

1 'प्रकृतिपुरुष-संयोगवियोगयोरीश्वरेच्छा-व्यतिरेकेणानुपपत्तेः, I. 24.

2 'सांख्या निरीश्वराः केचित् केचिदीश्वर-देवताः', Śl. 35, p. 32.

3 'प्रकृतीश्वरयोरेवं हेतुत्वप्रतिषेधनात् ।
प्रत्येकं सहितं कर्तृ नोभयं जन्मिनामिदम् ॥' *Tattva-saṃgraha*, p. 58.

4 तत्रेदमुक्तं भगवता—'स चायमङ्कुरो न स्वयं कृतो नोभयकृतो नेश्वरनिर्मितो न प्रकृति-सम्भूतो नैककारणाधीनो नाप्यहेतुः समुत्पन्नः', Kamalaśila's commentary, p. 11.

place to the *prakṛti*. But in the classical Sāṃkhya, the independent *prakṛti* itself is held to be the power. In the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* list also power forms a distinct item[1] and elsewhere in the *Ahirbyudhna*, *prakṛti* itself is regarded as the power.[2] Not only this, the Upaniṣad explicitly mentions *prakṛti* to be an illusion and the great Lord as the magician[3] and thereby it intends to ignore the separate existence of the *prakṛti*.

But we are not inclined to believe in such a school of Sāṃkhya as treats *prakṛti* to be an illusion or as the self-power of the supreme deity and thereby goes to deny its separate existence. Whatever be the manifold schools of Sāṃkhya, it always insists upon the independent existence of *prakṛti* and if it is disregarded it merges into Vedānta. Then, is it an attempt on the part of the *Śvet. Up.* to reconcile the conflicting views of the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta ?

Some satisfactory results may be obtained if we compare some portions of the *Kaṭha* with the *Śvet. Up.*. The first three chapters of the *Kaṭha* which comprise the first book emphasise upon the *puruṣa*. It is held as higher than the unevolved, there is nothing higher than this, it is the highest consummation, it is the supreme goal (I. iii. 11). The central interest lies in finding it out. There is no tinge of any supreme deity as the lord or as the director. In one verse only it is stated that the person who is without any desire or free from grief realises the majesty of the self by the grace of the creator (I. ii. 20). Except this, nowhere we meet with any such expression as speaks of any creator or supreme being other

1 See, 'त्रीणि तन्त्राण्यथान्यानि शक्तेर्नियतिकालयोः', *Ahirbyudhna*, XII. 20.

2 'यत् तद् गुणमयं रूपं शक्तेस्तस्याः प्रकीर्तितम्', *ibid* VI. 16.

3 'मायान्तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनन्तु महेश्वरम्', *Śvet.* IV. 10.

than the self. But this very verse is also found in the *Śvet. Up.* (III. 20) and we shall not be unjustified in holding the said verse which suddenly appears in the *Kaṭha* without bearing any important relation with the preceding verses, to be an interpolation to it. Otherwise the verse which calls the *puruṣa* to be the highest consummation becomes useless.

The second book of the *Kaṭha* (II. i-iii) which seems to be a later addition emphatically discards the idea of many realities (नेह नानाऽस्ति किञ्चन, II. i. 11). The said book emphasises upon one universal soul who though manifests himself in different bodies yet transcends them. 'Just as one fire, after it has entered the world, though one becomes different according to whatever it burns ; so also the one self which is the inner self of every being becomes different according to whatever it enters and exists also without' (II. ii. 9). 'As the sun, the eye of the whole world is not contaminated by the external impurities seen by the eyes, thus the one self within all beings is never contaminated by the misery of the world, being himself without' (II ii. 11). But even this universal soul is not stated as the agent. *Śvet. Up.* also speaks elsewhere the *ātman* to be infinite, assuming all forms and inactive (अनन्तश्चात्मा विश्वरूपो ह्यकर्ता, I. 9) ; it is one hidden in all beings, all pervading, the self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one and free from qualities (VI. 11).

Further, towards the end of the *Kaṭha*, II. ii, all the verses contain the conception of one universal soul and it is interesting to notice that some of these verses also find their place in the *Śvet. Up.* The verse II. ii. 15 of the *Kaṭha* is read verbatim in the *Śvet. Up.*, VI. 14. The two verses II. ii, 12-13 of the *Kaṭha* are also read in the *Śvet. Up.*, VI. 12-13 with some variants in reading and this fact deserves special attention. The reading of the *Kaṭha* is :

एको वशी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा एकं रूपं बहुधा यः करोति ।
तमात्मस्थं येऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरास्तेषां सुखं शाश्वतं नेतरेषाम् ॥ १२ ॥
नित्योऽनित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानामेको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् ।
तमात्मस्थं येऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरास्तेषां शान्तिः शाश्वती नेतरेषाम् ॥ १३ ॥

It is apparent that the second hemistich of the previous verse is almost repeated in the subsequent one. The first verse as well as the first hemistich of the second verse are read in the *Śvet. Up.* with a slight variation in reading, but the second hemistich of the second verse is entirely replaced by the line **'तत् कारणं सांख्ययोगाधिगम्यं ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः'** which suggests Sāṃkhya and Yoga as the means of apprehending the supreme reality, but the *Kaṭha* (I. ii. 12) suggests *adhyātma-yoga* in their stead. We quote below the following verses for the sake of critical examination.

तं दुर्दर्शं गूढमनुप्रविष्टं गुहाहितं गह्वरेष्ठं पुराणम् ।
अध्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन देवं मत्वा धीरो हर्षशोकौ जहाति ॥ (*Kaṭha*, I. ii. 12)

नित्योऽनित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानामेकं बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् ।
तमात्मस्थं येऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरास्तेषां शान्तिः शाश्वती नेतरेषाम् ॥ (*Kaṭha*, II.ii. 13)

नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानामेकं बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् ।
तत् कारणं सांख्ययोगाधिगम्यं ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः ॥ (*Śvet*, VI. 13)

These verses refer to the supreme reality, the means to attain it and the result to be obtained therefrom. The second verse only does not speak of the means ; the result is the same, more or less everywhere. In one case *adhyātma-yoga* is suggested as the means and in another case 'Sāṃkhya-yoga' constitutes the same. *Adhyātma-yoga* does not differ from 'Sāṃkhya-yoga' as we have already discussed.[1] But the supreme reality varies everywhere. *Puruṣa* is the central figure in the first book of the *Kaṭha* and this *puruṣa* does not differ from the individual soul as we have already

1 See above, pp. 18-19.

tried to show. Here also the *deva* of the first verse who is to be apprehended by the *adhyātma-yoga* is the *puruṣa* as is evident from the context. Further, the expression **'गुहाहितम्'** of the first verse reminds us of a quotation in the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*[1] where also the eternal *brahman* is said to have got his residence in the cave. This cave is the function of the *buddhi* which does not look different from the *brahman*. The inner self is meant here by the term *brahman* and hence it is not different from the *puruṣa*. In the second place, one universal soul who is the inner self of every individual is the supreme reality. But with regard to the third case, it is something else which excels even the universal soul. Though the first hemistich is almost common with the preceding verse, yet the conception of the deity (*deva*) who is resorted to to be the cause (*tatkāraṇam*) is something else as is evident from the other passages of the *Śvet. Up.* This *deva* is the supreme lord of the lords (VI. 7) ; he is the maker of everything, he is the lord of the *pradhāna*, *kṣetrajña* and the *guṇas* (VI. 16) ; he first creates *brahman* and delivers the Vedas unto him (VI. 18). But Sāṃkhya cannot entertain the conception of such a *deva* in its philosophy. The fact is this that the *Śvet. Up.* attempts to synthesise the Sāṃkhya with the Vedānta with the result that the Vedantic idea remains predominant and the Sāṃkhya conception is undermined. Again the Upaniṣad itself states towards its end that in the ancient cycle of creation, the highest mystery was delivered in the Vedānta (VI. 22) and hence it is not surprising to note that the absolute monism which is the doctrine of the Vedānta should be maintained in and through this Upaniṣad. This is not all. The aim of the Upaniṣad is to unite all the principal doctrines which were prevelant at the time of its compilation. Sāṃkhya as we have already

1 'गुहा यस्यां निहितं ब्रह्म शाश्वतं बुद्धिवृत्तिमविशिष्टां कवयो वेदयन्ते,' *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*, IV. 22.

pointed out, has been mentioned in it. The second chapter is entirely given to Yoga. Rudra is sometimes highly spoken of in the third and the fourth chapters. Śiva also holds an important place and at the end it even speaks of the *bhakti* (VI. 23).

In conclusion, we may suggest that Sāṃkhya picked up its categories from the store house of the Upaniṣadic speculations and at the time of the most ancient prose Upaniṣads it did not attain to any definite shape. It was still in its embryonic stage. But at the time of the *Kaṭha* it immerged from the womb and at the age of the *Śevt. Up.* it was much more developed and most probably it then enjoyed a very wide popularity in the Brahmanical circle. This is why the *Śvet.* is very keen to synthesise it with the Vedānta.

Stray references to some Sāṃkhya tenets are also found in the *Mahānārāyaṇa*, but they are also surcharged with the Vedāntic doctrines. Like the *Śvet*, the said Upaniṣad also reads the verse *ajām ekām* etc. (III. i. 1) where the Sāṃkhyaites find the conception of the *prakṛti* with the three *guṇas* as its constituents. Again, the term *prakṛti-līna* as found in the last verse of the tenth chapter[1] reminds us of the conception of *prakṛti-laya* as found in the *Yoga-sūtra*, I. 19. *Prakṛti-layas* are those who believe the *prakṛti* to be their self and remain wholly absorbed in its meditation. As a result of this, their internal organs are saturated with the idea of the meditation for the *prakṛti*. They merge into the *prakṛti* after the separation of their bodies and remain absorbed in it until the fruition of their previously acquired merit. But the idea of the *prakṛti-līna* as found in the *Mahānārāyaṇa* is wholly coloured with the Vedāntic conception.

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1 'यो वेदादौ स्वरः प्रोक्तो वेदान्ते च प्रतिष्ठितः ।
तस्य प्रकृतिलीनस्य यः परः स महेश्वरः' ॥

The *Maitrāyaṇi* Upaniṣad acquaints us with some Sāṃkhya tenets, much more developed than those which we have examined before. The title of the text varies, for it is also read as *Maitri*. It begins with a pessimistic tone which is a special feature of the Sāṃkhya. With regard to the cosmogony it states that "in the beginning there had been only *tamas*, it rested on the supreme (*puruṣa*) and being moved by him it becomes uneven and thus it becomes *rajas* ; *rajas* also being moved becomes uneven and thus it becomes *sattva*. This *sattva* being moved, the essence was generated. This is the part which is consciousness itself. It is the knower of the body (*kṣetrajña*) abiding in every *puruṣa* and is attested with determination, willing and egoism" (V. 2). Though the ordinary Sāṃkhya does not speak of cosmogony in this way, yet we meet with a similar statement[1] in some of the early commentaries on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*— such as the chinese version of Paramārtha, *Māṭhara-vṛtti* and the *Jayamaṅgalā*. All these commentaries refer to the doctrine which Kapila imparted to Āsuri in brief. The doctrine runs thus 'In the beginning there was only *tamas*, in that *tamas* the *kṣetrajña* appeared for the first time'. The commentators speak this *tamas* to be the *prakṛti*. But the classical Sāṃkhya nowhere states the *kṣetrajña* as the essence of *sattva*.

The Upaniṣad states the *ātman* as pure, firm, stable undefiled, unmoved, free from desire, spectator and abiding in itself (II. 7). The *kṣetrajña* is the individual self and it is mentioned as the part of the *ātman* ; it is attested with determination, willing and egoism (II. 5). The text further speaks of one *bhūtātman* (elemental self). "*Bhūta* means the five subtle and the gross elements and the body is said to be their combination. Hence, he who resides in the body is said to be the *bhūtātman*. It is the

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1 See above, p. 8.

self who is overcome by the *guṇas* of the *prakṛti*. Being subjected to egoism he thinks "it is I, this is mine' and thus binds his self by his own self just as a bird does itself by the net" (III. 2). This conception of binding oneself by his own self is also found in the *Kārikā* where *prakṛti* is stated as one who binds herself by her own self (*kā*, 63). The *ātman* who is thus attested with determination, willing and egoism is bound and who is different from it is liberated (VI. 30). This conception of bondage and liberation also tallies with that of the classical Sāṃkhya.

Further, the Upaniṣad mentions for the first time the specific names of the *guṇas*; the functions of *tamas* and *rajas* are also elaborately described in III. 5. In VI. 10, *prakṛti* is described as the food and the inner self as the eater. This food which is not different from the *prakṛti* becomes the *liṅga* beginning from the *mahat* and ending in the specifics (*viśeṣa*) owing to the different transformations of the *guṇas*. The universe also is described as attested with pleasure, pain and delusion and hence we find that its doctrines are keeping perfect harmony with those of the *Kārikā*. In III. 2, it explicitly mentions the *tanmātras*. Besides these, the Upaniṣad always strives to differentiate the *prakṛti* from the *ātman*. This tendency of the Upaniṣad and specially some of its expressions such as **'प्राकृतमन्नं त्रिगुणभेदपरिणामत्वान्महदाद्यं लिङ्गम्, सुखदुःखमोहसंज्ञं ह्यन्नभूतमिदं जगत्'** (VI. 10) etc. bear testimony to the fact that at the time of its compilation the Sāṃkhya attained to a very developed stage. The remarkable difference with the doctrine of the classical Sāṃkhya is this that *ātman* is still maintained as one and the *kṣetrajña* or the individual self is regarded as its part[1].

But this Upaniṣad cannot be regarded as a very ancient one. It is post-buddhistic, for it mercilessly criticises the Buddhists for

1 'सोऽंशोऽयं यश्चेतामात्रः प्रतिपुरुषं क्षेत्रज्ञः सङ्कल्पाध्यवसायाभिमानलिङ्गः' ..., II. 5.

advocating the doctrine of the non-existence of self.[1] Again this Upaniṣad cannot be maintained as a genuine one, for the Upaniṣad itself speaks that it conveys the knowledge of all the Upaniṣads.[2] Moreover, it frequently refers to the view of other texts to substantiate its own statements. This is evident from the common expression **'अथान्यत्राप्युक्तम्'** as found here and there.[3] Most interesting is to notice that it quotes such lines from other texts and authorities as distinctively speak the doctrine of Sāṃkhya.[4] Hence it is better to regard it as a summary of other texts and not to treat it as a genuine Upaniṣad.

Of the minor Upaniṣads, the *Jāvāla* refers to the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* (IV.) and speaks of them as the three *dhātus*. The *Nṛsiṃha-tāpanī* while speaking of the absolute, mentions it as free from the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* (IX. 20). Both the *Subāla* and the *Mantrika* mention the term 'Sāṃkhya' and the *Garbha. Up.* speaks of the eight-fold *prakṛti* and the sixteen modifications; but thereby they do not preach absolutely Sāṃkhya doctrines.

We have already pointed out that Sāṃkhya borrowed some of its principal tenets from the Upaniṣads. Further, the *BS.* in some of its *sūtras* refers to some fragments of the Upaniṣads where Sāṃkhya is accustomed to hold its own doctrine[5]. This fact

1 'नैरात्म्यवादकुहकैर्मिथ्यादृष्टान्तहेतुभिः
भ्राम्यल्लोको न जानाति वेदविद्याऽन्तरं तु यत्', VII. 8.

2 अथ खल्वियं....सर्वोपनिषद्विद्या वा...., II. 3.

3 See the beinnings of III. 3, 4, 5 ; IV. 2 ; V. 4, 5 ; VI. 4, 5, 12, 13 etc.

4 सोमसंज्ञोऽयं भूतात्माऽग्निसंज्ञोऽप्यव्यक्तमुखा इति वचनात्···, VI. 10 ;
अत्रैक आहुर्गुणः प्रकृतिभेदवशादध्यवसायात्मबन्धमुपागतोऽध्यवसायस्य दोषक्षयाद्
विमोक्षः, VI. 30.

5 ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम्, I. i. 5 ; वदतीति चेन्न प्राज्ञो हि प्रकरणात्, I. iv. 5 ;
महद्वच्च, I. iv. 7 ; न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि नानाभावादतिरेकाच्च, I. iv. 11.

indicates that at the time of the *BS.*, Sāṃkhya endeavoured to prove itself as an offshoot of the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara in his commentary plainly states that Sāṃkhya tries to show its own tenets as being based upon the Upaniṣads and in support of his view, traces some passages of the Upaniṣads which are explained by the Sāṃkhyaites in such a way as to strengthen their own views. He further states that the explanation of the advocates of Sāṃkhya is illusive and should not be regarded as the genuine one[1].

However, Sāṃkhya cannot be regarded as the direct discendent of the Upaniṣads like the Vedānta. The central interest of the ancient Upaniṣads rests generally upon monism whereas the Sāṃkhya always strives to maintain its dualism. The pluralism of the soul is another important deviation of the classical Sāṃkhya from the Upaniṣadic conception of the one universal soul. But whether Sāṃkhya advocated the doctrine of pluralism from its very inception is a problem which is not easy to solve. We have already pointed out that the pre-kārikā Sāṃkhya admitted *brahman*[2] and it is somewhere used to mean the inner self and elsewhere it is identified with the stage of liberation. The *Ṣaṣṭitantra* list of the *Ahirbyudhna* sheds further light on the point. The topic on *brahman* comes first in the said list and then comes the topic on the *puruṣa*[3]. Hence it appears that *brahman* was maintained as something other than the *puruṣa*. The said list further informs us that the topic on liberation constitutes the last chapter of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* and hence *brahman* cannot be even identified with the stage of liberation. Then, does the *brahman* of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* stand for one universal soul ? From the statement of the *Mbh.*, we know that Āsuri, the first disciple of Kapila, explained in the assembly

1 सांख्यादयः स्वपक्षस्थापनाय वेदान्तवाक्यान्यप्युदाहृत्य स्वपक्षानुगुण्येनैव योजयन्तो व्याचक्षते, तेषां यद् व्याख्यानं तद् व्याख्यानाभासम्···, II. ii. 1.

2 See above, pp. 26-28.

3 'तत्राद्यं ब्रह्मतन्त्वं तु द्वितीयं पुरुषाङ्कितम्, XII. 20.

of the followers of Kapila, the *brahman* who is one, immutable and seen in diverse forms[1]. This reminds us of the second book of the *Kaṭha* where some verses speak of one universal soul, who is the inner self of every being and exists also without[2]. The conception of liberation as set forth by Pañcaśikha throws further light on the point. He states : "just as the rivers falling into the sea lose their forms and names, in the same manner occurs the extinction of life which is called liberation. Under these circumstances, the individual soul which through delusion is attested with attributes, when united with *brahman*, the universal soul and where its so called attributes disappear, then there remains no sign by which it can be differentiated. As a result of this rebirth is also impossible, for the individual soul is then taken up by the universal soul".[3] Thus we see that in the opinion of Pañcaśikha, liberation is the unification of the individual soul with *brahman*, the universal soul. Even the *Maitrāyaṇi* which is too much saturated with Sāṃkhya ideas speaks *kṣetrajna*, the individual soul, to be the part of the *puruṣa*. Though this is not counted as one of the most ancient Upaniṣads, yet it should not be regarded as a very later one; for the *Mbh.*, in its *Mokṣa-dharma* section of the twelfth book seems to have borrowed some lines from it[4].

Hence it appears that there had been some ancient school of

1 *Mbh.* XII. 218. 14, also see above p. 26n.

2 *Kaṭha*, II. ii. 9-11.

3 'यथाऽर्णवगता नद्यो व्यक्तीर्जहति नाम च ।
नद्यश्च ता नियच्छन्ति तादृशः सत्त्वसंक्षयः ॥
एवं सति कुतः संज्ञा प्रेत्यभावे पुनर्भवेत् ।
जीवे च प्रतिसंयुक्ते गृह्यमाणे च सर्वतः' ॥ XII. 219. 42-43.

4 "In my opinion these parallels together with the *cittasya hi prasādena* stanza above, indicate that the epic has copied from the sixth chapter of the Upaniṣad as well as from the earlier portions". See, Hopkins' *The Great Epic of India*, p. 46.

Sāṃkhya which incorporated into its philosophy the doctrine of *brahman*, the one universal soul. Our assumption is based upon the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* list and is further corroborated by the statements of the *Mbh.* etc. But the *Ahirbyudhna* itself at the end of the said list states that there had been numerous forms of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*[1]. Under these circumstances it is difficult to ascertain whether the *Ahirbyudhna* informs us of the original *Ṣaṣṭitantra* or of a different recension of it. This being the case, it cannot be definitely stated whether the original *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, the first systematic treatise on Sāṃkhya really advocated the doctrine of *brahman*, the universal soul or not. From the available resources we intend to hold that the most ancient form of the Sāṃkhya is contained in a nut-shell in the first book of the *Kaṭha* which is content with finding out the real nature of the self by differentiating it from the physical body, it does not speak of *brahman* as the one universal soul. It is after the compilation of the first book of the *Kaṭha* that Sāṃkhya advocates the conception of *brahman* as the one universal soul. The theistic school of Sāṃkhya which is reflected in the *Śvet.* and elsewhere as we have already remarked comes afterwards. Oldenberg is of opinion that the pre-classical form of the Sāṃkhya consists of a truine-unity as set forth in the *Śvet. Up.*[1], but we are not prepared to accept the philosophy of the *Śvet.* as the genuine Sāṃkhya, nor the theistic coloured accounts of Śāṃkhya of that Upaniṣad to be the original form of Sāṃkhya.

The theory of evolution is another distinctive achievement of Sāṃkhya from the cosmogonical accounts of the ancient prose Upaniṣads. The central interest of Sāṃkhya lies in differentiating the soul from that which does not constitute the soul and in order to exhibit the real nature of the non-soul it invents for the first time its theory of evolution which speaks of its subtle power of

1 'षष्टितन्त्राण्यथैकैकमेषां नानाविधं मुने', XII. 30.

2 Zur Geschiste der Sāṃkhya-philosophie, NG, 1917, pp. 218-253.

reasoning as against the dogmatic tendencies of the Vedas. Though it is indebted to a great extent to the Upaniṣads, yet it chalks out an independent path of its own; for it establishes its tenets by absolute reason and does not rest content upon only citing the scriptural passages in support of them. Even in supporting the conception of the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* etc., it does not generally quote the passages of the Upaniṣads where such ideas are found but establishes them by logical reasonings. This is why the newly discovered *Yuktidīpikā* in its very beginning compares the Sāṃkhya to an elephant who has got the *vīta* and the *avīta* forms of inference as its two tusks[1]. Even the *BS.* which is always very keen to refute the doctrine of Sāṃkhya speaks the *prakṛti* as the *anumāna* or *ānumānika*[2] (lit. based upon inference). This fact tends to suggest that even at the time of the composition of the *BS.*, the Sāṃkhya was famous for its rationalism. This is not all. Kauṭilya explicitly speaks the Sāṃkhya to be the *ānvīkṣakī*, *i. e.* the system which tries to establish the validity of its tenets by the process of logical reasonings.[3]

1 'वीतावीतविषाणस्य पक्षतावनसेविनः ।
प्रवादाः सांख्यकरिणः शल्लकीखण्डभङ्गुराः' ॥

2 कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा, I. i. 18; नानुमानमतच्छब्दात्, I. iii. 3; आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेन्न...., I. iv. 1; रचनाऽनुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम्, II.ii.1.

3 'सांख्यं योगो लोकायतञ्चेत्यान्वीक्षकी', Kauṭilya under *vidyā-samuddeśa*.

THE SĀṂKHYA ACCOUNTS OF THE MAHĀBHĀRATA.

In the philosophical discourses of the *Mbh.*, Sāṃkhya holds a very prominent place. But the numerous forms of Sāṃkhya as are found there, are not always consistent and none of them fully tallies with the Sāṃkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. This is evident from a careful examination of the Sāṃkhya tenets as are found here and there and specially in the *Mokṣadharma* section of the twelfth book. Let us first of all examine the evolution series of the Sāṃkhya system. Thus we find that the twenty-four constituents of Sāṃkhya, *i.e.* the *prakṛti* and its twenty-three evolutes are divided into two groups of (1) eight primary constituents and (2) sixteen modifications. The former which is called the eight-fold *prakṛti* constitutes the *prakṛti, mahat, ahaṃkāra,* and the five gross elements; the latter being the ten organs, mind and the five objects of the senses. The classical Sāṃkhya always maintains the five gross elements to be the products only, for they do not give rise to any new *tattva*; but in the *Mbh.* we find that the five objects of the senses which are stated there as the *tattvas,* come out from the gross elements. The orthodox Sāṃkhya never mentions these sense-objects as the *tattvas* and maintains the gross elements to be the evolutes of the *tanmātras* or the subtle elements. But the *Mbh.* in its exposition of Sāṃkhya does not generally speak of the *tanmātras* and they occur only in I. 90. 13-14 and XIII. 14. 202 and Hopkins holds this passages to be the latter additions in the epic[1]. Again the *Mbh,* somewhere states the gross elements to be the evolutes of the *ahaṃkāra*[2] and elsewhere as those of the mind[3], while the orthodox

1 See Hopkins, *The Great Epic of India*—p. 173.

2 'पञ्चभूतान्यहङ्कारादाहुः सांख्यात्मदर्शिनः', XII. 306. 28.

3 'मनसस्तु समुद्भूता महाभूता नराधिप', XII. 311. 19.

Sāṃkhya always states them to be the products of the subtle elements.

Another difficulty arises with regard to the view of Pañcaśikha who is held to be a reputed teacher of Sāṃkhya. His view as we find in XII. 209 goes against the doctrine of the orthodox Sāṃkhya in many important respects. Let us first of all briefly observe his treatment of psychology. In his opinion, the entities, namely knowledge, heat and wind produce three kinds of activity.[1] Again he introduces *svabhāva* (nature) and feeling along with the senses and their objects etc., and in his opinion these constitute the body of an individual.[2] Along with the organs of action, he states 'power' as the sixth organ of action.[3] Like other teachers of Sāṃkhya, he also speaks of the *kṣetra* and the *kṣetrajña. Kṣetra* as we know, is the physical body[4] and this constitutes the *prakṛti* and its twenty-three evolutes. But in his exposition, we do not find the name of the twenty-four categories, *i.e.* the *prakṛti* and its evolutes in a systematic way. *Ahaṃkāra* is ignored and his manner of exposition also is haphazard.

His conception of liberation also differs from that of the orthodox Sāṃkhya. In his opinion, the individual soul when liberated is united with the universal soul and as a result of this it then loses its individuality. "Just as the rivers falling into the ocean lose their forms and names, in the same manner occurs the extinction of life which is called liberation"[5]. Thus it appears that Pañcaśikha advocates the Vedantic view in this respect. But the pre-Kārikā sāṃkhya also seems to advocate the doctrine of

1 'ज्ञानमुष्मा च वायुश्च त्रिविधः कार्यसंग्रहः', XII. 219. 9.

2 'इन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियार्थाश्च स्वभावश्चेतना मनः', XII. 219. 9.

3 'बलषष्ठानि वक्ष्यामि पञ्चकर्मेन्द्रियाणि तु', XII. 219. 20.

4 See 'इदं शरीरं कौन्तेय क्षेत्रमित्यभिधीयते', *B. Gītā* XIII. 2.

5 XII. 219. 42.

brahman as the one universal soul and this we have already tried to show above.[1]

But in other main principles, he does not generally deviate from the orthodox Sāṃkhya. He states 'ignorance' as the cause of bondage and emphasises upon renunciation and elsewhere upon non-attachment[2] as the means of liberation. He also speaks of the three *guṇas* and his conception of them does not go against the view of the orthodox Sāṃkhya.

Hopkins states that in XII. 321. 96-112 there is a different account of the views of Pañcaśikha,[3] for here there are thirty principles with God superadded. This is due to an oversight; for the verses which speak of the thirty principles come from the mouth of Sulabhā and not from Janaka, the disciple of Pañcaśikha. Further, Sulabhā is nowhere found to speak herself as the disciple of Pañcaśikha. Hence there is no ground to regard the exposition of Sulabhā as the view of Pañcaśikha.

The author of the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya* is found here and there to quote some fragments from the works of the ancient Sāṃkhya teachers and some of these fragments are attributed to Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati. We shall discus them afterwards and intend to compare them with the view of Pañcaśikha as we find in the *Mbh*.

Another difficulty arises with the philosophy of Asita-Devala. He states that the knowledge of Sāṃkhya is essential to wipe away the fruits of merit and demerit,[4] but his exposition as we get specially in the *Mbh.* XII. 274, does not

1 See above pp. 26-28.

2 'वैराग्यं पुनरेतस्य मोक्षस्य परमो विधिः', XII. 320. 29.

3 Hopkins, *The Great Epic of India*, p. 152. Prof. Keith also wrongly supports him; see Keith, *The Sāṃkhya system*, p. 47.

4 'पुण्यपापक्षयार्थं हि सांख्यज्ञानं विधीयते', XII. 274. 38.

always tally with the orthodox Sāṃkhya. He offers a prominent place to 'time' which in his opinion plays an important part in the field of creation. But 'time' as an independent entity is always rejected by the orthodox Sāṃkhya. Again, he speaks of the eight elements which comprise the five gross elements together with 'time', 'entity' and 'non-entity'. The last named three are not reckoned as separate categories in the ordinary Sāṃkhya. Further, he states that *citta* is higher than the sense-organs, mind is higher than *citta*, higher than mind is the *buddhi* and higher than *buddhi* is the *kṣetrajña*. Difference among the *citta*, mind and the *buddhi* is not clear; the *ahaṃkāra* and the *prakṛti* are ingnored. Unlike the *Kārikā*, he reckons eight organs of knowledge. Like Pañcaśikha he also speaks of 'power' as the sixth organ of actions and the stage of *brahman* (XII. 274. 37) to be the final achievement[1].

The *B. Gītā* also refers to the tenets and doctrines of Sāṃkhya here and there and these do not generally differ from those of the orthodox Sāṃkhya. But in one place Kṛṣṇa is found to state that through him—the overlooker, the *prakṛti* produces the universe of mobiles and immobiles[2]. The reason is not very far to seek. The central interest of the *Gītā* is to maintain Kṛṣṇa as the supreme lord and hence it cannot be expected that the independence of the *prakṛti* would be maintained everywhere.

The Sāṃkhya as it is well known is a system that speaks of the twenty-five principles and of these, the *puruṣa* is counted as the twenty-fifth. This *puruṣa* in its true nature is the pure consciousness itself and is never regarded as the agent. Further, the orthodox Sāṃkhya always maintains its pluralism. But we have already pointed out that Pañcaśikha, like the Vedantists, advocates the

1 For further about Devala, See p.

2 मयाऽध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम्, *Gītā*, IX. 10.

conception of one universal soul as the refuge of the individual souls. Āsuri also, as it is stated, explains in the assembly of the followers of Kapila, the *brahman* who is one, immutable and seen in diverse forms[1]. Further, Bhīṣma in his exposition of Sāṃkhya in xii. 301, speaks of Nārāyaṇa as the highest consummation ; he is higher than the *prakṛti*, he is eternal, he is the supreme soul[2]. Being freed from merit and demerit, the individual takes shelter in him and never returns again[3]. He is the agent[4], from him proceeds creation and dissolution[5] and he holds the entire Sāṃkhya[6]. The classical Sāṃkhya cannot tolerate the conception of such a supreme soul. But Bhīṣma himself is not consistent everywhere ; for elsewhere in the same chapter he is found to state that the individual souls who seek after liberation on the path of Sāṃkhya are carried by Nārāyaṇa to the *paramātman* or the supreme soul. The individual souls thus attaining the supreme soul merge in him and are thus liberated, never to return again[7]. Thus we find that in the same chapter Nārāyaṇa is somewhere maintained as the supreme lord and elsewhere he is stated as holding the intermediate position between the individual soul and the supreme soul.

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1 *Mbh*, XII. 218. 14 ; also see above, p. 26n.

2 प्रकृतिञ्चाप्यतिक्रम्य गच्छत्यात्मानमव्ययम् ।
परं नारायणात्मानं निर्द्वन्द्वं प्रकृतेः परम् ॥96.

3 विमुक्तः पुण्यपापेभ्यः प्रविष्टस्तमनामयम् ।
परमात्मानमगुणं न निवर्तति भारत ॥97

4 अनादिमध्यनिधनं निर्द्वन्द्वं कर्तृ शाश्वतम् , 102.

5 यतः सर्वाः प्रवर्तन्ते सर्गप्रलयविक्रियाः, 103.

6 कृत्स्नञ्च सांख्यं नृपते महात्मा, नारायणो धारयतेऽप्रमेयम्, 114.

7 सत्त्वं वहति शुद्धात्मन् परं नारायणं प्रभुम् ।
प्रभुर्वहति शुद्धात्मा परमात्मानमात्मना ॥ 77.
परमात्मानमासाद्य तद्भूतायतनामलाः ।
अमृतत्वाय कल्पन्ते न निवर्तन्ति वा विभो ॥ 78.

But in other respects, Bhīṣma is not found to advocate any conflicting view ; in and through the chapter he is keen to find fault with the objects and lays emphasis upon knowledge by dint of which the sages overcome the obstacles that stand in their way (XII. 301. 72).

Vaśiṣṭha also in his exposition of Sāṃkhya to Karāla-Janaka (xii. 302-308) speaks of the twenty-five principles of Sāṃkhya. But the *tanmātras* do not find their place therein and the objects of the senses are also counted as the *tattvas*. First of all, he enumerates the twenty-four principles, i. e. the *prakṛti* and its evolutes and then states that Viṣṇu is to be regarded as the twenty-fifth[1]. This reminds us of the exposition of Bhīṣma who offers a prominent place to Nārāyaṇa. But Vaśiṣṭha nowhere mentions Viṣṇu either as the agent or as the cause of creation and destruction. Again, in his opinion the twenty-fifth principle, i. e. the *puruṣa* is not really a different *tattva* ; through delusion it embraces the *tattvas* and this is why it is also regarded as a separate *tattva* (302. 38). Though the twenty-fifth principle is without any form, yet it assumes numerous forms by coming in contact with the *prakṛti* ; though it is not subjected to creation and destruction, yet in conjunction with the *prakṛti* which is attested with the attributes, it also takes the attributes as its own (XII. 302. 39-40). But in its real nature, it is without any form ; it is absolute, conscious and eternal. There is no other *tattva* beyond the twenty-fifth[2].

So far we do not notice any discrepancy. But in xii. 308, we find him introducing the twenty-sixth principle and he is thus found to deviate from his own statement as well as from the standpoint of the orthodox Sāṃkhya which never speaks of any principle beyond the twenty-fifth. The solution of this apparent contradic-

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1 पञ्चविंशतिमो विष्णुः,…, XII. 302. 38.

2 पञ्चविंशात् परं तत्त्वं पठ्यते न नराधिप', XII. 307. 47.

tion comes from the statement of Vaśiṣṭha himself. The main topics of discussion in the chapter where the twenty-sixth principle finds its place are the *aprati-buddha*, the *budhyamāna* and the *buddha*. Of these, the *aprati-buddha* is the *prakṛti*[1]. The *budhyamāna* is the *puruṣa*—the twenty-fifth, who being associated with the *prakṛti* thinks its activities as his own[2]; it is the *jīva* and not the *puruṣa* in its true nature. The *buddha* is the liberated soul who has cut off all connections with the *prakṛti* and thus transcends it; this *buddha* is the twenty-sixth principle[3]. It is not a different *tattva*; for the *tattvas* are only twenty-five in number (307. 47). The individual spirit which is conditioned by the *prakṛti* becomes one with this twenty-sixth when the former can recognise that he is not practically different from the latter[4]. A little after, it is clearly stated that the twenty-fifth is united with the twenty-sixth when the former fails to apprehend anything by his own intelligence[5]. Thus we find that Vaśiṣṭha is going to reconcile the Sāṃkhya theory of the plurality of the spirits with the doctrine of unity. Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not speak of the twenty-sixth, nor he is found to introduce such terms as the *buddha* and the *aprati-buddha* etc., in explaining the tenets of the Sāṃkhya.

In the concluding verses of the previous chapter (xii. 307),

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1 See, 'अनेनाप्रतिबुद्धेति वदन्त्यव्यक्तमच्युतम्', XII. 308. 5.

2 'पञ्चविंशः प्रकृत्यात्मा बुध्यमान इति स्मृतः', XII. 306. 44. Nīlakaṇṭha reads 'पञ्चविंशोऽप्रकृत्यात्मा...'

3 'षड्विंशं विमलं बुद्धमप्रमेयं सनातनम्', XII. 308. 7.

4 षड्विंशोऽहमिति प्राज्ञो गृह्यमाणोऽजरामरः।
केवलेन बलेनैव समतां यात्यसंशयम्॥ 308. 16.

5 चेतनेन समे तस्य पञ्चविंशतिकस्य ह।
एकत्वं वै भवत्यस्य यदा बुद्ध्या न बुध्यते॥ 308. 18.

Vaśiṣṭha states that the *buddha*, *aprati-buddha* and the *budhyamāna* form the topics of discussion in the Yoga system[1]. In xii. 308, he speaks of the characteristics of those principles and introduces the twenty-sixth. Towards the end of the chapter, he further states that he obtained this knowledge from Hiraṇyagarbha[2]. But Hiraṇyagarbha is known to be the propounder of the Yoga. Hence it appears that Vaśiṣṭha is going to speak of the doctrines of the Yoga in this chapter and if this be the case, it will not be wrong to suggest that the early Yoga advocated the doctrine of the twenty-sixth principle. But we are disappointed to find that Vaśiṣṭha himself fuses the doctrines of the Yoga with those of the Sāṃkhya; for a verse in the said chapter definitely states that the Sāṃkhya also advocates the doctrine of the twenty-sixth[3].

Like Vaśiṣṭha, Yājñavalkya also in course of his exposition of Sāṃkhya and Yoga (xii. 310-319) refers to the *buddha*, *aprati-buddha* and the *budhyamāna* and thus introduces the twenty-sixth principle. His exposition of the pure Sāṃkhya comprises the chapters xii. 310-315. So far we do not find him speaking of the twenty-sixth. But from his own statement (xii. 316-1) we know that he is going to elucidate the principles of the Yoga in the following chapters (xii. 316-319) and it is in xii. 318, that we find him speaking of the twenty-sixth principle together with the explanation of the *aprati-buddha* etc. Hence it appears that the twenty-sixth principle forms the subject matter of

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1 बुद्धमप्रतिबुद्धत्वात् बुध्यमानञ्च तत्त्वतः।
बुध्यमानञ्च बुद्धञ्च प्राहुर्योगनिदर्शनम्॥ xii. 307. 48.

2 'अवाप्तमेतद्धि मया सनातनाद्धिरण्यगर्भाद् गदतो नराधिप', xii. 308. 40.

3 'षड्विंशेन प्रबुद्धेन बुध्यमानोऽप्यबुद्धिमान्।
एतन्नानात्वमित्युक्तं सांख्यश्रुतिनिदर्शनात्'॥ xii. 308. 17.

discussion in the Yoga system. But Yājñavalkya's account of the Yoga also like that of Vaśiṣtha cannot be regarded as a pure one; for the chapters which deal with the twenty-sixth and other allied principles contain an admixture of both the Sāṃkhya and Yoga accounts. This is evident from the statement of Yājñavalkya himself. Thus we find him stating:

> "When *puruṣa*, the twenty-fifth, can realise that he is one principle and the *prakṛti* is another, he attains to liberation and apprehends the twenty-sixth principle; this is why the advocates of the S ā ṃ k h y a and Y o g a are not prepared to accept the twenty-fifth as the final stage" (xii. 319. 77-79).

The aforesaid lines thus clearly state that the doctrine of the twenty-sixth principle finds its place not only in the Yoga but also in the Sāṃkhya system.

While discussing the philosophy of Vaśiṣtha, it has been noticed that the twenty-sixth principle is identical with the one universal soul with whom the individual souls are united at the time of their liberation. But it is a matter of astonishment that Yājñavalkya in one place advocates the doctrine of the plurality of souls[1] and in another place he is found to deviate from his own statement; for it has been shown above that he ascribes the doctrine of the twenty-sixth to both the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga systems. How to account for this discrepancy? Prof. Oldenberg is of opinion that *puruṣa*, the twenty-fifth, includes both the individual and the universal soul in the Sāṃkhya, while these two are differentiated in the Yoga of the Epic[2]. But Jacobi, who finds fault with this suggestion, urges that in this case the distinction between the individual and the universal spirit would be the same

1 अन्यत्कैकत्वमित्याहुर्नानात्वं पुरुषास्तथा, xii. 315. 11.

2 *Nachrichten von der Kgl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, 1917, p. 231.

as between the manifest and the unmanifest *prakṛti*[1]. In our opinion, the twenty-sixth principle cannot be regarded as the doctrine of the pure Sāṃkhya; but it is the Sāṃkhya-Yoga School of the Epic which is found to advocate the said doctrine[2].

Though there are some minor differences of opinion, the philosophy of Vaśiṣtha and Yājñavalkya tallies to a considerable extent with the traditional Sāṃkhya. Vaśiṣtha states the *prakṛti* as *aliṅga* (303. 47) *i.e.* without any distinctive mark and this epithet of the *prakṛti* is also to be met with in the *Yoga-sūtra* (II. 19). He further states that the conception of the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* is based upon inference[3] and Īśvarakṛṣṇa also establishes both of them by the same process. Again, Yājñavalkya plainly states that the *prakṛti* is constituted of the *guṇas*, it cannot transcend them (315. 3). It is devoid of consciousness; being presided over by the *puruṣa*, it creates and destroys[4]. The orthodox Sāṃkhya also advocates the same view. This is not all. Both Vaśiṣtha and Yājñavalkya describe the characteristics of the *guṇas* and strive to differentiate the *puruṣa* from the *prakṛti*. Further,

1 *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1919, p. 6, n. 1.

2 Prof. Keith also after discussing the view of Oldenberg and Jacobi comes to the same conclusion—*Sāṃkhya system*, p. 57.

But the Janaka-Pañcaśikha episode (xii. 218-19) speaks of the absolute and hence Prof. Keith regards the theory of liberation as propounded by Pañcaśikha to be Vedantic. However, on the strength of some early references, we have already tried to show that some early school of the Sāṃkhya advocated the doctrine of *brahman* (pp. 26-28). But the distinction between the twenty-sixth and *brahman* is not very clear.

3 अलिङ्गां प्रकृतिं त्वाहुर्लिङ्गैरनुमिमीमहे ।
तथैव पौरुषं लिङ्गमनुमानाद्धि गम्यते ॥ 303. 47.

4 अचेतना चैव मता प्रकृतिश्चेति पार्थिव ।
एतेनाधिष्ठिता चैव सृजते संहरत्यपि ॥ 314. 12.

the relation of the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* is vividly explained by Yājñavalkya:

"Just as the mosquito which is encased within the fig is different from the fig, though existing with the fig the worm thereby should not be regarded as forming a portion of the fig (315. 13); the fish is different from the water in which it lives, though the fish and water exist together yet the fish is not drenched by the water (315. 14); the lotus leaf that floats upon water is distinct from the water on which it floats, its co-existence with water does not make it a portion of water" (315. 16).

Similarly the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, though exist together, should under no circumstances be considered as forming one principle. They should always be regarded as two distinct principles; under the spell of ignorance the ordinary people fails to differentiate them.

So far we have tried to point out the doctrines as tally with those of the orthodox Sāṃkhya. Now we intend to point out some of their important deviations. Both Vaśiṣṭha and Yājñavalkya enumerate the twenty-five principles, but none of them speak of the *tanmātras*. In the opinion of Vaśiṣṭha, the gross elements come out from the *ahaṃkāra*[1], whereas Yājñavalkya regards them as the evolutes of the mind[2]. Further, Vaśiṣṭha intends to maintain the unity of the *prakṛti* in the stage of dissolution and manifoldness in the stage of evolution[3]; but the classical Sāṃkhya always maintains the unity of the *prakṛti*.

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1 भूतसर्गमहङ्कारात् तृतीयं विद्धि पार्थिव। 302. 24.

2 मनसस्तु समुद्भूता महाभूता नराधिप। 310. 19.

3 सर्गप्रलय एतावान् प्रकृतेर्नृपसत्तम।
एकत्वं प्रलये चास्य बहुत्वञ्च यदाऽसृजत्॥ 306. 33.

There had been a school of Sāṃkhya which advocated the doctrine of the plurality of the *prakṛti*. In this connection, *Yuktidīpikā* refers to one Paurika who had been the exponent of this school. See—

'प्रतिपुरुषमन्यत् प्रधानं शरीराद्यर्थं करोति, तेषाञ्च माहात्म्यशरीर-प्रधानं यदा प्रवर्तते तदेतराण्यपि, तन्निवृत्तौ च तेषामपि निवृत्तिरिति पौ रि कः सांख्याचार्यो मन्यते—

Yukti-dīpikā, p. 169. 17-18; see also the foot notes in the said page.

Besides these, there is a peculiarity in their method of explanation of the dualism of the Sāṃkhya. The said system which is a dualistic one, lays emphasis upon two distinct principles—one *prakṛti*, the other being the *puruṣa*. The former which is unconscious is characterised by pleasure, pain and delusion while the latter in its true nature is nothing but the pure consciousness abiding in itself. Being subjected to ignorance, the *puruṣa* ascribes the activities of the *prakṛti* to himself and as a result of this he binds himself and becomes subjected to miseries. When he can differentiate the *prakṛti* from himself, he regains his true nature and thus attains to liberation. But the Epic and specially Vaśiṣṭha and Yājñavalkya do not always explain the relation of these two conscious and unconscious entities by the terms *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* only; it is somewhere explained by the *kṣetra* and the *kṣetrajña* and elsewhere by the *kṣara* and *akṣara* etc. But everywhere the central interest lies upon distinguishing the self from what does not constitute the self. Whether these different manners of treatment arose in independent circles of thought or they are the off-shoots of the doctrine of a particular teacher is not easy to determine; for the data as are left to us are not sufficient.

The conception of the *puruṣa* in the Epic Sāṃkhya also deserves special attention. The orthodox Sāṃkhya always insists upon the plurality of the *puruṣa*. But the Epic is not consistent in this respect everywhere. In xii. 315. 11, Yājñavalkya plainly states that the *prakṛti* is one and the *puruṣas* are many. Again, in reply to the question of Janamejaya, Vaiśampāyana explicitly states that the advocates of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga always insist upon the plurality of the *puruṣa*, they never maintain its unity (xii. 350,9). But we find a different view in the Janaka-Pañcaśikha episode (xii. 218-19). Here Āsuri, the first disciple of Kapila, is said to have explained *brahman*, which is absolute, immutable and seen in diverse forms (218. 14). This is not all. Pañcaśikha's conception of liberation also bears testimony to the same view. In

his opinion, the individual spirits at the time of their liberation are merged into the absolute spirit[1] (xii. 219. 42-3).

Though the Epic does not always offer the same interpretation of the Sāṃkhya in its different chapters, yet it has got one special characteristic ; for it is always found to represent the atheistic school of Sāṃkhya. It boldly declares that the Sāṃkhya system is devoid of belief in a supreme God. This is clear from the verse xii. 300-3, where the Sāṃkhya is said to be the atheistic and the Yoga as the theistic system.

We have already tried to show that the Sāṃkhya and the *adhyātma-vidyā* are almost identical[2]. The explanation of the *adhyātma* is found here and there in some of the chapters of the twelfth book.[3] All these chapters contain nothing but the principal tenets of the Sāṃkhya, the important deviation from the orthodox Sāṃkhya is this that the organs are described everywhere as material objects (xii. 247. 9-12).

The Epic pre-supposes the existence of the Sāṃkhya literature.

It has been already stated that the *Mokṣadharma* section of the twelfth book deals with the Sāṃkhya in some of its chapters. From a careful examination of those chapters we find that a number of verses are repeated here and there. For instance, the *adhyātma* which contains almost nothing but the principal tenets of the Sāṃkhya is explained in three different chapters (xii. 194, 247, 285). In one place, Vyāsa is the speaker and in the other chapters Bhīṣma constitutes the same. The teaching does not vary anywhere and it is interesting to notice that a considerable number of verses are found common everywhere. This is not all. Some of these verses which speak of the characteristics of

1 See above, p. 43.
2 See, pp. 18-19.
3 Chapters 194, 247 and 285.

the *guṇas* are read almost verbatim even in the Janaka-Pañcaśikha episode[1]. This tends to suggest that these verses were taken

1 The following couplets find their place in the exposition of the *adhyātma* in xii. 194. 31-36.

“तत्र यत् प्रीतिसंयुक्तं काये मनसि वा भवेत् ।
वर्तेते सात्त्विको भाव इत्याचक्षीत तत् तथा ॥
अथ यद् दुःख-संयुक्तमप्रीतिकरमात्मनः ।
प्रवृत्तं रज इत्येव तन्न संरभ्य चिन्तयेत् ॥
अथ यन्मोहसंयुक्तमव्यक्तविषयं भवेत् ।
अप्रतर्क्यमविज्ञेयं तमस्तदुपधारयेत् ॥
प्रहर्षः प्रीतिरानन्दः सुखं संशान्तचित्तता ।
कथञ्चिदभिवर्तन्त इत्येते सात्त्विका गुणाः ॥
अतुष्टिः परितापश्च शोको लोभस्तथाऽक्षमा ।
लिङ्गानि रजसस्तानि दृश्यन्ते हेत्वहेतुभिः ॥
अवमानस्तथा मोहः प्रमादः स्वप्नतन्द्रिता ।
कथञ्चिदभिवर्तन्ते विविधास्तामसा गुणाः ॥

These verses are also found with some alterations in reading in xii. 247. 20-25 and xii. 285. 29-31 & 25-28.

For the sake of comparison, the corresponding couplets from the exposition of Pañcaśikha in xii. 219 are also given below :

अत्र यत् प्रीतिसंयुक्तं काये मनसि वा भवेत् ।
वर्तेते सत्त्विको भाव इत्यपेक्षेत तत् तथा ॥ 29
यत्त्वसंतोषसंयुक्तमप्रीतिकरमात्मनः ।
प्रवृत्तं रज इत्येवं ततस्तदपि चिन्तयेत् ॥ 30
अथ यन्मोहसंयुक्तं काये मनसि वा भवेत् ।
अप्रतर्क्यमविज्ञेयं तमस्तदुपधारयेत् ॥ 31
प्रहर्षः प्रीतिरानन्दः सुखं संशान्तचित्तता ।
अकुतश्चित् कुतश्चिद्वा चिन्तितः सात्त्विको गुणः ॥ 26
अतुष्टिः परितापश्च शोको लोभस्तथाऽक्षमा ।
लिङ्गानि रजसस्तानि दृश्यन्ते हेत्वहेतुतः ॥ 27
अविवेकस्तथा मोहः प्रमादः स्वप्नतन्द्रिता ।
कथञ्चिदपि वर्तन्ते विविधास्तामसा गुणाः ॥ 28

from a common source. Again, the Epic explicitly states that the Sāṃkhya system consists of a vast literature (बृहच्चैवमिदं शास्त्रमित्याहुर्विदुषो जनाः, xii. 307.46 ; सांख्यं विशालं परमं पुराणम् xii. 301.114). Hence it appears that the Epic was aware of the existence of the Sāṃkhya literature.

The *B. Gītā* sheds further light on the point.. It highly speaks of the renunciation of the fruits of *karman* in the beginning of its last chapter and in this connection it refers to the Sāṃkhya system which speaks of the five kinds of causes as are held indispensable for the completion of all sorts of actions. Then follows the enumeration of those causes and all these may be noticed in the following couplets :

पञ्चेमानि महाबाहो कारणानि निबोध मे ।
सांख्ये कृतान्ते प्रोक्तानि सिद्धये सर्वकर्मणाम् ॥
अधिष्ठानं तथा कर्ता करणञ्च पृथग्विधम् ।
विविधाश्च पृथक् चेष्टा दैवञ्चैवात्र पञ्चमम् ॥ (xviii.13-14).

The expression 'सांख्ये कृतान्ते प्रोक्तानि' deserves special attention. *Kṛtānta* means 'established conclusion' and hence it shows that the Sāṃkhya was systematised before the composition of the *Gītā*.

Though such a manner of treatment is conspicuous by its absence in the orthodox Sāṃkhya, yet on the strength of this reference it appears that the said five-fold cause found its place in an ancient and elaborate treatise on Sāṃkhya.

More satisfactory result may be obtained from the thirteenth chapter of the *Gītā* which deals with the *prakṛti*, *puruṣa*, *kṣetra* and the *kṣetrajña* etc. First of all, the Lord goes to explain the *kṣetra*. The physical body is said to be the *kṣetra* (xiii. 1) and it comprises the gross elements, individuation, intellect, the unmanifest principle, the eleven organs and the five objects of the sense-organs etc. (xiii. 5-6). Thus we find that this explanation

proceeds from the standpoint of the Sāṃkhya. Just before the commencement of the enumeration of these principles, the Lord states that this *kṣetra* together with its source and other allied topics, are vividly described by the sages in numerous metres as well as in the S ū t r a and P a d a forms. The following couplets bear testimony to this :

तत् क्षेत्रं यच्च यादृक् च यद्विकारि यतश्च यत् ।
स च यो यत्प्रभावश्च तत् समासेन मे शृणु ॥
ऋषिभिर्बहुधा गीतं छन्दोभिर्विविधैः पृथक् ।
ब्रह्मसूत्रपदैश्चैव हेतुमद्भिर्विनिश्चितैः ॥ (xiii. 3-4).

The expression 'ब्रह्मसूत्रपदैश्चैव' of the above-mentioned verse has been explained by the commentators from the standpoint of the Vedānta[1]. However, the B r a h m a-s ū t r a as referred to here, cannot mean the present *Brahma-sūtra* which is found to enunciate the doctrines of the Vedānta ; for the *kṣetra* as the sum-total of the *prakṛti* and its evolutes, does not form the subject matter of discussion anywhere in the latter treatise. Hence it appears that the Gītā refers to a different B r a h m a-s ū t r a[2] which unlike the present one, explained the *kṣetra* after the fashion of the Sāṃkhya. The term *pada* also as found side by side with the *Brahma-sūtra*

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1 ब्रह्मणः सूत्रैः पदैश्च, ब्रह्म सूच्यते एभिरिति ब्रह्मसूत्राणि 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' इत्यादीनि तटस्थलक्षणपराणि उपनिषद्वाक्यानि, तथा ब्रह्म पद्यते साक्षात् ज्ञायते एभिरिति पदानि स्वरूपलक्षण-पराणि 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' इत्यादीनि, तैश्च बहुधा गीतम्—Śrīdhara-svāmin's commentary.

ब्रह्मणः सूचकानि वाक्यानि ब्रह्मसूत्राणि, तैः पद्यते ज्ञायते ब्रह्मेति पदान्युच्यन्ते, तैरेव च क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञयोर्याथार्थ्यं गीतम् । 'आत्मेत्येवोपासीत' इत्येवमादिभिः ब्रह्मसूत्रपदैरात्मा ज्ञायते—
Śaṃkara-bhāṣya.

2 Pāṇini also presupposes the existence of the philosophical discourses in the *sūtra* form ; for he refers to one *Pārāśarya-Bhikṣusūtra* in 4. 3. 110. For further about the *Bhikṣu-sūtra*, see pp. 77.

of the above mentioned expression sheds some important light. This *pada* should not be taken in its usual sense. Most probably it stands for a commentary upon the B r a h m a - s ū t r a as discussed above; for we find Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* referring to both the P a d a - k ā r a and the *Sūtrakāra* and on a closer examination it appears that the author of the *Vārttika* is meant by this P a d a - k ā r a[1]. The identity of the Pada-kāra with Kātyāyana, the author of the *Vārttika*, can be further established on the strength of a reference in the Yuktidīpikā where in connection with the discussion of the compound in the expression 'तदुपघातके' (Kā. 1), a fragment of the Vārttika is attributed to one P a d a - k ā r a[2]. Thus we find that the term *pada* in its technical sense passes for a commentary.

Besides these, the first hemistich of the second couplet informs us about the existence of some versified treatises which also contained the explanation of the *kṣetra*. Taking everything into consideration we find that the Epic presupposes the existence of the Sāṃkhya literature.

The reflection of the full-fledged Sāṃkhya in the Gītā.

The *Gītā* furnishes us here and there with some valuable informations about the contemporary Sāṃkhya. It speaks of the different types of the *guṇas* and their functions. But the ethical

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1 न लक्षणेन प द का रा अनुवर्त्याः, पदकारैर्नाम लक्षणमनुवर्त्यम्—
Mahābhāṣya under the *Vārttika* (2) in 3. 1. 109.

2 प द का र श्राह—'जातिवाचकत्वात्', *Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 7. The fragment 'जातिवाचकत्वात्' does not occur anywhere in the *sūtras* of Pāṇini. It occurs only in the following Vārttikas :

न वा समासस्यानुपसर्जनत्वाज्जातिवाचकत्वाच्च शब्दस्य सामान्येन ङीष्विधानम् (7), 4. 1. 4. दम्भेर्हल्ग्रहणस्य जातिवाचकत्वात् सिद्धम् (1), 1. 2. 10,

interest is predominent everywhere. In xviii. 19, we find the Lord addressing Arjuna thus :

"In the exposition of the *guṇas* it is declared that the knowledge, action and the agent—all of them are of three-fold character owing to the variation of the *guṇas* in them. Here them also properly."

Then follows a description of the said entities from the stand point of the variation of the *guṇas*. Thus we find that the *Gītā* in order to support its own statements is going to refer to another work where the exposition of the *guṇas* finds its place. Most probably the work as referred to here would be a Sāṃkhya one; for the *guṇas* constitute a vital portion of the Sāṃkhya.

As regards the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*, the Gītā states that 'both of them are held as eternal; the modifications and the *guṇas* are to be taken as the evolutes of the *prakṛti*. In the functioning of the cause and the effect, the *prakṛti* is regarded as the instrumental; whereas in the experience of pleasure and pain, the *puruṣa* is regarded as such' (xiii. 20). The *puruṣa* identifying himself with the *prakṛti* experiences the *guṇas*; the reason of his birth in good and evil wombs is due to his attachment towards the *guṇas*' (xiii. 21).

The classical Sāṃkhya also advocates the same view. The only difference being that the Gītā maintains the *guṇas* as the products of the *prakṛti*, whereas the classical Sāṃkhya holds them as its constituents.

In the second chapter of the Gītā, the *puruṣa* is described as 'unchangeable, all pervading, stable, firm and eternal' (II. 24). An effort is also made to distinguish the self from the physical body, and in this connection it is interesting to notice that the Lord himself states that his answer to Arjuna proceeds from the standpoint of the Sāṃkhya (II. 39). The Sāṃkhya theory of causation also is clearly hinted in the following couplet :

नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ।
उभयोरपि दृष्टोऽन्तस्त्वनयोस्तत्त्वदर्शिभिः ॥ (II. 16).

From these evidences we may suggest that the Gītā was acquainted with the full-fledged Sāṃkhya.

Does the Epic preach the true Sāṃkhya view ?

We have already pointed out the different forms of the Epic Sāmkhya and have further attempted to show that the Epic presupposes the existence of the Sāṃkhya literature. Now the question naturally arises whether these different and divergent accounts of the Epic form the expositions of the different schools of the Sāṃkhya as were prevalent in those days or they are to be regarded as the contamination of the true Sāṃkhya. It has been already stated that in good many instances, the Epic faithfully follows the traditional Sāṃkhya. But the most serious deviation being in the case of the doctrine of *brahman* as the one universal soul which the ordinary Sāṃkhya cannot approve at any rate. The doctrine of the twenty-sixth principle as found in the exposition of the philosophy of Vaśiṣtha and Yājñavalkya has been already maintained by us as forming the part and parcel of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga school. But how to account for the *brahman* doctrine of the Janaka-Pañcaśikha episode ? Here both Āsuri and Pañcaśikha who are held as reputed teachers of Sāṃkhya even by the orthodox school, are found to advocate the doctrine of *brahman* as the one universal soul with whom the individual souls are united at the time of liberation. The reason of these discrepancies is not very far to seek. The Epic as we have it now is not the product of a single brain. Some centuries were taken when it was redacted into its present shape. Within this period, the teachings of the numerous sects and systems as were prevalant in those days, were poured into it to give it a wide popularity. During this formative stage of the Epic, the Sāṃkhya also most probably was divided into numerous schools. Moreover, it had been the most popular system of thought in those days and hence

the Epic did not hesitate to incorporate within itself the teachings of the said system even with its different and divergent forms. Thus we are not inclined to support the view of Hopkins who holds the Epic Sāṃkhya to be the hybrid hotch-potch of the genuine Sāṃkhya.

Prof. Keith is of opinion that the Epic does not ascribe the doctrine of *brahman* to the Sāṃkhya proper[1] But apart from the statement of the Janaka-Pañcaśikha episode, the said doctrine may be attributed to a school of Sāmkhya even on the strength of some other references. For instance, the *Ahirbudhnya* speaks of the *brahma-tantra* in the very beginning of the enumeration of the sixty different topics of the *Saṣṭi-tantra*. Further, the *Caraka-saṃhitā* as well as the *Buddha-carita* also speaks of the *brahman* in their brief exposition of the Sāṃkhya. All these references have been already pointed out by us and hence it is needless to repeat them here (pp. 27-28).

But thereby all the chapters of the Epic which apparently seem to deal with Sāmkhya cannot on a closer examination be regarded as representing the true Sāṃkhya view ; for some of them are blended with such materials as warn us not to hold them as such. For instance, the philosophy of Bhīṣma (xii. 301) though abounds with the terms and tenets of the Sāṃkhya, maintains after the fashion of the Purāṇas, Nārāyaṇa as the supreme lord from whom proceeds creation and destruction (xii. 301. 15-16). Thus we find that the sectarian interest is predominant there and hence we may take his exposition as the contamination of the proper Sāṃkhya.

The Purāṇas also are found to speak of the tenets and doctrines of the Sāṃkhya here and there ; but the sectarian interest is predominant almost everywhere and as a result of this, the true philosophy is for the most part undermined by relegion. We find

1 Keith, *Sāṃkhya system*, p. 57.

the evolutionery series of the Sāṃkhya taken into the cosmogonical accounts of the Purāṇas and unlike the *Mbh.*, the subtle elements (*tanmātras*) also find their places therein. But it is a matter of astonishment to notice that the four *vyūhas* of the Bhāgavata doctrine, such as the *vāsudeva*, *saṃkarṣaṇa* etc. are equated to the *prakṛti*, *mahat* and such other principles of the Sāṃkhya. The *guṇas* also are equated to the truine unity which constitutes Brahman, Viṣṇu and Śiva. Thus Brahman is held to be the creator, Viṣṇu as the preserver and Śiva as the destroyer and they correspond to the *rajas*, *sattva* and *tamas* respectively. This is not all. Viṣṇu is somewhere regarded as the supreme deity and elsewhere Śiva constitutes the same, and they are mentioned even as the director of the *prakṛti*—a conception which the ordinary Sāṃkhya cannot approve at any rate. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa deals with the Sāṃkhya and Yoga in the Kapila-Devahūti episode (iii. 24-33), but the main interest is centred upon Viṣṇu who is held as the supreme lord. The Brahma-Purāṇa offers a much more detailed description of the Sāṃkhya in the chapters 238-45, and it is curious to notice that the expositions of the Sāṃkhya by Bhīṣma and Karāla-Janaka as found in the *Mbh.* (xiii. 301-8), are almost taken verbatim in it; the only difference being that in the *Mbh.* Bhīṣma is found to address Yudhiṣṭhira, whereas Vyāsa addresses the sages in the said Purāṇa.

So far we have tried to offer a general review of the pre-classical Sāṃkhya[1]. It has been already stated (pp. 4-5) that the

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1 Garbe in his 'Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie' is not prepared to admit any pre-classical form of the Sāṃkhya. He holds that the Sāṃkhya which was thought out as a complete and well planned system by Kapila alone, passed for more than a dozen centuries as unaltered in its essentials. During this long period it did not undergo any change or important modification in its principal doctrines. In his opinion, Īśvarakṛṣṇa represents the original form of the Sāṃkhya.

origin of the Sāṃkhya is due to the reaction against the performances of the Vedic sacrifices which were specially advocated by the orthodox Brahmins and hence the question naturally arises whether the Sāṃkhya which criticises the Vedas is of Brahmanical origin or not. Garbe in his 'Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie' urges that the Sāṃkhya is not of Brahmanical origin, but he is not found to adduce any weightier ground in support of his view. On the other hand, we find that the system received a special sanctity in the ancient scriptural literature. The *Mbh.* which speaks highly of the Sāṃkhya states in one place that all kinds of supreme knowledge as are available in the Vedas and the Purāṇas etc. owe their origin in the Sāṃkhya[2]. The Āśvalāyana-Gṛhyasūtra in its *tarpaṇa* ceremonial list (iii. 4. 1) gives direction for offering the oblation of water to the Sāṃkhyaites and the *siddhas*[3]. Here the term *siddha* as found side by side with the *sāṃkhya* reminds us of

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Prof. Oldenberg does not advocate this view (*Nach. G. W.* 1917, pp. 218-253). In his opinion, the founder of the most systems sets forth some new ideas and it is the followers who work them out in detail. In doing so, the original tenets and doctrines are modified here and there whenever any difficulty stands in the way of the progressive movement of the thought. As a result of this, the original system is divided into numerous schools. This opinion of Oldenberg, specially holds good with respect to the principal systems of Indian thoughts.

The only difference of opinion with us lies in the fact that Oldenberg postulates the pre-classical form of the Sāṃkhya consisting of a truine unity as set forth in the Śvet. For our criticism of this view, see p. 40.

2 'ज्ञानं महद् यद्धि महत्सु राजन्
वेदेषु सांख्येषु तथैव योगे ।
यच्चापि दृष्टं विविधं पुराणे
सांख्यागतं तन्निखिलं नरेन्द्र ॥
Mbh., xii, 301. 108.

3 देवतास्तर्पयति ... सां ख्याः सिद्धाः समुद्राः ... ...,
Āśvalāyana-Gṛhyasūtra, iii. 4. 1.

Kapila—the propounder of the Sāṃkhya, who is held to be the foremoste among the *siddhas* (सिद्धानां कपिलो मुनिः, Gitā, x. 26). Further, the Atharvaveda-Pariśiṣṭa speaks of the Sāṃkhya teachers, such as Kapila, a Āsuri and Pañcaśikha (xliii. 3. 4.) in connection with the *tarpaṇa* invokation. The Baudhāyana-Gṛhyasūtra is found to advocate the view of Kapila[1] in prescribing the duties of a recluse. Thus we find that not only the Sāṃkhya, but also its propounder and followers were given a high place in the ancient literature of the Brahmins. Hence we are not prepared like Garbe to assume that the Sāṃkhya which exercised such a remarkable influence upon the orthodox mind, was originated in the non-brahmanical circle.

1 'अथातः क पि ल-सन्नथासविधिं व्याख्यास्यामः,

Baudhāyana-Gṛhyasūtra, iv. 16. 1.

SĀṂKHYA AND YOGA

The Sāṃkhya and the Yoga are so much inter-related in the Sanskrit literature that whenever any occassion arises of explaining or referring to the tenets and doctrines of the Sāṃkhya, those of the Yoga also are not generally overlooked. The two systems do not vary in their essentials. The Sāṃkhya lays emphasis upon knowledge which is regarged as the only means for attaining to the supreme reality, whereas the Yoga gives its wholehearted support to meditation by which the mind is progressively stilled and thus gradually becomes fit for achieving the supreme stage. The former is specially busy with the theoretical investigation, whereas the latter deals with the practical side. Speaking briefly, the two systems are nothing but the concave and convex side of the same sphere.

The main difference between the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, as it is generally known, lies in the fact that the former is regarded as atheistic while the latter is known to be theistic. The so called theism of the Yoga deserves special attention. The Mbh. while describing the respective superiority of the two systems, states that one *i.e.* the Sāṃkhya which is *anīśvara* cannot bring about liberation; this is why the advocates of the Yoga regard their system as the supreme (xii. 300. 3.)[1] From the term '*anīśvara*' of the verse as referred to above, some body try to guess that the Sāṃkhya is the upholder of atheism and the Yoga is that of theism. Such would be the case if the term '*anīśvara*' be replaced by '*nirīśvara*.' But the term '*anīśvara*' does not speak of him who intends to do away with God. It stands for the person who is

1 अनीश्वरः कथं मुच्येदित्येवं शत्रुकर्शन ।
वदन्ति कारणश्रैष्ठ्यं योगाः सम्यङ्मनीषिणः ॥

lacking in power or perfection ; for the verses which follow afterwards are busy to declare nothing but the superiority of the 'power' as can be achieved by the practices of Yoga. Hence '*anīśvara*' means one who is not *īśvara* or powerful. The term is used here in its derivative sense; it speaks of him who is devoid of power or pefection and there is no reasonable ground to take it here in its technical sense. Indeed, there is not a single couplet anywhere in the exposition of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga in the *Mbh.*, which speaks of Īśvara as the supreme being from whom proceeds creation and destruction.

The twenty-sixth principle as has been already discussed by us, is attributed to the Yoga as well as to the Sāṃkhya by both Vaśiṣṭha and Yājñavalkya. Hence we have maintained this as the doctrine of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga School of the Epic. But the said principle is not declared anywhere as the director of the *prakṛti* and hence it has nothing to do with creation or destruction of the universe.

Īśvara finds a prominent place in the system of Patañjali. He is described there as a distinct *puruṣa*, who is never affected by afflictions, actions and impression etc. (I. 24).[1] Though he is differentiated from the ordinary *puruṣa*, yet he is not to be regarded as a different *tattva* other than the *puruṣa*. Thus we find that Patañjali does not hold Īśvara as the twenty-sixth. With regard to the necessity of postulating such an Īsvara, the Bhāṣya remarks that though Īśvara has got no selfish motive to be fulfiled, yet he is naturally compassionate to the living beings. For he rescues the transmigratory spirits at the periodical and final dissolution by imparting knowledge and virtue to them (तस्य आत्मानुग्रहाभावेऽपि भूतानुग्रहः प्रयोजनम् , ज्ञानधर्मोपदेशेन कल्पप्रलय-महाप्रलयेषु संसारिनः पुरुषान् उद्धरिष्यामीति, Bhāṣya, I. 25). In order to justify this statement, the

1 क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः ।

Bhāṣya quotes a fragment from an ancient work which states that "the revered great sage, the first among the wise, adopted the *nirmāṇa-citta* and out of compassion imparted the doctrine to the enquiring Āsuri" (तथा चोक्तम् , 'आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठायकारुण्यात् भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच' इति I. 25). This fragment clearly refers to Kapila and hence we find that the author of the Bhāṣya is going to identify Īśvara with Kapila. Elsewhere the Bhāṣya regards Īśvara as the foremost of the *siddhas*[1] and Kapila also is regarded as such. But Vācaspati who in his commentary attributes the above mentioned fragment to Pañcaśikha, remarks that this view of transmission of knowledge and virtue by the compassionate Lord is also accepted by the followers of Kapila. He differentiates Kapila from Īśvara of Patañjali by the fact that the former is first among the emancipated (आदिमुक्त), whereas emancipation of the latter is without any beginning (अनादिमुक्त).

Udayana also in his Nyāya-Kusumāñjali refers to the view of the numerous sects and systems in connection with the definition of Īśvara. He is found to state there that in the opinion of the followers of Patañjali, Īśvara is one who is never touched by afflictions, actions and impressions etc. and who adopting the *nirmāṇa-kāya* inspires the followers out of compassion towards them (क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टो निर्माणकायमधिष्ठाय सम्प्रदायप्रद्योतको-ऽनुग्राहकश्चेति पातञ्जलाः, I. 3). This statement clearly indicates that Udayana also does not ignore the view of the Bhāṣya ; for he is not content with quoting the portion of the Sūtra of Patañjali only, but supplements it with the statement of the Bhāṣya. Taking everything into consideration, we find that in the opinion of the followers of Patañjali, the main function of Īśvara is to impart knowledge to the followers so that they may be finally emancipated. The term '*īśvara*' again finds its place in the Sūtra II.32, and here

1 यथा अस्य सर्गस्यादौ प्रकर्षगत्या सिद्धस्तथा...., i. 26.

also the Bhāṣya explains it as the supreme teacher. This interpretation of Īśvara as made by the author of the Bhāṣya, does not affect the view of the Sūtra in any way; for Patañjali himself regards Īśvara 'as the teacher of even the earliest teachers' (I. 26).

Again, the knowledge of a man, however enlightened he may be, is limited and hence it is not proper to hold him as the supreme teacher. But Īśvara's wisdom is unparalleled (तत्र निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञ-बीजम्, I. 25) and hence it befits him only to impart knowledge to the followers so that they may attain to final beatitude and never to return to the whirlpool of existence.

Now the question natuarally arises whether this Īśvara has got any hold over the *prakṛti* which is regarded by the Saṃkhya as the fundamental cause of the universe. The Yoga-sūtra as well as the Bhāṣya always regard the *prakṛti* as the eternal principle and hence it cannot be held as the creation of Īśvara; for what is known to be created can never be eternal. Further in the Sūtra 'निमित्तमप्रयोजकं प्रकृतीनां वरणभेदस्तु ततः क्षेत्रिकवत् (IV. 3), it is stated that the *prakṛti* functions of its own accord and the incidental causes such as the 'virtue' and 'vice' etc, cannot move her into action. The said causes only remove the barrier that stands in the way of the functioning of the *prakṛti* and when the barrier is removed, the *prakṛti* itself plays its part and does not require the assistance of any other external agency. Hence we find that in the system of Patañjali, Īśvara is not held as the director of the *prakṛti*. But Vācaspati intends to connect Īśvara with evolution and involution of the world. For, he explicitly states in one place that the Lord performs the dissolution of the world[1].

Bhojarāja in his commentary remarks that the conjunction of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* cannot happen without the will of

1 ......प्रणिधानं कृत्वा भगवान् जगत् संजहार, i. 24.

Īśvara[1]. But we are not sure that this is the orthodox Yoga view, for such an idea is not even hinted anywhere in the Sūtra. Further the author of the Bhāṣya explicitly mentions that the conjunction of these two principles is held as eternal and in order to justify his view quotes a fragment from an ancient work which runs thus: 'धर्मिणामनादिसंयोगाद्धर्ममात्राणामप्यनादिः संयोगः' (II. 22). Speaking briefly, neither the Sūtra nor the Bhāṣya attaches any importance to Īśvara with regard to the evolution of the universe. Under these circumstances, Patañjali's system which maintains Īśvara as an ethical personality cannot be strictly regarded as theistic; for theism implies belief in the existence of God who is regarded as the creator and preserver of the world.

Ancient works on Yoga.

The *Mbh.* mentions the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga as two eternal systems of thought[2]. But the most ancient works of the Yoga school like those of the Sāṃkhya have not come down to us. It is well known that Hiraṇyagarbha is known to be the propounder of the Yoga and and Kapila as that or the Sāṃkhya. But we know very little as regards the first systematic treatise of Yoga—the work of Hiraṇyagarbha if there had been any, except some vague outline as furnished by the Ahirbudhnya-Saṁhitā of the Pañcarātra school. This text enumerates the different sections of the vast Yoga treatise which was revealed through Hiraṇyagarbha. It is stated therein that Hiraṇyagarbha for the first time disclosed the entire science of the Yoga into two different texts, the first was known to be the *Nirodha-saṃhitā* and the second as the *Karma-saṃhitā*. The former text consists of

1 प्रकृतिपुरुष-संयोगवियोगयोरीश्वरेच्छा-व्यतिरेकेणानुपपत्तेः, i. 24.

2 सांख्यञ्च योगञ्च सनातने द्वे, xiii. 30.

twelve different sections and the latter of four. All these can be noticed in the following couplets of the Ahirbudhnya (xii 31-38).

विष्णुसंकल्परूपञ्च महद्योगानुशासनम् ।
हिरण्यगर्भादुद्भूतं तस्य भेदानिमान् शृणु ॥
आदौ हिरण्यगर्भेण द्वे प्रोक्ते योगसंहिते ।
एका निरोध-योगाख्या कर्मयोगाह्वयाऽपरा ।
संहिता तु निरोधाख्या तत्र द्वादशधा स्मृता ॥
अङ्गतन्त्रमथाद्यं तु दोषतन्त्रमतःपरम् ।
उपसर्गाभिधं तन्त्रं तथाऽधिष्ठानकं परम् ॥
आधारतन्त्रं योगश्च बहिस्तत्त्वाधिकारवत् ।
रिक्तयोगाख्यतन्त्रञ्च पूर्णयोगाख्यमेवच ॥
सिद्धियोगाख्यया त्रीणि मोक्षतन्त्रमतःपरम् ।
इति द्वादशभेदास्ते निरोधायाः प्रकीर्त्तिताः ॥
(कर्मसंहितायाः चातुर्विध्यम्)
ब्रह्मणा गदितास्तत्र चतस्रः कर्मसंहिताः ।
नानाकर्ममयी प्रोक्ता परा त्वेका क्रियामयी ।
बाह्याभ्यन्तररूपेण द्वेऽपि द्विविधे स्मृते ॥
योगानुशासनं शास्त्रमिति षोड़शविस्तरम् ।
सुदर्शनमयं विष्णोरुदितं तत् प्रजापतेः ॥

It is interesting to observe that the Ahirbudhnya calls the vast treatise of Hiraṇyagarbha as 'योगानुशासनम्', and Patañjali also begins his work with the Sūtra 'अथ योगानुशासनम्'. Again, of the two works of Hiraṇyagarbh, as the Ahirbudhnya informs us, the first one passes under the name of the 'निरोधसंहिता' and Patañjali also emphasises 'निरोध' specially in the first chapter of his work ; for he defines 'Yoga' as 'योगश्चित्तवृत्ति-निरोधः' (Yoga is the suppression of the function of the thought-staff). This is not all ; but clear traces of some of the items of the *Nirodha-saṃhitā* with its twelve sections are also left in the Yoga-sūtra. For

instance, the 'अङ्गतन्त्र' is represented in the Sūtra 'यम-नियमासन-प्राणायाम-प्रत्याहार-धारणा-ध्यान-समाधयोऽष्टा व ङ्गा नि' (II.29) which speaks of the subdivisions of the Yoga. The 'दोषतन्त्र'[1] and 'उपसर्गतन्त्र' are referred to in the Sūtra I. 30-31 ; for these two Sūtras speak of the defects and barriers that stand in the way of practising Yoga. The subject matter of discussion under 'अधिष्ठान' and 'आधारतन्त्र' is not clear. 'योगश्च बहिस्तत्त्वाधिकारवत्' speaks of the form of Yoga where an external object is chosen as the substratum of meditation and Patañjali alse treats them in greater length in I. 35-46, and classifies them as 'सवितर्क', 'सविचार' etc. Further, the so called types of meditations are termed by him as 'सबीज-समाधि' (I. 46), because they owe their origin to concentrating the mind on an external object. 'रिक्तयोग' as the name itself suggests, means such types of Yoga where there is no substratum of meditation and it is better known as 'असम्प्रज्ञात' (I. 18) or 'निर्बीजसमाधि' (I. 51) in the system of Patañjali. 'पूर्णयोग' is hinted in the Sūtras III.52-54. It is to be practised by the *saṃyama* over the 'moment' and its order of succession.[2] The moment is to be regarded here as the infinitesimal particle of time. As a result of this, the discriminative knowledge springs forth. It is the intuitional knowledge, it covers everything, it operates under all conditions and it is never ending. This is the highest stage of knowledge and *Yoga* terminates herein.[3] 'सिद्धियोग' is vividly described in the third chapter and this is why it is also called as the 'विभूतिपाद' *i.e.* the chapter which speaks of the various kinds of prefections. 'मोक्षतन्त्र' is represented in the end of the Sūtra, for here we find Patañjali speaking of the stage of liberation as maintained by the upholders of the Yoga.

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1 Cp. 'रागं मोहं तथा स्नेहं कामं क्रोधञ्च पञ्चमम् ।
योगाच्छित्त्वा ततो दो षा न् पञ्चैतान् प्राप्नुवन्ति ते, *Mbh.* xii. 300. 11.

2 'क्षणतत्क्रमयोः संयमाद्विवेकजं ज्ञानम्' iii. 52.

3 'एतद्विवेकजं ज्ञानं प रि पू र्ण म्,..., Bhāṣya, iii. 54.

So far about the Nirodha-Saṃhita. In the Karma-Saṃhita, *kriyā* or 'practice' finds a prominent place and Patañjali also lays emphasis upon the same in the beginning of the second chapter of his work. This is evident from the Sūtra **'तपः-स्वाध्यायेश्वर-प्रणिधानाणि क्रियायोगः'** (II. 1) where the term **'क्रियायोग'** itself finds its place.

This remarkable dependence of the Yoga-Sūtra on the vast literature of Hiraṇyagarbha (if we do not disregard the table of contents as furnished by the Ahirbudhnya and there is no apparent reason for doing so), tends to suggest that Patañjali was an adherent of the Hiraṇyagarbha school of the Yoga. Though he had been highly influenced by the so called treatise of Hiraṇyagarbha, yet his manner of treatment is unique in itself. Even in the midst of depicting the principles of the Yoga, he speaks of the fundamental principles of the Sāṃkhya whenever any necessity arises and thus we find that both the theory and practice find equal importance in his treatise.

The Yoga-bhāṣya sheds further light in this connection. It explains the aphoristic statements of Patañjali in a dignified manner and sets out the results of the theoretical discussions and practical discipline in such a way as speaks of its subtle power of observation. The theoretical discussions are so informative that the views of the particuler school of the Sāṃkhya[1] which he represents therein would have otherwise remained almost unknown to us. Speaking briefly, Patañjali and specially the author of the Bhāṣya may be better regarded as the exponents of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga School[2].

1 The author of the Yogasūtra-bhāṣya reprsents the Vārṣagaṇya school of the Sāṃkhya and this we intend to deal with in greater length later on.

2 This is different from the Sāṃkhya-yoga school of the Epic with its twenty-sixth principle. It is an admixture of the teachings of the Vārṣyagaṇya school of the Sāṃkhya and the Hiraṇya-garbha school of the Yoga.

It is further interesting to observe that the colophon at the end of the different chapters of the Yoga-bhaṣya generally runs thus : **'इति पातञ्जले सांख्यप्रवचने योगशास्त्रे ...पादः समाप्तः'**. The expression **'सांख्य-प्रवचन'** as found here side by side with **'योगशास्त्र'** clearly shows that the text was composed with a view to elucidate the principles of both the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga.

We intend to discuss the date of Patañjali and the author of the Bhāṣya in a seperate section along with that of the other Sāṃkhya teachers.

Of the other ancient works on Yoga philosophy we know very little except some fragmentayy quotations from them as found here and there. Śaṁkara in B. S. II.i.3, quotes the aphoristic statement **'अथ तत्त्वदर्शनोपायो योगः'** with the remark **'तथा च योगशास्त्रे'** ; but the commentators supply us with no further data regarding the same. The Yoga-bhāṣya also quotes profusely from both the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga works, but unfortunately none of them have come down to us.

There are different varieties of Yoga, such as the *Rāja-yoga*, *Mantra-yoga* and *Haṭha-yoga* etc., and Patañjali emphasises the *Samādhi-yoga* only and disapproves the rest. Discussions on the occult powers and the method of attaining them find a prominent place in the literature of the so called forms of the Yoga and philosophical interest is almost conspicuous by its absence therein.

It is strange to notice that the doctrines of the Nyāya and specially of the Vaiśeṣika are sometimes attributed to the Yoga system. Thus we get from the evidence of Vātsyāyana who in his comment on Ns. I.i.29, states that the advocates of the

1 Vide the Sūtras iv. 1 & 6.

Sāṃkhya hold that "an absolute non-entity can never come into existence and an entity can never lose its existence, the conscious element is not subject to change while the body, the sense organs, the mind, the gross elements and their rudimentary causes all are subject to modification; on the other hand, those of the Yoga are of opinion that the creation is due to the past activities of men and the 'defects' and 'inclinations' give rise to activities, the intelligent beings are endowed with their own respective qualities, non-existing principles come into existence and that which is produced is destroyed."[1] Further, Uddyotakara adds here that in the opinion of the Sāṃkhya, the sense-organs are the products of *ahaṅkāra*, whereas the Yoga regards them as elemental products.[2] Thus we find that Vātsyāyana regards the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga as two independent and different systems of thought. But from the evidence of the Mbh. and other scriptural works we find that the doctrines of the Yoga are based upon those of the Sāṃkhya and thus we do not find any reason why Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara regard the doctrines of these two systems as **'प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्त'** instead of **'समानतन्त्रसिद्धान्त'**.[3] In connection with the discussion on *'dharma'*, Bhavanātha also in his *Nayaviveka* states that the Sāṃkhya regards it as the quality of the *'buddhi'* and the Yoga as that of the

1 'यथा नासत आत्मलाभः, न सत आत्महानम् ; निरतिशयाश्चेतना देहन्द्रियमनःसु विषयेषु तत्तत् कारणेषु च विशेष इति सां ख्या ना म्। पुरुषकर्मादिनिमित्तो भूतसर्गः, कर्महेतवो दोषाः प्रवृत्तिश्च, स्वगुणविशिष्टाश्चेतनाः ; असदुत्पद्यते उत्पन्नं निरुध्यतें इति यो गा ना म्'।

2 'भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणीति यो गा ना म्, अभौतिकानीति सां ख्या ना म्'।

3 The doctrine which is accepted by one system of philosophy and not by another is called 'प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्त'; for its definition, See N.S. I. I. 29. 'समानतन्त्रसिद्धान्त' (N.S. I. I. 28) is the doctrine which is not incompatible with other systems of thought.

soul.[1] Besides these. the Jainas frequently refer to the Yaugas[2] and everywhere the doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika are atributed to them. Guṇaratna in his Ṣaḍdarśana-Samuccaya identifies the Yaugas with the Naiyāyikas[3] but does not put forward any ground for his doing so.

What is the reason of regarding the advocates of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems as **'योगाः'** or **'यौगाः'**? The point has received attention of the modern orthodox scholars also. Some of them suggest that the term 'yoga' ordinarily means 'combination' **(संयोग)** and hence **'योगाः'** or **'यौगाः'** would necessarily speak of the combinationists or the Vaiśeṣikas who explain the origin of the world from the combination of atoms. But this view does not seem to be plausible as most of the principal systems of thought depend more or less upon the 'combination of two different entities' in explaining the origin of the world. For instance, the Sāṃkhya explains it by the combination of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*, the Vedānta by the *brahman* and *māyā*, the Vaiśeṣikas by the combination of atoms and so on.

Most probably, in ancient times the practice of Yoga found a prominent place in the circle of the followers of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools and this is why the advocates of these two systems are styled as **'योगाः'** or **'यौगाः'**. This is further corroborated by the evidence of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra which is found to

1 'ननु कार्यरूपो न धर्मः, तीर्थिकविमतेः···बुद्धिगुण इति सांख्याः, सिद्धरूप एवात्मगुणः इति योगाः', I. i. 2, p. 57. See also the commentary which states: 'निष्पन्नावस्थ आत्मगुण इति वैशेषिकादयः'।

2 See, 'यौगस्याप्येवमेव···, यौगास्तु प्रगल्भन्ते···, the commentary *Ratnākarāvatārikā* on *Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra*, p. 12 & 86. 'यौगास्त्वाहुः'··· com. on *Syādvādamañjarī*, p. 75.

3 'अथादौ नैयायिकानां यौगापराभिधानानां लिङ्गादिव्यक्तिरुच्यते', (ii).

lay emphasis upon 'yoga' here and there.[1] This is not all; Praśastapāda in the end of his work informs us that Kaṇāda formulated the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika system after pacifying Maheśvara by dint of his Yogic achievement.[2]

1 See the *sūtras*, ix. 1. 11 & 13 ; ix. 2. 13.

2 'योगाचारविभूत्या य स्तोषयित्वा महेश्वरम् ।
चक्रे वैशेषिकं शास्त्रं तस्मै कणभुजे नमः ॥

Further, Praśastapāda also speaks of Yoga while discussing on 'perception'.

The problem whether the Buddhism as represented in the ancient Pāli literature presupposes the doctrine of Sāṃkhya or not, has already received attention of the scholars. In his 'Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie' (p. 15), Garbe endavours to prove that Sāṃkhya is older than Buddhism and in support of his view refers to a passage of the Brahmajāla Sutta[1] where Buddha is found to condemn the view of some recluses and Brahmins who hold both the soul and the world as eternal, and he considers this view to be the forecast of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of dualism. For Sāṃkhya also holds the primordial *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* as two eternal principles. But this finding of Garbe, is disproved by Rhys Davids[2] who urges that the advocates of Sāṃkhya hold the primordial *prakṛti* as eternal and not the world as such, for it is considered as the product of the former. And if the vauge expression 'world' in its special sense is taken to mean the *prakṛti*, it then leads to another contradiction. For the heretics in the said Pāli passage are found to hold the soul as well as the world as barren and giving birth to nothing[3] whereas in the Sāṃkhya system the visible world is held to be the outcome of the *prakṛti*. Hence in the opinion of Prof. Davids, the passage of the Brahmajāla-Sutta does not speak of the Sāṃkhya view proper[4]. He further adds that "there is nothing at all in any of the details peculiar to the

1 *Santi bhikkhave eke samaṇa-brāhmaṇā sassatavādā, sassataṃ attānañ ca lokañ ca paññāpenti catūhi vatthūhi, D. 1. i. 3.*

2 Buddhism, American lectures, pp. 27-29.

3 *Sassato attā ca loko ca bañjho kūṭaṭṭho esikaṭṭhā-yiṭṭhito, D. 1. i. 34.*

4 Otto Schrader who deviates here, is of opinion that the Pāli passage as referred to above probably speaks of the doctrine of Sāṃkhya. He suggests that the term *kūṭaṭṭha* is to be taken here as a substantive and not as an adjective as the previous scholars did. As a result of this, the meaning of the passage becomes thus :

'The self (1) and the world (2) are eternal ; (for), the *kūṭastha* (1) is unproductive as a piller firmly fixed ; and the beings (2) run through births, transmigrate, pass away and spring up, which is (again) a sort of eternity'.

Vedānta and Sāṃkhya in primitive Buddhism, Indian Culture, Vol. I. p. 546.

Sāṃkhya which has been borrowed by Gautama or is even to be found at all in any of the oldest Buddhist writings (p. 29)".

However, there are ideas in the ancient Pāli literature which have got a striking resemblance with those of the Sāṃkhya. Let us first of all take up the conception of *ātman*. The ancient Pāli texts occassionally refers to the various conceptions of the soul and in this connection, the Dīgha (ix. 23) states that the soul is formless and consists of conciousness[1]. In the next passage it further points out the view which holds consciousness as the self of a man[2]. This view of the self holds good with the Sāṃkhya also. According to this system, *puruṣa* is regarded as the self of an individual and it is in its true nature nothing but the pure consciousness abiding in itself.

Again, one of the characteristic features of Sāṃkhya is to differentiate the soul from the physical body and a similar manner of treatment is also to be met with in a passage of the Dīgha (i. 2. 13.) where Buddha is going to speak of the fourth semi-eternalist doctrine. The passage runs thus :

"*Yaṃ kho idaṃ vuccati cakkhun ti pi sotan ti pi ghānan ti pi jivhā ti pi kāyo ti pi ayaṃ attā anicco addhuvo asassato vipariṇāma-dhammo. Yañ ca kho idaṃ vuccati cittan ti vā mano ti vā viññāṇan ti vā ayaṃ attā nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo sassati-samaṃ tath' eva ṭhassatīti*".

(This which is called eye and ear and nose and tongue and body is a self which is impermanent, unstable, non-eternal, subject to change But this which is called heart or mind or consciousness[3] is a self which is permanent, stedfast, eternal and knows no change, and it will remain for ever and ever)[4].

1 *Arupiṃ kho ahaṃ bhante attānaṃ paccemi saññāmayanti.*

2 *Saññā purisassa attā' ti vā*, *D. ix.* 24.

3 '*Viññānaṃ*' corresponds to sk. *vijñāna* and in the Sāṃkhya literature it is mentioned as an attribute of the *buddhi*. Hence from the strict Sāṃkhya point of view, it is different from 'consciousness'.

4 From the translation of Rhys Davids.

The above-mentioned passags speaks of two different groups of soul and at the same time it is very keen to differentiate one group from the other by exhibiting their opposite characteristics. Sāṃkhya also differentiates the self from the physical body in the same manner. This is clear from the fact that the said system also holds the *ātman* as permanent, stedfast, eternal and without any change ; while the physical body is regarded as possessing the opposite characteristics. But the serious deviation lies in the fact that Sāṃkhya never regards any one of the *citta*, mind or intelligence (*vijñāna*) as the *ātman* or even as its constituent.

From the evidence of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (vii. 2-7), we find that there had been such sects as used to worship some one or other of these aforesaid entities as the *ātman* or *brahman*. In the Poṭṭhapāda Sutta also, Buddha refers to the different theories of soul and here we find a view which held the mind as the soul.[1] But unlike the Pāli passage as quoted above, attempt is not made in those places to differentiate one kind of soul from the other.

Again, Buddha in his introductory remark to this heretical doctrine states that "in this case the heretic who is addicted to logic and reasoning gives utterance to the conclusion of his own, beaten out by his argumentations and based on his sophistry." But the passages of the Upaniṣad which apparently dictate to worship the 'mind', '*citta*' or the *vijñāna* and such other entities as the self, do not take recourse to logical arguments in doing so. On the other hand, Sāṃkhya differentiates the self from the non-self by logical reasonings ; for the said system was famous for its rationalism even at an early age. This is evident from the statement of Kauṭilya who in his Arthaśāstra[2] explicitly mentions the

1 '*Tayo kho' me Poṭṭhapāda atta-paṭilābhā, oḷariko attapaṭilābho, manomaya atta-paṭilābho, arūpa atta-paṭilābho*, *D. ix. 39*.

2 See above, p. 41, n3.

Sāṃkhya as *ānvīkṣa(i)kī*, *i.e.* the system which is based on logical reasonings," These facts tempt us to suggest that in the above-mentioned Pāli passage Buddha's main intention was to condemn the view of the Sāṃkhya.

Discourses of Buddha with Uttara, the pupil of the Pārāsariya Brahmin in Majjhima[1] reveals further interest in this connection. Here Buddha is found to refute the view of Pārāsariya in whose opinion *indriya-bhāvanā* comes at a stage when the 'eye' does not see any colour and the 'ear' does not hear any sound. Briefly speaking, it is the state when the senses cease to function. The Bibhāṣā (Taisho Issakiyo ed., XXVII, 729, *a* 29)[2] attributes this tenet to one Pārāsari *tīrthika* (heretic). A similar view is also referred to in the Yogabhāṣya (ii.55) where in the opinion of Jaigīṣavya sense-control consists in the non-perception of the objects and this stage comes as the result of the full concentration of the *citta.*[3] The Bhāṣya also more or less advocates the same view. It states that when 'the *citta* is supressed, the senses automatically cease to function and herein lies the perfect control of the senses. Thus we find that the view of the Pārāsariya does not fundamentally differ from that of Jaigīṣavya and the Yoga-bhāṣya. Now the question naturally arises whether this Pārāsariya is a Sāṃkhya-Yoga teacher or not. In the Buddha-Carita (xii. 67) we find one Vṛddha Pārāśara mentioned side by side with Jaigīṣavya and Janaka who are regarded there as the exponents of the Sāṃkhya School and the Mbh. in the Janaka-Pañcaśikha episode further mentions Pañcaśikha, the reputed Sāṃkhya teacher, as the Vṛddha Pārāśara in the following verse :

'पराशरसगोत्रस्य वृद्धस्य सुमहात्मनः ।
भिक्षोः पञ्चशिखस्याहं शिष्यः परमसम्मतः ॥ (*Mbh.* xii. 320.24).

1 *Indriya-bhāvanā-suttaṃ* (152).
2 Pointed out by Johnston, Early Sāṃkhya, p. 9n.
3 चित्तैकाग्र्यादप्रतिपत्तिरेवेति जैगीषव्यः ।

Again, the Yoga-bhāṣya here and there quotes some fragments from the works of ancient teachers and some of them are attributed to Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati and this particular tenet of sense-control may be even based upon the view of Pañcaśikha. Thus, the heretical teacher Pārāsariya of the *Majjhima* may even be identical with Pañcaśikha—the renowned Sāṃkhya teacher.[1]

In this connection, I further beg to draw the attention of the scholars to one 'Pārāśaryya Bhikṣu-sūtra' as referred to by Pāṇini[2] in his grammar. The Bhikṣu-sūtra as the name itself suggests probably speaks of the rules and principles by which ascetics are to be guided. The Dharma-sūtras and the Smṛtis also here and there give directions to the mode of their living. It is interesting to notice that the Baudhāyana-Gṛhyasūtra is found to formulate the duties of the ascetics on the basis of Kapila which is evident from the *Sūtra* 'अथातः क पि ल-सन्न्यासविधिं व्याख्यास्याम :' (IV. 16.1).[3] Hence it appears that there had been in ancient times a group of ascetics who had been the followers of Kapila; and the Bhikṣu-sūtra of Pārāśarya also may be a further development of the principles as laid down by Kapila, provided the identification of Pārāśarya with Pañcaśikha be taken as certain. However, Pārāsariya of the Majjhima may even be identical with this Pārāśarya, the author of the Bhikṣu-sūtra, as referred to by Pāṇini.

The Vedantists generally hold Pārāśarya as Vyāsa, the son of Parāśara, to whom the authorship of the Brahma-sūtra is ascribed. Hence, by Pārāśarya-Bhikṣu-sūtra they would naturally mean the Brahma-sūtra which is also held in high esteem by a particular group of ascetics. But the present Brahma-Sūtra is blended with such materials as speak of its uncertain date.

1 Discussed in detail by Johnston, *Early Sāṃkhya*, p. 9.
2 पाराशर्य-शिलालिभ्यां भिक्षुनटसूत्रयोः, iv. 3. 110.
3 Also see above, p. 64.

The doctrine of Purāṇa-kassapa also as expounded in the Dīgha, II. 17, deserves special attention. In the opinion of this heretical teacher (as Buddha states him), there is neither merit nor demerit in the activities of a man. If any body goes on slaying persons, or committing robbery and adultery, it would not be thereby resulting into any demerit. On the other hand, if he goes on giving alms and offering sacrifices, there would be no merit then resulting. Buddha holds this to be the theory of non-action (*ittham kho me bhante······a k i r i y a ṃ vyākāsi*). The Jainas also refer to this doctrine of non-action. In one of their canonical texts, it is stated that the upholders of this doctrine deny *karman* and they are not prepared to admit that the action of the soul is transmitted to the future moments[1]. Śīlāṅka, the commentator, reckons Sāṃkhya as one of the upholders of this अक्रियावाद. The Tattvārtha-Rājavārttika states that the *akriyā-vādins* comprise of eighty-four different schools and it furnishes a list of teachers[2] who are held to be the advocates of this doctrine. The said list includes the names of Kapila, Bāddhali[3] and Māṭhara who are elsewhere known to be reputed Sāṃkhya teachers.

The reason of charging Sāṃkhya as advocating the doctrine of non-action is not far to seek. The *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhya is held to be inactive, he is merely the onlooker, he is not to reap the harvest of merits and demerits acquired by the *prakṛti*. This is why the advocates of Sāṃkhya are held as *akriyāvadins*. The Yoga-sūtra also explicitly states that the activities of a Yogin do not produce any result, for his *karman* is neither white nor black (कर्माशुक्लाकृष्णं योगिन स्त्रिविधमितरेषाम्, IV. 7). This view has got a remarkable resemblance with the doctrine of

1 *Sūtrakṛtāṅga-sūtra*, i. 12. 4.

2 मरीच-कुमार-कपिलोलूक--गार्ग्य-व्याघ्रभूति--बाद्धलि-माठर-मौद्गल्यायनादीनामक्रियावाददृष्टीनां चतुरशीतिः, *Tattavārtha-Rājavārttika*, i. 5., p. 51.

3 For Bāddhali, see *Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 175.

Purāṇa-kassapa. But it should be taken into consideration that this doctrine of transcending merit and demerit holds good with him only who is beyond the range of the *prakṛti*. The ordinary man who is associated with the activities of the *prakṛti*, must reap the result of actions performed by him.

So far we have pointed out some tenets and doctrines which are attributed to the heretics by Buddha and side by side we have tried to show the similar teachings of Sāṃkhya. But the term 'Sāṃkhya' is conspicuous by its absence in the Pāli canonical literature though the term '*saṃkhyā*' even in the sense of 'right knowledge' or 'correct thinking' finds its place in two or three instances[1]. The terms '*padhānam*' (sk. *pradhānam*) and '*pakati*' (sk. *prakṛti*) occur here and there, but they are nowhere used in the technical sense of Sāṃkhya.

The relation of Sāṃkhya with Buddhism as well as the problem of dependence of one system upon another has been fairly dealt with by Prof. Keith[2] and hence it is needless to discuss the same here in detail. But it is interesting to observe that some of the ideas of Buddha, nay even some of his technical expressions also, find their place in the Sāṃkhya literature, specially in the Yoga-sūtra and its Bhāṣya. We are pointing out some of them below and hope that these parallelisms will rouse further interest on the subject.

1 See, '*Yo dha puññan ca pāpañ ca bāhitvā brahmacariyaṃ, S a n-k h ā y a loke carati sa ve bhikkūti vuccati' ti*', *Saṃyutta*, *Brahmin Suttas*, vii. 2. 10. The expressions '*Saṅkhiyā-dhammo udapādi*' (D. i. 1. 3) and '*saṅkhiyā-dhammaṃ viditvā*' (D. i. 1. 4) also deserve special attention in this connection, but it is difficult to ascertain the exact sense in which they are used, Buddhaghoṣa here explains *saṅkhyā* as conversation, but it does not seem to be convincing.

2 *Sāṃkhya System*, pp. 24-30.

(i) The Yogabhāṣya (ii. 15) states that just as the medical science comprises of the four-fold doctrine of the disease, its cause, healing and medicine, so also the science of Sāṃkhya-Yoga speaks of the four-fold doctrine of birth, its cause, liberation and the means to attain it. It is interesting to note that such a manner of treatment corresponds also to the four truths of Buddhism, such as the pain, origin of pain, cessation of pain and the path that leads to the cessation of pain. In this connection, Prof. Keith[1] further points out that in one Buddhist text, these four truths are compared with disease, its origin, its healing, and the prevention of recurrance.

(ii) *Avidyā* (ignorance) and *saṃskāra* (impression) play a prominent part in the causal series as propagated by Buddha. They are also fairly dealt with in the Sāṃkhya and specially in the system of Patañjali.

(iii) Both Sāṃkhya and Buddhism hold the view that the objects are in a state of constant change (*pariṇāma*). But the serious deviation lies in the fact that Sāṃkhya insists on the existence of a permanent stuff which lies at the root of all manifestations. This abiding principle though undergoes change in every successive moment, does not therely lose itself entirely. It is real and eternal. Eternity of this primordial stuff (*prakṛti*) is what is called eternity of mutation (**परिणामि-नित्य**) as opposed to the immutable eternity (**कूटस्थ-नित्य**) which belongs to the *puruṣa*. But Buddha advocates the doctrine of constant change only and emphatically states that there is no such abiding principle at all.

(iv) It is stated in the Sāṃkhya literature that Kapila furnished himself with a *nirmāṇa-citta* before he appeared before Āsuri to impart him the knowledge of Sāṃkhya, and the Yoga-sūtra describes how it is evolved from the stuff of *asmitā*[2] (individuation).

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1 *Ibid*, p. 30.

2 निर्माण-चित्तान्यस्मितामात्रात्, iv. 4.

Buddha also speaks of *nirmāṇa-kāya* i.e. the calling up of a mental image while describing the immediate fruits of the life of a recluse who has entered into and abides in the supreme meditation. In this connection, it is further interesting to observe that Buddha explains this method of calling up of one body from another body by the simile of 'the reed and the sheath' (*muñja* and *isīkā*), the 'sword and the scabbard' (*asi* and *kosa*) and 'the snake and its slough' (*ahi* and *karaṇḍa*). This is clear from the following lines :

Seyyathā pi mahārāja puriso muñjamhā isīkaṃ pavāheyya. Tassa cvam assa : Ayaṃ muñjo, ayaṃ isīkā, añño muñjo aññā isīkā, muñjamhā tv eva isīkā pavāḷhāti. . . . . ayaṃ asi ayaṃ kosi . . . Ayaṃ ahi ayaṃ karaṇḍo . . . (D. ii. 86).

Some of these similes which already found their place in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upanīṣads also occur here and there in the exposition of Sāṃkhya[1].

(v) In D. ix. 25, Poṭṭhapāda is found to ask Buddha whether the world is eternal or not, and in reply to this Buddha states that this is a matter on which he expressed no opinion. Yogabhāṣya also raises this very question and states that this is a problem which is not possible to solve[2].

(vi) Buddha is very keen to find fault with the objects, for in his opinion they are impermanent, subject to change and bring forth suffering (*Savve te bhavā aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāma-*

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1 See, 'यथा मुञ्ज इषीकाणां तथैवैतद्धि जायते', Yājñavalkya's exposition of Sāṃkhya, *Mbh.* xii. 315. 12. Also, 'ततो मुञ्जादिषीकेव शकुनिः पञ्जरादिव, क्षेत्रज्ञो निःसृतो देहान्मुक्त इत्यभिधीयते', Philosophy of Arāḍa, *Buddha-carita*, xii. 64 ; 'जीर्णां त्वचमिवोरगः', quoted by Vijñānabhikṣu in his *bhāṣya* on the *sūtra* अहिनिर्ल्वयनीवत् , S.S. iv. 6.

2 'अथास्य संसारस्य स्थित्या गत्या च गुणेषु वर्तमानस्यास्ति क्रमसमाप्तिर्न वेति, अवचनीयमेतत……, अयन्तु अवचनीयः प्रश्नः संसारोऽयमन्तवानथानन्त इति'. iv. 33.

dhammā' ti[1]). Sāṃkhya also holds this view. Further, Patañjali emphatically states that to the wise all is pain. This is evident from the *Sūtra* **'परिणाम-ताप संस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः'** (Ys. II. 15) where he comes to the said conclusion after pointing out the defects of the objects.

In this connection, we beg to draw the attention of the scholars to the fact that in the above mentioned *Sūtra*, Patañjali speaks of the three different aspects of suffering, such as, **परिणामदुःख, तापदुःख** and **संस्कारदुःख**. Similarly Buddha also speaks of the three states of suffering which is clear from his following utterance :

Tisso dukkhatā—Dukkha-dukkhatā, saṃkhāra-dukkhatā, vipariṇāma-dukkhatā[2].

Of these the **तापदुःख** of Patañjali and *dukka-dukkhatā* of the Pāli text only vary in name and not in essence, for the terms *tāpa* and *duhkha* are held as synonymous in the Sanskrit literature.

(vii) The expression "*na etaṃ mama, n'eso' hamasmi, na me so attāti*" (there is no mine, no 'this is I' no 'this is myself') occurs here and there in the Pāli Canonical literature[3]. This reminds of the expression **'एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहम्'** of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā (64) which also speaks of a similar idea.

(viii) The following verse occurs in the Dhammapada (*appamāda vaggo*, 2) :

> *Paññāpāsādaṃ āruyha asoko sakiniṃ pajaṃ,*
> *pavvatattho va bhumatthe dhiro vāle avekkhati.*

The Yogabhāṣya (I. 47) also quotes a similar verse which is given below for the sake of comparison :

1 *Udāna, Nandavagga, Lokasuttaṃ.*

2 D. xxxiii. 10 (xxvii).

3 *Majjhima, Sallekha sutta* (8)

प्रज्ञाप्रसादमारुह्य ह्यशोच्यः शोचतो जनान्,
भूमिष्ठानिव शैलस्थः सर्वान् प्राज्ञोऽनुपश्यति ॥

It is curious to notice that Vācaspati in his commentary attributes this verse to Paramarṣi (the great sage) who is no other than Kapila[1].

Besides these, there are some technical terms and expressions which are found common in the Pāli Canonical texts as well as in the Yoga system. An attempt is made below to point out some of them.

(1) The Pāli texts speak of the three bases of discourse, which are concerned with the past, future and the present. These are generally represented by the expression '*atīto addhā, anāgato addhā*, etc[2]. Similarly, the Yoga-sūtra and the Bhāṣya also apply the expressions '*atīta addhā* and *anāgata addhā* etc, while speaking of the past, future and the present stages of an entity[3]. Such a manner of expressing these different stages of an entity is not generally to be met with in the other systems of Indian thought.

(ii) Buddha speaks of '*paññā-vimutti*' and '*citta-vimutti*' here and their in the Canonical texts (. . . *ceto vimuttiṃ paññā-vimuttiṃ*[4] ; also, *Imā kho bikkhave rāga-virāgā ceto vimutti, avijjā-virāgā paññā-vimutti*[5]). The Yoga-bhāṣya also

1 अत्रैव पारमर्षीं गाथामुदाहरति, 'तथा च इति'.

2 *Tayo addhā : atīto addhā, anāgato addhā, paccuppanna addhā*, D. xxxiii. 1. 10 (xxiv) ; also see, *ye hi keci bho atītaṃ addhānaṃ... anāgataṃ addhānaṃ...*, D. xviii. 20.

3 'अतीतानागतं स्वरूपतोऽस्त्यध्वभेदाद्धर्माणाम्', iv. 12 ; also see 'त्रिभिरध्वभिर्युक्तम् ..., *Yoga-bhāṣya*, iii. 13.

4 D. xxviii. 3.

5 *Aṅguttara*, ii. 3. 10.

refers to these two different phases of liberation (**इत्येषा चतुष्टयी कार्या विमुक्ति प्रज्ञायाः ; चित्तविमुक्तिस्तु त्रयी**[1] . . .).

(iii) The terms *saddhā*, *viriyam*, *sati*, *samādhi* and *paññā* are used side by side in the following Pāli passage :

No kho Alārass'eva Kālāmassa atthi saddhā mayham pi atthi Saddhā. ... Viriyam ... Sati ... Samādhi...Paññā[2]...This reminds us of the *Sūtra* **श्रद्धा-वीर्य-समाधि-प्रज्ञापूर्वक इतरेषाम्** where also the said terms are mentioned successively. The only difference lies in the fact that the term '*sati*' of the Pāli text is not recorded by Patañjali.

(iv) Buddha speaks of the four *brahma-vihāras*[3] (the sublime resting places of the mind) ; such as *mettā*, *karuṇā*, *muditā* and *upekkhā*. Patañjali also refers to these terms in the *Sūtra* **'मैत्री-करुणा-मुदितोपेक्षाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां भावनातश्चित्तप्रसादनम्** (I. 33). But unlike Buddha, he is not found to style them as the *brahma-vihāras*. However, they are simply stated as the *vihāras* in a fragment of an ancient Sāṃkhya-Yoga text which is quoted by the author of the Yoga-Bhāṣya (**ये चैते मैत्र्यादयो ध्यायिनां वि हा राः**...... iv. 10). The Sanskrit-Buddhist texts also do not leave them untouched; for the Gaṇḍavyūha-Sūtra is found to refer to them[4].

(v) Both Buddha and Patañjali speak of the different stages of meditation, such as the **सवितर्क, सविचार, निर्वितर्क** and **निर्विचार** etc.

(vi) Instead of **पाप** and **पुण्य**, the Pāli texts[5] are generally fond of using the terms **कुशल** and **अकुशल** to mean virtue and vice.

1 YS. ii. 27.

2 *Majjhima*, *Ariyapariyesana-suttam* (26)

3 YS. i. *20*.

4 ये ते मैत्री-विहारिणश्च न क्वचिदनुनयविहारिणः, ये ते करुणा-विहारिणश्च न क्वचिदनु-संशयदर्शनविहारिणः, ये ते मुदिता-विहारिणश्च ... ये ते उपेक्षा-विहारिणश्च ..., p. 472.

5 *Kusalam*, *akusalam*, *Maj*. i. 98 ; *Kusalesu dhammesu*, i. 417 ; *akusalañca. . .akusala-mulāñca. . .kusalañca. . .kusala-mulāñca. . .*, i. 46 ; *Akusalehi dhammehi. . .*, D. ii. 75.

The Yoga-bhāṣya and some other ancient Sāṃkhya-Yoga texts also are found to follow the same principle[1]. But it does not thereby mean that the former terms are entirely absent in the said texts. The thing is this that they occur only in a few cases.

(vii) Though Buddha is not found to deal with the *guṇas* and their varieties after the manner of Sāṃkhya as represented specially in the system of Patañjali, yet the terms *rajas* and *tamas* find their place here and there in the Pāli literature[2]. But these terms are used in their ethical sense just as we find them for the most part in the Sāṃkhya accounts of the Epic.

(viii) The Kevaḍḍha Sutta (D. xi) refers to the different groups of gods, such as the *Cātummhā-rājika*, *Tāvatiṁsa*, *Nirmāṇa-rati*, *Paranimmāna-vasavatti Tuṣita* and *Brahmakāyika* etc. The names of some of these gods, such as the *Tuṣita*, *Parinirmāṇa-vasavartin*, the *Brahma-kāyika* and the like, are also referred to in the Yoga-bhāṣya (iii. 26) where in connection with the explanation of the different regions of the universe, the names of the different groups of gods residing in different celestial abodes are mentioned. But the names of these peculier types of gods are not generally to be met with in the ordinary Sanskrit literature.

These remarkable similarities of some of the ideas and expressions of Buddha with Sāṃkhya and Yoga tend to suggest that one of these two systems was influenced by the other. A careful perusal of the aforesaid parallelisms reveals the fact that the

1 कुशलाकुशलानि कर्माणि, i. 24 ; समाना हि तयोः कुशलाकुशलयो ... वासनेति, ii. 9. ; क्षीणतृष्णः कुशलो न जनिष्यते, iv. 33 ; कुशलस्य नापकर्षायालम्, कस्मात्, कुशलं हि मे बह्वन्यदस्ति, quoted in the *Bhāṣya* from an ancient Sāṃkhya treatise (ii. 27). Vācaspati attributes this fragment to Pañcaśikha.

2 *Moha* is regarded as one of the akusala-mulas, D. xxxiii. 1. 10. 1. for *rajas*, see *appa-rajakkha* (*skt. alpa-rajaska*) *Maj*. Vol. i. p. 169, also *mahā-rajakkha*, *Samyutta*, Vol. i. p. 137.

form of Sāṃkhya with which some of the teachings of Buddha resemble to a considerable extent is not what is represented in the Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa ; but it is the Sāṃkhya-Yoga school which is represented in the *Sūtras* of Patañjali and specially in its *Bhāṣya.* Now the difficulty arises that the *Yoga-sūtra* is not regarded to be a very old work, for it is found to refute the doctrines of later Buddhism. Hence, it is far from convincing that Buddha was ever influenced by Patañjali. On the otherhand, there is no such conclusive evidence to prove that all the ideas and technical expressions of the Pāli canonical texts are the independent achievements of Buddha, though there are good many ideas which are his own inventions. Hence, the probable view is that both the systems were nourished by a common heritage. But this common heritage belongs to an independent stream of thought other than what we find in the speculations of the most ancient Upaniṣads with which Buddha was familiar ; for such ideas and technical expressions as have been pointed out above are almost conspicuous by their absence in those texts.

In order to substantiate its own statements, the *Yoga-bhāṣya* is found to quote profusely here and there from works of ancient Sāṃkhya and Yoga teachers. But, unfortunately none of these texts have come down to us; hence in the absence of any satisfactory evidence it cannot be definitely ascertained whether some of those works were of Pre-Buddhistic age or not. Patañjali also cannot be credited with the sole invention of the Yoga-system. From the evidence of the ancient Sanskrit literature we find that Hiraṇyagarbha is held to be the propounder of the Yoga and not Patañjali as such. Moreover, the great Epic and other ancient texts which preceed Patañjali by some centuries are found to contain brief expositions of Sāṃkhya and Yoga here and there. This is not all. The Epic, as we have already tried to show, pre-supposes the existence of Sāṃkhya literature[1]. Further, in one place it emphatically states that Sāṃkhya and Yoga are the two systems of eternal existence[1]. Under these circumstances, it is not legitimate to conclude that all the ideas in the *Yoga-sūtra* are the independent achievements of Patañjali ; he must have received the principal ideas from the works of his predecessors. The fact is this that his manner of treatment is independent and it is at the same time unique in itself.

1 See above, pp. 54-8.

In his commentary on the *Tattva-Saṃgraha* (p. 11), Kamala-Śīla quotes a *sūtra* which he ascribes to the Lord Buddha. The said *Sūtra* together with his introductory remark upon it runs thus

तत्रेदमुक्तं भगवता—'स चायमङकुरो न स्वयं कृतो नोभयकृतो नेश्वर-निर्मितो न प्र कृ ति-स म्भू तो नैककारणाधीनो नाप्यहेतुः समुत्पन्नः'[2] ।

Amidst other things, Buddha disregards in this *Sūtra* the view which holds *prakṛti* as the agent. Evidently this is a reflection upon the Sāṃkhya. Unfortunately, this *Sūtra* cannot be traced in the existing Pāli canonical texts.

Reference is made to one Gandhabba Pañcasikha in an old Pāli text[3]. This stray reference does not furnish us with any data to establish his indentity with Pañcaśikha, the reputed Sāṃkhya teacher. Elsewhere we find Buddha speaking of one Brahma Sanaṃkumāra (sk. Sanatkumāra) who having created a grosser personality, became in appearance as the Kumāra Pañcasikha.[4] The name of Sanatkumāra as a Sāṃkhya teacher is also read in the Epic along with Pañcaśikha, Āsuri and such other teachers

1 सांखञ्च योगञ्च सनातने द्वे, xii. 349. 73.

2 Also referred to by Candrakīrti with slight variations in reading, Commentary on The *Mādhyamika-Sūtra*, p. 567.

3 *Sakkapañha-sutta*. D. xxi. 1. 2.

4 *Janavasabha-sutta*, D. xviii. 18. Further, Pa caśikha is stated as the tenth *kumāra* in the *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 1759.

from whom the Gandharva Viśvāvasu is said to have received the knowledge of Sāṃkhya[1].

The doctrine of Arāḍa-kālama as set forth in the Buddha-Carita of Aśvaghoṣa (xii) also deserves special attention in this connection. Here Buddha before his enlightenment is found to approach before Arāḍa to seek perfect knowledge by which one can completely overcome miseries. In reply to the question of Buddha, Arāḍa offers an exposition of his philosophy which is nothing but on offshoot of Sāṃkhya. But the Pāli texts nowhere portray such a comprehensive account of the view of Arāḍa as Aśvaghoṣa does. Hence in the opinion of some scholars, the authenticity of the account of Aśvaghoṣa is questionable[2]. However, it can be held without any hesitation that even at the time of Aśvaghoṣa, Sāṃkhya was regarded as a very ancient system of thought and he definitely knew it to be a Pre-Bhuddistic one.

The Jainas also refer to the Sāṃkhya teachers, their works and tenets here and there in their canonical texts. But the dates of these texts are uncertain and hence it is not possible to deduce any correct information therefrom as regards the antiquities of the Sāṃkhya system.

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1 XII. 318. 59-62.

2 In the *Ariyapariyesana-sutta* (*Majjhima*, 26), Buddha is found to make a passing remark upon Āḷāra-kālāma. On being asked by Buddha as to what point he himself had reached and realised of the doctrine he had entered on, Āḷāra states that he had reached up to the plane of Naught (*ākiñcaññāyatanaṁ pavedesi*). Similarly, in the *Buddha-carita* (xii. 63) also, Arāḍa speaks of the final stage as such :

अध्यात्मकुशलस्त्वन्यो निवर्त्यात्मानमात्मना
किञ्चिन्नास्तीति संपश्यन्नाकिञ्चन्य इति स्मृतः, Cf. एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम्, Kā, 64.

Sāṃkhya and the Abhidharma literature

The Abhidharma literature (Skt.) is far more superior in philosophical discussions to the Pāli texts that we have examined before. It is indeed astonishing to notice that some of the fundamental conceptions of the Abhidharmists together with the manner of argument advanced by them to establish their validity, closely follow those of the particular school of Sāṃkhya represented in the Yoga-sūtra and specially in its Bhāsya[1]. Let us first of all examine the *guṇas* of the Sāṃkhya and the *dharmas* of the Abhidharmists which constitute the basic conceptions of their respective systems[2].

The advocates of Sāṃkhya explain the phenomenal world, physical as well as mental, by the *guṇas* which are infra-atomic *quanta* of three different energies, *viz* ; illumination, activity and inertia. Their mutual inter-actions give rise to everything whether physical or mental. Speaking briefly, all entities other than the *puruṣa* are the conglomerations of these *guṇas* which are infinitesimal particles of reals, rather forces than substance[3]. They are dynamical and are in a state of constant change[4]. The Sautrāntikas also explain in their turn all phenomena as the assemblage of the minutest units of force, which are called *dharmas* and like the *guṇas* they are also in a state of constant change and give rise to new entities in every succeeding moment. But the serious deviation lies in the fact that the *dharmas* are momentary units and do not retain their existence in the succeeding moment, while

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1 The point has already received attention of Prof. Stcherbatsky, *Central conception of Buddhism*, chapter xii, also see n3, p. 47.

2 Discussed in detail by Prof. Stcherbatsky, *The dharmas of the Buddhists and the guṇas of the Sāṃkhya*, I.H.Q. Vol. x, pp. 737-60.

3 See *Yogabhāṣya*, ii. 18 & iv. 13.

4 'चलञ्च गुणवृत्तम्', *ibid*, iii. 13 & iv. 15.

Sāṃkhya speaks of a *dharmin* which is a pervading principle, manifesting itself in and through the *dharmas*[1]. Though the manifestations i.e. the *dharmas* are in a state of flux, thereby they do not affect the *dharmin* in any way with which they are inherently connected—a conception which is always rejected by the Sautrāntikas; for they are not prepared to admit the existence of any such *dharmin* or abiding principle apart from the *dharmas*.

Secondly, the orthodox school of Sāṃkhya postulates the existence of a subtle intermediate body which transmigrates in the next world after death. The Sarvāstivādins and later Mahīśāsakas also believed in the existence of such a body (*antarābhava*)[2].

Both the Sarvāstivādins and the Sāṃkhya-Yogins are keen to establish the reality of the past and future and are found to advance almost the same arguments in support of their view. The Sarvāstivādins urge that in the entire absence of an underlying object, its cognition cannot arise at all. If the past and future did not really exist, their cognition also would be non-existent. But in reality it is not such. Hence, past and future really exist. Again, a deed whether good or bad produces its fruition at a future moment, for it requires some amount of time to become ripe. If the past and future do not exist, then a deed which had been executed in the past moment could not produce its fruition at a future moment. Hence, past and future are existents[3].

The Yoga-system also establishes the reality of the past and future in a similar manner. The sūtra '**अतीतानागतं स्वरूपतोऽस्त्यध्व-**

1 य एतेष्वभिव्यक्तानभिव्यक्तेषु धर्मेष्वनुपाती सामान्यविशेषात्मा, सोऽन्वयी धर्मी, *Yoga-bhāṣya* iii.14; also see धर्मिविक्रियैवैषा धर्मद्वारा प्रपञ्चयते, iii.13.

2 Masuda, *Origin and Doctrines of the Early Indian Buddhist Schools*, Asia Major, Vol. ii. 1925, pp. 31-2, n3.

3 See the commentaries on the *Abhidharma-kośa*, v. 24.

भेदाद् धर्माणाम्' (iv. 12) bears testimony to this. Here, the Bhāṣya argues that if the past and the future did not exist in reality, then in the absence of any substratum their cognition also would not arise at all. Further, in case of the negation of past and future, the fact that former deeds produce their fruition in future would always remain inexplainable. If any deed whether performed with a view to enjoy the merit to be obtained therefrom or to attain emancipation would tend to no result at all, then the performance of meritorious deeds would be futile. Thus we find that both the Sarvāstivādins and the Sāṃkhya-Yogins apply almost the same process of reasoning in proving the reality of past and future.

In this connection it should be taken into account that neither Sāṃkhya nor Yoga admits of the existence of 'time' as a separate entity. The Yoga-bhāṣya emphatically states that 'time' is an empty construction of the mind without any reality behind it[1]. Though they insist on the reality of past and future, one need not apprehend that the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya is thereby going to controvert his own statement. The fact is this that the past and the future whose reality is admitted above refer to the different stages of an entity and they do not speak of the duration-time. Here, both Sāṃkhya and Sarvāstivādins explain the reality of past and present by the term *adhvan* which speaks of a transitional period as opposed to *kāla*, the duration-time.

Most interesting is to observe the four different theories of the Sarvāstivādin teachers, propounded with a view to explain the relation of the permanent essence of an element and the various manifestations it undergoes in its past, present and future stages. In this connection, four prominent teachers hold four different views.

(i) The venerable Dharmatrāta maintained a change of existence (**भावान्यथावादी**). He holds that an element has got

1 स खल्वयं कालो वस्तुशून्यो बुद्धिनिर्माणः……, iii, 52,

different existence at different times and in course of transition, it does not lose itself entirely. The manner of existence is only changed and not the essence ; just as a golden pot when broken, changes its form only, but the gold itself is not affected thereby at all. Similarly, an element which enters into its present stage from the future one, gets rid of its future stage and when from the present it becomes past, it gives up its present stage and retains the present one. But the substance itself remains the same always.

(ii) Ghoṣaka holds that an element changes its aspect in different times (**लक्षणान्यथावादी**). For instance, an element when enters into its past stage, retains its past aspect without being detached from its present and future stages ; when it is in its present stage, it retains its present aspect without being detached from its past and future stages and so on. This is illustrated by the case of a passionate man who when in love with a particular woman does not thereby totally ignore his love for other women. The fact is this that his passion becomes prominent at the time for the particular woman whom he loves, whereas it is then latent in the case of other women.

(iii) Vasumitra advocates a change of condition (**अवस्था-ऽन्यथावादी**). He maintains that the condition under which an element does not produce its function is called future, when produces it, it is called present and when having produced it ceases to function, it is then called past. Thus everywhere there is a change of condition and not of the very essence of the element itself. This is illustrated by a line which when marked in the place of tens becomes ten, when in the place of hundred becomes hundred and so on.

(iv) Finally, Buddhadeva was of opinion that past, present and future were contingent upon one another (**अन्यथाऽन्यथिक**) ; just as the same woman becomes a mother with respect to her child and a daughter with respect to her mother.

It is curious to notice that Patañjali also refers to these

different forms of manifestations in the *Sūtra* '**एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्म-लक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याताः**' (iii. 13). The Yoga-bhāṣya explains and illustrates them almost in the same language as has been done by the Sarvāstivādins[1]. Of these, the **धर्मपरिणाम** of Patañjali does not differ from the **भावपरिणाम** of the Buddhists, for the Bhāṣya itself counts **धर्म** and **भाव** as the same thing. Buddhadeva's theory is

1 After the manner of Vasubandhu on the *Abhidharma-kośa*, Kā, V. 25, Kamalaśila also in his commentary on the *Tattva-saṃgraha* (*Trikālya-parīkṣā* p. 504), is found to utter the following lines in this connection :

तत्र भावान्यथावादी भदन्तधर्मत्रातः, स किलाह, धर्मस्याध्वसु वर्तमानस्य भावान्यथात्वमेव केवलं न तु द्रव्यस्येति । यथा सुवर्णद्रव्यस्य कटक-केयूर-कुण्डलाद्यभिधाननिमित्तस्य गुणस्यान्यथात्वं न सुवर्णस्य तथा धर्मस्यानागतादिभावादन्यथात्वम् । तथाहि अनागतभाव-परित्यागेन वर्तमानभावं प्रतिपद्यते धर्मो वर्तमानभावपरित्यागेन चातीतभावम्, नतु द्रव्यान्यथात्वम्, सर्वत्र द्रव्यस्याव्यभिचारात् ।

लक्षणान्यथावादी भदन्तघोषकः । स किलाह, धर्मोऽध्वसु वर्तमानोऽतीतोऽतीतलक्षणयुक्तो-ऽनागतप्रत्युत्पन्नाभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यामवियुक्तः । यथा पुरुष एकस्यां स्त्रियां रक्तः शेषास्वविरक्तः, एवमनागत-प्रत्युत्पन्नावपि वाच्ये ।

अवस्थाऽन्यथावादी भदन्तवसुमित्रः । स किलाह, धर्मोऽध्वसु वर्तमानोऽवस्थामवस्थां प्राप्यान्योऽन्यो निर्दिश्यतेऽवस्थाऽन्तरतो न द्रव्यतः ; द्रव्यस्य त्रिष्वपि कालेष्वभिन्नत्वात् । यथा मृद्गुडिका एकाङ्के प्रक्षिप्ता एकमित्युच्यते, शताङ्के शतम्, सहस्राङ्के सहस्रम् ; तथा कारित्रेऽवस्थितो भावो वर्तमानस्ततः प्रच्युतोऽतीत स्तदप्राप्तोऽनागत इति ।

अन्यथाऽन्यथिको बुद्धदेवः । स किलाह, धर्मोऽध्वसु वर्तमानः पूर्वापरमपेक्ष्यान्योन्य उच्यत इति । यथैका स्त्री माता चोच्यते दुहिता चेति ।

Similarly the Yoga-bhāṣya also argues :

तत्र धर्मस्य धर्मिणि वर्तमानस्यैवाध्वसु अतीतानागतवर्तमानेषु भावान्यथात्वम् । यथा सुवर्णभाजनस्य भित्त्वाऽन्यथा क्रियमाणस्य भावान्यथात्वं भवति न द्रव्यान्यथात्वमिति ।

लक्षणपरिणामः—धर्मोऽध्वसु वर्तमानोऽतीतलक्षणयुक्तोऽनागतवर्तमानाभ्यां लक्षणाभ्याम-वियुक्तः, तथाऽनागतोऽनागतलक्षणयुक्तो वर्तमानातीताभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यामवियुक्तः, तथा वर्तमानो वर्तमान-लक्षणयुक्तोऽतीतानागताभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यायवियुक्त इति । यथा पुरुष एकस्यां स्त्रियां रक्तो न शेषासु विरक्तो भवतीति ।

न धर्मी त्र्यध्वा धर्मास्तु त्र्यध्वानः, ते लक्षिता अलक्षिताश्च तां तामवस्थां प्राप्नुवन्तोऽन्यत्वेन प्रतिनिर्दिश्यन्ते अवस्थाऽन्तरतो न द्रव्यान्तरतः, यथैका रेखा शतस्थाने शतं दशस्थाने दश एकञ्चैकस्थाने, यथा चैकत्वेऽपि स्त्री माता चोच्यते दुहिता च स्वसा चेति ।

not counted separately in the Yoga system. Probably it was included in the **अवस्थापरिणाम** ; for the very illustration of the same female as being the mother and daughter finds its place there along with that of the 'mark' which is counted as ten, hundred and one accordingly as it is made in the place of tens, hundred and unit etc.

Of the four theories mentioned above, only that of Vasumitra found general acceptance to the Sarvāstivādins, while the rest were rejected by themselves. But the Sāṃkhya-Yogins accepted all these views with a synthetic spirit. In this connection, the Yoga-bhāṣya emphatically remarks that practically there is only one kind of manifestation of the object which is being treated differently under different circumstances[1].

The question whether the idea of these different manifestations were received by the Sarvāstivādins from the Sāṃkhya or it was the Sāṃkhya who received them from the Buddhists is not easy to ascertain. Vyāsa who is not generally counted as a very early authority on the subject may be influenced by the Buddhists, but it also should be taken into account that the later Sarvāstivādins reject the theory of Dharmatrāta on the ground that such a view would drift them towards Sāṃkhya[2].

Further, while establishing the reality of the past and the future, the Vaibhāṣika is also charged by the Sautrāntika as advocating ultimately nothing but the theory of the followers of Vārṣagaṇya. In this connection, the Sautrāntika is found to urge that "if everything without any exception is pre-existent, there can be nothing that could have a force to produce anything ! In the end it comes to the same as the theory of the followers of Vārṣagaṇya. According to them there is neither production of something new nor

1 'एक एव द्रव्यपरिणामो भेदेनोपदर्शितः', iii. 13.

2 तत्र प्रथमः परिणामवादित्वात् सांख्यमतान्न भिद्यते, Kamalaśīla on *Tattva-saṃgraha*, p. 504. Also see the commentaries on the *Abhidharma-koṣa*, Kā. 25.

extinction of something existent : what exists is always existent, what does not exist will never become existent"[1].

Thus it appears that the Vaibhāṣikas were, more or less, influnced by Sāṃkhya in establishing their special theories[2].

SĀṂKHYA ACCOUNTS IN THE CARAKA-SAṂHITĀ AND BUDDHA-CARITA

The Caraka-Saṃhitā here and there deals with some topics of philosophical interest and some of them contain clear traces of Sāṃkhya[3]. In the beginning of the first chapter of the eighth book, the pupil Agniveśa is found to ask Ātreya about the nature of *ātman*. In reply to this, Ātreya speaks of the three different types of *ātman* as are conceived from the different angles of vision. Of these, the first one is the conglomeration of the five material substances and the conscious element, the second forms the pure consciousness alone and the third being the conglomeration of twenty-four principles which comprise the mind, the ten organs, the five objects of the senses and the eight-fold *prakṛti* (viii. i. 15-16) The first *puruṣa* is the ordinary individual (**षड्धातवः समुदिता लोक इति शब्दं लभन्ते, तद् यथा पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशं ब्रह्म चाव्यक्तमिति**, viii. v. 5). The second type wholly tallies with what is conceived in the Sāṃkhya literature. The third one deserves special attention. Its

1 Stcherbatsky, Vasubandhu on Sarvāstivāda, *Central conception of Buddhism*, p. 89.

2 Perhaps the influence of Sāṃkhya upon the Abhidharma literature was brought about by scholars who had been previously adherents of Sāṃkhya, but later on embraced Buddhism. For instance, Harivarman (3rd century A.D.) is said to have been a follower of Sāṃkhya before he became a Buddhist. But he introduced some doctrines of Sāṃkhya in his *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*, Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p. 5n. Similar may be the case even with some of the earlier Sarvāstivādins.

3 The fact came to the notice of Prof. S. N. Dasgupta for the first time, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, pp. 213-17.

twenty-four constituents are nothing but the evolutionary series of the Sāṃkhya[1]. But the *puruṣa* of Sāṃkhya is nothing but the pure consciousness itself and it is generally reckoned as the twenty-fifth principle. Further, Sāṃkhya is always keen to differentiate the *puruṣa* from the group of the *prakṛti*. Then why does Caraka maintain the *rāśi*, i. e. the conglomeration of the twenty-four principles as the *puruṣa*[2] which from the strict Sāṃkhya point of view cannot be called *puruṣa* at all ? The answer proceeds from the statement of Caraka himself. He concludes that the supreme *puruṣa* is not subjected to birth, for it is without any beginning. But the *puruṣa* which is called *rāśi* is the out-come of delusion, desire and hatred (viii. i. 52). It is endowed with delusion, happiness misery, life and death (i. 36) ; it is the object of medical treatment (**चिकित्सां च वेद्यं यच्चात्र किञ्चन**, i. 37). Further, Caraka is an authority on the Āyurveda, and it is natural that his interest should be centerd upon the type of *puruṣa* that can undergo medical treatment ; but the *puruṣa* of Sāṃkhya is always without any modification and hence a physician has very little to do with such a *puruṣa*. Speaking briefly, the *rāśi* which is the conglomeration of the twenty-four principles is nothing but the individual and it passes for the *puruṣa* in its ordinary sense. Further, a critical survey of the entire text of Caraka reveals the fact that he was highly influenced by Vaiśesika and Sāṃkhya. The first conception of the individual proceeds from the standpoint of Vaiśeṣika and the last from that of Sāṃkhya. But the difficulty is not still removed. While speaking of the first *puruṣa* he states that it is the conglomeration of the five material substances and the conscious element, whereas in the case of the *rāśi*, he absolutely disregards the conscious

1 This series differs from the traditional Sāṃkhya in some respects, for further discussion about it, see below p. 103.

2 चतुर्विंशतिको ह्येष राशिः पुरुषसंज्ञकः, *Śārīra*, i. 34. Also compare 'स सप्तदशकेनापि राशिना युज्यते च सः', *Mbh.* xii. 351. 16. where *rāśi* speaks of the subtle body.

element. Under these circumstances, the *rāśi* can be better treated as a dead body which is also devoid of consciousness.

In viii. i. 59—67, Caraka deals with the *vyakta* and *avyakta*, *prakṛti* and *vikāra*, *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña*. Let us examine all these points and see whether we can arrive at a satisfactory solution of the problem as raised above.

The eight-fold *prakṛti* as it is stated there, comprises the five gross elements, the *ahaṃkāra*, *buddhi* and *avyakta*. The *vikāras* are sixteen in number and they are the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the mind and the five objects of the senses (i. 62-3). Thus we find that the *prakṛti* and *vikāra* groups contain twenty-four principles in all and they do not differ from the *rāśi* which is also held to be the conglomeration of these twenty-four principles. But these principles which constitute the *prakṛti* and the *vikāra* groups are further divided into *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña*. *Kṣetra* is the combination of the twenty-four principles except the *avyakta*, whereas *avyakta* is known to be the *kṣetrajña* (i. 64). From *avyakta* comes out *buddhi*, from *buddhi* appears *ahaṅkāra* and from *ahaṅkāra* come out the five gross elements. This conception of *kṣetrajña* as well as the manner of the evolution of the *tattvas* differs in some fundamental points from the orthodox Sāṃkhya. First of all let us examine the conception of *avyakta*. In the orthodox Sāṃkhya, *avyakta* is read as a synonym of *prakṛti*. Caraka also states this to be one of the constituents of the eight-fold *prakṛti* and holds *buddhi* to be its evolute, and so far he does not practically deviate from the traditional Sāṃkhya. But it is curious to notice that he identifies *avyakta* with *kṣetrajña* which ordinarily passes for the *ātman*. This is not all. He emphatically declares *avyakta*, *pradhāna*, *prakṛti*, *jīva*[1] as the

1 Johnston wrongly remarks that *jiva* is not referred to anywhere by Caraka, *Early Sāṃkhya*, p. 46. The word occurs in *Śārīra*, iv. 7. See also p. 102, footnote 1.

synonym of *ātman*[1], which the orthodox Sāṃkhya cannot sanction at any rate ; for its main interest is to show the *ātman* and the *prakṛti* as the two distinct principles. Speaking briefly, in the opinion of Caraka, *avyakta* or *prakṛti* and the *ātman* constitutes one single principle[2] and this is why he enumerates twenty-four principles in all.

The identity of *avyakta* with *puruṣa* is also hinted at in the expression **'पुरुषावस्थमव्यक्तं परमार्थं न्यवेदयत्'** *Mbh.* xii. 218. 12, where Pañcaśikha is found to state that the supreme reality is the *avyakta* in the state of *puruṣa*[3]. Further, Yājñavalkya also refers to a school of Sāṃkhya which holds *puruṣa* as the twenty-fourth principle[4]. Hence it appears that there had been a school of Sāṃkhya which combined *avyakta* and *puruṣa* as one principle and Caraka was an exponent of that particular school.

The first chapter of the *Śārīra* is an admixture of Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika views. We find that the answer to the question of the enquiring pupil proceeds sometimes from the standpoint of Sāṃkhya and for the most part from that of the Vaiśeṣika. Thus we find that the supreme self is stated to be endowed with will, hatred, happiness, misery[5] etc, a purely Vaiśeṣika view. Such

1 See, तस्माज् ज्ञः प्रकृतिश्चात्मा द्रष्टा कारणमेव च, i. 340, also... चेतनाधातुः.... मन्ता बोधयिता....पुरुषः....प्रधानमव्यक्तं जीवो ज्ञः....चान्तरात्मा चेति, iv. 7.

2 The *Yājñavalkya-saṃhitā* also identifies *avyakta* with *ātman* in the hemistich 'अव्यक्तमात्मा क्षेत्रज्ञः क्षेत्रस्यास्य निगद्यते' iii. 178.

3 Nīlkaṇṭha, the commentator, explains the fragment in the light of Vedānta.

4 See, षड्विंशं पञ्चविंशञ्च चतुर्विंशं च पश्यति, *Mbh.* xii. 318. 72.
also, पञ्चविंशोऽभिमन्येत नान्योऽस्ति परतो मम,
न चतुर्विंशको ग्राह्यो मनुजैर्ज्ञानदर्शिभिः ॥, 73-4.

5 इच्छा द्वेषः सुखं दुःखं प्रयत्नश्चेतना धृतिः,
बुद्धिः स्मृतिरहङ्कारो लिङ्गानि परमात्मनः, i. 71.

instances have sometimes rendered it difficult to differentiate the genuine Sāṃkhya accounts from those of the Vaiśeṣika.

But in other important respects his exposition of Sāṃkhya does not necessarily deviate from the ordinary one. For instance, the *guṇas* and their characteristics are referred to here and there. The Sāṃkhya theory of causation is clearly hinted at in the expression **'सतो ह्यवस्थाऽन्तरगमनमात्रमेव हि जन्मोच्यते'** (iii. 16). The existence of a subtle intermediate body capable to migrate into the next world[1], is also maintained in i. 51.

Let us now turn our attention to the twelfth canto of the Buddha-carita of Aśvaghoṣa where Arāḍa, the former teacher of Buddha, is found to offer an exposition of his philosophy which is nothing but a brief treatment of one of the various schools of Sāṃkhya. From a critical examination of this account of Sāṃkhya we find that it tallies to a considerable extent with what is furnished by Caraka in the *Śārīra-sthāna* of his medical treatise. We are showing some points of their striking similarities below :

(i) Unlike the Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, both Caraka and Aśvaghoṣa classify the *avyakta* and its evolutes into two groups. The first is the eight-fold *prakṛti* which constitutes the *avyakta, buddhi, ahaṅkāra* and the five gross elements ; the second being the *vikāra* (modification) group which comprises the ten organs, the mind and the five objects of the senses. Neither Caraka nor Aśvaghoṣa mentions the *tanmātras* and both of them count the objects of the senses as the *tattvas*. The main difference of opinion lies in the fact that Caraka combines the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* into one single principle which he calls *avyakta*, whereas Aśvaghoṣa is not found to advocate such a peculiar view. Both the authors speak of the division of *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña* and at the same time

1 अहङ्कारः फलं कर्म देहान्तरगतिः स्मृतिः,
विद्यते सति भूतानां कारणे देहमन्तरा ।

are keen to differentiate the *avyakta* from the *vyakta*, *i.e.* the unseen from the seen.

(ii) While explaining the cause of misery, Caraka states that "delusion, desire, hatred and activity—these four are at the root of inclination and this in its turn gives rise to **अहङ्कार** (egoism), **सङ्ग** (attachment), **संशय** (doubt), **अभिसंप्लव** (wrong conjunction), **अभ्यवपात** (down fall), **विप्रत्यय** (wrong notion), **अविशेष** (lack of descrimination) and **अनुपाय** (wrong means). Just as trees with huge branches subjugate a tender tree that springs up by their side, even so the *puruṣa* is overcome by these eight factors and as a result of this he fails to transcend his worldly existence."

Of these, the idea that I am endowed with such a caste, such beauty, such wealth, such intellect, such character, such learning, such rank, such age and such influence is said to be *ahaṅkāra*.

Saṅga or attachment is that stage when mind, speech, body and activity do not tend to emancipation.

Saṃśaya is to express doubt in the existence of the fruits of action, emancipation, soul and the future life etc.

The idea that I am unchanged under all circumstances, I am the creator, I am naturally established, I am the conglomeration of the body, senses, intellect, memory and the like, is what is called *abhisaṃplava*.

That parents, brothers, wife, children, kinsmen and relatives are mine and I am theirs is to be regarded as *abhyavapāta*.

Vipratyaya is the wrong notion of what should be done and what should not be done, of what is beneficial and what is not beneficial, of what is good and what is bad.

Aviśeṣa is the lack of discrimination between the pairs of opposites, such as the conscious and the unconscious element, the primary constituents and the modifications, inclination and abstention.

Sprinkling (of water with *kuṣa* grass), fasting, *Agnihotra*

ceremony, taking ablutions thrice in a day, invocation, performance of rituals on one's own account as well as for others, begging for religious purpose, sacrificing life on entering into water or fire and such other practices are to be known as *anupāya*.

Aśvaghoṣa also enumerates and defines these eight factors which are at the root of worldly existence. The sequence of these motive factors as counted by Caraka and Aśvaghoṣa is not the same and both the teachers slightly differ here and there in their definitions[1]. To make the point clearer, we are quoting below the corresponding portions of the Caraka-Saṃhitā and the Buddha-Carita :

भगवानुवाच—मोहेच्छा-द्वेषकर्ममूला प्रवृत्तिः, तज्जा ह्यहङ्कार-सङ्ग-संशयाभिसंप्लवाभ्यवपात-विप्रत्ययाविशेषानुपायास्तरुणमिव द्रुममतिविपुलशाखास्तरवोऽभिभूय पुरुषमवतत्यैवोतिष्ठन्ते, यैरभिभूतो न सत्तामतिवर्तते। तत्रैवंजाति-रूप-वित्त-वृत्त-बुद्धि-शील-विद्याभिजन-वयोवीर्य्य-प्रभावसम्पन्नोऽहमित्यहङ्कारः। यन्मनोवाक्कायकर्म नापवर्गाय, स सङ्गः। कर्मफल-मोक्ष-पुरुष-प्रेत्यभावादयः सन्ति न वेति संशयः। सर्वावस्थास्वनन्योऽहमहं स्रष्टा स्वभाव-संसिद्धोऽहमहं शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिविशेषराशिरिति ग्रहणमभिसंप्लवः। मम मातृ-पितृ-भ्रातृ-दारापत्य-वन्धु-मित्र-भृत्यगणो, गणस्य चाहमित्यभ्यवपातः। कार्य्याकार्य-हिताहित-शुभाशुभेषु विपरीताभिनिवेशो विप्रत्ययः। ज्ञाज्ञयोः प्रकृति-विकारयोः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्योश्च सामान्यदर्शनमविशेषः। प्रोक्षणानशनाग्निहोत्र-त्रिःसवनाभ्युक्षणावाहन-यजनयाजनयाचन-सलिलहुताशन-प्रवेशादयः समारम्भाः प्रोच्यन्ते ह्यनुपायाः।

Caraka, on *Śarīra*. V. 12—20.

विप्रत्ययादहंकारात् संदेहादभिसंप्लवात्।
अविशेषानुपायाभ्यां सङ्गादभ्यवपाततः ॥ २४ ॥
तत्र विप्रत्ययो नाम विपरीतं प्रवर्तते।
अन्यथा कुरुते कार्यं मन्तव्यं मन्यतेऽन्यथा ॥ २५ ॥
ब्रवीम्यहमहं वेद्मि गच्छाम्यहमहं स्थितः।
इतीहैवमहंकारस्त्वनहंकार वर्तते ॥ २६ ॥

1 Some of these variations are pointed out by Johnston in his translation of the corresponding verses of the *Buddha-Carita*.

यस्तु भावानसंदिग्धानेकीभावेन पश्यति ।
मृत्पिण्डवदसंदेह संदेहः स इहोच्यते ॥ २७ ॥

य एवाहं स एवेदं मनो बुद्धिश्च कर्म च ।
यश्चैवैष गणः सोऽहमिति यः सोऽभिसंप्लवः ॥ २८ ॥

अविशेषं विशेषज्ञ प्रतिबुद्धाप्रबुद्धयोः ।
प्रकृतीनां च यो वेद सोऽविशेष इति स्मृतः ॥ २९ ॥

नमस्कारवषट्कारौ प्रोक्षणाभ्युक्षणादयः ।
अनुपाय इति प्राज्ञैरुपायज्ञ प्रवेदितः ॥ ३० ॥

सज्जते येन दुर्मेधा मनोवाग्बुद्धिकर्मभिः ।
विषयेष्वनभिष्वङ्ग सोऽभिष्वङ्ग इति स्मृतः ॥ ३१ ॥

ममेदमहमस्येति यद्दुःखमभिमन्यते ।
विज्ञेयोऽभ्यवपातः स संसारे येन पात्यते ॥ ३२ ॥

Buddha-Carita, xii.

(iii) The conception of liberation, as advocated in the Sāṃkhya accounts of these two texts, also deserves special attention. In this connection, it is stated in the Caraka-Saṃhita that in the final stage of renunciation all knowables become known and as a result of this all sorts of feelings with their roots are exterminated (*śārīra*, i. 153). After this the individual soul which becomes one with *brahman* can no longer be experienced; being divested of all ideas, it then leaves no trace of its individual existence. *Brahman* is indestructible and without attributes, and it is the goal of all who know it[1]. Thus we find that in the opinion of Caraka, *brahman* is the supreme felicity of life and it is identified with the stage of liberation.

1 अतः परं ब्रह्मभूतो भूतात्मा नोपलभ्यते,
निःसृतः सर्वभावेभ्यश्चिह्नं यस्य न विद्यते ।
गतिर्ब्रह्मविदां ब्रह्म तच्चाक्षरमलक्षणम्,
ज्ञानं ब्रह्मविदां चात्र नाज्ञस्तज्ज्ञातुमर्हति ।, i. 154-55

The identity of *brahman*[1] with the stage of liberation is further mentioned explicitly in the following couplet which reads the various synonyms of final beatitude :

[2]विपापं विरजः शान्तं परमक्षरमव्ययम्,
अमृतं ब्रह्म निर्वाणं पर्यायैः शान्तिरुच्यते ।

Like Caraka, Aśvaghoṣa also identifies the stage of liberation with *brahman*. Thus he is found to state that 'the supreme *brahman* is without any attribute, it is real and immutable. This is called liberation by the wise men. The following verse bears testimony to this view :

[3]एतत् परमं ब्रह्म निर्लिङ्गं ध्रुवमक्षरम्,
यन्मोक्ष इति तत्त्वज्ञाः कथयन्ति मनीषिणः ।

These remarkble similarities of the Sāṃkhya accounts of Caraka and Aśvaghoṣa tend to suggest that both of them received their ideas from a common source, and evidently it was different from the school which was represented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Besides these, there are some other technical terms of Sāṃkhya which find their place in the accounts of Aśvaghoṣa, whereas Caraka does not care to discuss them seriously. First of all, let us turn our attention to the definition of *sattva*. Here Aśvaghoṣa states that the primary matter, its modifications, birth, death and old age—all these are said to be *sattva*[4]. Reference is also made to *sattva* in the fragment 'व्यक्तमव्यक्तं वा सत्त्वमात्मत्वेनाभिप्रतीत्य……, which is quoted in the Yoga-bhāṣya (ii. 5) and attributed to Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati. But Caraka does not define the term,

1 Elsewhere Caraka states the inner self as the *brahman*. See तस्य च पुरुषस्य पृथिवी मूर्त्तिः………ब्रह्मान्तरात्मा, v. 6.
2 *Śārīra*, v. 34.
3 *Buddha-Carita*, xii. 65.
4 प्रकृतिश्च विकारश्च जन्म मृत्यु जरैव च
तत्तावत् सत्त्वमित्युक्तं स्थिरसत्त्वपरेहि तत्, *Buddha-Carita*, xii. 17.

though he refers to the expression 'शुद्धसत्त्व' here and there. The varities of five-fold ignorance (पञ्चपर्वा अविद्या) are also enumerated and defined in the Buddha-Carita (xii. 33-7) whereas Caraka does not mention them at all. The doctrine of this five-fold ignorance is attributed to Vārṣagaṇya by Vācaspati[1].

Further, there are some ideas in the exposition of the philosophy of Arāḍa, which are closely related to some of the passages of the Sāṃkhya accounts of the Epic. First of all, let us examine the conception of *vyakta* and its differentiation from the *avyakta*. In the opinion of Arāḍa, *vyakta* is that which is subject to birth, old age, disease and death, while the reverse is known to be the *avyakta*. This we know, from the following couplet of the Buddha-Carita (xii. 22) :

जायते जीर्यते चैव बाध्यते म्रियते च यत् ।
तद्व्यक्तमिति विज्ञेयमव्यक्तं तु विपर्ययात् ॥

A similar idea can be noticed also in the following couplets of the *Mbh.* (xii. 236. 30-1) :

प्रोक्तं तद्व्यक्तमित्येव जायते वर्द्धते च यत् ।
जीर्यते म्रियते चैव चतुर्भिर्लक्षणैर्युतम् ॥
विपरीतमतो यत्तु तदव्यक्तमुदाहृतम् ।

Secondly, Aśvaghoṣa is found to introduce some technical terms, such as प्रतिबुद्ध, अप्रबुद्ध[2] and the like, while depicting the philosophy of Arāḍa. The Epic also frequently refers to such terms in the Sāṃkhya accounts of Vaśiṣṭha and Yājñavalkya[3]. But these

1 अतएव पञ्चपर्वाऽविद्येत्याह भगवान् वार्षगण्यः, *Tattva-kaumudī*, *Kā*, 47. Also see, 'सेयं पञ्चपर्वा भवति अविद्या.......एते एव स्वसंज्ञाभिः तमो मोहो महामोह स्तामिस्रः अन्धतामिस्र इति, *Yoga-bhāṣya*, i. 8.

2 See, 'प्रतिबुद्धाप्रबुद्धौ च व्यक्तमव्यक्तमेव च' xii. 40, also 'स पुत्रोऽप्रतिबुद्धस्तु प्रजापतिरिहोच्यते', 21.

3. See above, pp. 48-9. The term 'अप्रतिबुद्ध' occurs even in a quotation in the *Yoga-bhāṣya* which runs thus : 'व्यक्तमव्यक्तं वा सत्वमात्मत्वेनाभिप्रतीत्य.......स सर्वोऽप्रतिबुद्धः' (ii. 5).

terms are conspicuous by their absence in the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā and its commentaries.

The classification of the twenty-four *tattvas* into two groups of eight primary constituents and sixteen modicafications, and consequently the negation of the *tanmātras* are also to be met with in the Epic[1].

Arāḍa is of opinion that ignorance, activity and desire—these three are at the root of the cycle of existence ; he who abides in these three cannot transcend existence. This we know from the evidence of the following verse :

अज्ञानं कर्म तृष्णा च ज्ञेयाः संसारहेतवः,
स्थितोऽस्मिंस्त्रितये जन्तुस्तत् सत्त्वं नातिवर्तते (xiii. 23).

The Epic also reiterates the same thing in the following couplet :

एवं पतति संसारे तासु तास्विह योनिषु,
अविद्या-कर्म-तृष्णाभिर्भ्राम्यमाणोऽथ चक्रवत् (iii. 2. 71).

Of these 'अज्ञान' and 'अविद्या' do not differ fundamentally.

Again, Arāḍa regards Jaigīṣavya, Janaka and Vṛddha-Parāśara as the upholders of his philosophy. The Epic also in its turn does not ignore the view of these celebrated exponents of Sāṃkhya[2].

Thus it appears that Aśvaghoṣa, Caraka, the Epic and even the authorities cited in the Yoga-bhāṣya were more or less influenced by a common school of Sāṃkhya. But Aśvaghoṣa deviates from all other Sāṃkhya teachers in one important point. His conception of the four kinds of meditations[3], the practice of which,

1 xii. 306. 27-9. Also see above, p. 42.

2 For Jaigīṣavya, see *Mbh.* xii. 229. For Janaka and Vṛddha-Parāśara, see xii. 218-9 and specially xii. 320. 24, where Vṛddha-Parāśara is identified with Pañcaśikha. Also see above, p. 80.

3 See, xii. 49-56.

in his opinion, gradually leads one to final emancipation, is conspicuous by its absence in any of the existing works on Sāṃkhya. These meditations correspond to some extent with those of the Buddhists ; but the fact whether these conceptions of the numerous meditations and trances were the independent achievements of the Buddhists or they were borrowed by Buddha from the Sāṃkhya is not possible to ascertain, for the data as are left to us are not adequate.

The doctrine of the *guṇas* does not find its place in the accounts of Arāḍa, hence Aśvaghoṣa is sometimes accused by scholars[1] for expounding a school of Sāṃkhya which does not speak of the *guṇas*. The reason of not incorporating the *guṇa* theory into the teachings of Arāḍa is not very far to seek. Araḍa's treatment is after all brief and concise. Like the *guṇa* theory, he also ignores other fundamental doctrines of Sāṃkhya. For instance, he is not found to speak of the *satkārya* theory which asserts that the effect really exists beforehand in its material cause, nor does he care to speak of the *pramāṇas* and their varieties. Does it thereby indicate that he is going to expound a form of Sāṃkhya which ignored not only the *guṇas*, but also the doctrine of causation and epistemology as well ? The fact is this that Aśvaghoṣa is after all writing a *Kāvya* and not a philosophical treatise. Hence for philosophical discussions, his space was limited. This is why he made a brief statement of the philosophy of Arāḍa and did not consider it necessary to set out his philosophy in detail. Thus we do not find any reasonable ground to accuse Aśvaghoṣa of having expounded a form of Sāṃkhya that did not speak of the *guṇas*.

That Aśvaghoṣa was not ignorant of the *guṇa* theory can be further proved from the evidence of the Buddha-Carita at xxvi. 10—14, where he is found to refute the doctrine of the *guṇas*[2].

1 See Keith, *Sāṃkhya System*, pp. 25-6.

2 Pointed out by Johnston, *Acts of the Buddha*, Introduction, lviii.

SĀṂKHYA TEACHERS AND THEIR WORKS

Kapila, the great sage, is regarded as the propounder of Sāṃkhya. In the Sāṃkhya tradition, he is held to be the first among the wise (आदिविद्वान्) and he appears at the beginning of each cycle of creation. Virtue, wisdom, dispassion and power are natural to him and he is the foremost of the *siddhas*. His *siddhi* or perfection is regarded as an instance of what is called 'जन्मसिद्धि'[1] *i.e.* he was endowed with perfection from the very moment of his birth. It is stated that out of compassion he imparted the knowledge of Sāṃkhya to Āsuri, his first disciple. This is corroborated by the expression 'आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्यात भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच' as quoted in the Yoga-bhāṣya (i. 25). The term 'निर्माणचित्त' deserves special attention. It shows that the teacher assumed a form by dint of his supernatural power and appeared before Āsuri to impart to him the knowledge of Sāṃkhya. This shows that Kapila had no physical body and thus he cannot be regarded as an historical person.

The *Mbh.* also mentions him to be the propounder of Sāṃkhya[2]. But he is somewhere stated as the incarnation of fire, somewhere as the light residing in the orb of the Sun and elsewhere as one of the mind-born sons (मानसपुत्र) of the god Brahman. Further, he is in one place identified with Viṣṇu and in another with Śiva. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa mentions him to be the fifth incarnation of Viṣṇu[3]. All these facts clearly point to his mythological origin and he may not be taken as an historical personage.

1 For *janma-siddhi*, see Y.S. iv. 1.

2 'सांख्यस्य वक्ता कपिलः परमर्षिः स उच्यते', xii. 349. 65.

3 'पञ्चमः कपिलो नाम सिद्धेशः कालविप्लुतम्
प्रोवाचासुरये सांख्यं तत्त्वग्रामविनिर्णयम्', i. 3. 10.

The initiation of Āsuri by Kapila, as depicted by Paramārtha, Māṭhara (Kā, 1) and Jayamaṅgalā (Kā, 70), is also fanciful. All these authorities declare unanimously that Kapila appeared thrice before Āsuri—each time after a lapse of a millenium. Perhaps the story came down to these teachers from the works of ancient authorities on the subject. Thus we find that mythological element is prominent everywhere and as a result of this, the historical fact has totally disappeared. Speaking briefly, Kapila cannot be taken as an historical personage. His name was associated with Sāṃkhya probably to give a greater sanctity to the system.

Further, the commentators as mentioned above characterise Āsuri with the epithet 'वर्षसहस्रयाजी', *i.e.* one who had performed sacrifices for thousand years. This shows that before his initiation, he was a staunch advocate of the Vedic sacrifices. The fact whether he was identical with Āsuri of Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa is not possible to ascertain. The Purāṇas read his name along with Kapila and such other mental creations of the god Brahman ; but Māṭhara (Kā, 1) and the Jaymaṅgalā (Kā, 70) mention the pupil of Kapila as a Brahmin, belonging to the clan of Āsuri. Hence it appears that some of the commentators regarded him as an historical person. The *Mbh.* states him to be the upholder of the doctrine of *brahman*[1].

Guṇaratna Sūri[2] attributes the following couplet to Āsuri :

[3]विविक्ते दृक्परिणतौ बुद्धौ भोगोऽस्य कथ्यते ।
प्रतिविम्बोदयः स्वच्छे यथा चन्द्रमसोऽम्भसि ॥

But how far he is correct, is difficult to ascertain.

1 xii. 218. 14.

2 See his exposition of Saṃkhya in the *Saḍdarśana-samuccaya.*

3 The commentary *Vyomavati* also quotes and explains this verse, but does not mention the source. The reading is slightly different ; it reads 'विविक्तादृक्परिणतौ', p. 521 (chowkhamba edition).

PAÑCAŚIKHA

In the hierarchy of the Sāṃkhya teachers, Pañcaśikha comes next to Āsuri from whom he is said to have obtained the knowledge of Sāṃkhya. Like Kapila and Āsuri, he is also portrayed mythologically in the Purāṇas.

It has been already pointed out (p. 91) that a Pāli text refers to one Brahma Sanaṃ-kumāra who having created a grosser personality became Kumāra Pañcaśikha in appearance. The Yuktidīpikā also regards Pañcaśikha as a Kumāra. Further, Sanatkumāra is known to be a mythical figure in the Sanskrit literature ; for he is said to have originated from the mind of god Brahman and elsewhere in the *Mbh.*, he is mentioned as a Sāṃkhya teacher along with Pañcaśikha and others. Taking everything into consideration it appears that one Pañcaśikha passed as a mythical figure even in the days of Buddha and he may even be identical with the Sāṃkhya teacher of that name as represented in the Purāṇas. Aśvaghoṣa[1] also in one place mentions Āsuri and Pañcaśikha as celestial beings.

However, Pañcaśikha figures as an historical personage in the Epic. In xii. 218, he is mentioned as the son of Kapilā, the female brahmin, and elsewhere his pupil Janaka states him as a mendicant belonging to the family of Parāśara[2]. Aśvaghoṣa also refers to one Vṛddha-Parāśara along with Janaka and Jaigīṣavya as an exponent of Sāṃkhya, and attempt has been already made (pp. 80-1) to identify him with the mendicant Pañcaśikha of the *Mbh.* Thus we find two Pañcaśikhas, one mythical and the

1 *Buddha-Carita*, xxi. 10, translated by Johnston, *Acta Orientalia* Vol. xv. p. 100.

2 *Mbh.* xii. 320. 24.

other historical. This Vṛddha-Parāśara alias Pañcaśikha must be placed at a period before Christ as even an early authority like Aśvaghoṣa speaks of him to be an ancient authority on the subject. Buddha also seems to pre-suppose him, for he is found to refute the doctrine of sense-control of one Pārāsarīya who appears to be identical with Pañcaśikha. The point has been already treated elaborately in pp. 80-1. The *Mbh.* also speaks of him as a teacher of remote antiquity. On the otherhand, if we assume that the Janaka-Pañcaśikha episode of the Epic conveys a faithful representation of his philosophy, it becomes difficult to place him at a period before Buddha, for some of his utterances in that episode, bear testimony to the fact that he is going to refute therein the doctrine of Buddhism[1].

The Philosophy of Pañcaśikha as depicted in the Epic deviates in some fundamental principles from the traditional Sāṃkhya and this has been already noticed by us (pp. 43-4) while discussing the Sāṃkhya accounts of the *Mbh.*

In order to corroborate its own statements, the Yoga-bhāṣya is found to quote some fragments here and there from the works

1 See, अविद्या कर्म तृष्णा च केचिदाहुः पुनर्भवे ।
कारणं लोभमोहौ तु दोषाणां तु निषेवनम् ॥
अविद्यां क्षेत्रमाहुर्हि कर्मबीजं तथा कृतम् ।
तृष्णासञ्जननं स्नेह एष तेषां पुनर्भवः ॥
.... xii. 218. 32-9.

Cp. अथ चेमान्यस्य द्वादशाङ्गस्य प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्य चत्वार्यङ्गानि सङ्घातक्रियायै हेतुत्वेन प्रवर्तन्ते । कतमानि चत्वारि, यदुताविद्या तृष्णा कर्म विज्ञानञ्च । तत्र विज्ञानं बीजस्वभावत्वेन हेतुः, कर्म क्षेत्रस्वभावत्वेन हेतुः, अविद्या तृष्णा च क्लेशस्वभावत्वेन हेतुः । कर्म-क्लेशा विज्ञानबीजं जनयन्ति । तत्र कर्म विज्ञानबीजस्य क्षेत्रकार्यं करोति, तृष्णा विज्ञानबीजं स्नेहयति, अविद्या विज्ञान-बीजमवकिरति । असतां चैषां प्रत्ययानां (विज्ञान)बीजस्याभिनिर्वृत्तिर्न भवति,...Candrakirti on 'द्वादशाङ्ग-परीक्षा', *Madhyamika-vṛtti*, p. 566.

of Sāṃkhya and Yoga teachers. Thus the Bhāṣya (i. 4,) quotes the aphorism **'एकमेव दर्शनं ख्यातिरेव दर्शनम्'** with the remark **'तथा च सूत्रम्'**, while Vācaspati states this to be the *sūtra* of Pañcaśikha. The *sūtras* as it is well known must be brief and concise. But it is astonishing to notice that even the longer quotations[1] in the Yoga-bhāṣya which under no circumstances can be regarded as *sūtras*, are sometimes attributed to Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati. It thus appears that Pañcaśikha was not only the author of a Sūtra, but also wrote a Bhāṣya or some such treatise in prose on Sāṃkhya-Yoga. But this does not seem to be convincing. Had Vācaspati ever seen the works of Pañcaśikha, he would have naturally furnished us with some accounts of them. Moreover, nowhere in his commentaries on Sāṃkhya and Yoga, he is found to acquaint us with any of the teachings of this celebrated teacher other than what have, in his opinion, already been quoted in the Yogabhāṣya. Hence the authenticity of his statement seems to be doubtful.

Further, the fragment **'रूपातिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण विरुध्यन्ते, सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते'** is quoted in the Yoga-bhāṣya (iii. 13) and Vācaspati regards this to be the view of Pañcaśikha. But the author of the Yukti-dīpikā who has every reason of being regarded as an earlier authority on the subject, attributes this to V ā r ṣ a g a ṇ y a[2]. Not only this, the Yoga-bhāṣya itself in one place attributes a quotation to this celebrated exponent of Sāṃkhya[3]. Taking everything into consideration, it appears that most of the longer quotations in prose in the Yoga-bhāṣya were taken from the work of Vārṣagaṇya and not from that of Pañcaśikha as

1 व्यक्तमव्यक्तं वा सत्वमात्मत्वेनाभिप्रतीत्य...सर्वोऽप्रतिबुद्धः, ii. 5 ; स्यात् स्वल्पः सङ्करः...करिष्यति, ii. 13.

2 तथा च भगवान् वार्षगण्यः पठति रूपातिशया..., p 72.

3 मूर्ति-व्यवधि-जातिभेदाभावान्नास्ति मूलपृथक्त्वमिति वार्षगण्यः, iii. 53.

Vācaspati thinks them to be. But what about the authorship of the Sūtra as referred to by Vyāsa himself? In the present state of our knowledge, it is not possible to determine precisely the fact whether the aphoristic treatise containing the said Sūtra[1] came from the pen of Pañcaśikha or from that of Vārṣagaṇya.

The Sāṃkhya-Sūtra refers to the view of Pañcaśikha[2] on the nature of 'invariable concomitance' (*vyāpti*) which plays a prominent part in logical discussions. Again, his view on the cause of the conjunction of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* is also referred to in vi. 68. But we are not prepared to attach too much weight to this Sūtra, for it is generally held to be a later work. Again, some of the later writers on Sāṃkhya are of opinion that Pañcaśikha wrote a commentary on the Tattvasamāsa-Sūtra. We shall disprove their view in our discussion on the 'Tattvasamāsa-Sūtra and its commentaries'. Bhoja and Hemacandra ascribe the authorship of a Kāvya treatise of the title of Śūdraka-kathā[3] to one Pañcaśikha, but it cannot be definitely stated whether he is identical with the re-nowned Sāṃkhya teacher of that name.

Ṣaṣṭitantra and its authorship

In the last verse of the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, Iśvarakṛṣṇa states that his treatise in seventy distiches is a compendium of the entire Ṣaṣṭitantra, divested of parables and the controversial doctrines of

1 The fact that there existed a Sūtra text upon Sāṃkhya even at an early period, can be noticed in the exprerssion 'पूर्वाचार्य-सूत्रप्रबन्धे' of the *Yukti-dīpikā*, p, 175. Further, in his *Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prākṛt Mss. in the Central Provinces and Berar*, Rai Bahadur Hiralal informs us of the existence of a Ms. of a *Sāṃkhya-Sūtra* of Pañcaśikhâcārya (No. 6371) in possession of Pt. Govinda Prasad Sastri of Jubbulpore. No opinion can be expressed here until the text is thoroughly examined.

2 आधेयशक्तियोग इति पञ्चशिखः, v. 32.

3 Pointed out by Krishnamachariar, *Classical Sanskrit Literature*, p. 461.

other teachers. This shows that the original work on the basis o which he composed the Kārikā, passed under the name of Ṣaṣṭitantra and the significance of the name was probably due to the fact that the text dealt with the sixty different topics of Sāṃkhya.

According to the Rājavārttika[1], the sixty topics of discussion consist of the ten fundamental principles, the five kinds of error, the nine contentments, the twenty-eight infirmities of the organs and the eight perfections. Of these, the ten fundamental principles constitute (1) the reality of *prakṛti*, (2) its unity, (3) its purposeful-ness, (4) its difference from the *puruṣa*, (5) its activity for the sake of the *puruṣa*, (6) the plurality of the *puruṣas*, (7) their union with and (8) release from the *prakṛti*, (9) the duration of the body and (10) inactivity of the *puruṣa*. The remaining fifty topics are dealt with in Kā, 47-51.

Unlike the Rājavārttika, the Ahirbyudhna-Saṃhitā of the Pañcarātra school furnishes a different list of the topics of the Ṣaṣṭitantra. It classifies them into two heads of *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta-maṇḍala*. The former consists of thirty-two topics called *tantras* and the latter of twenty-eight called *kāṇḍas*. This can be noticed in the following couplets of the Ahirbyudhna (xii. 18-30) :

सांख्यरूपेण सङ्कल्पो वैष्णवः कपिलादृषेः ।
उदितो यादृशः पूर्वं तादृशं शृणु मेऽखिलम् ॥
षष्टिभेदं स्मृतं तन्त्रं सांख्यं नाम महामुने ।
प्राकृतं वैकृतं चेति मण्डले द्वे समासतः ॥
प्राकृतं मण्डलं तत्र द्वात्रिंशद्भेदमिष्यते ।

तत्राद्यं ब्रह्मतन्त्रं तु द्वितीयं पुरुषाङ्कितम् ।
त्रीणि तन्त्राण्यथान्यानि शक्तेर्नियतिकालयोः ॥

1 Referred to by Vācaspati, kā. 72.

गुणतन्त्राण्यथ त्रीणि तन्त्रमक्षरपूर्वकम् ।
प्राणतन्त्रमथान्यत् तु कर्तृतन्त्रमथेतरत् ॥
सामितन्त्रमथान्यत्तु ज्ञानतन्त्राणि पञ्च च ।
क्रियातन्त्राणि पञ्चाथ मात्रातन्त्राणि पञ्च च ।
भूततन्त्राणि पञ्चेति त्रिंशद्द्वे च भिदा इमाः ॥
प्राकृतं मण्डलं प्रोक्तं वैकृतं मण्डलं शृणु ।

अष्टाविंशतिभेदं तन्मण्डलं वैकृतं स्मृतम् ।
कृत्यकाण्डानि पञ्चादौ भोगकाण्डं तथाऽ परम् ॥
वृत्तकाण्डं तथैकं तु क्लेशकाण्डानि पञ्च च ।
त्रीणि प्रमाणकाण्डानि ख्यातिकाण्डमतः परम् ॥
धर्म्मकाण्डमथैकं च काण्डं वैराग्यपूर्व्वकम् ।
अथैश्वर्य्यस्य काण्डं च गुणकाण्डमतः परम् ॥
लिङ्गकाण्डमथैकं च दुःखकाण्डमतः परम् ।
सिद्धिकाण्ड[1]मथैकञ्च काण्डं काषायवाचकम् ॥
तथा समयकाण्डं च मोक्षकाण्डमतः परम् ।
अष्टाविंशतिभेदं तदित्थं विकृतिमण्डलम् ॥

षष्टितन्त्राण्यथैकैकमेषां नानाविधं मुने ।
षष्टितन्त्रमिदं सांख्यं सुदर्शनमयं हरेः ।
आविर्बभूव सर्व्वज्ञात् परमर्षेर्महामुनेः ॥

From the evidence of the verses quoted above, we find that of the two series, the first one includes the topics on *brahman*, *puruṣa*, *śakti*, 'destiny' and 'time' Then come the three topics on the *guṇas* which are followed by *akṣara*. Next is that of the *prāṇas* which refer to the five vital breaths and they find an

1 The expression 'सिद्धिकाण्ड' also finds its place in the *Yukti-dipikā*, तयोरपूर्वम्—अष्टः शब्दोऽध्ययनमिति सि द्धि का ण्डा नु-पतितानि, p. 113.

important place here and there in the Sāṃkhya literature[1]. The *kartṛtantra* probably speaks of *ahaṅkāra* which is nothing but egoism and under whose influence the *puruṣa* thinks himself to be the agent. The significance of *sāmitantra*[2] is not clear. The term *sāmi* in sanskrit means 'half'. Perhaps this topic refers to 'mind' which is regarded as an organ of sense as well as of action. Speaking briefly, it is half **'ज्ञानेन्द्रिय'** and half **'कर्मेन्द्रिय'**. The remaining topics of this series are those of the five organs of sense, five organs of action, five subtle elements and five gross elements.

A careful perusal of these thirty-two topics which constitute the so called *prākṛta-maṇḍala* reveals some points of interest. First of all, let us take up the case of *brahman* which constitutes the first of these topics. The Kārikā ignores it altogether, but it has been already pointed out (pp. 26-8) that it found a prominent place in some of the early schools of Sāṃkhya. *Śakti* probably speaks of *prakṛti* which is held to be the store-house of energy. The term is also referred to here and there in the Ahirbyudhna, but it is difficult to ascertain the exact sense in which it is used. In ii. 57, it is defined as the material cause of the Universe (**जगत्प्रकृतिभावो यः सा शक्तिः परिकीर्त्तिता**) and in the hemistich **'यत् तद् गुणमयं रूपं शक्तेस्तस्याः प्रकीर्तितम्'** (vi. 16), the term evidently speaks of *prakṛti* which is held to be the conglomeration of the *guṇas* But it is astonishing to observe that in another place *puruṣa* is mentioned as one of the various aspects of the *śakti*, and it can be noticed in the following couplet :

व्यक्ताव्यक्त-पुमाख्याभिः तथा कालाख्ययामुने ।
उक्ता चतसृभिः सैव शक्तिर्वै सांख्ययोगयोः ॥ (51. 42)

1 'प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च' Kā, 29. For a fuller treatment of the *prāṇas*, see *Yukti-dīpikā*, pp. 125-9.

2 Prof. Keith has altered the reading into *Svāmin*, *Sāṃkhya System*, *p. 71*.

This reminds us of the expression 'देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम्' of the Śvet. up (I. 3), where it is stated that the self-power of the supreme deity is enveloped in his own *guṇas*. However, from this stray references it is not possible to determine precisely the fact whether the Ṣaṣṭitantra advocated the theistic coloured Sāṃkhya or not.

'Destiny' and 'time' are not regarded as separate categories in the orthodox Sāṃkhya. But the Ahirbyudhna, in its stray references to Sāṃkhya, attaches some importance to 'time'; for the verse as quoted above explicitly mentions 'time' as one of the aspects of *śakti*. Devala also in his brief exposition of Sāṃkhya in the *Mbh.*, is found to assign a prominent place to 'time'. In his opinion, it plays an important part in the building up of the cosmos[1].

These three factors, viz, 'शक्ति' (energy), 'नियति' (destiny) and 'काल' (time) play an important part in the speculations of the Bhāgavatas. They hold that at the time of dissolution *tamas* enters into *rajas*, *rajas* in its turn into *sattva*, *sattva* into *kāla*, *kāla* into *niyati*, *niyati* into *śakti*, *śakti* into the *puruṣa* and so on[2]. Thus it has become a point of investigation whether the Ahirbyudhna gave a Bhāgavata colouring in its enumeration of the topics of the Ṣaṣṭitantra.

Akṣara deserves special attention. The term occurs here and there in the Sanskrit literature. In his exposition of Sāṃkhya and Yoga in the *Mbh.*, Vaśiṣṭha is found to identify *akṣara* with *prakṛti*[3]. On the other hand, the Gītā states it to be the immutable self[4]. Hence the subject matter of discussion under

1 See, 'तेभ्यो सृजति भूतानि काल आत्मप्रचोदित:', xii. 275. 5.

2 *Ahirbyudhna*, iv. 39-78.

3 सर्गप्रलयधर्मत्वादव्यक्तं प्राहुरक्षरम्, xii. 307. 13.

4 द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च
क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते, xv. 16.

this head is difficult to ascertain. If *prakṛti*, which does not find any separate place in the list, comes under *śakti*, then *akṣara* is to be regarded as the immutable self as distinct from the ordinary one.

It is curious to notice that *buddhi* is absolutely overlooked in the series. Perhaps, this as well as *ahaṅkāra* was included under the category of √*kartṛtantra*. The name '*prākṛta-maṇḍala*' suggests that the series deals with the primary principles of Sāṃkhya.

Of the second series, *kṛtyakāṇḍa* comprises the first five topics and they are most probably, the five sources of actions, generally known as *karma-yonis*.[1] Then comes the topic on *bhoga*, *i.e.* the experience of the fruits of merit and demerit by *puruṣa*. Next is *vṛtta* which, as Prof. Keith[2] rightly suggests, refers to the 'circle of becoming and passing away, the *saṃcara* and *prati-saṃcara* of the Tattvasamāsa'. The five topics which follow this, deal with the five *kleśas* and they correspond to the five kinds of ignorance of Sāṃkhya[3]. The next three items speak of the three forms of proof. These are followed by the topics on *khyāti*[4] (knowledge), *vairāgya* (dispassion), *dharma* (righteousness) and *aiśvarya* (divine power) which are stated in the Kārikā (23) as the Sattvic modifications of *buddhi*. The topic on *guṇa* which comes next, already found its place in the previous series; but

1 'पञ्च कर्मयोनयः', *TS.* 9; for a fuller treatment of them see *Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 128.

2. *Sāṃkhya System*, p. 71.

3 सेयं पञ्चपर्वा भवति अविद्या, अविद्याऽस्मिता रागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशा इति, एते एव स्वसंज्ञाभिः तमो मोहो महामोहस्तामिस्रः अन्धतामिस्र इति, *YS.* i. 8.

4 The term occurs in this sense here and there in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga literature. For instance, 'तत् परं पुरुषख्यातेर्गुणवैतृष्ण्यम्', *YS.* i. 16.; विवेकख्यातिपर्यन्तं ज्ञेयं प्रकृतिचेष्टितम्', quoted in *TK.* under Kā. 44. *SS.* deals with it in a different light in 'सदसत्ख्यातिर्बाधाबाधात्', v. 56.

it is strange to notice that it reappears here. The subject matter of discussion which falls under this head is not easy to ascertain. Then comes the topic on *liṅga*, the subtle intermediate body that migrates into the next world after death. *Dṛṣṭi* and *ānuśravika* refer to the ordinary means and the Vedic ones respectively; their inefficacy to wipe out the miseries is proved in the kā, 1-2. Next are the topics on miseries (kā, 1) and perfections (kā, 51). *Kaṣāya*[1] which comes afterwards, speaks of 'attachment' and such passions as appear as the result of the prevalence of *tamas*. *Samaya* means 'established conclusion' and it refers to the criticism of the controversial doctrines of other teachers.[2] Last of all comes the topic on final emancipation.

Thus we find that the second series deals with those principles which come into existence as a result of *vikṛti* or modification of the primary ones, and this is why it is called *Vaikṛta-maṇḍala.*

Comparing this table of contents of the Ṣaṣṭitantra with what is furnished by the Rājavārttika, we find that the difference is not negligible. Rājavārttika divides the sixty topics of the Ṣaṣṭitantra into two groups of ten primary principles and fifty modifications (of the *buddhi*), whereas the Ahirbudhnya does so into thirty-two and twenty-eight. Further, there are such topics of discussion as occur in one of these two lists, but are conspicuous by their absence in the other. Most interesting is to notice that the *tuṣṭis* (nine contentments) and *aśaktis* (twenty-eight forms of disability) are totally ignored by the Ahirbudhnya, whereas a prominent place is assigned to them in the traditional Sāṃkhya. It thus appears that there had been different recensions of the Ṣaṣṭitantra and hence there are discrepancies. This suggestion is

1 The term also finds its place in *TK.*—रागादय: कषायाश्चित्तवर्तिन:, Kā. 23.

2 Cf. 'परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि', Kā. 72.

further corroborated by the evidence of the Ahirbudhnya itself; for this text explicitly states that there are numerous forms of the Ṣaṣṭitantra[1].

The authorship of Ṣaṣṭitantra is also a controversial problem. From the evidence of the Kārikā it appears that Kapila only promulgated the doctrine of Sāṃkhya and it was Pañcaśikha who extensively propagated the system (**तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम्**, Kā 70). The Chinese commentary on the Kārikā sheds some important light here. While commenting upon the above-mentioned expression it states that Pañcaśikha dealt the doctrine elaborately in a treatise of sixty-thousand verses, while the Jayamaṅgalā explicitly mentions him to be the author of Ṣaṣṭitantra, a treatise consisting of sixty chapters[2]. But it does not state anything as regards the bulk of the treatise. Reference is also made of Ṣaṣṭitantra in the Canonical Literature of the Jains[3], but nothing important can be obtained therefrom. However, the fact that there existed a huge treatise on Sāṃkhya even at an early age, is further borne out by the evidence of the Mbh. where Vaśiṣṭha is found to state that 'Sāṃkhya consists of a vast literature, so say the wise men'[4]. Again, the additional verse which Māṭhara reads at the very end of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, also states that Iśvarkṛṣṇa's compendium is, as it were, a reflection in a mirror of the original text of enormous bulk[5]. Most satisfactory light may be obtained from the Yukti-dipikā which in its introductory remark (p. 1) expressly states that the huge treatise is not possible to master even

1 'षष्टितन्त्राण्यथैकैकमेषां नानाविधं मुने', xii. 29.

2 'पञ्चशिखेन मुनिना बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम्—षष्टितन्त्राख्यं षष्टिखण्डं कृतमिति । तत्रैव हि षष्टिरर्था व्याख्याता:', Kā. 70.

3 काविलं···षट्टितंतं माढर:..., *Uttarādhyāyana-Sūtra*, The same passage with a slight variation in reading, also occurs in the *Nandi-Sūtra*.

4 बृहच्चैवमिदं शास्त्रमित्याहुर्विदुषो जना:, xii. 307. 46.

5 तन्त्रस्य च बृहन्मूर्तेर्दर्पणसंक्रान्तमिव बिम्बम् ।

in hundred years[1]. But it ascribes the authorship of the text to Kapila and not to Pañcaśikha as Paramārtha holds it to be. Elsewhere it states that Sāṃkhya consists of several thousand verses[2]. Speaking briefly, it was the tradition that the original systematic treatise on Sāṃkhya consisted of a tremendous volume.

Again, the last verse of the Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa states that the treatise in seventy verses is a compendium of the entire Ṣaṣṭitantra, divested of parables and controversial doctrines of other teachers. Hence it appears that the Ṣaṣṭitantra was written in a fashion akin to that of the Great Epic, where also philosophical problems are explained for the most part through parables.

But the difficulty as regards the authorship of this huge treatise is not still removed. The Ahirbudhnya (xii. 30) as well as the Yuktidīpikā (p. 1) asserts that it was revealed through Kapila. Bhāskara also in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra (II. i. 1) remarks that Kapila was the author of the Ṣaṣṭitantra (**कपिलमहर्षि-प्रणीत-षष्टितन्त्राख्य-स्मृतेः**). On the other hand, the Jayamaṅgalā and the Chinese version of Paramārtha plainly state that Pañcaśikha was its author, and this has been already noticed by us above. Further, Vācaspati has rendered the problem still more complicated. For instance. he holds the verse **'प्रज्ञाप्रसादमारुह्य'** etc., as quoted in the Yoga-bhāṣya (i. 47), to be a *gāthā* (psalm) of Paramarṣi who is no other than Kapila, the great sage. The reason of calling this verse a *gāthā* is not known. On the otherhand, from the evidence of the Yukti-dīpikā[3] we know that the verses of the Ṣaṣṭitantra also were passed as *gāthās*. But thereby it cannot be definitely

1 तत्त्वं जिज्ञासमानाय विप्रायासुरये मुनिः ।
यदुवाच महत्तन्त्रं दुःखत्रयनिवृत्तये ॥
न तस्याधिगमः शक्यः कर्त्तुं वर्षशतैरपि ।

2 अनेकग्रन्थसहस्राख्येयं (दं) सांख्यं···, p. 175.

3 षष्टितन्त्रादुपाख्यानगाथा-व्यवहितानि···, p. 175.

stated whether the said verse also constituted a part of the Ṣaṣṭitantra. So far it can be said that there had been a philosophical treatise which passed as the production of Kapila, provided due regard is paid upon the statement of Vācaspati.

Again, the couplet **'गुणानां परमं रूपम्'** etc., is quoted in the Yoga-bhāṣya (iv. 13) with the introductory remark **'तथा च शास्त्रानुशासनम्'**. This shows that the couplet forms the injunction of a Śāstra, but the name of the particular Śāstra from which it is quoted, is not mentioned. Here Vācaspati in his commentary holds it to be an injunction of the Ṣaṣṭitantra, The same verse with a slight variation in reading is also quoted by him in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra (ii. i. 3) where it is attributed to Vārṣagaṇya whom he mentions to be the expounder of the Yoga-śāstra. Hence it appears that Vācaspati considered Ṣaṣṭitantra to be a Yoga treatise and Vārṣagaṇya as its author. But his enumeration of the sixty topics of the Ṣaṣṭitantra as he quotes from the Rāja-vārttika[1] goes to show that the text consisted of the different principles of the Sāṃkhya and not of Yoga.

The reason of his regarding Vārṣagaṇya as an expounder of Yoga is difficult to ascertain. In our discussion on 'Vārṣagaṇya and his followers', it will be pointed out that the school of Sāṃkhya as represented in the Yoga-Sūtra and specially in its Bhāṣya is based upon the school of Vārṣagaṇya and not upon that of Iśvarakṛṣṇa. This is why perhaps Vācaspati considered Vārṣagaṇya as an expounder of Yoga.

Difference of opinion as regards the style of the text, has also made the problem more complicated. In their commentary on the Kā. 17, Gauḍa and Māṭhara are found to quote a prose fragment from the Ṣaṣṭitantra[2]. Paramārtha also cites here the

1 See his commentary on Kā. 72.

2 Gauḍa, तथा चोक्तं षष्टितन्त्रे—'पुरुषाधिष्ठितं प्रधानं प्रवर्तते' ; Māṭhara, अपि चोक्तं षष्टितन्त्रे—'पुरुषाधिष्ठितं प्रधानं प्रवर्तते' इति ।

same expression from the said text[1]. But in his commentary on Kā. 70, he explicitly states that the text consisted of sixty-thousand verses. Further, it has been already noticed above that the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya quotes the verse **'गुणानां परमं रूपम्'** etc., from the Śāstra while Vācaspati identifies the Śāstra with the Ṣaṣṭitantra. The Yuktidipikā[2] also quotes profusely from the Śāstra, but curious to notice that all those quotations are in prose.

From these different and divergent accounts, it is difficult to form a correct idea of the Ṣaṣṭitantra. Taking everything into consideration, it appears that the nucleus of Sāṃkhya was formulated by Kapila and it was Pañcaśikha who propagated the system into a huge treatise of verse. Later on, Vārṣagaṇya thought it necessary to re-write the text of Pañcaśikha and as a result of this, the original text of verse became an admixture of prose and verse.

The re-writing of a text by a different author is not absolutely new in Sanskrit lilerature, nay even in the case of Sāṃkhya. From the evidence of the Chinese source, we know that Vindhyavāsin also re-wrote the text of Vṛṣagaṇa or Vārṣagaṇa[3]. Thus we find that different teachers of different ages played their

1 See, 'as is said in the *Treatise of the sixty Categories*' ; "Nature, it is that in which spirit resides, and it is because of that that she can produce actions". From the translation of Suryanarayan Sastri.

2 तथा च शास्त्रमाह—'एतस्माद्धि महत आत्मन इमे त्रय आत्मनः सृज्यन्ते वैकारिक-तैजस-भूतादयोऽहङ्कारलक्षणाः । अहमित्येवैषां सामान्यं लक्षणं भवति, गुणप्रवृत्तौ च पुनर्विशेष-लक्षणम्' इति p. 114 ; शास्त्रञ्चैवमाह—'तदेतस्मिन् वैकारिके स्रक्ष्यमाण एष भूतादिस्तैजसेनोपष्टब्धः एतं वैकारिकमभिधावति । तथैव तस्मिन् भूतादौ स्रक्ष्यमाण एष भूतादिस्तैजसेनोपष्टब्ध एतं भूतादिमभिभवति', p. 117 ; शास्त्रं ह्येवमाह—का नु भो संज्ञा मातुरुदरेऽवस्थितं कुमारं प्रत्यभिनिर्विशत इति, अस्मीत्येषा माहात्मीसंविदिति, p. 124 ; शास्त्रमाह—'सत्तारामः सत्तामिथुनश्च सदा स्यात्' इति, p. 129 ; also see pp. 152, 156, 158, 170.

3 For further about Vṛṣagaṇa and Vārṣagaṇa, see our discussion on 'Vārṣagaṇya and his followers'.

respective parts in bringing about the Ṣaṣṭitantra into its final shape. To explain the fact more clearly, we beg to draw the attention of scholars to the medical treatise of Caraka. It is well known that the original text of Agniveśa which was based upon the teachings of Ātreya, was re-written by Caraka. Similary the original text of Pañcaśikha which was based upon the teachings of Kapila, was re-written by Vārṣagaṇya. This is why even a single treatise is sometimes ascribed to different teachers though they belong to different age.

Some Sāṃkhya teachers as referred to in the Epic

Reference is made of some teachers in the Epic[1] from whom Gandharva Viśvāvasu is said to have received the teachings of the system with twenty five principles. They are Jaigīṣavya, Asita-Devala, Parāśara, Vārṣagaṇya, Bhṛgu, Pañcaśikha, Kapila, Śuka, Gautama, Ārṣṭiṣeṇa, Garga, Nārada, Āsuri, Pulastya, Sanatkumāra, Śukra, Kaśyapa and Rudra-Viśvarūpa.

It is obvions that the list consists of the names of mythical as well as of historical figures. Of these, Jaigīṣavya is also mentioned in the Buddha-carita[2] as an exponent of Sāṃkhya along with Janaka and Vṛddha-Parāśara. In xii. 229, the Epic records a dialogue of this great teacher with Devala which is rather ethical than philosophical. In his opinion. the highest stage can be attained by him who is not agitated by blame or praise.

But from some stray references as we get here and there, he appears to be a teacher of Yoga and not that of pure Sāṃkhya. The Kūrma Purāṇa sheds some light in this connection. It refers to the hermitage of Jaigīṣavya as the abode of great Yogins where the teacher used to reside with his disciples, prominent among whom were Śaṅkha, Manohara, Kauśika, Kṛṣṇa, Sumanas

1 xii. 318. 59 62.

2 xii. 67.

and Vedavāda[1]. In another place it mentions him as one of the different incarnations of Mahādeva in the Kali Age and credits him with the epithet *Yogīndra*[2] (foremost of Yogins). The Īśvaragīta (xi. 128) states that he as well as Pañcaśikha was pupil of Kapila.

The Yoga-bhāṣya refers to his view of sense-control[3]. In his opinion it is the stage when the senses do not perceive any object and it comes as a result of the full concentration of the thinking faculty. Again in iii. 18, it refers to an instance of his wonderful Yogic achievment. Further, in NVT. (iii. 2. 42), Vācaspati also mentions him as the author of the Dhāraṇā-Śāstra[4].

Let us now turn our attention to Devala. His philosophy as treated in the Mbh. xii. 275, differs to a considerable extent with the orthodox Sāṃkhya and this has been already noticed above (pp. 44-5). Further, he is credited with the authorship of a Dharma-Sūtra which also abounds with the tenets and doctrines of Sāṃkhya and Yoga. This can be noticed in the following quotations from his text as found in the Aparārka (iii. 109), a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti.

" अथातो धर्मवर्जितत्वान्न तिर्यग्योन्यां पुरुषार्थोपदेशः । देवमानुषयो र्द्विविधः पुरुषार्थः—अभ्युदयो निःश्रेयसमिति । तयोरभ्युदयः पूर्वोक्तः । द्विविधं निःश्रेयसम्—साङ्ख्ययोगाविति । पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानं साङ्ख्यम । विषयेभ्यो निवर्त्याभिप्रेतेऽर्थे मनसोऽवस्थापनं योगः । उभयत्रापवर्गः फलम् । जन्म-मरण-दुःखयोरत्यन्ताभावोऽपवर्गः ।"

Śaṇkara also accuses him of adopting the terms and tenets of Sāṃkhya into his Dhrama-Śāstra[5].

1 i. 47. 17-9.

2 योगीन्द्रो जैगीषव्योऽथ सप्तमे, i. 52. 5.

3 'चित्तैकाग्र्यादप्रतिपत्तिरेवेति जैगीषव्यः', ii. 55.

4 धारणाशास्त्रं जैगीषव्यादिप्रोक्तम् ।

5 ...देवलप्रभृतिमिश्च कैश्चिद्धर्मसूत्रकारैः स्वग्रन्थेष्वाश्रितः, Bhāṣya on *BS*, I. iv. 28.

The case of Vārṣagaṇya will be dealt with in a separate chapter. Kapila, Āsuri and Pañcaśikha have been already noticed above. Nārada is found to give an exposition of his philosophical and ethical views in his advice to Śuka in xii. 329-31. It is interesting to notice that some of his ideas, nay even some expressions and verses also, are found almost verbatim in the philosophical account of the Caraka-Saṃhitā[1]. In another place

1 See, Mbh. xii. 329. 46-52 :

चतुर्विंशक इत्येष व्यक्ताव्यक्तमयो गणः ॥
एतैः सर्वैः समायुक्तः पुमानित्यभिधीयते ।
त्रिवर्गं तु सुखं दुःखं जीवितं मरणं तथा ॥
य इदं वेद तत्त्वेन स वेद प्रभवाप्ययौ ।
पारम्पर्येण बोद्धव्यं ज्ञानानां यच्च किञ्चन ॥
इन्द्रियैर्गृह्यते यद् यत् तदव्यक्तमिति स्थितिः ।
अव्यक्तमिति विज्ञेयं लिङ्गग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियम् ॥
इन्द्रियैर्नियतैर्देही धाराभिरिव तर्प्यते ।
लोके विततमात्मानं लोकांश्चात्मनि पश्यति ॥
परावरदृशः शक्तिर्ज्ञानमूला न पश्यति ।
पश्यतः सर्वभूतानि सर्वावस्थासु सर्वदा ॥
सर्वभूतस्य संयोगो नाशुभेनोपपद्यते ।
ज्ञानेन विविधान् क्लेशानतिवृत्तस्य मोहजान् ॥

Cf. Caraka-Saṃhitā, Śārīra, i :

चतुर्विंशक इत्येष राशिः पुरुषसंज्ञकः ॥ 34
अत्र कर्मफलञ्चात्र ज्ञानञ्चात्र प्रतिष्ठितम् ।
अत्र मोहः सुखं दुःखं जीवितं मरणं स्वता ॥ 36
एवं यो वेद तत्त्वेन स वेद प्रलयोदयौ ।
पारम्पर्यं चिकित्सा च ज्ञातव्यं यच्च किञ्चन ॥ 37
व्यक्तमैन्द्रियकञ्चैव गृह्यते तद् यदिन्द्रियैः ।
अतोऽन्यत् पुनरव्यक्तं लिङ्गग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियम् ॥ 61

Śārīra, v. 31-2.

लोके विततमात्मानं लोकञ्चात्मनि पश्यतः ।
परावरदृशः शान्तिर्ज्ञानमूला न नश्यति ॥

it is stated that he taught Sāṃkhya to the sons of Dakṣa[1]. Sanatkumāra is elsewhere mentioned as one of the mind-born sons of Brahman[2]. Nārada attributes a verse to him[3] which he cites before Śuka. Some of his verses are also referred to in xii. 342. 16-9, but they speak of the superiority of Brahmins and nothing else. As regards the philosophical views of others, we know very little worth-mentioning.

POST-PAÑCAŚIKHA SĀṂKHYA TEACHERS

From the evidence of the Yukti-dīpikā[4], we know that Pañcaśikha transmitted the knowledge of Sāṃkhya to Janaka, Vaśiṣṭha and such other pupils. But the gap between him and Īśvarakṛṣṇa is very wide and from the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to bridge the gulf. The Yukti-dīpikā boldly declares in this connection that the Śāstra was promulgated by Kapila at the beginning (of creation), hence it is not possible like other systems of thought, to enumerate its lineage of teachers even in hundred years[5]. He briefly enumerates the names of some

पश्यतः सर्वभूतानि सर्वावस्थासु सर्वदा ।
ब्रह्मभूतस्य संयोगो न शुद्धस्योपपद्यते ॥

1 सहस्रसंख्यान् सम्भूतान् दक्षपुत्रांश्च नारदः
मोक्षमध्यापयामास सांख्यज्ञानमनुत्तमम्, Mbh, i. 75. 7.

2 The mind-born sons of Brahman are held to be well versed in Sāṃkhya and Yoga (एते योगविदो मुख्याः सांख्यज्ञान-विशारदाः, Mbh. xii. 340. 72). But none of their doctrines have come down to us, except that the *Sāṃkhya-Sūtra* refers to Sanandanâcārya in whose opinion the subtle body is responsible for the connection of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* (लिङ्गशरीरनिमित्तक इति सनन्दनाचार्यः, vi. 69).

3 Mbh. xii. 329. 5.

4 बहुभ्यो जनकवशिष्ठादिभ्यः समाख्यातम्, p. 175. The Mbh. also mentions Janaka to be a pupil of Pañcaśikha.

5 अस्य तु शास्त्रस्य भगवतोऽग्रे प्रवृत्तत्वात् न शास्त्रान्तरव(त्) वंशः शक्यो वर्षशतसहस्रैरप्याख्यातुम्, p. 175.

prominent teachers who appeared between Pañcaśikha and Īśvarakṛṣṇa. They are Hārīta[1], Bāddhali, Kairāta, Paurika, Ṛṣbheśvara, Pañcâdhikaraṇa, Patañjali, Vārṣagaṇya, Kauṇḍinya, Mūka (?) and the like. Similarly Māṭhara mentions the names of Bhārgava, Ulūka, Vālmīkin, Hārīta and Devala, while the Jayamaṅgalā mentions Garga, Gautama and such other teachers who intervened between Pañcaśikha and Iśvarakṛṣṇa. All these can be noticed in the following lines :

Māṭhara—'तस्मात् भार्गवोलूक-वाल्मीकि-हारीत-देवल-प्र भृ तिना गतम्, ततस्तेभ्य ईश्वरकृष्णेन' (Kā, 71).

Jaya—पञ्चशिखस्तथा गर्ग-गौतम-प्र भृ ति र्णरामतं ग्रम्या (?) ईश्वरकृष्ण-नामानं परिव्राजकमित्यनया शिष्यपरम्परया.

Everywhere the term 'प्रभृति' indicates a wide gap. It is Paramārtha who attempts to bridge the gulf. In his opinion, Pañcaśikha transmitted the knowledge of Sāṃkhya to Ho-kia, Ho-kia to Ulūka, Ulūka to Po-p'o-li and Po-p'o-li to Iśvarakṛṣṇa. But the gulf is not so narrow as he thinks it to be.

Of the teachers mentioned above, nothing is known about Hārīta, Kairāta, Ṛṣabhesvara, Kauṇḍinya, Mūka (?) Bhārgava, Ulūka,[2] Vālmīkin, Garga and Gautama as teachers of Sāṃkhya, except that some of these names only find their place in the list of the Epic. Devala has been noticed in the previous chapter. Ho-kia of the Chinese is read as Kat'-kia in the Japanese version and this seems to be Garga of Sanskrit. Po-p'o-li is read as

1 There is a lacunae in the Ms. of the *Yukti-dīpikā* just before the name of Hārīta ; thus it appears that the names of some other teachers have been left out here.

2 It is peculiar indeed to notice that Śrutadeva Sūri attributes the Sāṃkhya system to Ulūka. See साङ्ख्यमुलूकदर्शनं सत्कार्यपरनामधेयम्—Com. on *Yaśastilaka Campū*, Vol III. p. 111.

Bat'-ba-li in the Japanese version and this corresponds to Bāddhali[1] of the Yukti-dīpikā. He is also referred to in the Tattvārtha-Rājavārttika[2] of the Jains as an advocate of the doctrine of non-action (अक्रियावाद) along with Kapila Gārgya, Māṭhara and others.

The remaining teachers, such as Paurika, Pañcâdhikaraṇa, Patañjali and Vārṣagaṇya deserve special treatment.

Paurika

This teacher is only referred to in the Yukti-dīpikā. In his opinion, there is a separate *prakṛti* attached to each *puruṣa*[3]. Thus he deviates from the orthodox Sāṃkhya which is very keen to establish the unity of *prakṛti*. Guṇaratna Sūri[4] attributes this doctrine of the plurality of *prakṛtis* to the ancient teachers. That this theory was current in Sāṃkhya at a very early period can be further proved from the fact that even Vārṣagṇya is found to criticise it. This can be noticed in a quotation from him in the Yoga-bhāṣya[5] wherein he refutes the plurality of *prakṛti*—the ultimate cause.

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1 Takakusu's suggestion of the sanskrit original of Po-po'-li is not convincing. Finding it difficult to get back to the original, he suggests that Po-po'-li is a mistake for Po-li-so ; Jap., Bat-li-sha , Sk, Vṛsā (cf. Vārṣagaṇya)—*La Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, p. 148, n 3. Had he been aware of Bāddhali as a teacher of Sāṃkhya, the problem would not be so much puzzling to him.

2 कपिलोलूक-गार्ग्य-व्याघ्रभूति – बा द्ध लि – माठर········ *Tattvārtha-Rāja-vārttika*, p. 51.

3 प्रतिपुरुषमन्यत् प्रधानं शरीराद्यर्थं करोति । तेषाञ्च माहात्म्यशरीरप्रधानं यदा प्रवर्तते तदेतराण्यपि, तन्निवृत्तौ च तेषामपि निवृत्तिरिति पौ रि कः सांख्याचार्यो मन्यते, Yukti-dīpikā, p. 169.

4 मौलिक्यसांख्या ह्यात्मानमात्मानं प्रति पृथक्प्रधानं वदन्ति, उत्तरे तु सांख्याः सर्वात्मस्वप्येकं नित्यं प्रधानमिति प्रपन्नाः, commentary on *Ṣaḍdarśana-Samuccaya*, Sāṃkhya Section.

5 मूर्तिव्यवधिजातिभेदाभावान्नास्ति मूलपृथक्त्वमिति वार्षगण्यः, iii. 53.

Pañcādhikaraṇa

His views on some critical points of Sāṃkhya are referred to here and there in the Yukti-dīpikā. According to the Kārikā, the organs are thirteen in number whereas he regards only ten as such[1]. Further, in his opinion they cannot function out of their own accord. They are like a dry river and whenever there is an influx from the *prakṛti*, it is then only that they can operate[2] Most interesting is to notice that unlike other teachers of Sāṃkhya he holds the *indriyas* to be elemental products[3]. The process in which the *puruṣa* enters into migration is also explained by him in a different manner. The point will be specially treated by us in our discussion on 'the subtle-intermediate body'. He also deviates from Īśvarakṛṣṇa in his classification of the *bhāvas*[4]. However, like Paurika he is not an absolutely new figure in the Sanskrit literature ; for he is also referred to in the Nareśvara-Parīkṣā[5] as well as in the Padmapāda's commentary on the Prapañcasāra-Tantra[6].

Patañjali

The view of one Patañjali is referred to here and there in the Yukti-dīpikā. He plainly denies the separate existence of

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1 दशविधमिति तान्त्रिकाः पञ्चाधिकरण-प्रभृतयः, *Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 132 *infra*.

2 करणं निर्लिखितस्वरूपं शून्यग्रामनदीकल्पम्, प्राकृतवैकृतिकानि तु ज्ञानानि प्रकाङ्गसंगृहीतानि प्रधानादागच्छन्ति चेति पञ्चाधिकरणः, *ibid* p. 108. Also see p. 114 *supra*.

3 भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणीति पञ्चाधिकरणमतम्, *ibid* p. 108.

4 *ibid* p. 147-8.

5 The text reads the name of the teacher as Pañcâṅgâdhikaraṇa. However, he is not different from Pañcâdhikaraṇa, the Sāṃkhya teacher. See, नन्वर्थाहिताकारविशेषसंवेदनादात्मनोऽर्थविशेषव्यवस्थापकत्वम्, अतो नैष दोषः इति प ञ्चा ङ्गा धि-क र णाः । यदाह—'तद्योग्य-प्रतिबिम्बस्य ग्रहणं भोग आत्मनि' इति. p. 19, *infra*.

6 See, कथं क्षेत्रज्ञप्रवेश इति । तत्र मतभेदं दर्शयति······रेतःशोणितजमिति प ञ्चा धि क र णा नां पक्षः, i. 94-7.

ahaṅkāra[1], for he holds egoism as the function of the intellect. Unlike Pañcâdhikaraṇa, he is of opinion that the organs wholly act from within and not from without[2]. He has also got his independent view on the subtle intermediate body, which we intend to deal with in a separate chapter along with that of Pañcâdhikaraṇa and others. Padmapāda also refers to his view in the commentary on the Prapañcasāra Tantra[3].

But it is strange to notice that these views are not supported anywhere in the Yoga-Sūtra or in its Bhāṣya. This tends to suggest that there were different philosophers of the name of Patañjali.

Alberuni also translated some passages from the work of one Patañjali. Unfortunately, most of those passages cannot be traced in the Yoga-Sūtra or in its Bhāṣya. However, from the evidence of his translation it is risky to assume the existence of a different philosopher of the name of Patañjali other than the author of the Yoga-Sūtra, for the simple reason that his translation scarcely observes fidelity to the original text. This is evident from the fact that in the translation of some verses of the Bhagavat-Gītā as found here and there in his work, he has traversed a long way off from the original.

A Ms. of a text of the title of Y o g a-D a r p a ṇ a, attributed to one Patañjali, is noticed in the 'Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit Mss. in the Central Provinces and Berar'[4]. But no opinion can be passed until it may be thoroughly examined.

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1 नैवाहङ्कारो विद्यत इति प त ञ लिः, महतोऽस्मिप्रत्ययरूपत्वाभ्युपगमात्, *Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 32. *supra*.

2 करणानां महती स्वभावातिवृत्तिः······सर्वा स्वत इति पतञ्जलिः, *ibid*, p. 108.

3 कथं क्षेत्रज्ञप्रवेश इति। तत्र मतभेदं दर्शयति——दीपात् दीपान्तरमिति पतञ्जलि-धन्वन्तर्यादिपक्षः, i. 94-7-

4 No. 4432, deposited with Pt. Govindaprasad Sastri of Jubbulpore.

Orthodox Scholars regard Patañjali of the Yoga-Sūtra and the author of the Mahābhāṣya as the same man. But from internal evidence, we do not find any such clue as may help us to establish their identity. On the contrary, the thing appears to be otherwise if we compare the grammarian's conception of *dravya* (substance) with that of the philosopher. According to the grammarian, substance is the aggregate of attributes (गुणसमूहो द्रव्यम्)[1]; whereas in the opinion of the philosopher, it is the aggregate of components which are inseparably connected with one another (अयुतसिद्धावयवभेदानुगतः समूहो द्रव्यमिति पतञ्जलिः)[2]. Thus we find that the grammarian's conception of the same has not attained such a developed stage as that of the philosopher. Again, the Yoga-Sūtra seems to attack the doctrine of the Vijñānavādins and it is doubtful whether their doctrine could attain such prominence as may deserve criticism of reputed scholars even at the time of the author of the Mahābhāṣya which is usually admitted to be the middle of the second century B.C.

VĀRṢAGAṆYA AND HIS FOLLOWERS

Vārṣagaṇya is a distinguished teacher of Sāṃkhya, but unfortunately none of his systematic works has come down to us. All that we can know of him are a few references to his views scattered in the Sanskrit literature[3]. However, he is a very ancient authority on Sāṃkhya, for the Mbh.[4] even mentions him as a teacher on the subject. The name also appears in the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali[5], but it is not certain whether the particular teacher is referred to there. In our opinion he re-wrote

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1 *Mahābhāṣya*, IV. i. 1 (*Vārttika*, 7).

2 *Yogabhāṣya*, iii. 44.

3 *Yukti-dīpikā*, pp. 72, 108, 130; *Nyāyavārttika-tātparyaṭīkā*, I. i. 4; *Yogabhāṣya*, iii. 44.

4 xii. 318. 59.

5 Pā, I. i. 51 (*Vārttika*, 2).

the original Ṣaṣṭitantra of Pañcaśikha, and this has been already discussed above (pp. 126-7).

His followers (वार्षगणाः) are frequently referred to in the Yukti-dīpikā[1], but they do not always hold the same view as that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. They are also refered to in Padmapāda's commentary on the Prapañcasāra Tantra[2], Rasavaiśeṣika-Sūtra[3] and Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya[4] of Vasubandhu.

Some Chinese texts also seem to speak of this teacher and his followers. But in some cases the authors of those texts have suggested fanciful etymology of Sanskrit proper names, hence the accounts furnished by them cannot be always much estimated. For instance, in his commentaries on the Vijñānamātra-Siddhi and Nyāyânusāra, Kuei-chi, the pupil of Yuan-chwang says[5] : "The Sāṃkhya school was formerly split up into eighteen different groups, the head of which was Fa-li-cha meaning 'Rain' (वर्ष). His associates were all called the 'Rain-host' (वार्षगण)". Evidently he refers here to the followers of Vārṣagaṇya who are called 'वार्षगणाः' in Sanskrit. But he failed to understand the real significance of the original Sanskrit name 'वार्षगण' which usually denotes a follower of Vārṣagaṇya. Instead of having the term derived from 'वार्षगण्य', he wrongly takes it to be the juxtaposition of two words 'वार्ष' (pertaing to Varṣa) and 'गण' (host). Thus in his

1 See pp 39, 67, 95, 102. 132-3, 145 & 170.

2 (क्षेत्रज्ञः) मातुराहृतादाहाराद् यो रसः पाकजः तद्द्वारेण गर्भशरीरं विशतीति वार्षगणाः, i. 94-7.

3 आहङ्कारिकाणीति वार्षगण्याः (णाः), औलूक्याः पुनर्भौतिकानि, iii. 2, p. 124.

4 See, 'In the end it comes to the same as the theory of the followers of Vārṣagaṇya. According to them there is neither production of something new nor extinction of something existent ; what exists is always existent, what does not exist will never become existent'. Vasubandhu on Sarvâstivāda—Stcherbatsky, *Central conception of Buddhism*, p. 89.

5 Pointed out by Takakusu, J. R. A. S., 1905, p. 44.

opinion 'वार्षगण' means the associates of Varṣa—an interpretation which is not at all convincing. This is not the only instance of his fanciful etymology. Even while speaking of Kapila, the propounder of Sāṃkhya, he states that the term denotes 'red' and the teacher was called such as his complexion was red[1].

Paramārtha in his 'Life of Vasubandhu' states that P'i-li-cha-kia-na[2], the king of the Nāgas, having assumed the form of a sage lived at the foot of the mountain of Vindhya. He was well versed in Sāṃkhya, and Vindhyavāsa was his pupil. The name of the teacher is read as 'Bi-ri-sha-gaṇa' in the Japanese version, and in the opinion of Takakusu[3] the original name was either Vṛṣagaṇa or Vārṣagaṇa. The former suggestion does not seem to be plausible ; for Vṛṣagaṇa is not mentioned anywhere else as a teacher of Sāṃkhya. With regared to him so far it may be said that he is a progenitor[4] and Vārṣagaṇya was his descendent. The Yukti-dīpikā[5] alsȯ refers to one V ṛ ṣ a g a ṇ a-v ī r a who is no other than Vārṣagaṇya himself for the term *'vīra'* in sanskrit means a 'son' which again in its wider sense passes even for a descendent. Speaking briefly, Vārṣagaṇya which is an appelation, is grammatically derived from Vṛṣagaṇa and there is no reasonable ground to regard the progenitor also as a teacher of Sāṃkhya.

If it is a fact that Paramārtha really meant Vṛṣagaṇa to be the teacher of Vindhyavāsa, he probably did so for the reason that he found Vindhyavāsa generally passing as 'Vārṣagaṇa' in the Sāṃkhya literature, and by Vārṣagaṇa he wrongly meant a follower of Vṛṣagana ; but he failed to understand that the same term may

1 See Takakusu's Introduction on 'La Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, p. 38, *Supra*.

2 The original Chinese name is 毗梨沙伽那 .

3 *La Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, Introd., p. 40 *infra*.

4 The grammarians read the name in the 'गर्गादि' class.

5 See p. 130.

also mean a follower of Vārṣagaṇya[1], the reputed teacher of Sāṃkhya and not that of Vṛṣagaṇa, the progenitor.

The alternative suggestion of Takakusu seems to be more probable. In this case Vārṣagaṇa becomes the teacher of Vindhyavāsa. Vārṣagaṇa also is an appelation given to a follower of Vārṣagaṇya and thereby Vindhyavāsa becomes a remote follower of Vārṣagaṇya.

Vārṣagaṇya, his followers and the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya

It has been already noticed above that the tenets and doctrines of Sāṃkhya referred to in the Yoga-bhāṣya, do not always tally with those of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The reason is not very far to seek. From a careful perusal, it reveals that the Bhāṣya follows the Vārṣagaṇya school of Sāṃkhya and specially that of Vindhyvāsin. This can be noticed from the fact that the author of the Bhāṣya in support of his statements, occassionally quotes fragments from the works of Vārṣagaṇya and his followers. For instance, in anticipation to the objection as to how a single entity can consist of the characteristics of pleasure, pain and delusion which are contradictory to one another, he remarks[2] (ii. 15) :—

रूपातिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण विरुद्ध्यन्ते, सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते' (The forms as well as the functions when in their intensity, are contradictory to one another ; the ordinary ones, however can co-operate with those that are in their intensity). The idea is this :—the forms here speak of the eight forms of *buddhi* which are virtue, wisdom, dispassion and the like ; while the functions refer to pleasure, pain and delusion—the so called characteristics of the *guṇas*. When all these are in their zenith and equally ready to function, it is then only that they can contradict one

1 See, कण्वादिभ्यो गोत्रे, Pā, 4. 2. 111.

2 The author again quotes this expression in iii. 13, while Vācaspati holds it to be the view of Pañcaśikha.

another ; but when one of them is in its ordinary form, it can easily co-operate with the other which has gone to the extreme. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, unlike the Yogabhāṣya, explains the same by the illustration of the wick, oil and the lamp which though contradictory to one another, work together for a single end (Kā, 13).

Thus we find that the manner of exposition of the two teachers is different. But the above-mentioned fragment by which the author of the Bhāṣya made his position clear, is also quoted in the Yukti-dīpikā[1] where it is attributed to Vārṣagaṇya. This tends to suggest that he was influenced by the doctrine of this celebrated exponent of Sāṃkhya. In another place of his Bhāṣya (III. 53) also, our author substantiates his own statement by a quotation from this teacher.

Secondly, the reply of the Bhāṣya to a charge of the Buddhists against Sāṃkhya, reveals some amount of interest in this connection. The Buddhists accuse Sāṃkhya for maintaining the existence of an abiding principle (**धर्मी**) which manifests itself in and through its properties (**धर्म**). They argue :—The object has no seperate existence of its own, apart from its properties. If the object continued its existence even through the various modifications of the properties, its reality would be the same even in its past and future stages. It would thus lead to its immutable eternity like that of the *puruṣa*. To this charge of the opponent the author of the Bhāṣya replies that his system does not maintain the immutable eternity of an object like that of the *puruṣa*. In this connection, he makes his position well established by the introduction of the following logical argument (iii. 13) :—

तदेतत् त्रैलोक्यं व्यक्तेरपैति । कस्मात् ? नित्यत्वप्रतिषेधात् । अपेतमप्यस्ति विनाशप्रतिषेधात् । संसर्गाच्चास्य सौक्ष्म्यम् , सौक्ष्म्याच्चानुपलब्धिरिति ।

The idea is this : The object, nay even the entire universe, is liable to enter into its past stage from the stage of its mani-

1 तथा च भगवान् वा र्ष ग ण्यः पठति—'रूपातिशया···', p. 72, *supra*.

festation ; thus it is not (absolutely) eternal. Though it becomes past, thereby it does not lose its very existence ; it then only lies in its latent stage into its primary cause and this is why it cannot be perceived then.

It is curious to notice that the aforesaid lines are attributed to the followers of Vārṣagaṇya in the Yukti-dīpikā[1]. The Nyāya-Bhāṣya[2] as well as the Vārttika also refers to these lines, but does not mention the source.

Thirdly, the followers of Vārṣagaṇya are of opinion that there is neither production of something new. nor extinction of something existent ; what exists is always existent, what does not exist will never become existent[3]. The Yoga-Bhāṣya (iv. 11) also utters verbatim the first half of this expression and this may be noticed in the line :—'नास्त्यसतः सम्भवः, न चास्ति सतो विनाशः'. Vātsyāyana[4] also refers to a similar expression. Evidently, all these expressions speak of the Sāṃkhya theory of causation. But Īśvarakṛṣṇa's manner and language of expounding the same is different.

Further, the Yoga-Bhāṣya (ii. 23) states that 'अदर्शन' (ignorance, lit. non-perception) is the cause of the conjunction of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, and at the same time refers to the various interpretations of the term attempted by other teachers of Sāṃkhya. Even Vātsyāyana[5] also refers to the term. This shows that the term played an important part in the ancient literature of Sāṃkhya. Īśarakṛṣṇa only hints upon the same in the expression 'न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य' (Kā, 61), but he is not found to attach any importance upon the term.

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1 तथा च वा र्ष ग णाः पठन्ति—तदेतत् त्रैलोक्यं..., p, 89.

2 N. Bh. I. ii. 6.

3 See, Stcherbatsky, *Central conception of Buddhism*, p. 89.

4 'नासत आत्मलाभः, न सत आत्महानम्...इति सांख्यानाम्', N. Bh. I. i, 29.

5 N. Bh. III. ii. 68.

Most interesting is to notice that in numerous instances, the Bhāṣya follows the view of Vindhyavāsin. Firstly, we know from the evidence of Kumārila[1] that Vindhayvāsin rejects the doctrine of the subtle intermediate body called 'अन्तराभवदेह'. The Bhāṣya[2] also is not prepared to accept the same.

Secondly, Vindhayvāsin, unlike Īśvarkṛṣṇa, is of opinion that the *ahaṃkāra* as well as the five subtle elements come out from the *buddhi*[3] ; the Bhāṣya[4] also endorses the same view.

Thirdly, Bhoja in his commentary on the Yoga-sūtra (iv. 23) attributes the expression 'सत्वतप्यत्वमेव पुरुषतप्यत्वम्' to Vindhyavāsin. It means that it is the *buddhi* which is afflicted by *rajas* ; but the *puruṣa* also appears to be afflicted in as much as he is reflected in the *buddhi* which is transparent like a looking glass. A similar expression is also to be met with in the Yoga-bhāṣya (सत्वे तु तप्यमाने तदाकारानुरोधी पुरुषोऽनुतप्यत इति दृश्यते, ii. 17).

Fourthly, in the opinion of Vindhyavāsin everything is experienced in the mind[5] and not in the *buddhi* as other teachers of Sāṃkhya hold. A similar view is also hinted in the expression 'एकादशं मनः सर्वार्थम्' in the Yoga-bhāṣya (ii. 19).

All these facts tend to suggest that the theoretical portions of the Yoga-bhāṣya is based upon the system of Vārṣagaṇya and his followers.

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1 *Śloka-vārttika*, ātmavāda, 62.

2 See, घटप्रसादप्रदीपकल्पं संकोचविकाशि चित्तं शरीरपरिमाणाकारमात्रमित्यपरे प्रतिपन्नाः, तथा चा न्त रा भ वः संसारश्च युक्त इति । वृत्तिरेवास्य विभुनः संकोच-विकाशिनीत्याचार्यः, IV. 10.

3 महतः षडविशेषाः सृज्यन्ते, पञ्चतन्मात्राण्यहङ्कारश्चेति वि न्ध्य वा सि-मतम्, *Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 108.

4 See, ii. 19, but it is peculiar to notice that in another place (i.45) he closely follows the ordinary view.

5 ...सर्वार्थोपलब्धिः, मनसि विन्ध्यवासिनः, *Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 108.

VINDHYAVĀSIN

Vindhyavāsin is one of the celebrated exponents of Sāṃkhya whose views are referred to here and there in the Sanskrit litereture. He is somewhere mentioned as Vindhya-nivāsa and elsewhere as Vindhyavāsa. For instance, Kumārila in his Śloka-vārttika[1] says :

तेन नात्यन्तभिन्नोऽर्थः सारूप्यमिति वर्णितम् ।
ग्रन्थे विन्ध्यनिवासेन भ्रान्तैः सादृश्यमुच्यते ॥

The commentator Umbeka remarks here : **किञ्च विन्ध्यवासिनोऽपि पिण्डसारूप्यं सामान्यमिति वदतो नायमभिप्रायः**. Thus we find that the commentator regards Vindhyanivāsa as a synonym of Vindhyavāsin. Again, Kumārila refers to Vindhyavāsin's view of the rejection of the subtle intermediate body in the hemistich : **'अन्तराभवदेहस्तु निषिद्धो विन्ध्यवासिना'**[2] ; while Medhātithi in his Bhāṣya on Manu (i. 55) ascribes the same view to Vindhyavāsa whom he mentions to be an advocate of Sāṃkhya. This can be noticed in the expression **'सांख्या अपि केचिन्नान्तराभवमिच्छन्ति विन्ध्यवासप्रभृतयः**. Hence it is clear that Vindhyavāsin, Vindhya-nivāsin and Vindhyavāsa refer to one and the same person. This fact invalidates the assumption of Prof. Keith who in his Karma-mīmāṃsā (p. 59) considers Vindhyavāsin and Vindhyavāsa as two distinct persons, one being a teacher of Sāṃkhya and the other of Mimāṃsā.

Vindhyavāsin and Vyāḍi

Pt. Tanusukharam in his introduction to the Māṭhara-vṛtti endavours to establish the identity of Vindhyavāsin with Vyāḍi, the famous grammarian. His contention is that some lexicographers are found to read Vindhyavāsin as a synonym of Vyāḍi. Further light is shed in this connection by Umbeka who in his

1 Ākṛtivāda, 76.
2 *Śloka-vārttika*, ātmavāda 62.

introductory remark on a verse of the Śloka-vārttika[1] states : **'अत्र व्याडिराह, पिण्डसारूप्यमेव सामान्यमिति'**. Again, under another verse of the same book[2] he says : **किञ्च, विन्ध्यवासिनोऽपि पिण्डसारूप्यं सामान्यमिति वदतो नायमभिप्रायः सादृश्यरूपं सामान्यमिति'**. Thus the commentator attributes the view **'पिण्डसारूप्यमेव सामान्यम्'** (universality does not differ from similarity) in one place to Vyāḍi and in another place to Vindhyavāsin, and thereby establishes their identity.

Again, Kumārila in his discussion on **'आकृतिवाद'** holds Vindhyavāsin to be the advocate of **'व्यक्तिवाद'** ; while Śyālikanātha in his commentory on Prabhākara's Vṛhati (1.iii.33) states Vyāḍi to be the same (**अतो व्यक्त्यभिधानी मन्यते व्याडिरिति निदर्शितम्**). Thus the doctrine of *vyakti* is ascribed by one author to Vindhyavāsin and by the other to Vyaḍi. This fact also shows that Vindhyavāsin and Vyāḍi was the same man.

Much has been said in favour of identity of the two teachers. But we are still hesitating to hold the view that the two names speak of one and the same person. First of all, Vindhyavāsin is an exponent of Sāṃkhya, while Vyāḍi generally passes as a distinguished grammarian. Thus we find that the sphere of activity of the two teachers is different. Secondly, all the tenents and doctrines ascribed to Vyāḍi in the Sanskrit literature, speak more or less of grammatical speculations and none of them falls under the province of pure Sāṃkhya. It is indeed true that Sāṃkhya, as we know from the evidence of the Yukti-dīpikā[3], regards **'सामान्य'** (universality) to be nothing but **'सारूप्यं'** (similarity)—a view which again is ascribed to Vyāḍi by Umbeka, yet it is mainly concerned with grammatical speculation and very

1 Ākṛtivāda, 65.
2 ibid, 76.
3 See, न हि वः सामान्यं द्रव्यादर्थान्तरभूतमस्ति, सारूप्यमात्रे सामान्यपरिकल्पनात्, p. 76.

little to do with Sāṃkhya proper. Thirdly, Vyāḍi is a very ancient teacher; for he is referred to even in the Vārttika of Kātyāyana[1], while the Kathāsarit-sāgara (I. ii) mentions him to be a contemporary of Pāṇini. He is usually held to be the author of Saṃgraha a huge treatise on the philosophy of grammar. Patañjali also refers to the text in the Mahābhāṣya (p. 6). Bhartṛhari while speaking of this Saṃgraha in his Vākyapadīya[2], states that it was impossible on the part of the ordinary grammarians to grasp the huge text. As a result of this, it became extinct during his time. Considering everything we find that Vyāḍi lived at a period some centuries before Christ and consequently Vindhyavāsin also must be placed at the same age if he is held to be identical with Vyāḍi. But such an early date on the part of the Sāṃkhya teacher, seems to be over lapping. The plausible view is that Vindhyavāsin is an appelation[3] given to both the teachers. Of these, one is a Sāṃkhya teacher, the other being a grammarian.

The fact that Vindhyavāsin was an appelation given to the Sāṃkhya teacher while his real name was Rudrila, is further borne out by the evidence of the following verse quoted by Kamala Śila in his commentry on the Tattva Saṃgraha (p. 22):

यदेव दधि तत् क्षीरं यत् क्षीरं तद् दधीति च ।
वदता रुद्रिलेनैव ख्यापिता विन्ध्यवासिता ॥

From the statement of Paramārtha[4] we know that Vindhyavāsa composed some couplets in which he revised the doctrine of

1 द्रव्याभिधानं व्याडिः, Pā. I. ii. 64 (45).

2 See, ii. 484 & 488.

3 Both Vyāḍi and Vindhyavāsin are common names. Alberuni refers to one Vyāḍi as an alchemist who lived at the time of the king Vikramâditya of Ujjain—XVII. pp. 189-91.

Similarly, one Vindhyavāsin is mentioned as the author of *Loha-pradīpa*—See, Aufrecht, *Catalogus Catalogorum*.

4 See his 'Life of Vasubandhu,' translated from the original Chinese by Takakusu—*Toung Pao*, July 1904.

his teacher P'i-li-cha-kia-na. Further, he is said to have defeated Buddhamitra, the teacher of Vasubandhu in a debate. Upon this, the king Vikramâditya of Ayodhyā who had been an adherent of Sāṃkhya, rewarded him with three lacs of gold. Vasubandhu was then at Puruṣapura (modern Peshwar). On hearing the news of the defeat of his teacher, he came to Ayodhyā and challenged Vindhyavāsa for a further debate. Finding no response from the heretic, he searched him here and there and at last found him dead in the Vindhya mountain. He then composed Paramārtha-Saptati—a treatise in seventy verses, as a refutation to the revised work of Vindhyavāsa. The crown prince Bālâditya was his patron.

Let us now examine the statement of Paramārtha. As regards the couplets composed by Vindhyavāsa we know nothing except that Guṇaratna Sūri in his account of Sāṃkhya in the Ṣaḍdarśana-Samuccaya quotes a verse[1] which he ascribes to Vindhyavāsin. The same verse is also referred to in the Vyomavati[2] without mentioning the source.

It is also true that Vindhyavāsin revised the Sāṃkhya-Śāstra generally current at his time. For instance, the early definition of perception is 'श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षम्[3],' whereas Vindhyavāsin holds it to be 'श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरविकल्पिका[4]'. Again, Sāṃkhya generally holds the five subtle elements to be the products of *ahaṃkāra*, but he maintains that *ahaṃkāra* as well as the five subtle

1 पुरुषोऽविकृतात्मैव स्वनिर्भासमचेतनम्,
मनः करोति सान्निध्यादुपाधेः स्फटिको यथा ।

2 P. 521 (Chowkhamba).

3 Referred to in the *Yukti-dipikā*, p. 4; *Nyāya-vārttika*, I. i. 4; *Pramāṇa-Samuccaya* of Diṅnāga, p. 64 (restored into Sanskrit by R. Iyengar.)

4 See श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरविकल्पिकेति वि न्ध्य वा सि–प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमनेनैव निरस्तम्, *Sanmati-tarkaprakaraṇa*, p. 533; also referred to in the *Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 100 (Vizianagram edition).

elements come out from *buddhi*[1]. Besides these, there are many other points in which he deviates from his predecessors and these will be treated in their proper place.

The reference to the debate of Vindhyavāsa with the teacher of Vasubandhu and the subsequent reward of the former by the king Vikramâditya of Ayodhyā, deserves special attention. If this be the case, Vindhyavāsa becomes an elder contemporary of Vasubandhu. But the date of Vasubandhu is controversial. It was placed in the last three quarters of the fifth century A. D. by Takakusu[2]. But on the strength of Chinese source N. péri[3] placed it a century earlier, while V. A. Smith[4] further pushed it back to 280-360 A. D. Further light in this connection is shed by Vāmana who in his Kāvyâlaṅkāra Sūtra-vṛtti[5] quotes the last half of a verse which runs thus :

सोऽयं सम्प्रति चन्द्रगुप्ततनयश्चन्द्रप्रकाशो युवा,
जातो भूपतिराश्रयः कृतधियां दिष्ट्या कृतार्थश्रमः ।

The idea is this : 'The very son of Candragupta, young and shining like the Moon, a patron of men of letters, fortunately in the success of his effort has now become king'. Here Vāmana remarks that the expression 'आश्रयः कृतधियाम्' (patron of men of letters) indicates a reference to the ministership of Vasubandhu[6]. Thus we find that Vasubandhu received patronage of the son of Candragupta. Now, who is this Candragupta ? Is he Candragupta I, the founder of the Gupta Empire or his grand son Candragupta II ? In our opinion he seems to be the latter ; for it is he and not the former who assumed the title of Vikramâditya

1 See above, p. 141, n3.
2 J. R. A. S., 1905, pp. 33-53.
3 BEFEO, xi, 356 ff.
4 *The Early History of India*, appendix iv.
5 III. ii. 2, p. 86.
6 आश्रयः कृतधियामित्यस्य वसुबन्धु–साचिव्योपक्षेपपरत्वात् साभिप्रायत्वम्.

and in every possibility identical with the king Vikramâditya of Ayodhyā as referred to by Paramārtha. If our suggestion is right, the verse quoted by Vāmana speaks of the achievements of Kumāragupta, the son of Candragupta II. The date of his accession to the throne is usually held to be 413 A. D. Consequently the Sāṃkhya teacher who was rewarded by his father, died not later than in the beginning of the fifth century A. D.

Nothing is definitely known of the Paramārtha Saptati of Vasubandhu. Kamala Śila only refers to the text[1] and does not furnish with any detail. However, he quotes a verse in his commentary (p. 22) which apparently seems to be a quotation from the text of Vasubandhu ; but he does not mention the source. The verse runs thus :

यदेव दधि तत् क्षीरं यत् क्षीरं तद् दधीति च ।
वदता रुद्रिलेनैव ख्यापिता विन्ध्यवासिता ॥

Here Vindhyavāsin is indirectly called a beast. The real name of the Sāṃkhya teacher was Rudrila, while Vindhyavāsin was an appelation given to him. As the teacher is of opinion that milk and curd do not differ materially—the Sāṃkhya theory of causation which makes no distinction between the material cause and its effect, so the opponent sarcastically remarks in this couplet that the appelation Vindhyavāsin really befits Rudrila for such silly utterance. The idea is this : Vindhyavāsin literally means an inhabitant of the mountain of Vindhya, and it is a beast that usually inhabits a mountain.

As this verse mercilessly criticises Vindhyavāsin, hence some are of opinion that it may constitute one of the couplets of Paramārtha-Saptati where Vasubandhu is said to have refuted the view of the Sāṃkhya teacher. However, this is a mere suggestion and there is no conclusive evidence in support of it.

1 आचार्यवसुबन्धुप्रभृतिभिः कोश-परमार्थसप्तदिकादिष्वभिप्रायप्रकाशनात् पराक्रान्तम्, p. 129.

Unlike Paramārtha, Yuan-chwang[1] mentions Manoratha to be the teacher of Vasubandhu. His pupil Kuei-chi[2] also narrates a similar account of a debate between a Sāṃkhya teacher and a Buddhist; but he does not mention their names. He states that the Sāṃkhya teacher composed the 'Gold-Seventy', a metrical treatise in seventy couplets in which he revised the doctrine of Sāṃkhya. It was called such, as the king rewarded the author with gold for his triumph in the debate. Vasubandhu composed 'Paramārtha-Saptati' in opposition to the 'Gold-Seventy'.

This 'Gold-Seventy' is no other than the 'Sāṃkhya-Saptati' of Īśvarakṛṣṇa; for the latter also is a treatise of seventy stanzas. Further light in this connection is shed by the Catalogue of Nānjio where it is found that 'Gold-Seventy' was the familiar name of the Sāṃkhya-Saptati in China[3]. Mention is also made of one 'Kanaga-Saṭtari' (Sk. Kanaka-Saptati) along with Kābila, Saṭṭhitanta and Māḍhara in the canonical literature of the Jains[4]. It thus appears that Kanaka-Saptati, Gold-Seventy and the Sāṃkhya-Saptati speak of the same treatise. If this be the case, Vasubandhu wrote his 'Paramārtha-Saptati' in opposition to the Sāṃkhya-Saptati, i. e. the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. On the other hand, Paramārtha states that Vasubandhu did so with a view to refuting the revised Sāṃkhya work of Vindhyavāsa. How to account for these two conflicting statements? Takakusu[5] attempted to get rid of the difficulty by holding Iśvarakṛṣṇa and Vindhyavāsa as the same man. But these two teachers are sometimes found to hold different and even contradictory views on some important

1 See Beal's translation—*The Buddhist records of the western world*, Vol. I, p. 108.

2 See Takakusu, *La Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, Introd. pp. 38-40.

3 See Takakusu, J. R. A. S., 1905. p. 47, n3.

4 See above, p. 123, n3.

5 *A Study of Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu and the date of Vasubandhu*—J. R. A. S., 1905, pp. 33-53.

points of Sāṃkhya; hence it is far from convincing that they were one and the same man. For instance, Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition of perception is 'प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम्', whereas Vindhyavāsin defines it as 'श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरविकल्पिका'. The former advocates the doctrine of the subtle intermediate body, whereas the latter rejects it altogether. One is of opinion that the organs are thirteen in number while the other regards only eleven as such. Besides these, there are many other points where one deviates from the other[1].

Further, there is evidence to prove that Vindhyavāsin was a predecessor of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, In course of discussing on the different members of a syllogistic reasoning, the Yukti-dīpikā[2] remarks that Iśvarakṛṣṇa did not dwell upon them for the simple reason that these had been already treated by Vindhyavāsin and such other teachers in their respective works; hence it is needless on the part of Īśvarakṛṣṇa to repeat them here. This fact clearly indicates that the author of the Yukti-dīpikā knew Vindhyavāsin to be a predecessor of Iśvarakṛṣṇa. The Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā (p. 39) of the Jains also considers Vindhyavāsin to be earlier than Īśvarakṛṣṇa. While referring to the heretical conceptions of perception, the said text observes that perception, according to the early teachers of Sāṃkhya is 'श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरविकल्पिका', whereas Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines it as 'प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम्'. The former, as has been already pointed out above, constitutes the definition of Vindhyavāsin and the latter that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Thus the identity of Vindhyavāsa and Iśvarakṛṣṇa, as proposed by Takakusu cannot be established at all, and as a result of this it has become impossible to reconcile the conflicting statements of Paramārtha and Kuei-chi.

However, let us turn our attention to Kuei-chi and see whether any other evidence may be obtained in favour of his state-

1 Also see Gopinath Kaviraj's Introduction on *Jayamaṅgalā*.

2 तन्त्रान्तरेषु हि विन्ध्यवासिप्रभृतिभिराचार्यैरुपदिष्टाः······जिज्ञासादीनाम्, p. 4.

ment. Unlike Paramārtha, he states that Vasubandhu wrote his Paramārtha-Saptati in opposition to the Gold-Seventy which has been already maintained by us to be the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Hence in his opinion, it was Īśvarakṛṣṇa and not Vindhyavāsa who vanquished the Buddhist teacher in the debate and was subsequently rewarded by the king. The Yukti-dīpikā sheds important light in this connection. A careful perusal of the entire text reveals the fact that in writing this commentary, the main intention of the author was to refute the arguments of the opponents and thereby to establish the validity of the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Almost in every page, he first of all faithfully puts forward the contradictory views and arguments of the opponents and criticises them step by step. But the major portion of his criticism is marshalled against the anti-Sāṃkhya arguments and counter arguments of the Buddhists who are all anterior to Dharmakīrti. Unfortunately the author himself does not always mention the names of the teachers whose views he is going to refute therein. However, in one place[1] it has been possible to point out that he vehemently criticises the view of Vasubandhu; but thereby it cannot be definitely stated whether all the anti-Buddhistic arguments of the author were advanced against this reputed Buddhist teacher. Most interesting is to observe that our author while putting forward the version of the opponent, occasionally quotes some verses which are anti-Sāṃkhya in character. The following couplets bear testimony to this :

(i) भिन्ना लक्षणभेदाश्चेन् मिथः सत्त्वादयो गुणाः,
तर्हि लक्षणयुक्तत्वात् षड्गुणाः प्राप्नुवन्ति ते । (p. 72).

Here the opponent urges : You Sāṃkhya are of opinion that *sattva* is light and illuminating, *rajas* is dynamic and exciting while *tamas* is massive and inert. By way of explaining and illustrating these different characteristics of the *guṇas*, you come

1 See *Yukti-dīpikā*, pp. 136-7 (notes).

to the conclusion that the *guṇas* are three in number and thus disregard their unity. Now the question naturally arises whether these pairs of characteristics, such as lightness and illumination, mobility and excitement, massiveness and inertia differ between themselves or not ? If they differ, the number of the *guṇas* becomes three multiplied by two, i. e. six ; if they do not, it is superfluous to count them separately.

Evidently the couplet quoted above makes reflection on the following Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa :

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकं चलमुपष्टम्भकञ्च रजः,
गुरु वरणकमेव तमः प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ।

In this connection, our author quotes another couplet (p. 72) where also the opponent attacks the *guṇa* theory of Sāṃkhya. The couplet is quoted below :

(ii) अङ्गभावं व्रजत् सत्त्वं दुःखं सम्पद्यते यदि,
वैरूप्यस्योपसंहारात् पूर्वदोषानिवर्तनम् ।

Most interesting is to notice the following couplet (p. 107) :

(iii) विना सर्गेण बन्धो हि पुरुषस्य न युज्यते,
सर्गस्तस्यैव मोक्षार्थमहो सांख्यस्य सूक्तता ।

Here the opponent makes a sarcastic remark on the Sāṃkhya view of bondage and liberation. This appears to be a reflection on Īśvarakṛṣṇa who is of opinion that the *puruṣa* experiences pain arising of decay and death as long as he abides in the metempsychosis, and further that the *prakṛti* performs the manifold creations for the sake of liberation of the *puruṣa* though it appears that it does so for its own sake.

It thus appears that the main intention of the opponent in writing these couplets was to condemn the doctrine of Sāṃkhya and specially that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

So far we could not know the source from which these couplets were quoted. But the versified reply that proceeds from

our author to the saracastic remark of the opponent, sheds important light in this connection. It may be noticed in the following pair of couplets :

दृश्यदर्शनभावेन प्रकृतेः पुरुषस्य च ।
अपेक्षाशास्त्रतत्त्वज्ञैर्बन्ध इत्यभिधीयते ॥
एवं विनाऽपि सर्गेण यस्माद् बद्धः पुमान् गुणैः ।
तस्माद् विफलतां यातु म नो र थ-मनोरथः ॥

In these two couplets, the author first of all explains the true Sāṃkhya conception of bondage as opposed to the wrong notion of the opponent, and finally remarks that let the intention of M a n o r a t h a be thus frustrated. This fact clearly indicates that these anti-Sāṃkhya couplets speak of the remark of one Manoratha whose main intention was to find fault with the doctrine of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Now, Manoratha is mentioned to be the teacher of Vasubandhu by Yuan-chwang. On the other hand, Kuei-chi states that Vasubandhu wrote his Paramārtha-Saptati in opposition to the Gold-Seventy, i. e. the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Then, is it a fact that both the teacher and the pupil wrote separate metrical treatises in order to condemn the view of Īśvarakṛṣṇa ? But this does not seem to be the case. The plausible view is that the teacher himself did not write any such treatise, and it was Vasubandhu who in his Paramārtha-Saptati tried to restore the fame of his teacher who had been vanquished in a debate by the Sāṃkhya teacher, and in doing so it would be natural on the part of the pupil to ascribe sometimes even his own arguments to his teacher Monoratha and thus to make the position of the teacher more safe. This is why Manoratha became the target of attack of our author.

Speaking briefly, all the anti-Sāṃkhya couplets hitherto mentioned, were quoted from the Paramārtha-Saptati. Our author also in his turn gives a fitting reply not only to these couplets but

also to other arguments of Vasubandhu, and thus establishes the validity of the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In short, the Yukti-dīpikā may be better called a rejoinder of the Paramārtha-Saptati.

Thus, the statement of Kuei-chi seems to be more authentic than that of Paramārtha. Had Vasubandhu actually written his Paramārtha-Saptati with a view to refuting the treatise of Vindhyavāsa, the author of the Yukti-dīpikā would never take so much trouble in pleading the case of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In that case, he would certainly write a commentary on the treatise of Vindhyavāsa instead of the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

That Paramārtha's statement cannot be always taken seriously, is further borne out by the evidence of his translation of the Vijñaptimātra-Śāstra which for the lack of complete fidelity to the original Sanskrit text, had to be replaced by another translation of Yuan-chwang. But thereby it does not mean that his statement which occupied us so long is totally negligible. His main drawback is that he has confused between Vindhyavāsa and Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and mentioned Buddhamitra instead of Manoratha as the teacher of Vasubandhu. However, reference is made of one early Vasubandhu[1] in the Buddhist texts and Buddhamitra may be the teacher of that Vasubandhu. Besides these, there is nothing to contradict his statement. In conclusion, we may say that it was Īśvarakṛṣṇa and not Vindhyavāsa who had been rewarded by the king Vikramâditya of Ayodhyā. This Vikramâditya, as we have already noticed above, is no other than Candragupta II. He died in or about 413-14 A. D., and consequently Īśvarakṛṣṇa may be placed at the second half of the fourth century A. D. His

1 Yaśomitra refers to the view of one Sthavira-Vasubandhu which is criticised by Vasubandhu, the author of the Abhidharma-Kośa. See 'अपर इति स्थविरो वसुबन्धुराचार्यमनोरथोपाध्याय एवमाह, आचार्य आह कथमिति—*Sphūtārthābhidharma-Kośavyākhyā*, (Tokyo) p.289. *l* 6-7. Also see आश्रयभूत········इति वृद्धाचार्य-वसुबन्धुः, p. 35. *l* 20.

predecessor Vindhyavāsin becomes still earlier. But from the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to trace his exact date.

It will not be out of place here to speak a few words with regard to some other ancient teachers of Sāṃkhya whose names though do not appear in any of the printed works of Sāṃkhya, but are referred to in the other branches of Sanskrit literature. Thus Guṇaratna in his brief account of Sāṃkhya in the Ṣaḍdarśana-Samuccaya is found to mention one Ātreya-tantra as a treatise of Sāṃkhya. Evidently, its author was one Ātreya. Unfortunately nothing else is known of him as a teacher of Sāṃkhya. The relation of this Ātreya with the medical teacher of this name is not possible to ascertain. The Pramāṇa-naya-tattvâlokâlaṅkāra[1] of the Jains quotes some lines from the Bhāṣya of one Ātreya, but he seems to be a teacher of Vaiśeṣika. However, we cannot take the statement of Guṇaratna seriously; for it is indeed peculiar to notice that the same Ātreyatantra is mentioned by him in one place as a treatise of Sāṃkhya, while in his account of the Vaiśeṣika system it is mentioned to be a treatise of Vaiśeṣika.

Another Sāṃkhya teacher of the name of Mādhava, is referred to in two or three instances in the Sanskrit literature. Thus we find Kumārila in his Śloka-vārttika criticising the view of a teacher who finds fault with the Mīmāṃsakas for advocating the slaughtering of animals for sacrificial purposes. Here Umbeka[2] in his commentary states that it is Mādhava, the prominent teacher of Sāṃkhya, who is referred to and criticised by the author. This teacher is also referred to in the commentary on the Pramāṇa-

1 See p. 332 (Poona edition).

2 सांख्यनायकमाधवस्त्वाह—विहायानुमानादीन् विधिप्रतिषेधत्वनिवन्धनत्वमेव धर्मा-धर्मयोरवलम्ब्याग्नीषोमीयादिष्वधर्मतामाह क्वचिदिति श्लोकत्रयेण······*Ślokavārttika*, pp. 112-3 (Madras University).

Samuccaya of Diṅnāga[1]. Further, from the statement of Yuan-chwang[2] we know that this famous Sāṃkhya teacher was challenged by Guṇamati-Bodhisattva for a debate. Now Guṇamati[3] is mentioned to be a pupil of Vasubandhu, while others hold him to be a contemporary of Sthiramati. The latter's work was translated into Chinese as early as A. D. 397–439. Thus his lower limit can not be placed later than the fifth century A. D. Consequently Mādhava also should not be pushed later than this.

THE SĀṂKHYA KĀRIKĀ AND ITS COMMENTARIES

So far we had been traversing into the region of conjecture, supposition and doubt; but with Īśvarakṛṣṇa we come to a period in which the particular School of Sāṃkhya with which we are generally acquainted, finds its beginning. As regards his personal history we know very little worth mentioning. Speaking of him Paramārtha in his Chinese version only states that he had been a brāhmin of the family of Kauśika, and nothing more. One Īśvarakṛṣṇa is credited wtth the authorship of the lexicon of the name of Prayukta-mañjarī.

His Kārikā is a compendium of the vast literature on Sāṃkhya. In this connection, the Yukti-dīpikā in its introductory remark[4] states that the huge treatise of Kapila was not possible to master even in hundreds of years; hence the veteran teachers of Sāṃkhya for the sake of benefit of their pupils dealt with the teachings of Kapila in the short treatises of their own. The

1 'कपिलादयो मन्यन्ते सुखादीनां स्वरूपं सर्वत्र एकमेवेति, माधवस्तु सर्वत्र तानि भिद्यन्त इति, p. 77 ; also see p. 81.

2 See 'The Sāṃkhya teacher Mādhava and Guṇamati Bodhisattva' —Beal's translation, Vol. II, pp. 104-7.

3 For Guṇamati, see Takakusu—I-tsing's 'Record of Buddhist Religion', notes at the end (P. 181.).

4 See the introductory verses 3-8, p. 1.

Vaiśeṣikas, Buddhists and such other sects became their opponents, and with a view to refuting their arguments, the celebrated exponents of Sāṃkhya introduced most terse and subtle reasonings into their respective works. As it was most difficult on the part of the ordinary pupils to grasp those reasonings, so Īśvarakṛṣṇa composed this compendium. Our author himself also states at the end of the Kārikā that the treatise in seventy couplets consists of all the topics of discussion of the entire Ṣaṣṭitantra—exclusive of parables and controversial doctrines of other teachers.

In writing the Kārikā, our author has revised some of the tenets and doctrines of Sāṃkhya current at his time. Among these, mention may be specially made of his definitions of perception and inference. Early definitions of them are **श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षम्**[1]' and '**सम्बन्धादेकस्मात् शेषसिद्धिरनुमानम्**[2]' respectively; whereas in his opinion these constitute '**प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम्** and **तत् (अनुमानम्) लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्** (Kā, 5). The minor points in which he deviates from his predecessors have been occasionally noticed here and there and we need not repeat them here.

The text of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is written in the *ārya* metre and it generally passes under the name of 'Sāṃkhya-Kārikā' or Sāṃkhya-Saptati', while in China it is usually called 'Gold-Seventy' (Skt. Kanaka-Saptati). The term 'Saptati' implies that the text speaks of the principles of Sāṃkhya in seventy couplets. Gauḍapāda did not explain the last three couplets. This has led the late Pt. B. G. Tilak[3] to doubt their authenticity. He argues

1 For reference see above p. 145, n3,

2 Referred to in the *Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 4; *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 5. Also criticised by Diṅnāga in his *Vṛtti* on the *Pramāṇa-Samuccaya*—pointed out by Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 265 & 267.

3 *Sanskrit Research*, Vol. I, pp. 107-117. The point first of all came to the notice of Mr. Wilson, but he did not attempt to reconstruct the missing couplet.

that the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā which originally consisted of seventy couplets has now only sixty-nine as such and one couplet is thus missing. He reconstructed the missing couplet from the Bhāṣya of Gauḍapāda on Kā, 61 and suggested that some body dropped the couplet as it preached atheistic ideas. The couplet reconstructed runs thus :

कारणमीश्वरमेके ब्रुवते कालं परे स्वभावं वा,
प्रजाः कथं निर्गुणतो व्यक्तः कालः स्वभावश्च ।

We need not examine here the arguments he has advanced in supplementing this couplet; for a fitting reply of his view is to be met with in the Sanskrit introduction on the Māṭhara-vṛitti. So far we can say that the last three couplets are also read by Paramārtha who precedes Gauḍapāda by some centuries. Thus we find no reason to doubt their authenticity. The fact is that the last three couplets are not difficult to understand and this is why Gauḍapāda did not consider it necessary to explain them. Further, Īśvarakṛṣṇa has finished all what he has to say in the seventy couplets and in the concluding two couplets he only attempts to prove the authenticity of his treatise and nothing else. Thus the significane of the term 'Saptati' cannot be questionable.

The couplet LXIII is lacking in the Chinese version, while both Māṭhara and Vigraharāja Bhatta[1] read the following additional verse at the end of the text :

तस्मात् समासदृष्टं शास्त्रमिदं नार्थतश्च परिहीनम् ,
तन्त्रस्य च बृहन्मूर्तेर्दर्पणसंक्रान्तमिव बिम्बम् ।

It is interesting to notice that in the works of ancient teachers we occasionally meet with such lines as bear a striking resemblance with some of the expressions of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. For instance,

1 A Ms. of this author's commentary on the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā is deposited in the private library of His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmere. For further about this Ms., see appendix.

while enumerating the various causes by which an existing object also cannot be perceived, Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya[1] states :

षड्भिः प्रकारैः सतां भावानामनुपलब्धिर्भवत्यतिसन्निकर्षादतिविप्रकर्षान्मूर्त्यन्तर-व्यवधानात् तमसावृतत्वादिन्द्रियदौर्बल्यादतिप्रमादादिति ।

Caraka[2] also utters a similar expression which runs thus :

सताञ्च रूपाणामतिसन्निकर्षादतिविप्रकर्षादावरणात् करणदौर्बल्यात् मनोऽनव-स्थानात् समानाभिहारादभिभवादतिसौक्ष्म्याच्च प्रत्यक्षानुपलब्धिः ।

Turning our attention to Īśvarakṛṣṇa we find that he also enumerates more or less the same causes in the following Kārikā :—

अतिदूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियधातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ,
सौक्ष्म्याद् व्यवधानादभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ।

Again, Āryadeva in his Śataśāstra[3] quotes the following lines with the remark as it is said in the Sūtras of the Sāṃkhya's :—

'That the *dharma* of sacrifice is impure in as much as it has the characteristic of non-eternity. And of superiority and of inferiority ; therefore it must be abandoned'.

This reminds us of the expression 'दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धि-क्षयातिशययुक्तः' of the Kārikā (2). However, all these authorities recieved these similar ideas from a common heritage and there is no conclusive evidence to hold that all these expressions were the independent achievements of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Otherwise, his date must be pushed back to some centuries earlier, which is absurd. For we have already attempted to place him at the latter half of the 4th. century A. D.

There are numerous commentaries upon the Kārikā, the principal among whom are the Chinese version of Paramārtha, Māṭhara-vṛtti, Yukti-dīpikā, Gauḍapāda-Bhāṣya, Tattvakaumudī and the Jayamaṅgalā.

1 Pā, 4. 1. 3.

2 *Sūtrasthāna*, xi.

3 From Tucci's translation of *Śataśāstra*, p, 18 (6)—Gaekwad's Oriental Series, XLIX.

The Chinese version of Paramārtha

The earliest available commentary on the Kārikā is what had been translated into Chinese by Paramārtha during his literary activity in China which covers a period of twelve years from 557 to 569 A. D. It is written in a way, specially to serve the purpose of the beginners. The name of the commentator is not furnished by him, but it is strange to notice that Kuei-chi attributes the authorship of this commentary to Vasubandhu.[1]

Māṭhara-vṛtti

Māṭhara is an an ancient teacher of Sāṃkhya, for the name also appears in the Anuyogadvāra-sūtra of the Jains, together with Kābiliyaṃ, Saṭṭitantaṃ and Kanaga-sattari. One Māṭhara is mentioned by I-tsing as a minister of the king Kaniṣka, but it cannot be definitely stated whether this Māṭhara also was a teacher of Sāṃkhya. Further, Māṭhara is an appelation and not a name. However, the present Māṭhara-vṛtti is blended with such materials as clearly speak of its later date.

Mention is made of an old palm-leaf Ms. of the Māṭhara-vṛtti in the 'Catalogue of Mss. in the Jesalmere Bhāṇḍār's.[2] The editor remarks that its bulk is greater than that of the printed edition of the same, and it thus appears that it is a different work of a different author.[3] But nothing can be definitely known, unless it is collated with the printed text.

Dr. Belvalkar is of opinion that the Māṭhara-vṛtti is the original of the Chinese version of Paramārtha and in support of

1 Pointed out by Takakusu, *La Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, Introd., p. 38 *infra*.

2 Edited in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. XXI.

3 See, माठरवृत्तिस्तु सांप्रतं मुद्रिता, तस्याश्च प्रमाणं न महत् , इयं तु महती । इत्यत इयं काचि.न्याऽन्यकृता सम्भवेत्—पृः, ३२.

his view he cites several similar passeges from both the texts. But we are not prepared to accept his view ; for there are good many instances where the two commentators offer different and sometimes even contradictory explanations. Some of these had been already noticed by Suryanarayan Sastri[1] and we need not repeat them here. The plausible view is that both the commentators were indebted to a common source.

Yukti-dīpikā

It is a unique commentary on the Kārikā, edited[2] for the first time by the present writer from a transcription of a birch-bark Kasmirian Ms. deposited in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.

The text refers to the views of numerous Sāṃkhya teachers such as, Paurika, Pañcâdhikaraṇa, Patañjali, Vārṣagaṇya and his followers and Vindhyavāsin who are all anterior to Īśvarakṛṣṇa. This has enhanced the value of the text to a great extent. For these teachers are not always found to hold the same view as that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and thus the author helps us to have a glimpse of the different schools of Sāṃkhya existing before Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

It has been already observed that the main intention of the author in writing this commentary was to give a fitting reply to the hostile criticisms of the Paramārtha-Saptati of Vasubandhu, and thereby to establish the validity of the views of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The author also states towards the end that his Yukti-dīpikā (lit. illuminator of reasonings) dispels darkness in the shape of wrong notions (कुदृष्टितिमिरापहा). Speaking briefly, the text serves the purpose of a rejoinder of the criticisms of Vasubandhu.

The style of the author is archaic and highly polemical. He first of all puts in a nut-shell what he has to say, and then

1 'Māṭhara and Paramārtha', J. R. A. S., 1931, pp. 623-39.

2 Calcutta Sanskrit Series, No. XXIII.

expands the same. In doing so he attacks the view of the opponent who also in his turn re-attacks that of the defendant. In this way attacking, re-attacking and counter-attacking go on continually till the accepted conclusion is reached. This method has sometimes rendered it difficult to trace the place where the version of the opponent begins and that of the defendant ends.

Further, our author was not only a philosopher but also a grammarian. This is evident from his discussions on the *samāsa* in 'तदुपघातके' (kā, 1) and 'मूलप्रकृतिः' (kā, 2). He also raises a good deal of grammatical problems in the expression 'षोड्शकस्तु विकारः' (kā, 3). Besides these, there is evidence to show that he was thoroughly conversant with the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. For we find expressions and quotations from the Mahābhāṣya here and there in the Yukti-dīpikā. Not only this, in some places he even attempted to imitate the style of Patañjali.

The classification of the different chapters of the text is also worthy of notice. The whole text is divided into four *prakaraṇas* and eleven *āhnikas*—an old fashioned division which is not ordinarily to be met with in the other commentaries on the Kārikā[1].

The authorship of the text deserves special attention. The colophon at the end of the Ms. on the basis of which the text is edited, states Vācaspati Miśra to be its author. But this is far from convincing. For instance, the author of the Yukti-dīpikā attributes the fragment 'रूपातिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण विरुध्यन्ते…' to Vārṣagaṇya (p.70) whereas Vācaspati in his commentary on the Yoga-Bhāṣya (iii.13) attributes the same to Pañcaśikha. Further, his style as well as the manner of presentation is quite different from that of Vācaspati. Besides these, there is reason to believe that our author preceeded Vācaspati not less than by a century. The exact date of the author is not possible to ascertain. But from the internal evidence so much we may guess that his upper limit cannot be placed before the date of Bhartṛhari which is usually

1 Vigraharāja Bhaṭṭa also classifies his commentary on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā into seven *āhnikas*. A ms. of the said commentary is deposited in the personal library of his Highness, the Maharaja of Kashmere.

admitted to be the first half of the seventh century A.D.; for the author is found to quote some couplets in his work which find their place with slight alteration in reading in the Vākyapadīya[1] of Bhartṛhari. Considering the style of the text and the different authorities quoted therein, the date of the author does not seem to be later than the eighth century A. D.

But the name of the author is still shrouded in obscurity. A ms. of the name of 'Sāṃkhya-dīpikā'[2] whose authorship is attributed to Kaiyaṭa, is noticed in the 'Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit Mss. in the Central Provinces and Berar'. The present writer tried his best to secure the said manuscript but to no effect. Hence, it is not desirable to pass any opinion unless the said manuscript can be thoroughly examined.

Yukti-dīpikā and Rāja-vārttika

In his Tattva-kaumudī while commenting on the expression **'षष्ठितन्त्र'**(kā, 72) Vācaspati is found to quote some couplets from the Rāja-vārttika[3]. It is curious to notice that these couplets also find their place in the introductory stanzas (p 2, couplets 10-12) of the Yukti-dīpikā, and from the context it appears that the said couplets came from the pen of the author himself. Again, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his Nyāya-mañjarī (p. 109) while refuting the definition

1 प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोकः सर्वः समनुपश्यति ।
समारम्भाः प्रवर्तन्ते तिरश्चामपि तद्वशात् ॥—Vākyapadīya II, 149, quoted in the Yukti-dīpika p. 38.

Also see, पृथङ्निविष्टतत्त्वानां···न विद्यते *ibid*, II. 426-7, Yukti-dīpikā, p. 8.

2 No 6368, diposited with Pt. Ramnath Trivedi of Dhamtari, Raipur District.

3 तथा च राजवार्त्तिकम्—प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।
पारार्थ्यञ्च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥
... ...
इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टाभिः सह सिद्धिभिः ॥

of pereception of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, refers to the explanation of the same by one Rājā in the following lines :

यत्तु राजा व्याख्यातवान्—प्रतिराभिमुख्ये वर्तते, तेनाभिमुख्येन विषयाध्यवसायः प्रत्यक्षमिति ।

The author of the Yukti-dīpikā (p.42) also in his turn makes a similar statement. This may be noticed below :

विषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टमितीयत्युच्यमाने विषयमात्रे सम्प्रत्ययः स्यात्, प्रतिना तु आभिमुख्यं द्योत्यते। तेन सन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियवृत्त्युपनिपाती योऽध्यवसायस्तद् दृष्टमित्युपलभ्यते ।

From these striking similarities, it appears that both the Yukti dīpikā and the Rāja-vārttika may pass for the same commentary.

Again, in his Nyāya-vārttika-tātparyaṭīkā (I. i. 5) Vācaspati quotes a verse[1] which enumerates seven sorts of connections on the basis of which early Sāṃkhya used to establish 'inference'. Here Udayana in his commentary on the same states this to be a quotation from the Sāṃkhya-vārttika[2]. From the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to state precisely whether the Sāṃkhya-vārttika and the Rāja-vārttika speak of the same treatise. But the said quotation does not find its place in the Yukti-dīpikā. However, it is strange to notice that the expression **'तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्'** (kā, 5) which defines 'inference', is not touched at all in the Yukti-dīpikā. Most probably, it was due to carelessness of the scribe that the explanation of this important expression has been altogether left out in the Ms., and if this be the case who knows that the verse referred to above did not find its place therein ?

1 मात्रानिमित्तसंयोगिविरोधिसहचारिभिः
स्वस्वामिबध्यघाताद्यैः सांख्यानां सप्तधाऽनुमा.

2 A ms. of one Sāṃkhya-vārttika which is a versified commentary on the Tattvasamāsa sūtras, is deposited with Pt. Nityadhan Bhattacharyya, M.A., of Hindu School, Calcutta. An account of the said ms. is furnished in the 'Journal of the Vangīya Sāhitya Pariṣat'. Its author is Rāja-candrin. It is a later work and has nothing in common with the Rāja-vārttika or Sāṃkhya-vārttika referred to above.

The Bhāṣya of Gauḍapāda

This Bhāṣya is written in plain and simple language, and is free from the discussion of unnecessary topics. Its author is Gauḍapāda. But it is not possible to state precisely whether he and the author of the Gauḍapāda-kārikā on the Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad was one and the same man. Alberuni speaks of one Gauḍa, the anchorite, who composed a book that passed by his own name. But it is not certain whether he refers to the Gauḍapāda-kārikā or the Sāṃkhya-bhāṣya.

Tatta-kaumudī

The author of this commentary is Vācaspati Miśra who needs no introduction to the students of sanskrit. The commentary is very lucid and expressive, and like the Yukti-dīpikā it is not found to raise any hair splitting argument in ellucidating the text of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Vācaspati lived in the first half of the ninth century A. D.; for he is found to state in the end of his Nyāya-sūcīnibandha that he completed the work in the year 898. Here reference is made of the Vikrama era, for his commentator Udayana is found to state that he finished his 'Lakṣṇâvalī in the Śaka year 906. If the year referred to by Vācaspati be held to be the Śaka year, then Vācaspati and Udayana become contemporaneous which is untenable. Hence the era referred to by Vācaspati is that of Vikrama which corresponds to 841 A. D.[1]

Jayamaṅgalā

The authorship as well as the date of this commentary is difficult to ascertain. From the benedictory verse we know that its author was a Buddhist; but strange to notice that the colophon at the end ascribes the authorship to Śaṅkara, the famous teacher

1 On the other hand, Mr. Bhattacharyya is of opinion that the year referred to by Vācaspati is the Śaka era and consequently he places Vāsaspati in the latter half of the 10th century A.D. For the arguments advanced by him, see 'Date of Vācaspati Miśra and Udayanācārya', *Ganganath Jha Research Institute Journal*, Vol II, Part 4, pp. 349-56.

of Vedānta. M. M. Gopinath Kaviraj in his masterly introduction on the Jayamaṅgalā spares no pains to discuss on the authorship of this commentary and finally attributes the same to one Śaṅkarārya, the author of the commentary of the name of Jayamaṅgalā on the Nītisāra of Kāmandaka as well as the Kāmasūtra of Vātsyāyana. On the other hand Mr. Kavi[1] after briefly observing the various commentaries of the name of Jayamaṅgalā comes to the conclusion that these different Jayamaṅgalās came from the pen of one Śaṅkara who had also been the author of the Yogasūtra-bhāṣyavivaraṇa[2]. He further attempts to prove that this Śaṅkara was a pupil of one Govinda Bhāgavatapāda and that he was a member of the Payyur family that flourished between 1300-1400 A.D. But the serious objection to this finding of Mr. Kavi lies in the fact that the author of the Sāṃkhya commentary was a Buddhist while there is no reason to consider Śaṅkara of the Payyur family as such.

However, an early date cannot be assigned to the author of the Jayamaṅgalā on the Kāmasūtra; for he is found to quote from the work of Kakkoka who belongs to the tenth century A. D., while there is every reason to believe that the author of the Sāṃkhya commentary of the name of Jayamaṅgalā flourished at an earlier period.

Firstly, the numerous quotations cited in the text are taken from the works of such authorities as are in every possibility earlier than Vācaspati. Some of these quotations are also to be met with in the Chinese version of Paramārtha and the Yukti-dīpikā. Unfortunately none of the authors refers to the original source. Of the philosophical works quoted, Jayamaṅgalā only mentions the name of Sāṃkhya-pravacana by which it means the Yoga-sūtra as well as its Bhāṣya.

1 See, 'Literary gleanings, Jayamaṅgalā'—Quarterly Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society, pp. 133-36, October. 1927.

2 Ms. deposited in the Adyar Library, Madras, Cat. No. 39c 13.

Secondly, there is evidence to show that the author of the Jayamaṅgalā was influenced by the works of the ancient Sāṃkhya teachers in writing this commentary. Thus we find that he enumerates and illustrates the seven sorts of relations (kā, 5) by which early Sāṃkhya used to explain 'inference'. These relations are not mentioned by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, nor these are recorded by other commentators. But these are indispensable in explaining the early Sāṃkhya definition of 'inference' which runs thus :— **'सम्बन्धादेकस्मात् शेषसिद्धिरनुमानम्'**[1].

Further, it is well known that the *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhya is not the agent (**अकर्तृभावश्च**, kā, 19). While explaining this, the Jayamaṅgalā traverses a far way off from the ordinary commentators. He enumerates seven factors in this connection and quotes a verse from some Sāṃkhya text in support of his view. The Yukti-dīpikā only adopts this method ; but other commentators are not found to go into such details.

However, the author of the Jayamaṅgalā seems to pre-suppose the existence of the Yukti-dīpikā. For he is found to refer to a different interpretation of the expression **'कारणकार्यविभागात्'** (kā, 15) which closely follows the corresponding portion of the Yukti-dīpikā[2].

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1 See above, n 2, p. 156.

2 Cf. आह—तदनुपलब्धेरयुक्तम्, न हि शयनादीनां कारणकार्यविभागः कश्चिदुपलभ्यते, तस्मादयुक्तमेतत्। उच्यते—न, कार्यकारणयोरुपकारकोपकार्यप···वत्त्वात् कारणं कार्यमिति निर्वर्त्य-निर्वर्तकभावोऽभिप्रेतः, किन्तर्ह्युपकारकोपकार्यभावः। स चास्ति शयनादीनां व्यक्तस्य च। अतो न प्रमादाभिधानमेतत्।

आह—कः पुनर्व्यक्तस्य परस्परकार्यकारणभाव इति। उच्यते—गुणानां तावत् सत्त्वरजस्तमसां प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमलक्षणैर्धर्मैरितरेतरोपकारेण यथा प्रवृत्तिर्भवति, तथा 'प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः' (का, १२) इत्येतस्मिन् सूत्रे व्याख्यातम्। तथा शब्दादीनां पृथिव्यादिपु परस्परार्थमेकाधारत्वम्। श्रोत्रादीना-मितरेतरार्जन-रक्षणसंस्काराः। करणस्य कार्यात् स्थानसाधनप्रख्यापनादिकार्यस्य कारणाद् वृत्ति-क्षणभङ्गसंशोषण-परिपालनानि पृथिव्यादीनां वृत्तिसंग्रहपन्थिव्यूहावकाशदानैर्गवादिभावो(?) देवमानुषतिर श्चाम्, यथर्त्तुविधानेज्यापोषणाभ्यवहारं संव्यवहारेतरेतराध्ययनं वर्णानां स्वधर्मप्रवृत्तिविषयभावः। अन्यच्च लोकाद् यथासम्भवं द्रष्टव्यम्—*Yuktidīpikā*, p. 79-80.

With regard to the antiquities of the Jayamaṅgalā, most satisfactory result may be obtained from Vācaspati's commentary on the kā. 51, where he refers to the explanation of the various 'perfections' (**सिद्धि**) by a different commentator whose version he is not at all prepared to follow. It is curious to notice that the said interpretation has got a striking resmblance with that of the Jayamaṅgalā. To make the point clearer, we quote below the interpretation referred to by Vācaspati and the corresponding portions from the Jayamaṅgalā :—

Tk :—**अन्ये व्याचक्षते—"विनोपदेशादिना प्राग्भवीयाभ्यासवशात् तत्त्वस्य स्वयमूहनं यत् सा सिद्धि :—ऊहः। यस्य सांख्यशास्त्रमन्यदीयमाकर्ण्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा सिद्धिः—शब्दः, शब्दपाठान्तरभावात्। यस्य शिष्याचार्यसम्बन्धेन संवादेन सांख्यशास्त्रं ग्रन्थतोऽर्थतश्चाधीत्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते साऽध्ययनहेतुका सिद्धिः—अध्ययनम्। सुहृत्प्राप्तिरिति – यस्याधिगततत्त्वं सुहृदं प्राप्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा ज्ञानलक्षणा सिद्धिस्तस्य सुहृत्प्राप्तिः। 'दानञ्च' सिद्धिहेतुः—धनादिदानेनाराधितो ज्ञानी ज्ञानं प्रयच्छति।"**

अस्य च युक्तायुक्तत्वे सूरिभिरेवावगन्तव्ये इति कृतं परदोषोद्भावनेन सिद्धान्तमात्रव्याख्यान-प्रवृत्तानामिति।

Jaya :—**ऊह इति। जन्मान्तरसंस्कृतधियो यस्य बन्धमोक्षकारणमुत्प्रेक्षमाणस्य प्रधानपुरुषान्तरज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तस्य सिद्धिरूहहेतुका प्रथमा तारमित्युच्यते।**

यस्य सांख्यशास्त्रपाठमन्यदीयमाकर्ण्य तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, सा सिद्धिः शब्दहेतुका द्वितीया सुतारमित्युच्यते।

यस्य शिष्याचार्यसम्बन्धेन सांख्यशास्त्रं शब्दतोऽर्थतश्चाधीत्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, तस्याध्ययनहेतुका। अध्ययनेन हि तत्परिज्ञानात्। एषा तृतीया तारवि[?]इत्युच्यते।

अन्यैरन्यथा व्याख्यायते—यदुपकरोति तत् कारणम्। यदुपक्रियते तत् कार्यम्। तयोर्विभागात् उपकार्योपकारकभावादित्यर्थः। तत्र कार्य···व्यादीनि शरीरस्थानि स्थानसाधना···वभोगैः कारणा-न्युपकुर्वन्ति। कारणानि च वृद्धिक्षतसंरोहणपालनैः कार्याणि। बाह्यानि च कारणानि पृथिव्याः धृतिसंग्रहपत्तिव्यूहनावकाशदानैः परस्परमुपकुर्वन्ति। तथा दैवमानुषतैर्यग्योनानि परस्परोपकारीणि। तत्र दैवम्, यथाकालं शीतोष्णवातवर्षागमः, मानुषतैर्यग्योनान्युपकरोति। मानुषमिज्यायागस्तुतिभिर्दैवं रक्षति, पोषणभैषज्यैश्च तैर्यग्योनमुपकरोति। यथाऽऽध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां चोपकार्योपकारकभावो बुद्धिकृत इव दृश्यते तदस्य कश्चिद् व्यवस्थापिता स्यात्, कुतोऽयं विभाग इत्यन्यथाऽनुपपत्तेः—*Jayamaṅgalā*, p. 22.

[1] दुःखविघातकास्त्रयः' इति । योऽप्याध्यात्मिकेनाधिभौतिकेनाधिदैविकेन वा भावितस्तद्विघातार्थं ज्ञानं पर्येष्यति, ऊहेन शब्देनाध्ययनेन वा, तस्य तद्विघातहेतुकाः प्रमोद-प्रमुदित-मोदनाख्यास्तिस्रः, उपायस्य त्रित्वादिति । पूर्वा यास्तिस्रः सिद्धयस्ता न दुःखहेतुका इति बोद्धव्याः ।

'सुहृत्प्राप्तिः' इति । योऽधिगततत्त्वं सुहृदं प्राप्य ज्ञानमधिगच्छति, तस्य सुहृत्प्राप्तिपूर्विका, मित्रं हि स्नेहात् ज्ञानं प्रकाशयति, इयं सप्तमी रम्यकमित्युच्यते ।

दानञ्च सिद्धिहेतुः । दानेन ह्याराधितो ज्ञानी ज्ञानं प्रयच्छति, इयमष्टमी सदाप्रमुदितमित्युच्यते ।

Comparing both the versions, it appears that Vācaspati referred here to the Jayamaṅgalā. So far about the principal commentaries that have come down to us. But reference is made of the views of other commentators in the Yukti-dīpikā and Jayamaṅgalā; unfortunately there works are not still available. Hence it is not possible to state precisely which of the commentaries on the Kārikā was the earliest one.

The later commentaries are not found to supply any such data as may throw any important light on the dark period of Sāṁkhya. Hence it is needless to examine them here.

THE TATTVA SAMĀSA SŪTRAS

The commentators ascribe the authorship of the Tattvasamāsa-sūtras to Kapila. These *sūtras* are very concise and simple and were at one time very popular to the pandits of Benares. This fact led Prof. Maxmüller to assign an early date to them. But others are not prepared to accept his view on the ground that ancient writers are not found to comment upon them, nor these are quoted or referred to anywhere by any early writer.

But in the Bhagavadajjukīyam (p. 50-1) of the Jains, the following passage occurs[2].

1 Vācaspati has left out the corresponding portion.

2 Pointed out by T. R. Cintamani—'A note on the Tattva-saṃāsa', Journal of Oriental Researeh, April, 1928.

शाण्डिल्यः—सुणादो भअवो, "अष्टौ प्रकृतयः, षोड़शविकाराः, आत्मा, पञ्चावयवः, त्रैगुण्यम्, मनः, सञ्चरः, प्रतिसञ्चरश्चेति ।" एव्वं हि भअवदा जिणेन पिडअपुत्थएसु उत्तम् ।

परिव्राजकः—शाण्डिल्य ! सांख्यसमय एष, न शाक्यसमयः ।

The above mentioned passage reminds us of the Tattvasamāsa-Sūtras where also almost all these expressions find their place, and it may not be impossible that the author of the Bhagavadajjukīyam had in his mind the Tattvasamāsa-sūtras while composing the said passage. If this be the case then these *sūtras* were in existence even before the eighth century A. D., for the author Bodhāyana Kavi of that Jaina text is mentioned in the inscription[1] of the Pahlava king Mahendravikrama Varman who belonged to the eighth century A.D.

Bhāvāgaṇeśa at the beginning of his Tattvayāthārthyadīpana states that he has followed the exposition of Pañcaśikha in writing this commentary on the Tattvasamāsa[2]. He also quotes some couplets from Pañcaśikha[3]. Even his teacher Vijñānabhikṣu also in his commentary on the Sāṃkhya-sūtra (I.127) quotes a prose fragment and ascribes its authorship to Pañcaśikha[4]. That Pañcaśikha wrote a commentary on the Tattva-samāsa does not

1 Edited in Vol. IV of the 'South Indian Inscriptions'.

2 समाससूत्राण्यालम्ब्य व्याख्यां पञ्चशिखस्य च,
भावागणेशः कुरुते तत्त्वयाथार्थ्यदीपनम् ।

3 तथा चोक्तं पञ्चशिखेन प्रमाणवाक्यम्—
'पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो यत्र कुत्राश्रमे वसेत्
जटी मुण्डी शिखी वाऽपि मुच्यते नात्र संशयः' (p. 61),

सर्वतत्त्वानां ज्ञानफलं चोक्तं पञ्चशिखधृतवाक्येन—'तत्त्वानि यो वेदयते यथावद् गुणस्वरूपाण्यधिदैवतञ्च, विमुक्तपाप्मा गतदोषसङ्गो गुणांस्तु भुंक्ते न गुणैः स भुज्यते', p. 72. उक्तञ्च पञ्चशिखाचार्यैः—'प्राकृतेन तु बन्धेन तथा वैकारिकेन च । दक्षिणाभिस्तृतीयेन बद्धो जन्तुर्विवर्तते' p. 82, *Sāṃkhya-saṃgraha*, (Chowkhamba edition).

4 अत्रादिशब्दग्राह्याः पञ्चशिखाचार्यैरुक्ताः—यथा सत्त्वं नाम प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गप्रीतितितिक्षासन्तोषादिरूपानन्तभेदं समासतः सुखात्मकम् । एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनानाभेदं समासतो दुःखात्मकम् । एवं तमोऽपि निद्रादिनानाभेदं समासतो मोहात्मकमिति ।

seem to be convincing. On the other hand all the aforesaid quotations of Bhāvāgaṇeśa and his teacher Vijñānabhikṣu are to be met with in the Kramadīpikā[1], a posthumous commentary on the Tattva-samāsa. But Kramadīpikā cannot be the work of Pañcaśikha, for the author himself refers to the view of Pañcaśikha and Patañjali in one place (p.125). However, the said treatise which is undoubtedly the earliest of all the existing commentaries on the Tattvasamāsa, cannot be placed at a very later period. Firstly, Prajñākaramati while refuting the Sāṃkhya view quotes a couplet[2] from some Sāṃkhya treatise which he does not mention by name ; but the said couplet finds its place in the Kramadīpikā[3]. If the author of the Kramadīpikā be not supposed to take this couplet from a different source ; he can be safely placed at an earlier period.

Secondly, in the 'Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss. in the private libraries of the North-Western Province,' notice is made of a Ms. of the title of Sāṃkhya-kramadīpikā-vivaraṇam by Sadāśivendra[4]. It is further remarked there that the said Ms. is an obscure commentary on the Sāṃkhya-kramadīpikā and it was copied in 1415 Vikrama era which corresponds to 1358 A.D This being the case it can be safely suggested that the commentator lived before the fourteenth century A.D., and the author of the original Kramadīpikā should have preceeded him by a period which we cannot definitely state. Taking every thing into consideration the date of the original *sūtras* cannot be held so late as some of the modern scholars suggest.

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1 Cp. *Kramadīpikā*. pp. 124, 129, 138 and 127 respectively *Sāṃkhya-saṃgraha* (Chowkhamba edition).

2 'प्रवर्तमानान् प्रकृतेरिमान् गुणांस्तमोवृतत्वाद् विपरीतचेतनः,
अहं करोमीत्यबुधो हि मन्यते तृणस्य कुब्जीकरणेऽप्यनीश्वरः—
Bodhīcaryāvatāra-pañjikā, under couplet 60, p. 455.

3 See p. 124.

4 See No. 15, p. 388—*Cat. of Sans. mss. in private libraries of the N.W.P.* part I (1874, Benares).

THE SĀṂKHYA-SŪTRA

This aphoristic treatise cannot be placed at an early period and sheds no important light on the dark period of Sāṃkhya. Aniruddha wrote a simple commentary on it, while Vijñānabhikṣu composed an elaborate Bhāṣya on it. In the preface to his edition of Aniruddha's commentary, Garbe advanced various arguments to show that Aniruddha lived about 1500 A. D. Keith also supports him.

Vijñānabhikṣu extensively quotes from the Purāṇas and attempts to reconcile the conflicting doctrines of the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta. In the opinion of Garbe and Keith, he flourished at the second half of the sixteenth century A. D. But in the 'Catalogue of sanskrit mss. in private libraries of the N. W. P'., notice is made of one 'Sāṃkhya-sāra-viveka[1] by Vijñāna and it is remarked there that the said ms. was copied in 1516 of the Vikrama era. This being the case, Vijñāna should be placed at least one century earlier.

THE SĀṂKHYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Having thus glanced at its history and literature, we now intend to discuss some of the main doctrines of Sāṃkhya. Before dealing with the metaphysical side of the system, let us turn our attention towards its epistemological conceptions ; for it is, as Iśvarakṛṣṇa rightly observes, through the sources of cognition that the objects can be apprehended (**प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि**, kā, 4).

According to Sāṃkhya, there are three sources of cognition. These are (1) 'perception', (2) 'inference', and (3) 'valid testimony'. Of these, 'perception' in the opinion of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, is the determinate cognition produced through the sense-organs in contact with the objects. He defines it as **'प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम्'** (kā, 5). The author of the Yukti-dipikā, elucidates this and brings out the significance of all the terms in the definition. By **'विषय'** the objects of cognition are meant. These are the gross and the subtle matters. The gross matters are the objects of our cognition while the subtle matters fall within the province of perception of the *yogins* (kā, 34).

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1. See No. 4, p. 384, part I (1874, Benares).

The commentator breaks up the expression 'प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायः' in the following way : विषयं विषयं प्रति वर्तते प्रतिविषयम्—that which comes in contact with particular objects, *i. e.*, the sense-organ in its intercourse with the object. By 'प्रतिविषयम्' a real object must be present and it thus differentiates perception from illusion. 'प्रति' denotes proximity, *i. e.*, the sense organ must be in contact with the object and this characteristic excludes perception from inference. प्रतिविषये अध्यवसायः प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायः--अध्यवसाय is the function of intellect (अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः, kā, 23). The entire definition comes thus : the senses come in contact with their objects, the *buddhi* or intellect then operates in it. The idea is this : the senses are modified in the shape of their objects when they come in contact with them, the inertia or darkness of the *buddhi* is then removed and there is a flow of *sattva*. As a result of this a definite and determinate cognition of the object is thus produced. 'अध्यवसाय' also means 'ascertainment' and by this doubtful cognitions are excluded. Now the question arises as to how 'happiness', 'misery' and such other mental intuitions are to be cognised by this definition ; for the said entities cannot be perceived through the channel of the sense-organs. The author of the Yukti-dīpikā avoids this difficulty by taking recourse to grammatical jugglery. Finding no other means, he finally holds the expression 'प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायः' as an instance of एकशेष compound and expounds the same as 'प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायश्च प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायश्च—प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायः' Thus he gets the same expression twice which again he explains in two different ways to serve his purpose. Of these, the first प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायः in his opinion speaks of the sense-organs in contact with the objects and consequently the operation of the intellect in it (विषयं विषयं प्रति वर्तते प्रतिविषयम् । किं तत् ? इन्द्रियम् । तस्मिन् योऽध्यवसायः). This has been already discussed above. Here the term 'प्रति' is directly connected with the sense-organs. But by the second member of the compound he intends to mean the function of the intellect or *buddhi* with respect to all entities—physical or psychical, nearer or further (विषयं विषयं प्रति योऽध्यवसायः). This explanation has rendered it possible to explain perception of the mental intuitions as well as the supersensible

objects by the *yogins*. Here the term 'प्रति' unlike the former, is directly connected with 'अध्यवसाय'.

Vārṣagaṇya's definition of perception is thus rejected. According to him 'perception' is the functioning of the sense-organs (श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षम्[1]). The Yukti-dīpikā (p. 42, lines 11-15) criticises the said definition on the ground that it fails to cover the mental intuitions as well as the pre-science knowledge of the *yogins* (प्रातिभज्ञान), for these entities cannot be perceived simply by the functioning of the sense-organs.

Indeterminate and determinate perception

It has been already observed above that 'perception' is the definite and determinate cognition of the objects arrived at through the contact of the sense-organs with their respective objects. The author of the Yoga-bhāṣya also more or less advocates the same view. According to him the thought-stuff (चित्त) comes in contact with the external objects through the gate ways of the sense-organs and thus receives an impression of the object ; as a result of this there arises a definite and determinate cognition of the objects possessing both generic and specific qualities (सामान्यविशेषात्मनोऽर्थस्य-विशेषावधारणप्रधाना वृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षम् I. 7)

But in the opinion of Vācaspati perception is of two kinds—indeterminate and determinate (kā, 27). Of these, indeterminate (निर्विकल्पक) perception is the immediate cognition of an object, pure and simple. It presents only a vague idea of the object as 'it is' and not 'like that' just as what belongs to the mind of an infant, the dumb and the like. It is purely presentative in character and does not involve any representative process. On the other hand, determinate perception is the definite cognition of an object related with its properties and qualified by its generic and specific characteristics. It is presentative as well as representative in character ; for it involves the recollection of name, class and such other properties of the object as were experienced in the past and

1 See above, p. 145, n 3.

these are revived in the mind by the law of similarity. In determinate perception 'mind' plays an important part, for it assimilates and discriminates the image brought about by the senses ; where as in indeterminate perception 'mind' does not interfere at all, everything rests there with the sense-organs.

It is curious to notice that Vindhyavāsin's definition of 'perception' (**श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरविकल्पिका**[1]) speaks of indeterminate perception only and not the determinate one. In the opinion of this celebrated exponent of Sāṃkhya, the sense-organs come in contact with their respective objects and are accordingly modified into the form of the objects as they are. This is perception. It is free from imagination (**अविकल्पिका**) *i. e.*, from all associations of name, class and such other categories[2]. It thus presents an immediate and vague impression of the object to the mind. Buddhists also hold a similar view. According to them 'perception' is a non-erroneous cognition of the object free from imagination (**प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढ़ं नामजात्याद्यसंयुतम्**).

Psychological process in perception

Sāṃkhya generally holds that the external organs receive an immediate impression of the object which they in their turn make over to the mind. The mind reflects upon the said impression brought about by the senses and gives it over to *ahaṁkāra* (egoistic principle) which again in its turn appropriates this and finally presents this self-appropriated impression to the intellect. The latter thereupon resolves what is to be done and thus ascertains its duty towards the object known.

1 For Vindhyavāsin's definition of 'perception' see above, p. 145, n 4.

2 In his exposition of the Sāṃkhya view in the Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya (p. 108), Guṇaratna explains the above mentioned definition of perception in the following lines :—

श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरविकल्पिका प्रत्यक्षमिति । श्रोत्रं त्वक् चक्षुषी जिह्वा नासिका चेति पञ्चमीति । श्रोत्रादीनि इन्द्रियाणि, तेषां वृत्तिर्वर्तनं परिणाम इति यावत् । इन्द्रियाण्येव विषयाकारपरिणतानि प्रत्यक्षमिति हि तेषां सिद्धान्तः । अविकल्पिका——नामजात्यादिकल्पनारहिता शाक्यमताध्यक्षवद् व्याख्येयेति ।

Vācaspati illustrates the process thus : just as the headman of a village hands over the revenue collected by himself to the collector of the district who again in his turn delivers it to the governor of the country who finally hands it over to the king. Similarly the external organs make over the immediate impression of the object received by themselves to the mind for reflection who in its turn makes it over to the egoistic principle for appropriation who again presents this self appropriated impression to the intellect for final determination. Thus perception involves the operation of the external sense-organs, the mind, the egoistic principle and the intellect.

Of these, the external organs are classified into two groups : (1) the organs of knowledge and (2) the organs of action. The former comprises (1) the visual organ, (2) the auditory organ, (3) the olfactory organ, (4) the gustatory organ and (5) the tactual organ ; while the latter consists of (1) the vocal organ, (2) the prehensive organ, (3) the locomotive organ, (4) the evacuative organ and (5) the generative organ.

But whether these organs are limited or pervasive is a problem that deserves special attention. For, the ancient teachers of Sāṃkhya are not found here to follow the same view. From the statement of the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 108) we know that there are some teachers who hold that the sense-organs have got no fixed magnitude of their own. Whenever they receive the particular impression of an object, they are modified accordingly into the very shape of that object. Others are of opinion that they are limited, while Vindhyavāsin regards them as pervasive (**इन्द्रियाणि संस्कारविशेषयोगात् परिगृहीतरूपाणीति केचित्, परिच्छिन्नपरिमाणानीत्यपरे, विभूनीति विन्ध्यवासिमतम्**). Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself is silent in this respect ; but the author of the Yukti-dīpikā regards the sense-organs to be pervasive. This is evident from his criticism of the Naiyāyika view of the sense-organs where in connection of supporting his own view he is found to quote a fragment from the work of some ancient teacher of Sāṃkhya wherein the sense-organs are explicitly mentioned to be pervasive being the products of *ahaṃkāra* (**आहङ्कारिकाणां तु तेषां व्यापकत्वात्**, p. 123/12),

Pañcâdhikaraṇa, an ancient teacher of Sāṃkhya, is of opinion that the organs are material products[1]. But other teachers of Sāṃkhya vehemently criticises this view. In their opinion the sense-organs are the *sattic* modification of *ahaṁkāra* and thus they are differentiated from the eye, ear, nose and such other gross material parts of the body. If these physiological sites of the organs are to be regarded as organs themselves, then one whose eyes have been affected with cataract would be able to see, one whose feet have been paralysed would be able to walk and so on. Hence the physiological sites are not identical with the organs.

Again, perception requires direct contact of the sense-organs with the object without which it cannot be explained; for we cannot perceive even nearer objects hidden by an opaque body. This is why Sāṃkhya holds the organs to be '**प्राप्यकारि**', i. e., they function when they come in contact with the object of perception. A physical organ like the 'eye-ball' which is limited and material cannot account for the visual perception of an object lying at a distance or behind a glass. This becomes possible if the organs are regarded as pervasive. Further, the sense organs can receive impressions of all objects, whether great or small. But they could not do so if they were regarded as material substance. In that case they could receive such objects as were equal to them in magnitude. But from practical experience we find that they can receive objects both great and small. All these can be explained if the sense-organs are regarded as pervasive and this becomes possible if they are held to be the products of *ahaṁkāra*[2].

1 'भौतिकानीन्द्रियाणीति पञ्चाधिकरणमतम्'—*Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 108.

2 For the arguments advanced in this paragraph, see the following quotation in the Yukti-dīpikā, p. 123 :—

एवं हि सांख्यवृद्धा आहुः—'आहङ्कारिकाणीन्द्रियाणि अर्थं साधयितुमर्हन्ति नान्यथा। तथाहि कारकं कारकत्वादेव प्राप्यकारि भवति। भौतिकानि चेन्द्रियाणि कथं प्राप्यकारीणि दूरवर्तिनि विषये भवेयुः, आहङ्कारिकाणां तु तेषां व्यापकत्वात्। विषयाकारपरिणामात्मिका वृत्तिर्वृत्तिमतोऽनन्या सती सम्भवत्येवेति सुवचं प्राप्यकारित्वम्। अपि च महदणुग्रहणमाहङ्कारिकत्वे तेषां कल्पते, न भौतिकत्वे, भौतिकत्वे हि यत्परिमाणं करणं तत्परिमाणं ग्राह्यं गृह्णीयात्। Also quoted in the Nyāya-Mañjarī, Vol II, p. 49.

Now the question naturally arises as to how the contact of the sense-organs, specially in the case of visual and auditory perceptions, becomes possible with the external objects. In that case we do not find any direct contact of the said organs with their objects. Modern scientists are of opinion that the light waves are transmitted from the object to the eye, and in the case of auditory perception the sound waves travell through the ether and are received into the ear-passage. Thus visual as well as auditory perception become possible. But Sāṃkhya takes the opposite course. According to this system, an organ of knowledge when explained in the western light, is the sensory psychophysical impulse that goes out of the body and like the photographic process receives an immediate impression of the object. It is called *vṛtti* of the sense-organ through whose instrumentality direct contact with an external object becomes possible. All these can be explained if the sense-organs are regarded to be the products of *ahaṁkāra* with preponderance of *sattva* therein.

The function of the external organs is to receive only an immediate impression of the object and nothing more (**शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः**, kā, 28). The Yukti-dīpikā explicitly states that '**आलोचन**' means 'to receive'. The sense-organs come in contact with the object and are modified into the shape of the objects as they are. This is the only function of the sense-organs and nothing more. This view goes against that of those who hold that general cognition of an object belongs to the sense-organs and special cognition to the intellect[1].

Let us now turn our attention to the organs of action. The functions of these five organs are speaking, handling, walking, excretion and gratification (in the shape of sexual intercourse). Every organ has got its special function which cannot be performed by the other. This is why the Sāṃkhya counts the motor organs also as *indriyas* ; for the act of speaking, handling, walking and the like

1 See, यदुक्तमन्यैराचार्यैः—'सामान्यज्ञानमिन्द्रियाणां विशेषज्ञानं बुद्धे'रिति तत् प्रतिषिद्धं भवति,—Yukti-dīpikā, p. 121/18-9.

cannot be performed without these respective organs of action. In this connection Jayanta Bhaṭṭa[1] urges: the motor organs have got no justification to be held as *indriyas*, for the functions of some of these organs can be performed to a certain extent even by the other parts of the body also. For instance, one whose feet have been amputed, can proceed certain steps even by crawling. Further, if the respective parts of the body be held as *indriyas* for functioning a special action, then the throat, breast, shoulder and such other limbs also should be included in the list of the organs of action; for these are also found to function the special act of swallowing, embracing and carrying burdens etc. The Jains also disregard the Sāṃkhya view. In their opinion, the organs of action are to be included in the tactual organ.

Mind and its function

Mind (*manas*) also comes out of *ahaṁkāra*. It is a sensory organ as well as a motor organ. In this connection Vācaspati observes that the sensory organs as well as the motor organs can operate only when they are presided over by the mind. Hence 'mind' is both a sensory organ as well as a motor organ. Its special characteristic is discernment. The sensory organs only take a vague impression of the object as a homogeneous unit. The mind thereupon reflects 'it is such and such, not *that*', and thus assimilates it to similar objects and discriminates it from dissimilar ones. Hence, function of the mind is to discern (मनः सङ्कल्पयति).

The function of ahaṁkāra

Ahaṁkāra or the egoistic principle is the effect of the intellect (*buddhi*). Its special function is self-appropriation. When the mind has finished its assimilation and discrimination of the vague and indeterminate impression of the object produced by the sense-organs, the *ahaṁkāra* steps in and appropriates to itself the apprehension arrived at by the mind. The commentators explain the function of the *ahaṁkāra* thus: 'I alone preside over what has been

1 Nyāya-mañjarī, pp. 482/3.

discerned by the mind', 'I am entitled to this', 'all these objects are for my use', 'there is no one else entitled to it', 'I alone exist'—this self-appropriation is the function of *ahaṁkāra*.

The function of buddhi

The function of the intellect (*buddhi*) is to ascertain its duty towards what has been appropriated by the egoistic principle (*ahaṁkāra*). Vācaspati illustrates the process thus: every body who has to accomplish something, first of all ponders over it, then reflects on it, then associates himself with it, and finally resolves that he should do this and then proceeds to do it. This is the familiar way to every body. Thus intellect operates when it ascertains that such a duty is to be performed by me. This is the specific function of the intellect. This is called 'अध्यवसाय' (kā, 23) and it does not differ from the 'intellect' itself. The relation of *buddhi* with 'अध्यवसाय' is like that of the lamp with the flame.

The motor and the sensory organs are called external organs, while the mind, ego and intellect are called internal organs. Thus Īśvarakṛṣṇa counts thirteen organs in all. But with regard to the number of organs all the teachers of Sāṃkhya are not found to hold the same view. From the evidence of the Yukti-dīpikā (pp. 108 & 132) we know that according to Pañcâdhikaraṇa there are only ten organs, while the followers of Vārṣagaṇya regard eleven as such. Vindhyavāsin also is of the same opinion Patañjali does not regard *ahaṁkāra* as a separate entity. He includes it within *buddhi*. Hence in his opinion there are only twelve organs.

The function of the organs is to grasp, retain and illumine the objects (आहरण-धारण-प्रकाशकरम्, kā, 32). Here commentators differ in their expositions. According to Gauḍa grasping and retention belong to the motor organs and illumination to the sensory organs. On the other hand Vācaspati states that the motor organs grasp, the internal organs retain and the sensory organs illumine. The author of the Yukti-dīpikā refers to the view of a teacher in whose opinion the motor-organs grasp, 'mind' and 'individuation' retain, while the sensory organs and 'intellect' illumine the objects. But he himself does not advocate fully any of the views mentioned above.

He holds that the motor-organs grasp the objects, for they are capable to seize them. Retention belongs to the sensory organs which in the process of perception come in contact with the objects, take an immediate impression of them and are accordingly modified into the very shape of their respective objects. Hence, they sustain the objects through their *vṛtti*. Elsewhere he vehemently criticises the view of those who hold that the sensory-organs illumine the objects, and finally comes to the conclusion that the said organs retain the objects and not illumine them like a lamp (**तस्माद् युक्तमेतत् ग्राहकमिन्द्रियं नतु प्रदीपवत् प्रकाशकमिति**, p. 122/20). The function of the internal organs is to illumine *i. e.*, to manifest the objects.

Now the question arises whether the organs function successively or simultaneously. Vācaspati states that they function successively as well as simultaneously (**युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा**, kā, 30). He illustrates this in the following way. In dim light a person possesses a vague impression of something, then fixing his mind towards it he observes that it is a terrible robber aiming at him with his bow and arrow, then follows the self-appropriation that the robber is advancing to catch hold of me and finally resolves that I must run away from the place. Simultaneous operation is also illustrated by him thus : When by the flashes of lightning one sees a tiger in the dark just facing him, then vague impression, reflection, self-appropriation and determination are instantaneous and he runs away from the place at once.

Here also the author of the Yukti-dīpikā offers a different interpretation. He is not prepared to support simultaneous operation. Though in the case of the tremendous sound of thunder-strike or seeing a venomous snake lying in the way, operation of all the organs seems to be simultaneous ; but philosophically it cannot stand such. For, it is an established fact that the internal organs cannot directly receive the objects ; they do so through the instrumentality of the sensory organs. Further, it is an well known maxim that the external organs are like the gates while the internal ones are the gate keepers (kā, 35). The said maxim also becomes

invalid if simultaneous operation of the organs are maintained (**द्वारद्वारिभावव्याघातप्रसङ्गाच्च**, p. 130/23). However, he finally comes to the conclusion that the ancient teachers used to maintain simultaneous operation of the organs in tne case of the present percepts, whereas in the opinion of Īśvarakṛṣṇa the organs operate successively in apprehending all percepts past or present (**अस्य दृष्टे वर्तमाणे युगपद् वृत्तिः पूर्वाचार्यैर्निर्दिष्टाः, आचार्येण तु क्रमेणेत्यर्थः । अदृष्टेऽतीतादावपि क्रमशः क्रमेणैव**, p. 130/28-9).

With regard to the characteristic feature of the internal organs also, the ancient teachers of Sāṃkhya are found to differ in their opinion. There are some teachers who hold that every thing is experienced in the *buddhi*, whereas in the opinion of Vindhyavāsin it is done in the mind[1]. Other teachers regard 'reflection', 'self-appropriation' and 'ascertainment' as distinct separate entities ; but Vindhyavāsin speaks of their unity[2]. Again, the followers of Vārṣagaṇya are of opinion that whenever the organs function abnormally, the influx comes into them directly from the *prakṛti*, while in the ordinary course they act from within[3]. But Patañjali holds that they act always from within, while Pañcâdhikaraṇa adopts quite the opposite view[4]. In his opinion the organs by their very nature are without any impression left in them. They are like dry rivers and empty villages. Whenever there is an external stimulus of knowledge, they receive automatically an influx from the *prakṛti* and it is then only that they can operate[5]. Knowledge according to his system wholly imanates from the *prakṛti*.

He classifies 'knowledge' primarily into two heads—(1) **प्राकृत** (natural), and (2) **वैकृत** (acquired). The former is again subdivided into three classes—(1)**तत्त्वसम**, (2) **सांसिद्धिक**, and (3) **आभिष्यन्दिक**. Of these, **तत्त्वसम** is that variety of knowledge which appears in a *tattva*

1 तथाऽन्येषां महति सर्वार्थोपलब्धिः, मनसि विन्ध्यवासिनः, *Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 108/12.
2 सङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायनानात्वमन्येषाम्, एकत्वं विन्ध्यवासिनः, *ibid*, p. 108/12-3.
3 करणानां महती स्वभावातिवृत्तिः प्रधानात्, स्वल्पा च स्वत इति वार्षगण्यः, *idib*, p.108/15-6.
4 सर्वा स्वत इति पतञ्जलिः, सर्वा परत इति पञ्चाधिकरणः, *ibid*. p. 108/16-7.
5 करणं निर्लिखितस्वरूपं शून्यग्रामनदीकल्पम्, प्राकृतवैकृतिकानि तु ज्ञानानि प्रेरकाङ्गसंगृहीतानि प्रधानादागच्छन्ति चेति पञ्चाधिकरणः, *ibid*, p. 108/13-5.

(evolute of the *prakṛti*) *e. g.*, the 'intellect' (बुद्धितत्त्व) at the very moment of its manifestation from the *prakṛti*. Pañcâdhikaraṇa, the upholder of this view, thus intends to hold that an object and its knowledge are correlated ; one cannot exist without the other. The object exists but its knowledge is absent becomes untenable according to his opinion. By 'तत्त्वसम' he goes to maintain that as soon as an evolute of the *prakṛti* is manifested, its knowledge also emanates simultaneously in it. 'सांसिद्धिक' is what exists innately in a composite body consisting of the organs and their objects (उत्पन्नकार्यकरण). For instance, the knowledge of Kapila, the great sage. आभिष्यन्दिक also belongs to such a body. But it cannot function out of its own accord like the former. It requires a stimulus. 'वैकृत' is classified under two heads—(1) स्ववैकृत and (2) परवैकृत. The former is called 'तारक', (lit. acquired by self-reasoning[1]) a name given by the ancient teachers of Sāṃkhya to the first of the eight achievements called '*siddhis*' (kā, 51). The remaining seven *siddhis* fall under परवैकृत. 'Virtue' 'dispassion' and such other properties of the *buddhi* (kā, 23) also are classified by him similarly[2].

Vindhyavāsin disregards 'तत्त्वसम' as well as 'सांसिद्धिक'. In his opinion 'knowledge' does not function out of its own accord. It cannot be innate, it is to be acquired. It subsists in the substratum in its potential form, and whenever there is a stimulus it reveals itself. Even in the case of Kapila, the revered sage, it is not innate, it reveals in a subsequent period after he immerges into existence. For he is said to have obtained it through oral transmission from his spiritual teacher (ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्त्ति जायमानञ्च पश्येत् , Śvet. V. 2), and so will be the case even in the succeeding cycle of creation. By this, Vindhyavāsin intends to say that a stimulus in the form of an efficient cause is necessary for bringing out an already existing object into revelation. It helps to manifest the substance

1 This is the exposition of the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 161). But some of the commentators differ here.

2 For Pañcâdhikaraṇa's classification of the different varieties of knowledge', See Yukti-dīpikā, pp. 147-8,

which already exists in a latent form in the material cause ; but thereby it does not help to produce something altogether new. The difference between Kapila and an ordinary being lies in the fact that in the case of the revered sage there is very quick transmission of knowledge, for in him lies the highest degree of *sattva*. Hence his wisdom is unparalleled. But in the case of an ordinary being with predominance of *tamas*, it is obstructed to get itself fully manifested. With regard to the "वैकृत' group which comprises the eight *siddhis*, there is no difference of opinion[1].

But Īśvarakṛṣṇa classifies 'wisdom', 'dispassion' and such other properties of the *buddhi* into three groups (kā, 43)—(1) सांसिद्धिक (innate), (2) प्राकृतिक (natural), and (3) वैकृतिक (incidental). He is not prepared to admit 'तत्त्वसम' of Pañcâdhikaraṇa. In course of elucidating the view of the Kārikā, the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 148/15-7) boldly asserts that such a type of knowledge cannot exist. Puruṣa experiences the agreeable and disagreeable cognitions produced in the *buddhi*—this is one of the main conceptions of Sāṃkhya. If it be maintained that 'knowledge' is revealed in the *buddhi* just at the time of its manifestation from the *prakṛti*, then how would that knowledge be experienced ? The *puruṣa* can experience knowledge only when it becomes associated with a composite body consisting of the organs and the elements. More over, cognition is produced in the *buddhi* through the organs in contact with the objects. If cognition is revealed in the *buddhi* just at the time of its manifestation from the *prakṛti*, then further evolution of the *tattvas* and consequently the production of the composite bodies with the organs and elements would be superfluous. Thus 'तत्त्वसम' is disregarded.

Again, by advocating 'सांसिद्धिक' the author of the Kārikā goes to refute the view of Vindhyavāsin who holds that even 'wisdom'

1 For Vindhyavasin's view which is discussed in this paragraph, see the following fragment from the Yukti-dīpikā, p. 148/10-4.

'विन्ध्यवासिनस्तु नास्ति तत्त्वसमं सांसिद्धिकञ्च, किं तर्हि सिद्धिरूपमेव । तत्र परमर्षेरपि सर्गसंघातव्यूहोत्तरकालमेव ज्ञानं निष्पद्यते, यस्माद् गुरुमुखाभिप्रतिपत्तेः प्रतिपत्स्यत इत्यपीत्याह—सिद्धं निमित्तं नैमित्तिकस्यानुग्रहं कुरुते नापूर्वमुत्पादयति (cf. Yogabhāṣya, IV. 12), निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावश्चैवमुत्पद्यते—तत्र परमर्षेः पटुस्तूक्तः, अन्येषां क्लिष्ट इत्ययं विशेषः । सर्वेषामेव तु तारकाद्यविशिष्टम्' ।

belonging to Kapila reveals at a subsequent period after he immerges into existence. The commentator states that in the revered sage, there lies the highest degree of *sattva.* Thus owing to the absence of *rajas* and *tamas* there is no obstruction in him, and knowledge reveals itself automatically. So it does not wait for a subsequent period to function. The relation of knowledge with him is just like that of the lamp with its light. Speaking briefly, wisdom is innate with Kapila. In him it reveals automatically, it does not require any stimulus. Similarly 'virtue' is innate with Bhṛgu, 'dispassion' with Sanaka and 'divine power' with those in whom there is a flow of *sattva* and *rajas* only. They are called **'माहात्म्यशरीर'**[1]. With regard to their reverse also (that is, the *tamasic* modification of the *buddhi*) it may be illustrated that 'vice' is innate with the Yakṣas and the demons, 'passion' with the animals and so on.

'प्राकृतिक' (natural) wisdom and such other dispositions (**भावा:**) are those which exist potentially in the substratum, but reveal very quickly whenever there is an external stimulus. Just on seeing a venomous serpent lying on the way, movement becomes sudden and very quick, so the manifestation of the natural dispositions becomes sudden and very quick by coming in touch with an extraordinary stimulus. For instance, dispassion of Āsuri revealed abnormally by coming in touch with Kapila. Here the revered sage is the stimulus in dispelling the barrier of Āsuri and consequently there appeared an abnormal flow of dispassion in him. Similarly the divine power of Nandin revealed incessantly from his association with Maheśvara, the supreme lord. But in the case of **'सांसिद्धिक'** no such stimulus requires. However, in both the cases the influx comes directly from the *prakṛti*[2].

1 यस्य सत्त्वप्रधानं कार्यकरणं स परमर्षिः । यस्य सत्त्वरजोबहुलं स माहात्म्यशरीरः, Yukti-dīpikā, p, 88/22-3.

2 Such a view is also hinted in the Yoga-sūtra (IV. 2)— 'जात्यन्तरपरिणामः प्रकृत्यापूरात्',

वैकृत *or* **वैकृतिक** (incidental) dispositions belong to migratory beings like ourselves. The ordinary individuals with predominance of *tamas* strive to dispel the inertia of the *buddhi* by dint of their own effort and thus *sattva* begins to flow by slow degrees. As a result of this 'wisdom' and such other dispositions begin to reveal. Here the quantity of these *sattvic* modifications of the *buddhi* is comparatively meagre and unlike the previous cases they come out from the *buddhi.* Īśvarakṛṣṇa is not prepared to say that the *buddhi* is like a dry river, as Pañcâdhikaraṇa suggests. In his opinion, it is not absolutely dry ; it can irrigate to a certain extent, but it cannot inundate. In that case it would be exhausted. Speaking briefly, whenever there is super-abundance of these dispositions as in the previous cases, the influx comes directly from the *prakṛti* and in the case of those who attempt to remove the barrier *i. e.* the *tamas* by their own effort, the flow of *sattva* comes directly from the *buddhi.* By classifying the dispositions of the *buddhi* into these three different grades, Īśvarakṛṣṇa intends to support the view of Vārṣagaṇya according to whom whenever the organs function abnormally, the influx comes directly from the *prakṛti,* and in the ordinary cases it comes from within the *buddhi.* Thus he disregards the view of Patañjali in whose opinion the organs always act from within, and also the view of Pañcâdhikaraṇa according to whom they always act from without. The author of the Kārikā here takes a synthetic attitude ; for he attempts to reconcile both the extremes.

Buddhi and Puruṣa

The organs function out of their own accord ; they are not directed by any other external agent. They are mutually incited to activity. One understands the motive of the other and thus they act mutually. The Yukti-dīpikā (p. 131/19-22) illustrates the process thus :—the visual organ wistfully looks at the colour of a pomegranate. The gustatory organ is thus incited and becomes impatient to grasp it. Understanding the motive of the said organ, the feet begin to proceed towards the object and the hand seizes it. In this way the gustatory organ comes in direct contact with the

object and it operates its function. Thus one organ incites another to activity[1]. Hence there is no anomally in their operation.

Vācaspati illustrates their incitement to activity (आकूत, kā, 31) in the following way :—just as a number of persons with sword, lance, stick and such other weapons flock together for a joint operation against a common enemy and proceeds to act only when they know each other's motive. But in doing so the man with sword weilds up his sword only and not the lance, and the man with stick weilds up his stick only and not the sword. Similarly each of the organs are proned to their respective activity after knowing each other's motive. Hence, due to this mutual motive force which regulates the activity of the organs there cannot arise any complexity of functions.

Here an objection arises that the lancers, and the like are sentient beings. So they can easily understand each other's motive and can act accordingly. On the contrary, the organs are never sentient and as such the analogy cannot be applied in their case. Consequently there must be an intelligent director of them. Here the Kārikā (31) replies 'पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित् कार्यते करणम्'. The idea is that the organs function only for the sake of fulfilling the purpose of the *puruṣa*. No body is their director.

The purpose of the *puruṣa* is twofold—(1) to experience the desirable and undesirable modifications of the *buddhi* derived through the sense-organs called 'भोग' and (2) finally to realise its true nature called 'अपवर्ग'. Now the *buddhi* of Sāṃkhya is unconscious, active and subject to mutation ; while the *puruṣa* is conscious, inactive and immutable. Then how does this *bhoga* or experience of desirable and undesirable cognitions of the *buddhi* becomes possible on the part of *puruṣa* who is quite heterogeneous in nature to it. Here the author of the Yogabhāṣya replies that the *puruṣa* is neither entirely similar to the *buddhi* nor entirely

1 Vyomavatī in course of elucidating the Sāṃkhya conception of *bhoga* states that beholding *puruṣa's* eagerness to *bhoga* there arises an incitement in the *buddhi*. The sense-organs in their turn understanding this incitement of *buddhi* are consequently modified into the shape of the objects. Hence, in its opinion it is the *buddhi* which is incited and not the sense-organs. See below, p. 188, n2,

different from it (स बुद्धेर्न सरूपो नात्यन्तं विरूप इति, II. 20). *Buddhi*, unlike the self, is unconscious no doubt ; but it is not entirely foreign to the nature of the *puruṣa*. Whenever *sattva* predominates it becomes transparent and light like the self-luminous *puruṣa*, and it can then easily catch the reflection of the *puruṣa*. The unconscious *buddhi* also in its turn becomes as if possessed of consciousness due to the reflection of the conscious *puruṣa* upon it.

The manner of experiencing the agreeable and disagreeable cognitions of the *buddhi* by the *puruṣa* is clearly explained and illustrated in the following couplet quoted in the Vyomavatī from some ancient treatise of Sāṃkhya.

[1]"बिविक्तदृक्परिणतौ बुद्धौ भोगोऽस्य कथ्यते,
प्रतिबिम्बोदयः स्वच्छे यथा चन्द्रमसोऽम्भसि" ।

The idea is this :—*buddhi* is really a distinct principle from the *puruṣa*. The sense-organs are modified into the shape of their respective objects when they come in contact with them. Consequently the *buddhi* also assumes the very form of the sense-organs thus modified. As a result of this, there arises a flow of *sattva* in the *buddhi* which thus becomes transparent like the self-luminous *puruṣa*. In this stage the *puruṣa* is seen reflected in the *buddhi*. Just as the moon is reflected in the transparent water and not in the polluted one, similarly the self-luminous *puruṣa* is reflected in the *buddhi* when *sattva* pre-dominates in it and not in any other gross material object with preponderance of mass-stuff (*tamas*) which is held to be the factor of obstruction.

It is true that in the aforesaid instance the moon does not actually get itself united with the clear water, still it seems to be so in as much as its reflection is united with the water. Similarly the *puruṣa* though does not get itself actually united with the *buddhi*,

1 Vyomaśiva explains this couplet in the following way :—बिविक्तदृग्विषयाकारपरिणतेन्द्रियाकारपरिणतिर्यस्याः सा तथोक्ता, तस्यां बुद्धौ सत्यामात्मनो भोगः कथ्यते। किं रूपः ? प्रतिबिम्बोदयो न वास्तवः। यथा चन्द्रमसः प्रतिबिम्बनं स्वच्छे, न कलुषात्मके अम्भसीत्युदाहरणम्। यथा हि चन्द्रमसः प्रतिबिम्बनमम्भसि एवं विशिष्टपरिणामोपचितायां बुद्धावात्मन इति, वास्तवे हि भोगे पुरुषस्य पूर्वस्वरुपनिवृत्तौ स्वरुपान्तरापत्तिर्विकारः स्यात्। तत्र चाचेतनत्वादनेकदूषणमिति।—pp. 521-2 (Chowkhamba).

still it seems to be so since its reflection has been united with it. Just as even without activity of the moon the wavy transparent water into which the reflection of the moon has fallen makes the moon as if quivering, though the moon itself is never quivering ; so even in the absence of any activity of the *puruṣa*, the *buddhi* with which the reflection of the *puruṣa* has become united makes the *puruṣa* as if possessing activity. In this way the properties of the *buddhi* are ascribed to *puruṣa*. Just as victory and defeat belonging to the soldiers are ascribed to the king for it is he who enjoys the benefit derived thereof ; similarly 'enjoyment' and 'liberation' actually exist in the *buddhi*, but these are attributed to the *puruṣa* for it is he who enjoys the result attained thereof (Yoga-bhāṣya, ii. 18). *Puruṣa* thus does not directly experience the cognitions of the *buddhi*, but it does so through its reflection on it. This *bhoga* on the part of the *puruṣa* is apparent and not real.

Vindhyavāsin explains this *bhoga* in a slightly different way. He states that just as a red *javā* flower makes the transparent crystal as if red by virtue of its proximity to it ; similarly the *puruṣa* makes the unconscious mind as if conscious by virtue of its proximity to it without himself undergoing any modification. This is expressed in the following couplet attributed to him by Guṇaratna[1].

[2]"पुरुषोऽविकृतात्मैव स्वर्निभासमचेतनम्,
मनः करोति सान्निध्यादुपाधेः स्फटिको यथा" ॥

From thn evidence of the Yukti-dīpikā, we know that in the opinion of Vindhyavāsin everything is experienced in the mind and not in the *buddhi* as other teachers maintain (**तथाऽन्येषां महति सर्वार्थोपलब्धिः मनसि विन्ध्यवासिनः**, p. 108/11-2). This is why he states '**सनिर्भासमचेतनं मनः करोतिः**'. Such a view is also hinted in the expres-

1 See his exposition of Ṣāṃkhya in the Saḍdarśana-samuccaya.

2 Vyomavatī explains this couplet in the following lines (p. 521-22) :— अन्ये त्वन्यथा भोगं मन्यन्ते। यथा हि पुरुषोऽविकृतात्मैव स्वनिर्भासेन चेतनं मनः करोति सान्निध्यादुपाधिः स्फटिकमतद्रूपं स्वनिर्भासं स्वाकारं करोति, एवमयं पुरुषः अविकृतस्वरूप अचेतनं मनः स्वनिर्भासं चेतनमिव करोति स्वानिध्यान्न पुनर्वस्तुतस्तस्य चैतन्यं विकारित्वात्। ज्ञानन्तु विषयाकारपरिणतेन्द्रियाकारतया बुद्धेः परिणामः। तथा भोगोत्सुकं पुरुषं मत्वा बुद्धेराकूतिः सम्पद्यते तदाकूतसम्वेदनाच्च इन्द्रियाणां पूर्वस्वरूपनिवृत्तेः विषयाकारपरिणामः।

sion '**एकादशं मनः सवर्थिम्**' of the Yoga-bhāṣya (II. 19). In this connection it is to be noticed that in the opinion of this celebrated exponent of Sāṃkhya there are only eleven organs and not thirteen as such ; and like other teachers of Sāṃkhya he is not prepared to hold 'discernment' (**संकल्प**), 'self-appropriation' (**अभिमान**) and 'ascertainment' (**अध्यवसाय**) as distinct separate entities. He speaks of their identity.

So far about *bhoga*. Now what is the relation between the substance which experiences the agreeable and disagreeable cognitions and the substratum in which the said cognitions exist ? Here the auther of the Yoga-bhāṣya (1. 4) observes[1] that the thought-stuff (**चित्त**) is like a magnet and it attracts the *puruṣa* to perceive it as a witness. It helps the *puruṣa* to do so by the mere fact of being proximate to it. Thus its relation with the *puruṣa* is that of the 'property and the proprietor' (**स्वस्वामिभावसम्बन्ध**). Hence the reason why the *puruṣa* experiences the fluctuations of the thought-stuff is its beginningless correlation with it. Due to ignorance, *puruṣa* imposes this relation upon himself. By acquring discriminative knowledge when he can realise that the thought-stuff is entirely foreign to him in nature, he becomes isolated from it and the so called relation then ceases to exist. This is liberation.

Inference

Let us now say a few words about the Sāṃkhya conception of 'inference'. It will not be possible on our part to give an elaborate treatment of the subject, for the resources at our disposal is very limited.

'Inference' according to the early school of Sāṃkhya is the establishment of a fact on the basis of a relation perceived previously (**सम्बन्धादेकस्माच्छेषसिद्धिरनुमानम्**)[2]. Just as perceiving the relation of mutual extermination (**घात्यघातकसम्बन्ध**) in the case of the snake and the mongoose, it can be inferred that snakes are absent in a place

1 चित्तमयस्कान्तमणिकल्पं सन्निधिमात्रोपकारि दृश्यत्वेन स्वं भवति पुरुषस्य स्वामिनः। तस्माच्चित्तवृत्तिबोधे पुरुषस्यानादिसम्बन्धो हेतुः।

2 This seems to be the definition of Vārṣagaṇya. For reference, see above, p. 156, n2.

where mongooses abound. In this connection the said school of Sāṃkhya is found to speak of the seven sorts of relations, and the presence or absence of something is to be inferred on the basis of some one or other of these relations. The relation on the basis of which 'inference' is made must be between the probans and the probandum, and most probably it was the practice with this school that before inferring something the relation thus perceived was incorporated into someone or other of these seven kinds of relations.

This view of inference on the basis of seven kinds of relations is refuted in the Nyāya-Vārttika (I. i. 5). In course of elucidating the text of the Vārttika, Vācaspati quotes a verse wherein all these seven relations are enumerated. This may be noticed below :—

मात्रा-निमित्त-संयोगि-विरोधि-सहचारिभिः,
स्वस्वामि-बध्यघाताद्यैः सांख्यानां सप्तधाऽनुमा ।

Vardhamāna in his Prakāśa (p. 671) attributes this verse to the Sāṃkhya-Vārttika. Jayamaṅgalā also enumerates and illustrates all these relations in course of commenting on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's view of 'inference' (kā, 5) ; but it slightly differs from those pointed out in the above mentioned couplet.

However, the above-mentioned definition may not withstand the severe criticism of the commentators of Indian philosophy ; but the previous knowledge of a 'relation' is absolutely necessary in inferential knowledge. The author of the Yoga-bhaṣya also emphasises upon it. In his opinion, 'inference' is that fluctuation of the thought-stuff which is based upon the relation present in things belonging to the same class as the subject of inference and absent from things belonging to classes different from the subject of inference (**अनुमेयस्य तुल्यजातीयेष्वनुवृत्तो भिन्नजातीयेभ्यो व्यावृत्तः सम्बन्धो यस्तद्विषया सामान्यावधारण-प्रधाना वृत्तिरनुमानम्**, I. 7). For instance, the moon and the stars get from one place to another like Chaitra, hence they possess motion ; (negatively) the Vindhya mountain does not get from one place to another, hence it does not possess motion. Unlike perception, it is mainly concerned with the generic knowledge of the object.

The ancient teachers used to classify 'inference' primarily into two heads (1) **वीत**, and (2) **अवीत**. The former comprises the

positive figure or more precisely the *modus ponens* and the latter comprises the negative figure or *modus tollens*. Most of the fundamental conceptions of Sāṃkhya are based upon one or other of these two figures. Its *prakṛti*, its *puruṣa*, nay even its theory of causation are established by sheer reasoning and this shows that 'inference' played a very important part in the building up of the Sāṃkhya as a system. This is why the Yukti-dīpikā at its very beginning compares Sāṁkhya to an elephant having the positive and negative figures as its two tusks. But unfortunately the ancient works of Sāṃkhya are almost lost to us and traces of subtle power of reasoning of the ancient teachers may be observed only here and there in the Yoga-bhaṣya and the Yukti-dīpikā.

According to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, 'inference' is the cognition derived through the previous knowledge of the relation between the middle term and the major term (**तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्**[1], kā, 5), and it is of three kinds. Vācaspati explains this and in doing so he seems to have been influenced by the Nyāya school to a great extent. The three kinds of inference are :—(1) **पूर्ववत्** (a priori), (2) **शेषवत्** (a posteriori), and (3) **सामान्यतो दृष्ट** (based on general observation). Of these, **पूर्ववत्** is an inference from the antecedent to the consequence, i. e., from cause to effect. For instance, beholding the thickening cloud in the sky it may be inferred that a shower of rain is impending. **शेषवत्** is an inference from the consequence to the antecedent, i. e., from effect to cause ; as of rain in the upland from the flood in the river. That which lies beyond the range of sense-perception is to be cognised by **सामान्यतो दृष्ट** ; as from the previous knowledge of the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire in numerous instances, the existence of fire can be inferred from the smoke in the distant hill. The commentators are found to differ among themselves in explaining and illustrating the said varieties of inference. A detailed treatment of the subject has already been offered by Prof. Dhruva[2], hence we refrain from

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1 Cp. तत्पूर्वकमित्यनेन लिङ्गलिङ्गिनोः सम्बन्धदर्शनं लिङ्गदर्शनञ्चाभिसम्बध्यते, N. Bh., I. i. 5.

2 See '*trividham anumānam*', Proceedings and transactions of the first oriental conference, pp. 251-85.

further elucidation. Vācaspati classifies 'शेषवत्' under 'अवीत' (negative figure), and the remaining two under 'वीत' (positive figure).

Now, with regard to the members in a syllogistic reasoning, Sāṃkhya commentators are found to differ among themselves. Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself is silent in this respect. His commentator Māṭhara holds that an 'inference' is based upon three members and it must be free from the thirty-three fallacies (एवं त्रयस्त्रिंशदाभासरहितं त्र्यवयवमनुमानम् , kā, 5). The three members are : (1) प्रतिज्ञा (thesis) (2) हेतु (reason), and (3) उदाहरण (exemplification). Of the thirty-three fallacies, nine belong to wrong thesis, fourteen to wrong reason, and ten to wrong example (pp. 12-3). It is strange to notice that such a classification of fallacies are not to be met with anywhere else in the available works on orthodox logic—not even in the Nyāya-Vārttika which spares no pains to show almost all the possible permutations and combinations of fallacies. The three-membered logical reasoning is generally found to be adopted by the Buddhist teachers. The said thirty-three fallacies also are recognised in the Nyāya-Praveśa[1], a Buddhist treatise on logic. Now the question naturally arises whether there had been on old school of Sāṃkhya which was in favour of the three-membered logical reasoning or Māṭhara was influenced by the Buddhist teachers in advocating such a view. The Chinese translation of the Madhyāntânusāra Śāstra[2] (Nanjio, No. 1246) sheds important light in this connection. From the evidence of this text we know that the three-membered logical reasoning was introduced by the Sāṃkhyas and Pāśupatas before Vasubandhu. The Jaina writer Hemacandra also in his Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā-sūtra-vṛtti (II. i. 8) states that in the opinion of Sāṃkhya an 'inference' consists of three-members (प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणानीति त्र्यवयवमनुमानमिति सांख्याः). It therefore clearly shows that there had been a prominent school of Sāṃkhya which used to hold 'thesis', 'reason', and 'example' as the only members of a syllogistic reasoning. But the Chinese version of Paramārtha, the Bhāṣya of Gauḍapāda and the present Sāṃkhya-sūtra are in favour of the five-membered reasoning.

1 See pp. 2-7, part I, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, XXXVIII.

2 Composed by Nāgārjuna and Asanga (?), translated into Chinese in A. D. 543—see Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol I, p. 558.

On the otherhand, the author of the Yukti-dīpikā supports neither of these two views. In his opinion, a purely syllogistic reasoning rests upon ten members (p. 47/20-1). These are :—(1) जिज्ञासा (desire to know), (2) संशय (doubt), (3) प्रयोजन (purpose), (4) शक्यप्राप्ति (possibility of a solution), (5) संशयव्युदास (dispelling of the doubts), (6) प्रतिज्ञा (proposition), (7) हेतु (reason), (8) दृष्टान्त (exemplification), (9) उपसंहार (application) and (10) निगमन (conclusion). In support of his view he states that though Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself is silent in this respect, but some of the commentators collected them in their respective treatises—the validity of which cannot be ignored[1]. He further argues (pp. 3-4) that the author himself hints upon these different aspects of syllogistic reasoning. For instance, in the expression 'दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा' (kā, 1) he starts enquiry, in 'कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम्' (kā, 16) he places the thesis, in 'भेदानां परिमाणात्' (kā,15) he speaks of the reason, in 'नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम्' (kā, 14) he sets out the example, in क्षीरस्य यथा तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य' (kā, 57) he makes the application, and in 'तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि (kā, 35) he arrives at the conclusion. In support of this view of the ten-membered reasoning he further states that the said syllogistic members have been described by Vindhyavāsin[2] and such other reputed teachers of Sāṃkhya in their respective treatises; hence Īśvarakṛṣṇa did not think it necessary to treat them separately.

Reference is made of the ten-membered reasoning even in the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali[3]. Vātsyāyana also in his Nyāya-bhāṣya (I.i.32) criticises the view of certain Naiyāyikas who are in favour of the ten-membered reasoning[4]. He rejects them on the ground that

1 'यद्यपि सूत्रकारेणावयवोपदेशो न कृतस्तथाऽपि भाष्यकाराः केचिदेषां संग्रहञ्चक्रुः, ते च नः प्रमाणम्'—Yukti-dīpikā, p. 3/16-7.

2 'किञ्च तन्त्रान्तरोक्तेः, तन्त्रान्तरेषु हि विन्ध्यवासिप्रभृतिभिराचार्यैरुपदिष्टाः, प्रमाणं नस्ते आचार्या इत्यतश्चानुपदेशो जिज्ञासादीनाम्—Yukti-dīpikā, p. 4/7-8.

3 See under Vārttika, 1, Pā, V. ii. 42.

4 But the sequence of reckoning of Vātsyāyana does not tally with that of the Yukti-dīpikā. In the Nyāya-bhāṣya 'शक्यप्राप्ति' (possibility of a solution) is followed by 'प्रयोजन' (purpose) whereas in the Sāṃkhya commentary the former is preceeded by the latter.

these additional members beginning with 'enquiry' and ending in 'dispelling of doubt' are certainly phases in the psychological process of reasoning, but they have no place in proper syllogistic argument.

Though they may not have any logical necessity for proving a conclusion, yet they serve a very useful purpose in the discussion and exposition of a philosophical problem. Let us quote the examples given in the Yukti-dīpikā (pp. 47/22—48/5) in order to bring home the application of these additional members in exposition. For instance, a student of philosophy approaches a teacher of Sāṃkhya and solicits him to explain the nature of *puruṣa*. He wants to know whether the *puruṣa* as conceived by the Sāṃkhya exists or not. It is this impulse to know the truth about *puruṣa* which is direct motive of philosophical speculation. The master follows the Socratic dialectic and poses a question in order to bring out the intellectual make-up of the enquirer. Certainly no man of a serious disposition would attach any importance to such a frivolous question. It is therefore necessary to ascertain that the enquiry of the student is induced by a serious quest of truth and not a frivolous pastime or a dishonest move intended to make a capital offhand assertion. So the next step would be a question on the part of the teacher as to the *raison d'etre* of the doubt. "Why should you be in doubt that the *puruṣa* may exist or not"? The student may answer "well sir, my doubt is due to the fact that the existence of the self *i.e.*, the *puruṣa* is not a matter of direct observation and what is not directly observed may be of two classes—an entity or a non-entity. The other side of the moon and the sun though not observed, is definitely known to be existent; but a hair's horns equally incompetent to observation is known to be a non-entity. So mere non-observation cannot be made the ground of inference of the non-existence of a thing. The self as described by the Sāṃkhya as an unchanging ubiquitous self-luminous principle is not a matter of observation. Were it so there would be no dispute among philosophers. This non-observation, because it is found to appertain to existent and non-existent things alike is the cause of my doubt".

In order to taste further the seriousness of the enquiry the master would interrogate him about the motive of this query. "But why should you bother yourself about this problem which is a matter of idle speculation? What consequence would you derive by the knowledge of the truth as to the existence or non-existence of the self?" The student may then unfold his motive in the following terms. "Well sir, I want to know the truth about the self, because the knowledge of the truth is the surest way to ultimate salvation if it is known to be the truth that the self exists and is different from matter, indifferent to all changes and circumstances and is not bound by any spatial or temporal limit, I must conclude that the doctrine of self-lessness as propounded by the Buddhists is an unfounded illusion and the knowledge of the truth will enable me to shake up all bondage and to attain salvation than which nothing can be greater and more durable. And this is the position of the Sāṃkhya which maintains that the knowledge of the true nature of the manifest, unmanifest and *puruṣa* leads to salvation. If on the other hand the doctrine of the Buddhists be found to be true then I must be bound to conclude that the system or metaphysics as propounded by the Sāṃkhya philosopher is full of untruth and calculated to misguide an enquirer after truth and a seeker of salvation. The knowledge of the truth that there is no such thing as self will make it imperative for me to give up all allegiance to the doctrines which are served by the self. On the contrary, I must follow the discipline of the Buddhists and by an unremitting pursuit of a course of meditation I shall come to realise that the transcendent truth will dawn upon my mind according to the Buddhist teachers and this will automatically entail the final cessation of passions and defilements which characterise the existence of the denizens of the three worlds. And this is called *nirvāṇa* or extinction of personalised and individualised existence." And certainly the problem is competent to be decided by the application of the triple source of knowledge. The statement of this four steps thus satisfies the teacher that the enquiry is inspired by a real and honest difficulty. And it is now incumbent upon

the teacher to eliminate the doubt of the disciple, and this can be secured only by the five-fold syllogistic argument.

Valid testimony

Valid testimony (आप्तवचन) is also reckoned by Sāṃkhya as a separate source of knowledge. It includes all valid revelations—such as the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas, the religious codes of Manu etc., and the utterings of a person who is free from any defect. Such imperceptible entities as lie even beyond the range of inference are to be cognised by the said source of knowledge (kā,6).

Besides these three, there are other sources of knowledge which find their place in different systems of philosophy. These are 'analogy', 'presumption', negation', 'probabality' and the like. Sāṃkhya is not prepared to assign a separate place to them. This system includes some of them under 'inference' and the rest under 'valid testimony'.

CAUSALITY

Puruṣa of Sāṃkhya is always passive. It is never held to be the agent. All activities are attributed to *prakṛti* which has got the three *guṇas* as its constituents. Cause and effect are therefore nothing but the different modes of the *guṇas*. Causality is explained by the doctrine of '*satkārya*' which is a distinctive feature of this system. Unlike the Buddhist and the Naiyāyikas, the Sāṃkhya is of opinion that the effect is real and it is always existent. It is not an entirely new production; it exists in its cause in a latent form even before its production. The following Kārikā verse seeks to establish the said theory by a set of five arguments :

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम् ॥ (Sk. 9)

The commentators have explained this verse elaborately. The idea is this : (1) A non-entity as the horn of a hare can never come into existence. Vācaspati in this connection boldly states that 'blue can never be made yellow even by thousand artists'. (2) An appropriate material is resorted to for a certain

effect to be brought about. This means that there must be a definite relation of the cause with the effect. This being the case, the cause gives rise to the effect only when in relation with it. But if the effect be held to be non-existent, there would be no relation with the cause and consequently there would not be any production. (3) If the relation between the cause and its effect be deemed as unnecessary, then everything would come out of everything which would go against our common experience. (4) The Mīmāṃsakas are not prepared to admit of the aforesaid relation. They hold that the cause has got certain potency by which it gives rise to the particular effect. But Sāṃkhya intervenes here and argues that even the said potency can help to produce that effect only for which it is efficient. Otherwise oil could be pressed even from sands. This implies that cause and effect are co-related and the latter cannot come out from that which does not possess the necessary potency. (5) Finally, the effect does not essentially differ from its cause. Cloth does not differ in its essence from the threads. All these arguments attempt to establish the fact that the effect is not altogether a new entity. It is always existent; it is hidden in its cause even before its production.

The subject requires further elucidation. According to this system nothing new is produced. Effect is the developed stage of what was previously latent. It is the manifestation of the implicit (सूक्ष्माणां मूर्त्तिलाभः कार्यम्)[1]. The oil already exists in the sesamum, it is to be extracted by pressing; rice exists in the paddy and mere husking is required to bring it out. Thus we find that the effect already existed in its material cause and the efficient causes such as pressing and husking etc., only help it to reveal itself. The figure of the statue is not essentially different from the block of stone from which it was built, the jar does not vary in its essence from clay which is resorted to as its material cause; the skill of the sculptor and the potter made the forms only and nothing more, while the original matter remained the same without undergoing any funda-

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1 Yukti-dīpikā, p. 31/11

mental change. Though the jar can contain water while clay cannot do so, yet materially they do not differ. Their identity is fundamental while their various outward forms have their respective practical purposes to serve. Similarly, destruction also is not total annhilation. It is merely a change of forms while the original matter remains unaffected.

The Pātañjala school also explicitly states that a non-entity can never come into existence and an entity can never be annhilated[1]. But it tackles the problem of causality more scientifically. Its view-point may be briefly stated thus : The primary *prakṛti* is at the basis of all manifestations. It is constituted of the three *guṇas* which are always functioning. They do not rest even for a single moment without giving rise to one or other kind of modifications[2]. But all these modifications or changes are nothing but the different collocations of the *guṇas* and materially do not differ from them[3]. The collocations only vary in their shape while the substance whose different modifications they are, remains always at the back-ground. In the Yoga-system, this main substance is technically called *dharmin* while the modifications are called *dharmas*. The former is the substratum while the latter forms its different aspects. The relation of cause and effect then may be better maintained as that of the *dharmin* with its *dharmas*. Speaking of the characteristic feature of the former, the Bhāṣya states that 'it is at the back-ground of all the aspects or *dharmas* whether manifested or un-manifested, it is the substratum of both generic and particulars, and further it is inseparably connected with them'[4]. It is an abiding principle manifesting itself in and through the *dharmas*[5]. From these statements of the Bhāṣya, it is apparent that both the terms *dharmin* and *dharma* are inter-related, and the full implication of one cannot

1 नास्त्यसत: सम्भव: । न चास्ति सतो विनाश इति, IV. 12
2 धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामैः शून्यं न क्षणमपि गुणवृत्तमवतिष्ठते, चलञ्च गुणवृत्तम्, III. 13.
3 सर्वमिदं गुणानां सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रमिति परमार्थतो गुणात्मानः, IV. 13.
4 य एतेष्वभिव्यक्तानभिव्यक्तेषु धर्मेष्वनुपाती सामान्यविशेषात्मा सोऽन्वयी धर्मी, III. 14.
5 धर्मिविक्रियैवैषा धर्मद्वारा प्रपञ्च्यते, III. 13.

be clearly understood without knowing that of the other. So let us now turn our attention to the *dharma* and observe what is actually meant by this in the Yoga-system.

Patañjali only classifies it into three heads, but he does not define it. It is the author of the Bhāṣya who is found to explain it in the following line : **'योग्यतावच्छिन्ना धर्मिणः शक्तिरेव धर्मः** (III. 14) The underlying idea of this statement is rather difficult to understand. If the expression **'योग्यतावच्छिन्ना'** be taken to be a qualifying attribute of **'शक्तिः'** then the sense of the whole sentence generally comes thus : The *dharma* is nothing but the power of the *dharmin* capable of giving rise to that effect only for which it is equipped with the necessary efficiency. Vācaspati attempts to bring out the significance of the said statement in two ways. Firstly, he states that the *dharma* is the power of the substance—the original matter, which constitutes the 'earth' and the like. Here the 'power' is to be regarded as the capacity of producing dust, lump of clay, jar and similar other aspects that exist in the earth—their material cause, in an undeveloped state. Be it granted that they may evolve from the said substance. But how to account for the fact that a jar has the capacity of bringing water while the original substance in the shape of earth has not got anything as such ? This difficulty is removed by the epithet **'योग्यतावच्छिन्ना'**. This means that the power itself that generates the jar and such other forms is equipped with the efficiency of bringing water and the like. Hence the capacity to bring water etc., is not to be regarded as incidental. This has been inherited by the jar from its material cause along with the said power by which it becomes manifest to the objective world.

In his second interpretation he takes the expression **'योग्यतावच्छिन्ना'** in its plural form and thus making it a qualifying adjective of **'धर्मिणः'** (**योग्यतावच्छिन्नाः धर्मिणः=योग्यतावच्छिन्ना धर्मिणः**, the aspirant is dropped by the rule of *sandhi*). By construing the sentence thus, he arrives at the following conclusion : The *dharmins* or the principal materials are equipped with the necessary efficiency (**योग्यतावच्छिन्ना धर्मिणः**) ; it is the power which alone is to be regarded as the *dharma*

(शक्तिरेव धर्मः). The power here is nothing but the 'efficiency' as already stated above. From this it follows that 'efficiency' only and nothing else is to be regarded as the *dharma* (योग्यतैव धर्म इत्यर्थः), and that which possesses this 'efficiency' is said to be *dharmin.*

The subject requires further clarification The *dharmas* are classified into three heads (III. I4) :—(1) Past (शान्त), (2) present (उदित) and (3) future (अव्यपदेश्य). Of these, the first is that which is in its quiscent state after finishing its function and this is called past. The second is that which has manifested itself. It is actualised and called present. The remaining one is indeterminable. It is yet in the womb of its material cause and not yet commenced its operation. This is called future. Of these, the future one is followed by the present which again in its turn is followed by the past. But the past is not to be followed by the present as there does not exist any relation of antecedent and consequent between them ; for the past cannot be held to be the antecedent of the present.

Now, what happens to the past ? Is it totally annhilated ? No, from the principle of the conservation of energy it has been absorbed by its *dharmin* into its bosom[1]. The 'अनागत' or the

1 Is there any chance on the part of the past *dharma* of reappearing again even under favourable circumstances ? From the doctrine of 'सत्कार्य' and specially from its corollary (नाभावो विद्यते सतः) it becomes evident that an existing principle is never annhilated. From this it follows that the past *dharma* which formerly existed in its present form is now absorbed into the *dharmin* and exists there in union with it. It is not destroyed ; it simply disappears. Now, in the Yoga-bhāṣya it is stated that the past has got no sequence (नातीतस्यास्ति क्रमः, III. I5). Then how the yogin is said to be vested with the power of recalling the past form. A fitting reply proceeds from MM. Gopinath Kaviraj in this connection that 'he (the yogin) does not usually call back, but revokes only a phantom, an exact duplicate of the past'.

—'*The problem of causality : Sānkhya-yoga view', The princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, Vol IV, p.* 145 *fn.*

But the difficulty is not yet fully removed. It is an admitted fact that at the time of dissolution this stupendous universe is finally absorbed into the *prakṛti.* It then becomes nothing but a past aspect. This being the case, how does the universe emerge again at the time of new creation ? Does the same universe which went into its past stage re-appear or a similar one does so ? Bhartṛhari in his Vākyapadīya and specially his commentator Helārāja are found to deal with the problem. In course of his discussion on '*kāla*' the author in one place states that the present is contradicted by the past (अतीताख्या तु या शक्तिस्तया जन्म विरुध्यते, III. iii. 51), meaning thereby that the past is not to be followed by the present—the view which is also advocated by the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya. While explaining the hemistich as pointed out above, the commentator explicitly states that a dead is not born again ; similarly an entity which has entered into its past stage never re-appears (मृतस्य न पुनर्जन्मेति नातीतेऽध्वनि पतितमाविर्भवति वस्तु). From this it follows that the same universe does not come out again in the succeeding cycles of creation.

But a little after, we find Bhartṛhari referring to the view of those who are not prepared to follow the view supported by him. According to them the same universe which merged into its primary cause at the time of dissolution and thereby went into its past stage, reappears at the time of fresh creation (अतीतमपि केषाञ्चिद् जगद्विपरिवर्तते, III. iii. 53). Helārāja here in his commentary states this to be the view of the P a ñ c â d h i k a r a ṇ a school of Sāṃkhya. The followers of this school maintain that an entity which entered into its past stage re-appears in due time in the different cycles of creation. The entities which have finished their functions are ultimately absorbed by the primary *prakṛti* into its bosom. They reveal themselves at the time of fresh creation and also disappear into the *prakṛti*—their final cause, at the time of dissolution. From this it follows that the same entity appears and disappears in the process of evolution and involution. The upholders of this view stick to this principle on the strength of the dictum 'नाभावो विद्यते सतः' i. e, an existing entity never becomes non-existent. But the commentator while expounding

future one is not yet manifested. It is still in its embryonic stage. Patañjali calls it 'अव्यपदेश्य'[1]. It is the present one only which is revealed in the world of objects. Thus we find that both the past

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the view of Bhartṛhari states here that an entity which entered into its past stage cannot function again. Even in the course of the new cycle of creation the same universe which merged into the womb of its final cause does not re-appear. It is a similar one that comes out. Briefly speaking, the followers of P a ñ c â d h i k a r a ṇ a hold the view that the same revolves in the succeeding cycles of creation whereas Bhartṛhari and specially the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya are of opinion that it is a similar one and not the exact same that does so. These two divergent views have been pointed out by Helārāja in the following lines :—

केचित्तु मन्यन्ते—'अतीताध्व॒(तिनो)ऽपि पुनः कालान्तरे जगत्परावर्तेषूद्भवन्ति, कृतपरिनिष्ठिता हि भावाः प्रधानसेवकान्तर्गना यथाकालमुद्दर्शयन्त्यात्मानं पुनः प्रलये तत्रैव तिरोभवन्ति' इति प ञ्चा धि-क र ण–दर्शनस्थानां सांख्याना(मयमभ्युप)गमः। इत्थं चात्र दर्शने सुतरां त्रैयध्विकत्वमुपपद्यते सर्वेषामपि त्रिष्वप्यध्वसु सञ्चारात्। प्रबन्धप्रवृत्ते जगति पूर्वमतीतानां वर्तमानता नास्ति, जगत्-परिवर्तेऽपि न तदेवावर्तते, अपितु तत्सदृशमित्यतीतशक्तेर्वर्तमानशक्तिविरोधः पूर्वमुक्तः। इह तु 'नाभावो विद्यते सतः' इति तिरोभूतं पुनस्तदेवावर्तते इति दर्शनात् कथ्यते (III. iii. 53, p. 68)

A similar Sāṃkhya view like that of the Pañcâdhikaraṇa school is also referred to in the Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa. The text by way of refutation speaks of the 'three-fold change' of Sāṃkhya. While explaining 'change of aspect with reference to time' (लक्षणपरिणाम) the author is found to state that the future stage of an entity is followed by the present one and this again in its turn is followed by the past. This is not all. He proceeds further and states that the past is also followed by the future. And in this way the wheel always revolves. This is expressed in the following lines (p. 58) :—

तथाहि——कार्यमनागतलक्षणापन्नं तत्परित्यज्य वर्तमानलक्षणमापद्यते, पुनस्तत् परित्यज्य अतीतलक्षणापन्नं भवति, पुनस्तदेव आगामिलक्षणापन्नं भवति।

1 The term occurs also in the Nyāya-sūtra (I. i. 4) where Vātsyāyana explains it as 'that which cannot be designated'. It

and future are not manifested. They are one with the *dharmin*, while the present one alone is distinct from it; and according to yogic terminology it may be called 'विशेष' (particular, special).

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is what is not yet come to light. It exists potentially in its material cause. The author of the Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 14) when expanding the idea contained in the term states that 'everything contains everything potentially.' He further corroborates his statement by a quotation from some ancient authority wherein it is stated that 'various kinds of taste etc., arising out of the mutation of earth and water can be experienced in in-organic substances. Similarly that of the in-organic into the organic and vice versa. In this way everything contains everything potentially in so far as their generic property is not destroyed'. This will be clear from the following lines :—

अथ अव्यपदेश्याः के? सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति। यत्रेदमुक्तम्—जलभूम्योः पारिणामिकं रसादिवैश्वरूप्यं स्थावरेषु दृष्टम्। तथा स्थावराणां जङ्गमेषु जङ्गमानां स्थावरेष्वित्येवं जात्यनुच्छेदेन सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति।

The fragment needs further clarification. It seeks to explain the reason of diversity in nature. Let us explain this after the manner of Vācaspati. The gross element of earth contains odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, while that of water contains the last four. But it is strange to observe that the whole of the vegetable kingdom which forms a mutation of these two gross elements, is found to contain varieties of taste. This is not all. It is gathered from experience that even the roots, fruits, blossoms and foliages of the same species of tree, creeper or shrub as the case may be, contain peculiarities in taste. Similar is the case with their odour, colour and such other aspects also. This cannot be absolutely due to mutation of earth which does not contain so many varieties; nor it can be that of water for similar reason. Then how all these variations may be said to be arising out of the mutation of earth and water? For, it is an established fact that a cause cannot give rise to an entirely new effect.

Similarly, the effect arising out of mutation of vegetations is clearly visible in organic world. Thus animals acquire varieties of forms by subsisting on the roots, twigs and fruits of trees. And conversely, various forms are developed in the vegetable kingdom owing to mutation due to organic substance. It is found that pomegranates are highly developed if the root of the plant is sprinkled with blood. How to account for this heterogeneity? The reply is found in the expression 'एवं जात्यनुच्छेदेन सर्वं सर्वात्मकम्' which ordinarily means that everything contains the essence of everything, provided its common characteristic is not annhilated.

The full significance of the expression is brought out by Vācaspati in the following lines :—

एवं सर्वं जलभूम्यादिकं सर्वरसाद्यात्मकम्। तत्र हेतुमाह—'जात्यनुच्छेदेन' इति। जलत्वभूमित्वादिजातेः सर्वत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वनानुच्छेदात्।

Here the commentator strives to show that all things which owe their origin due to different permutations and combinations of earthy and watery substances inhere all the varieties of taste, colour, odour and the like from the original gross elements, for the simple reason that earth-hood and water-hood do not totally disappear from them. The rudimentary elements whose different manifestations they are, are not wiped out from the mutables; the former any how manifest their existence in and through the latter. This invalidates the theory of some scholars according to whom 'all contains all potentially, and if the, barrier be removed than anything can come out of anything'. They stick to this view on the strength of the expression 'सर्वं सर्वात्मकम्'—the real significance of which was misunderstood by them. Here the term 'सर्वं' does not stand for anything and everything; it is used here in a restricted sense. It has been explained by Vācaspati with reference to the quotation following it This is why he explains the term 'सर्वम्' as comprising everything that exists in the shape of water and earth (सर्वं—जलभूम्यादिकं). The expression 'सर्वात्मकम्' also in its turn does not stand as containing anything and everything. It means that

A *dharma* also may be regarded as a *dharmin* with respect to its further manifestation[1]. Really speaking, all these varying modes or aspects which are technically called *dharmas* constitute nothing but the marking of different events in the life-history of an entity. Of these the **'अव्यपदेश्य'** or the future one is the initial stage of its history and finality is achieved when it enters into its past stage.

Now as has been already referred to above, the *dharmin* is that which persists in both the manifested and unmanifested *dharmas*—manifested are those which are revealed to us and these are the present ones, while the unmanifested ones comprise both the past and future ones. It is also the substratum of both generic and

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which contains all the varieties of tastes and such other entities (सर्वात्मकं—सर्वरसाद्यात्मकम्). From this it follows that everything which is regarded as the outcome of the mutation of earth and water, contains all the varieties of tastes, colour and such other entities. Why is it so? The reason is given in the expression 'जात्यनुच्छेदात्'. This is so because 'water-hood' and 'earth-hood' do not totally disappear from them (जलत्वभूमित्वादिजातेः सर्वत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वनानुच्छेदात्).

Again if anything without discrimination could come out of anything, the expression 'जात्यनुच्छेदात्' which is indirectly used to restrict the province of production would be superfluous. This is not all. In that case the expression 'सर्वसम्भवाभावात्' (kā, 9) which has been already explained above (p. 197) would also be meaningless.

However, it is true that the primary *prakṛti* which is the storehouse of all energy, contains everything potentially. Its power is unlimited and it is never exhausted. It possesses infinite possibilities. If the barrier that stands in the way of its manifestation be any how removed, then anything and everything can come out of it. But it cannot be so in the case of the various manifestations of the gross-elements which are always limited, and a limited cause cannot contain unlimited potency.

1 धर्मोऽपि धर्मी भवत्यन्यधर्मस्वरूपापेक्षया, III. 15.

specific (सामान्यविशेषात्मा[1])—by generic the past and future ones are to be meant, for they are one with the *dharmin*; while the present ones which are being experienced by us are to be regarded as specifics and these also in their turn look forward to their material cause for their sustenance. Further, it is inseparably connected (अन्वयी) with the aspects. No question arises with regard to the past and future aspects, for they are merged into the *dharmin*. The present ones also are not absolutely different from the *dharmin*. Though the jar has got a distinct shape of its own by which it can be differntiated from the earth—its material cause, yet it has got its existence in and through the earth. It cannot be separated from the original matter.

From this discussion on the characteristic feature of the *dharmin* and the *dharma* it may be concluded without any hesitation that the *dharmin* is nothing but the original matter and the *dharmas* are their varying manifestations or forms. Consequently, the relation of cause and effect is that of the matter with its varying forms, and it is the relation of identity in difference (तादात्म्य). Though the past and future aspects are identical with the *dharmin*, yet they are left open to the perfect yogins whose doors are never barricaded.

Really speaking, this apparent distinction of *dharmin* and the *dharma* can only be experienced during the course of cosmic process (सृष्टि). But in the time of dissolution when the primordial *prakṛti* absorbs everything within itself, then one *dharmin* in the shape of *prakṛti* alone exists, and no other external *dharmas*.

So far we have dealt with the material cause only, and in doing so its various aspects have also been examined. Now, the Vaiśeṣikas are found to assign equal importance to an efficient cause (निमित्तकारण) also. What is its position in the Sāṃkhya-yoga school ? A suitable reply in this connection is to be met with in the Yoga-sūtra (IV. 3) and specially in its Bhāṣya. The fact is

1 सामान्यं धर्मिरूपम्, विशेषः धर्मः तदात्मा उभयात्मक इत्यर्थः ।

this : *Prakṛti* is self-propelled (स्वतः परिणामिनी). Motion is inherent in it. Impulse does not come in it from out-side. Though it is equipped with infinite potentiality and has got a natural proneness towards actualisation, yet it cannot always function. There is an obstructing force that stands as a barrier towards its functioning and unless it be rem ed it cannot act spontaneously. The efficient causes play thei role here and render assistance to the *prakṛti*. This has been beau ully described by way of illustration in the Yoga-bhāṣya (IV. 3). Just as a farmer with a view to irrigate the corn-fields does not himself carry water from the reservoir to the fields, but makes an outlet in the embankment and when this is done water flows to the distant fields out of its own accord. So also the efficient causes in the shape of 'virtue' and 'vice' etc., do not move *prakṛti* into action ; they simply remove the barrier and when this is done energy from *prakṛti* is automatically liberated. Just as the same farmer does uot himself force the water into the roots of the plants, but only weeds out the field and when this is finished, the roots of paddy-plants can easily suck out earthy and watery juice ; so also the efficient cause such as 'virtue' only removes 'impurity' that stood as a barrier in the way of functioning of *prakṛti* and consequenty helps to liberate the energy stored up there in. Speaking briefly, *prakṛti* is the sole agent. Activity is inherent in it. The efficient causes do not move it into action. They only help to remove the barrier. When the barrier is removed, there is an automatic liberation of energy so long confined in the womb of *prakṛti*.

Much has been said about cause and effect. But one important factor in this connection should not be lost sight of. Though the causes are present with their necessary concomitants, still the effects do not become manifested always and everywhere owing to limitation in 'space,' 'time,' 'form' and 'condition'[1]. For instance, the saffron plants do not thrive anywhere else except Kashmere,

1. देशकालाकारनिमित्तोपबन्धात् न खलु समानकालमात्मनामभिव्यक्तिरिति, *Yoga-bhāṣya*, III. 14,

though the other conditions remain elsewhere the same. This is due to limitation in space. Similary, paddy plants do not yield harvest if they are transplanted in summar, for they thrive in rainy season and not in summar ; and this is due to limitation in time. A doe does not give birth to a man, for the human form does not develop in her. This is an instance of limitation in form. Similarly, a vicious man cannot experience pleasure for the effectuating cause in the shape of 'virtue' is wanting in him[1].

We need not prolong our discussion on the topic here. But the subject cannot be said to be fully treated unless the principle of the 'conservation of energy', the 'theory of change' (**परिणामवाद**), the 'doctrine of succession' (**क्रमनियम**) and such other allied topics are explained. However, these will by the way come up for discussion in the next chapter and there we intend to reserve some space for further discussion on the subject that may be deemed necessary.

THE SĀṂKHYA THEORY OF EVOLUTION

Prakṛti and the Guṇas

All the principal systems of thought are keen to explain the universe as to how it is constituted and whither it will return ; and they do so from different angles of vision. Some are found to apply the positive method, others stick to critical one, while there are some who attempt to explain the problem purely from the negative point of view. The contribution of the Sāṃkhya teachers in this respect is indeed worthy of notice. They seek to explain the universe from the stand-point of cosmic evolution which again is based upon the principle of conservation, transformation and dissipation of energy.

According to this system *prakṛti* is held to be the ultimate principle at the back-ground of the universe. It is unmanifested, undifferentiated, ubiquitous, undecaying and unconscious. It has got

1 The illustrations have been drawn up from the commentary of Vācaspati.

three constituents which are called *guṇas* in the Sāṃkhya literature. But the reason of calling them as such is not definitely known. The later commentators suggest fanciful etymologies according to their own way, but the earlier authorities are silent in this respect.

The philosophy of the *guṇas* is very deep. From the evidence of the Yukti-dīpikā it may be stated that they are infra-atomic quanta of reals, rather forces than substance[1]. Speaking of their characteristic features the Yoga-bhāṣya states that they are always in a state of flux[2]. Their varying permutations and combinations give rise to all sorts of collocations which are manifested in the world of objects.[3] But really speaking, all these manifested objects do not essentially differ from the *guṇas* from which they appear for the simple reason that Sāṃkhya strickly maintains the view that the cause is immanant in its effects. However, the manifested objects only appear to our experience while the substratum whose manifestations are these objects of the visible world always remains beyond the range of perception. In this connection the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya quotes a verse wherein it is stated that the *guṇas* in their real forms do not come within visual range ; what comes within the range of vision is appearance like *māyā*.[4] ; From this it follows that the *guṇas* in their original forms are very subtle while it is their effects only that become manifested. Likewise, the Yukti-dīpikā also is found to state in one place that even the revered sage Kapila can experience the effects of the *guṇas* only, and not the *guṇas* themselves in their potential state for the simple reason that they in that state remain imperceptible.[5]

1 परमविभागमुपसंप्रप्ताः सूक्ष्माः शक्तयः, p. 57/12

2 चलञ्च गुणवृत्तमिति, II. 15.

3 सर्वमिदं गुणानां सन्निवेशविशेषमात्रमिति परमार्थतो गुणात्मानः, *Y. Bh.* IV. 13.

4 तथाच शास्त्रानुशासनम्—

गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति
यत्तु दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम्, IV. 13.

5 परमर्षेरपि गुणानां कार्यमेव प्रत्यक्षम्. न शक्तिमात्रेणावस्थानामसंवेद्यत्वात्, p. 72/22-3.

They are classified in the Sāṃkhya literature as (1) *sattva*, (2) *rajas*, and (3) *tamas* respectively. Of these, *sattva* has the characteristic of manifestation. It has the tendency of illuminating a phenomenon. When *sattva* does not manifest itself the *puruṣa* cannot experience any cognition, for the latter can cast its reflection on the *buddhi* when it becomes transparent and this is possible only when *sattva* predominates in it. Hence *sattva* serves as the medium for all conscious reflections of the *puruṣa*. *Rajas* is dynamic. It produces motion and it has the tendency to do work by overcoming resistence. *Tamas* is inert. It is the mass element which resists the other two *guṇas* to function. Speaking briefly, in any entity whether physical or psychical, whatever is serene and tranquil is due to *sattva*. All excitement, motion, force or energy is due to *rajas*, and all that is massive, inert or dull is due to *tamas*.

All these three constituents of the *prakṛti* play their respective parts in the building up of the cosmos. If *rajas* would be the only operating force, there would be unnecessary flow of activity everywhere which would never allow the formation of a grand and stupendous structure in the shape of this universe. In order to resist this the *prakṛti* provides itself with another constituent called *tamas* which by its very nature is massive and inert. Again, if there would be no illuminating force in the shape of *sattva*, there would not be any conscious regulation and adaptation. Consequently the *prakṛti* would be nothing but a blind force acting in a haphazard manner.

The three *guṇas* are interdependent and inseparably connected with one another. In every reality, whether physical or psychical, one of them becomes predominant and the other two sub-ordinate. The latter do not counter-balance the function of the former. They rather co-operate with it. Though contradictory to one another they can work together for a single end. The Kārikā (13) is found to explain this by the simile of the lamp. Just as the wick

and the oil, though opposed to the activity of fire, can co-operate even when in contact with fire for the single purpose of illumination, similarly the three *guṇas* though mutually possessed of contradictory properties, can work together for a single end.

The fact as to how these three divergent constituents of *prakṛti* can co-operate with one another has been more scientifically dealt with by Vārṣagaṇya, the celebrated exponent of Sāṃkhya. This is known specially from a reference in the Yukti-dipikā where the author in course of dealing with the problem states that the two entities in a pair of opposite resist each other provided they are equally strong. But the result becomes otherwise when one of them becomes prominent and the other subordinate. In that case there is no opposition. On the contrary, the weaker one remains closely associated with the stronger one and thus helps the other to function. This he goes to support by the following quotation from Vārṣagaṇya (p. 72):

तथा च भगवान् वार्षगण्यः पठति—**रूपातिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च विरुध्यन्ते, सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते। तद् यथा—जलाग्नी पचनीय-स्वेदनीयेषु कार्येषु, छायातपौ च सूक्ष्मरूपप्रकाशेन, शीतोष्णे च प्रजावस्थितौ, एवं तत्।**

Portion of this passage is also quoted in the Yoga-bhāṣya (II. 15 & III. 13), but without reference to the author. Vācaspati attributes this to Pañcaśikha. However, let us attempt to bring out the sense conveyed herein. The term '*rūpa*' in the passage speaks of the eight forms of *buddhi*, four with pre-dominance of *sattva* and the other four with that of *tamas* (**सात्त्विकमेतद् रूपं तामसमस्माद् विपर्यस्तम्**, kā, 23). These are (1) virtue, (2) wisdom, (3) dispassion and (4) power; the remaining four are there opposites. *Vṛtti* means the inner fluctuations of the mind and these are pleasure, pain and delusion. When these forms or the fluctations are in their intensity, it is then that one opposes the other. Thus both 'virtue' and 'vice' constitute forms of *buddhi*. When both of them are equally developed, they resist each other. But when one of them is pre-dominant and the other is in its

normal stage, then there is no opposition. What then happens is that one is over-powered by the other and there is no other alternative on the part of the weaker one but to co-operate with the stronger one. Similar is the case with 'pleasure' and 'pain'. When one of them is prominent, the other becomes sub-ordinate. The weaker one is then forced to help in the functioning of the stronger. This is what the revered teacher goes to illustrate by the simile of 'water and fire,' 'shade and light', and such other pairs of opposites. Just as water is opposed to fire, but their joint activity serves the purpose of cooking and boiling. Here fire is intense, while water is sub-ordinate. Being closely associated with fire, water also becomes extremely hot and thereby it helps the purpose of boiling and cooking. But the single fire without the close co-operation of water could never bring about the desired end. If on the other hand, both of them were equally powerful, one would try to collapse the other, and in that case there would not be any co-ordinated activity. Likewise, 'light' is opposed to 'shade'. But it is due to their co-ordinated activity that an object of minute shape may be revealed to the eye. Here the special condition under which the said object can be perceived is that it must be exposed to light; but the eye must be protected from intense ray of light. If both of them were equally exposed to severe sun-shine or similar other light, the eye-ball would be dazzled and consequently it would not be able to cast its glance on the minute object under perception. Hence 'shade' though opposed to 'light' co-operates in visual perception. Similar is the case with other pairs of opposites, such as 'heat and cold,' 'motion and rest', etc.

Two *guṇas* never become equally developed. In that case they would coalesce—a fact which Sāṃkhya can never admit. If, however, in a particular phenomenon one of them be in the highest degree of its development, then what happens with the remaining two is that one becomes latent and the other sub-latent.

The power of one is never confused into that of the other[1]. The triads of these three *guṇas* are innumerable. Hence the number of permutations and combinations arising out of their various groupings are countless. As a result of this, anything and everything can come out of them[2]. The particular aspect goes by the name of that *guṇa* which is dominant in it[3]

Modern Science and the doctrine of Guṇas

The naturalists hold the doctrine that "total energy of any body or system of bodies is a quantity which can neither be increased nor diminished by any mutual action of these bodies, though it may by transformed into any one of the forms of which energy is susceptible, and that the universe is such a system whose total energy remains the same in quantity amid all the changing forms in which it may exhibit itself." This is called 'conservation of energy' So also 'conservation of mass' and the like.

Sāṃkhya also maintains more or less a similar view From the doctrine of 'सत्कार्य' and its corollary it follows that the sum of effects exist in the sum of causes. And ultimately these causes are nothing but the *guṇas* themselves. But the aforesaid doctrine of 'conservation of energy and mass' is much more reflected in a passage of the Yoga-bhāṣya (II. 19) which seeks to explain some of the important features of the *guṇas*. In order to facilitate a fuller discussion on the point, the said passage is quoted below :

गुणास्तु सर्वधर्मानुपातिनो न प्रत्यस्तमयन्ते नोपजायन्ते। व्यक्तिभिरेवातीतानागतव्ययागमवतीभिर्गुणान्वयिनीभिरुपजननापायधर्मका इव प्रत्यवभासन्ते।

The idea is this : The aspects which are technically called *dharmas* constitute various modes of the *guṇas*. In a time-

1 अङ्गाङ्गित्वेऽप्यसंकीर्णशक्तिप्रविभागाः, *Y. Bh.*, II. 18.

2 सर्वे वा सर्वरूपा भवन्ति, *ibid*, II. 15.

3 गुणप्रधानभावकृतस्तेषां विशेषः, *ibid*.

series they are called future, present and past accordingly as they are in their potential state, or actualised, or absorbed into the primary cause. It is these aspects which come into being and pass out of existence. The *guṇas*, though they conform to them, are neither thereby increased nor diminished. What happens to them is that some of them are manifested and others remain unmanifested. However, it is a self-evident truth that totality of mass, energy and illumination always remains constant provided both the manifested and the unmanifested ones are taken into account. But the case appears to be otherwise by reason of their differentiated forms which are phenomenal appearances[1]. It is they who come and pass. They are subject to growth and decay. As these aspects are closely associated with the *guṇas* and are also sustained by them, so the property of one is wrongly ascribed to the other. This is beautifully illustrated in the text by the simile of Devadatta and his cows. Just as Devadatta is said to become poor for the reason that his cows are dying. But the cows are quite distinct from him, yet poverty arising out of their loss is ascribed to him. The aspects on the other hand are nothing but the effects of the *guṇas*, and therefore may be taken as different as well as non-different from their cause. Under these circumstances, it is not unnatural that the properties of the owned would be ascribed to the owner.

Though herein we find a glimpse of the doctrine of 'conservation of energy,' yet the approach of the Sāṃkhya teachers is purely metaphysical. It cannot be held to be scientific.

The electron of modern scientists also bears some affinity with the *guṇa* of Sāṃkya-yoga. Both are infra-atomic. The former constitutes a unit negative charge having inertia. The latter also constitutes mass charged with energy. But the serious deviation lies in the fact that the former is capable of isolation as in cathode rays, while the latter can never be detached.

1 See तन्मायैव सुतुच्छकम्, *Y. Bh.*, IV. 13.

Psychical aspects of the Guṇas

So far we have tried to deal with some of the prominent metaphysical features of the *guṇas*. Let us now turn our attention to the psychical side. From this point of view the Sāṃkhya teachers unanimously hold that the three *guṇas* give rise to pleasurable, painful and delusive cognitions. The earlier commentators are found to explain this by the simile of **स्त्री** (lady), **क्षत्र** (warrior) and **मेघ** (cloud)[1]. Just as a virtuous lady affords pleasure to her husband, becomes the source of pain to the co-wives, and deludes a sensuous person who fails to get her. Thus it is found that the same woman becomes the source of pleasure, pain and delusion to different persons. Let us also take up the instance of a warrior and cloud. A brave warrior affords pleasure to his lord, afflicts the enemy, and deludes them who begin to retreat quickly. The raining cloud also affords pleasure to the husbandman, afflicts the traveller, and deludes the woman who is separated from her husband at a great distance. By this it is evident that the same object becomes the source of pleasure, pain and delusion to different persons having different bent of mind. Similarly all the manifested entities are endowed with these three attributes. Hence, *prakṛti* which is resorted to to be the ultimate cause of all unconscious entities must possess the *guṇas* as its constituents; for it is the dictum of Sāṃkhya that the properties of the effect exist even in the cause (**कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्य**, kā, 14).

Prakṛti and its evolutes

All manifested entities pre-suppose a cause. From the Sāṃkhya doctrine of causation it follows that the effect is more developed than the cause. Even an effect becomes a cause with respect to its further manifestation. For instance, the lump of clay is the effect of the gross element of earth while it becomes a

1 See *Jayamaṅgalā*, kā, 12; also *Yukti-dipikā*, p. 71/5-12.

cause with respect to the jar—its further manifestation. Similarly the gross-element of earth which is the cause of the 'lump of clay' becomes an effect of the subtle-element of earth' and so on. If this series of cause and effect be minutely examined it is found that the effects beginning with the gross element of earth and ending downwards into the jar are becoming more and more developed; while in the series beginning from the lump of clay and ending upwards into the subtle element of earth what happens is quite reverse of the former. Here in the ascending order, the degree of manifestation is gradually diminishing. In this way if we continue to proceed upward with the causal series a stage will finally come when the cause will become totally unmanifested. And the Sāṃkhya teachers equate that stage with their *prakṛti*. Again, the pitcher has its cause in the shape of the lump of clay, that again has got the gross element of earth as its cause and that again in its turn has got the subtle element of earth as such, and so on. Hence, in order to avoid a *regressus ad infinitum* the Sāṃkhya teachers postulate the existence of *prakṛti* which is held to be the uncaused cause of all entities, whether physical or psychical. It is the final substratum of all empirical realities.

The author of the Yukti-dipikā is found to treat the problem more philosophically. He states that the cause and effect are not ontologically different. What was subtle and undifferentiated is called effect when it becomes manifest and differentiated. But when the effect loses its differentiation and remains undivided and undistinguished, it is then looked upon as the cause. In pursuing this apparently unending chain of cause and effect the philosopher has got to cry halt and stop at a state in which all possible differentiation has become defunct, all change into diversity has become arrested, and all its energies become quiescent and cease to operate in the teleological order as means end and as subsidiary and supreme. This state of the causal matter cannot be characterised as existent or non-existent, because existence is ordinarily considered

to be concomitant with teleological evolution; nor it is non-existent, for it cannot be absolutely rejected like the lotus in the sky. This state of absolute quiscence in which all movement and change are absolutely homogeneous and uniform is the final and ultimate reality than which nothing subtler[1] can possibly be imagined. This ultimate state of causal matter is the primus of the whole physical, biological and psychical order of being. It is the uncaused cause, and is the first term in the causal series. The language in which the topic is dealt with is very expressive, and this may be noticed in the following quotation from the text (p. 31/11-16):

"सूक्ष्माणां मूर्तिलाभः कार्यम्। निवृत्तविशेषाणामविभागात्मनाऽवस्थानं कारणमित्ययं सिद्धान्तः। तत्रास्तंगतविशेषाणां निवृत्तपरिणामव्यापाराणामङ्गाङ्गिभावमनुपगच्छतामुपसंहृतशक्तीनां सर्वविकारसाम्यं सर्वशक्तिप्रलयं निःसत्तासत्तं निःसदसदव्यक्तलक्षणमवस्थाऽन्तरमुपसंप्राप्तानां नास्त्यन्यत् सूक्ष्मतरमवस्थाऽन्तरं यस्येदंलक्षणमवस्थाऽन्तरं कार्यं स्यात्[2]। तस्मात् सुष्ठूच्यते 'मूलप्रकृतिरविकृति'रिति"।

The Sāṃkhya-kārikā (15-16) advances the following arguments in support of its existence:

(1) Individual objects that we behold around us are all limited in magnitude. Whatever is limited cannot be the final source of all these manifested objects, for the main cause must be something more enduring and more pervasive than the effects. Hence the ultimate cause must be vested with unlimited potency.

(2) All manifestations are analogous to one another. All of them again are more or less endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain and delusion. Because of this homogeneity their ultimate source must be one which would be the conglomeration of pleasure, pain and delusion.

(3) While dealing with causality, it has been pointed out above

1 See, 'सूक्ष्मविषयत्वं चालिङ्गपर्यवसानम्,' Y. S. I. 45.

2 Also compare, प्रतिसंसृज्यमानाश्च तस्मिन्नेव सत्तामात्रे महत्यात्मन्यवस्थाय यत् तन्निःसत्तासत्तं निःसदसन्निरसदव्यक्तमलिङ्गं प्रधानं प्रतीयन्तीति, Y. Bh. II. 19.

that a cause can give rise to that effect only for which it is held to be efficient. This causal efficiency speaks of the fact that the effect lies in its unmanifested stage in the cause. This is why sand cannot be the source of oil, for it is the oil-seed and no other entity else in which the oil subsists. Similarly, *prakṛti* is the ultimate cause in which all effects subsist in their manifested stage; it is the main source which is equipped with necessary potency of giving rise to all manifestations.

(4) The cause differs from the effect though it is immanant in it. The jar has the capacity of containing water while the lump of clay cannot do so; but it is the latter which though less manifested gives rise to the former. That which is the final substratum of all effects is unevolved, and this is called *prakṛti.*

The author of the Jayamaṅgalā refers here to the view of a different commentator who explains the expression **'कारणकार्यविभागात्'** in a different way. In his opinion, whatever renders some service is called **'कारण'** and that which receives the same is called **'कार्य'**. Both of these again are mutually served by each other. Then he attempts to show as to how the created beings and the gross elements of earth, water, etc., mutually work for the interest of each other. The human beings by dint of their physical labour level the earth where necessary, construct roads there on, excavate canals and tanks, and thus make it fit for habitation. They erect reservoirs, build dams to preserve rain-water for the purpose of irrigation; otherwise those regions of the globe where rain-fall is scanty would turn into arid lands. Even the vegetable kingdom is found to render some useful service to the earth. Plants by their roots hoard up moisture and thus keep the earth wet. Trees keep it cool by their shade, and so on. Hence it becomes evident that even the bounteous earth requires some sort of external service to yeild a satisfactory return. Earth and such other elements also in their turn sustain and nourish the animal as well as plant life, othewise the latter could not thrive. If any wound be inflicted on their person, the loss of organic matter incurred thereby could not be recovered

unless the elements fill up the same from the back-ground. This kind of mutual service is not confined to this world only. It may be observed even in higher sphere. Heat, cold, wind, rain and such other natural phenomena appear in due time by the influence of their presiding deities. In this way gods also are found to render useful service to mankind. The latter also in their turn try to pacify the former by means of offerings of oblations and prayer. Again, if we turn our attention downward to the world of animals we find that some of the animals are employed by man for vehicular purpose, while others are engaged in ploughing land, and so on. Their owners also in return rear them, and also heal them by administering drugs whenever any disease prevails among them. In this way the commentator seeks to establish the truth that in nature all is for all. Such mutual bond of service cannot be explained unless some principle works from the back-ground, and this is the *prakṛti.*

The author of the Yukti-dīpikā also speaks here of this mutual service, and attempts to point out the same almost in a similar language[1] In this connection he also refers to the fact that even the *guṇas*, though of diverse nature, mutually support one another in working together for a single end[2]. But his final approach is different from that of the Jayamaṅgalā. He urges that this skilful division into the server and the served presupposes their undivided state. Whatever entities are discrete and mutually served by one another must

1 See above, pp. 166-7, n. 2.

The view that in nature all is for the service of all is also advocated by the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya in II. 28, wherein he attempts to explain and illustrate the cause of sustenance (धृतिकारण) which forms one of the nine kinds of causes that are enumerated in a couplet therein. The following lines from the *Bhāṣya* thereon bears evidence to this : धृतिकारणं शरीरमिन्द्रियाणाम् , तानि च तस्य । महाभूतानि शरीराणाम् । तानि च परस्परं सर्वेषाम्—तैर्यग्योनमानुषदैवतानि परस्परार्थत्वात् ।

2 See, अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः, Kā, 12 , also, प्रख्या-प्रवृत्तिस्थितिरूपा बुद्धिगुणाः परस्परानुग्रहतन्त्रीभूत्वा……Y. Bh. II. 15.

possess primarily an indiscrete state, and this is the unevolved which is also called *prakṛti.* This unevolved principle which is held to be the ultimate cause is always self-propelled. It does not look foward to some other principle for mutual service. Just as the subtle particle of fire has got its own minute light, but in order to illumine a pot or similar other entity it requires the service of the wick and oil. Similarly the first impulse of the *guṇas* is due to their own power, but all other manifestations fróm *mahat* downward are in need of mutual service[1].

(5) As the entire universe with all its diversities disappears at the time of dissolution and reappears at the time of fresh creation, hence there must be some unmanifest principle in which it is absorbed at that time. Vācaspati explains this process by the simile of the tortoise. Just as the limbs of the tortoise are protruded and then retracted into its shell, similarly the effect is nothing but the manifestation of something already existent. It comes out from the unmanifest and merges into it. Hence, causal operation speaks of evolution of the unevolved. From this it follows that whatever is evolved is entirely caused by what is unevolved.

By this set of five *modus ponens*[2], Īśvarakṛṣṇa establishes the existence of *prakṛti* as the ultimate cause of all entities other than the self. In Kārikā 16, he speaks of the manner in which it operates.

Prakṛti functions through the *guṇas.* It never becomes inactive Even at the time of cosmic dissolution it continuously acts within itself. But the distinctive feature of activity at this stage

1 See, तद् यथा—सूक्ष्मोऽग्निः सूक्ष्मं प्रकाशं स्वयमेव करोति, घटादिप्रकाशने तु तैलवर्त्त्याद्यपेक्षते; तद्वद् गुणानामाद्यः प्रकोपः स्वशक्तितः, महदाद्यपेक्षस्तूपकारतः, *Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 81/17-8.

2 See, एवमेतैः पञ्चभिर्वीतैर्व्यक्तस्य कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तमितिसिद्धम् ,—*Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 82/1- 2. But unlike other commentators, Vācaspati combines the last two reasons into one, and this is placed by him at the very outset.

lies in the fact that each *guṇa* then functions independently without being blended with one another as in the creative stage. The reason of this independent activity will be discussed elsewhere when 'involution', 'dissolution' and such other allied topics will be dealt with. However, in the creative stage the *guṇas* through which it functions become blended up with one another. One of them becomes then dominant and the other two act in subservience to it. In this way the *prakṛti* functions through the *guṇas* continuously giving rise to numerous modifications which are diverse in their nature.

This diversity is due to varying permutations and combinations of the *guṇas.* The process has been illustrated by the simile of rain-water which having been discharged from the cloud becomes mixed up with various kinds of soils possessing different ingredients and thus transforms into the juice of cocoanut, wood-apple, myrabolan and such other fruits acquiring thereby a variety of taste, though this diversity was not present in it as pure rain-water.

Thus the whole fabric of this mysterious creation lies with the unevolved *prakṛti* which functions in and through the *guṇas.* It has got no separate existence apart from them. Hence its unity is an abstraction.

Not only the existence of *prakṛti,* but its unity also constitutes one of the ten fundamental principles of Sāṃkhya[1] But there had been an earlier school which maintained its plurality. While referring to this school in his Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya, (Sāṃkhya section) Guṇaratna Sūri is found to state that the advocates of the original school of Sāṃkhya maintained a separate *prakṛti* for each individual *puruṣa*[2]. Further light in this connection is thrown by

1 See, प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वम्······मौलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश, quoted by Vācaspati from the Rāja-vārttika (kā, 72) ; also अस्तित्वमेकत्वम्·········स्थितिः शरीरस्य च शेषवृत्तिः, Kramadipikā under the Tattva-Samāsa-sūtra 'दश मूलिकार्थाः'

2 मौलिक्यसांख्या ह्यात्मानमात्मानं प्रति पृथक् प्रधानं वदन्ति, उत्तरे तु सांख्याः सर्वात्मस्वप्येकं नित्यं प्रधानमिति प्रपन्नाः ।

the Yukti-dipikā (p.169/17-8) wherein it is stated that the propounder of this doctrine of plurality of *prakṛti* was Paurika. This teacher maintains that a separate *prakṛti* which is attached to each individual *puruṣa*, produces the physical body and such other objects for the sake of the latter at its empirical existence. But these separate units of *prakṛti* are sustained by another main *prakṛti* which again is attached to a **'माहात्म्यशरीर'**[1]— a term[2] which is not found in any other available text of Sāṃkhya. It is referred to here and there in the Yuktidipikā. Hence it requires elucidation.

The term speaks of those divine personalities who by dint of their strong power of will can give rise to various forms of creations. Brahman, or Hiranyagarbha, Maheśvara and such other divine beings fall under this category. But Kapila is excluded from the list. He is called *paramarṣi* or great sage, and is thus differentiated from them. Though all of them emerge into existence at the beginning of each cycle of creation, yet the revered sage is distinguished from the rest by the fact that his activity proceeds from an abnormal flow of *sattva*, while in the case of the *māhātmya-śarīra* group, both *sattva* and *rajas* become equally dominant[3] Just as 'knowledge' in the case of Kapila is innate, so also 'power' is with them[4] These divine personalities are vested with uncommon power by which they can give rise to peculiar varieties of creations as desired by them. The case of the great lord Śiva may be taken as an illustration. He is said to have produced hundreds of crores of Rudras by his will force. Such a kind of evolution

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1 प्रतिपुरुषमन्यत् प्रधानं शरीराद्यर्थं करोति। तेषाञ्च माहात्म्यशरीरप्रधानं यदा प्रवर्तते तदेतराण्यपि, तन्निवृत्तौ च तेषामपि निवृत्तिरिति पौरिकः सांख्याचार्यो मन्यते।

2. In the Mbh. (XII. 337), Nārada is found to address Nārāyaṇa under two hundred different names, and *Māhātmya-śarira* forms 174th. of them

3 यस्य सत्त्वप्रधानं कार्यकरणं स परमर्षिः, यस्य सत्त्वरजोबहुलं स माहात्म्यशरीरः, *yukti-dīpikā*, p. 88/22-3.

4 यथा च परमर्षेर्ज्ञानं सांसिद्धिकमेवं माहात्म्यशरीरस्यैश्वर्यम्, *ibid*, p. 148/22-3.

is equated by the author of the Yukti-dīpikā to the *prākṛta* form as mentioned in the Kārikā (43). He differs here with other commentators. In his opinion, this class is distinguished from the other two of the name of *'sāṃsiddhika'* (innate) and *'vaikṛta'* (incidental). He states that the *'prākṛta'* form of evolution comes out from the will-force of a *māhātmya-śarīra*, and whatever is desired by him is readily supplied by the *prakṛti* from the background. This may be noticed in the following lines (p 149/6-12).

त्रिविधा एवेति कललादि ग्रहणेन शरीराण्याह............। प्राकृतं यथा माहात्म्यशरीराभिमानात्। तस्य ह्यभिमानो भवति—हन्ताहं पुत्रान् स्रक्ष्ये ये मे कर्म करिष्यन्ति ये मां परञ्च ज्ञास्यन्ति। स यादृक्सर्गमभिधास्यति तादृक् प्रधानादुत्पद्यते। तद् यथा महेश्वरस्य रुद्रकोटिसृष्टाविति।

The term **'अभिमान'** in the passage deserves special attention.. It tends to suggest that such a form of evolution results from the sense of personality of the agent. This atonce reminds us of the aphorism **'निर्माणचित्तान्यस्मितामात्रात्'** (Y. S. iv. 4) where Patañjali is found to state that the so called mind-stuffs called *'nirmāṇa-cittas'* spring up from the strong personality of the Yogin vested with superior divine power. It is interesting to observe that a *māhātmya-śarīra* and a Yogin of the above-mentioned rank are almost similar. The former creates on the strength of **'अभिमान'** and the latter does so from **'अस्मिता'**—the two terms only varying in name but not in sense. Again, the mind-stuffs created by the will of such a Yogin is regulated and guided by a principal mind-stuff which is also created by the Yogin himself. Otherwise, conformity to intention, or readjustment of memory of this Yogin who has now so many bodies, cannot be explained. This is the idea that is expressed in the next *sūtra* **'प्रवृत्तिभेदे प्रयोजकं चित्तमेकमनेकेषाम्'** (Y. S. iv. 5). The *'nirmāṇa-kāya'* which was adopted by Kapila at the time of imparting knowledge of Sāṃkhya to Asuri may also be taken as a variety of such evolution as proceeds from the strong desire of the agent.

Taking every thing into consideration, we find that the process

adoptd by a *māhātmya-śarīra* in giving rise to *prākṛta* variety of evolution and that of the Yogin with superior power in creating the so called mind-stuffs are almost the same. By the way it has also been pointed out that the said mind-stuffs resulting from the strong feeling of personality of the Yogin, are regulated and guided by one principal mind-stuff. This bears a close affinity with the doctrine of Paurika. This teacher is also of opinion that a principal *prakṛti* attached to a *māhātmya-śarīra* guides and regulates the sub-ordinate *prakṛtis* of those personalities that are called up by his power of strong desire (**अभिध्यानात्**)[1]

Of these *māhātmya-śarīras* or divine personalities emerging into existence at the beginning of each cycle of creation, Brahman is held to be the foremost. He excels all other of his rank in his capacity as a creator. In the Purāṇas[2], he is stated to be the

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[1] Paurika's view of the two-fold *Prakṛti,* one main and the other sub-ordinate, reminds us of the similar conception of *avidyā* as held by Maṇḍana and Vācaspati. In the opinion of these two teachers, *avidyā* is both general as well as specific. For a fuller discussion, see Brahma-sūtra, I.i.1.

2 Brahman or the lord of creation is equated in the Purāṇas with *Mahat.* The author of the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 108/22) also reads *Mahat, Brahman, Īśvara* as synonyms. In some commentaries, Hiraṇyagarbha is also reckoned as such. But the reason of regarding all these as synonyms are not distinctly mentioned in any of the available works of Sāṃkhya. Further light in this connection is shed by the following passage quoted in the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 152/9-14) :

एवं हि **शास्त्रम्**—'महदादिविशेषान्तः सर्गो बुद्धिपूर्वकत्वात् । उत्पन्नकार्यकरणस्तु **माहात्म्य-शरीर** एकाकिनमात्मानमवेक्ष्याभिदध्यौ हन्ताहं पुत्रान् स्रक्ष्ये ये मे कर्म करिष्यन्ति ये मां परं चापरञ्च ज्ञास्यन्ति । तस्याभिध्यायतः पञ्च मुख्यस्रोतसो देवा प्रादुर्बभूवुः । तेषूत्पन्नेषु न तुष्टिं लेभे । ततोऽन्ये तिर्यक्स्रोतसोऽष्टाविंशतिः प्रजज्ञिरे, तेष्वप्यस्य मतिर्नैव तस्थे । अथापरे नवोर्ध्वस्रोतसो देवाः प्रादुर्बभूवुः । तेष्वप्युत्पन्नेषु नैव कृतार्थमात्मानं मेने । ततोऽन्येऽष्टावर्वाक्स्रोतस उत्पेदुः । एवं तस्माद् **ब्रह्मणो**ऽभिध्यानादुत्पन्नस्तस्मात् प्रत्ययसर्गः ।

The passage in a beautiful style speaks of the view of the ancient teachers of Sāṃkhya as to how the various forms of volitional evolution called

creator of the visible universe. But even such a divine personality is absorbed into the womb of *prakṛti* at the end of each cycle of creation, and a new Brahman occupies his place. Such is the case with Maheśvara and other divinities of this rank.

'प्रत्ययसर्ग' spring up from the will of Brahman who is again identified therein with *Māhātmyaśarīra.* The Kārikā (46) states this class of evolution to be the outcome of *buddhi,* and Brahman is not even mentioned anywhere in it.

However, the passage itself which in every possibility must have been quoted from an authority earlier than Īśvarakṛṣṇa, tends to show that Brahman also plays certain parts in the process of becoming. Reference is also made to Brahman and Hiraṇyagarbha in a few instances in the Yukti-dīpikā. As regards the emergence of such personalities, it is stated that in the beginning of each cycle of creation the *guṇas* having been transformed into the various evolutes of *prakṛti,* beginning from *mahat* and ending in the five gross elements, generate the physical bodies of Kapila, Hiraṇyagarbha and such other personalities (शब्दाद्युपलब्धिलक्षणं गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिलक्षणं चार्थमुद्दिश्य सत्त्वादयो महदहङ्कार-तन्मात्रेन्द्रिय भूतत्वेनावस्थाय परमर्षि-हिरण्यगर्भादीनां शरीरमुत्पादयन्ति, p. 164/6-8). This goes to show that the evolutes of *prakṛti* called *tattvas* emanate first, and then come the divine personalities. Elsewhere the text is found to state that the gods have four kinds of physical bodies ; of these the first one belongs to Kapila and Brahman, and this emanates through *prakṛti* (तत्र देवानां चतुर्विधं शरीरम् प्रधानानुग्रहात् यथा—परमर्षेर्विरिञ्चस्य च, p. 143/12-3).

It will not be out of place to state here that the Sāṃkhya conception of Brahman or Hiraṇyagarbha as we get specially in the statements of the Yukti-dīpikā, should on no account be confounded with that of the Vedantists. The main points of difference lie in the fact that in the Sāṃkhya, Kapila is the first personality who immerges into existence at the beginning of creation. He is the eldest of all (परमर्षिर्भगवान् सांसिद्धिकैर्धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यैराविष्टपिण्डो विश्वाग्रजः कपिलमुनिः) *Yukti-dīpikā,* p. 174 *supra*). He is followed by Brahman or Hiraṇyagarbha. This is also corroborated by the two fragments from the Yukti-dīpikā quoted in the preceeding paragraph where the name of *paramarṣi* or the revered sage Kapila is found to be followed by that of Hiraṇyagarbha in the first instance and *viriñca* or Brahman in the other. But in the Vedānta, Hirāṇyagarbha is held to be the first personality from whom proceed the other organic bodies (हिरण्यगर्भः समवर्तताग्रे, RV. X.121). He is further maintained there as the efficient as well as the material cause of

It thus appears that the Sāṃkhya teacher while propounding this doctrine of plurality of *prakṛti* might have been influenced to a certain extent by the Pauranic conception of creation, and as a consequence of this he had to introduce Brahman, Maheśvara and such other divinities of supreme grade, called *māhātmya-śarīras*—a term which seems to be specially connected with *mahat-ātman* or the great self that passes as a synonym of *buddhi* in the ancient Sāṃkhya literature. If this be the case, then it goes to indicate that *buddhi* or intellect of these divinities must be abnormally developed, and consequently the *prakṛtis* attached to them should also be more enduring and powerful than those of the ordinary beings that come into existence at the call of their strong will-power. The different units of *prakṛti* which are associated with the ordinary beings are limited; hence they look forward to the principal *prakṛtis* attached to the said supreme divinities for their sustenance and nourishment. Whenever one or other of these principal *prakṛtis* operates the different sets of ordinary *prakṛtis* under its command also do so. And finally, with the retirement of the principal *prakṛtis* at the end of a cycle of creation, the ordinary ones also disappear. In this way, the different units of *prakṛtis* that are associated with the ordinary beings are found to follow the principal ones in their evolution and involution. Of course, the *prakṛti* of a particular being who is liberated does not reappear.

The orthodox Sāṃkhya could not recognise this doctrine of plurality of *prakṛti*. The Yukti-dipikā (pp. 169-70) marshalls the following sets of criticisms in refutation to it. Firstly, there is no such proof as may be applied in favour of this doctrine of plurality. Perception fails herein ; for these *prakṛtis* are beyond the range of

the world of cosmos. But Sāṃkhya always disregards this view. According to this system, Brahman or Hiraṇyagarbha is regarded to be equipped with uncommon divine power, and through his power of will he can call up numerous entities to come into existence. And whatever is desired by him is readily supplied by the *prakṛti* from the back-ground. This fact explicitly shows that Hiraṇyagarbha is the efficient cause, while *prakṛti* is the material cause.

perception. Nor there is any definite reason by which this plurality can be inferred. Valid testimony also cannot be applied in support of its existence. Hence this plurality cannot be proved by any source of cognition. Secondly, it is superfluous to postulate the existence of different *prakṛtis* when one *prakṛti* with its unlimited power is capable enough to generate the physical bodies of the vast multitude of beings. If on the contrary, a separate *prakṛti* is maintained for each individual *puruṣa*, then such a *prakṛti* cannot be held to be equipped with unlimited potency. And consequently a stage will appear when this *prakṛti* must be exhausted. For, it is an admitted fact that an entity with limited potency at its disposal cannot serve its purpose eternally. Just as milk, though capable of giving rise to curd, butter, cheese and such other products, is after all perishable for the simple reason of its being limited ; similarly a limited *prakṛti* though capable of generating the physical body of an individual, will finally become exhausted. As a result of this there will appear a stage when the course of metempsychosis will be arrested. Thirdly, it is well known to the students of Sāṃkhya that a Yogin who is vested with superior power can call up several physical bodies (*nirmāṇa-kāyas*) by his strong power of will. But according to this doctrine of plurality, even the *prakṛti* of a yogin is to be regarded after all as a limited entity. And it is not possible on the part of a *prakṛti* with its limited resource to generate any number of physical bodies for the purpose of fulfilling the desire of the yogin. Again, the upholder of this doctrine cannot equate the *prakṛti* of a yogin to that of an ordinary being for the simple reason that one can generate several physical bodies while the other cannot do so at all. Hence it must be admitted that there are different grades of *prakṛtis*. And if this difference in *prakṛtis* be maintained, then it will give rise to such intricate problems as will require further explanations and suppositions. The orthodox Sāṃkhya easily averts these intricacies by maintaining one single *prakṛti* which is vested with unlimited potency. The upholders of this view are of opinion that whatever is desired by the yogin, is readily supplied

by the *prakṛti* from the back-ground. Thus it is found that one *prakṛti* can better explain the world-process. Hence it is unwise to maintain the doctrine of plurality of *prakṛti*. Again, as it has been clearly stated above that whenever the principal *prakṛti* attached to one or other of the supreme divinities, called *māhātmya-śarīras,* steps in, side by side the various units of *prakṛtis* at its command also begin to function ; and with its retirement at the end of a cycle of creation, these *prakṛtis* also cease to operate—such a view also cannot be accepted on the ground that there is no such specific feature of each individual *prakṛti* by which one may be differentiated from the rest. For the upholder of this doctrine of plurality there is no other alternative but to admit finally that there are different grades of *prakrtis.* The *prakṛtis* of the *māhātmya-śarīras,* of the yogins and that of the ordinary beings are not of the same cadre. Each has got special characteristics of its own. This is why one can direct and regulate the other. Such a view though apparently sounds well, but finally becomes untenable. All the *prakṛtis* should be equal. There can not be any excess in quality in one or other of them. Just as one *puruṣa* cannot direct the other owing to lack of such excessiveness, for the same reason one *prakṛti* cannot direct the other. If on the other hand, this excessiveness on the part of a particular *prakṛti* be maintained, then it will automatically speak of different grades in *prakṛtis* which again will unnecessarily involve a series of suppositions for their support. And in this way the main *prakṛti* will finally remain unestablished. Hence it is justifiable to hold that there is one single *prakṛti* which functions for the liberation of all indivinual beings.

V ā r ṣ a g a ṇ y a also is found to level his criticism against this doctrine of plurality of *prakṛti*. This can be noticed in a quotation in the Yoga-bhāṣya (**मूर्त्तिव्यवधिजातिभेदाभावान्नास्ति मूलपृथक्त्वमिति वा र्ष ग ण्यः**, III. 52). Here the revered teacher goes to state that the notion of distinction among several entities arises when there exists any difference of form, or of intervening space, or of genus. As there cannot be observed any such differentiating

factor therein, the final cause of one entity is not distinct from that of the other.

Having thus established the existence of *prakṛti* and its unity, let us now turn our attention towards the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution. It has been already stated above that *prakṛti* is the final cause of all entities other than the *puruṣa*. It is the prius of all physical, psychical and biological realities. 'Its centre is everywhere, but its circumference is nowhere'. In its final state, it is the equillibrium of three different forces, called *guṇas.* It is dynamic and self-propelled. Even in its quiscent state it works within its own self. Just as respiration is going on even in the state of sound sleep, and if it be stopped then there would be an eternal sleep from which there would be no further awakening ; similarly *prakṛti* is always working within its ownself, and if its movement be regarded to be stopped at the time of dissolution then there would be no further evolution. For there is no such outward agency as can move it into action ; it is always independent (**स्वतन्त्र**). Motion is inherent in it. It does not require any external stimulas. It is like an organic whole that works from within, and not like a machine that does so from without.

Evolution proceeds from the conjunction of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa.* Both of these two entities are all-pervading ; hence their conjunction also is eternal. But when this conjunction is viewed as a means for some definite end, it is then only held to be the cause of evolution. What this end is, will come up for discussion at its proper place. Now, *puruṣa* of Sāṃkhya is inactive ; it is undefiled and changeless. It is merely the onlooker. Hence its conjunction with *prakṛti* is regarded as secondary. Virtue and vice cannot stimulate *prakṛti* for activity ; for these are held to be the products of *buddhi*—an entity which has got no separate existence at the period of dissolution when *prakṛti* absorbs all its manifestations within its bosom. It is the transcendental influence of *puruṣa* that rouses *prakṛti* from her slumber at the advent of a new cycle of creation. The fact as to how *puruṣa* though devoid of any activity, exerts its influence upon *prakṛti* is explained in

the Yoga-bhāṣya by the simile of magnet and iron. Just as iron is attracted by magnet when placed adjacent to it, but the magnet itself is not affected thereby at all ; similarly *prakṛti* is influenced by the *puruṣa* by the fact of its mere proximity to it, while the latter remains always uneffected. The Kārikā attempts to explain the utility of this conjunction by the simile of the 'lame and the blind' (kā, 21). Just as the lame though capable of seeing the way cannot walk, while the blind though capable of walking can not see the way. But the lame when placed on the shoulder of the blind can direct the latter to proceed ahead. Thus it is seen that their joint activity can serve a common end which none of them can fulfil without the help of the other. Similarly, the *puruṣa* is inactive, but it is conscious ; while *prakṛti* is active, but it is unconscious. But their mutual co-operation can bring out an end which one of them cannot achieve independent of the other, Now, what is this end for which evolution proceeds ? The problem requires elucidation, for it is held to be one of the ten fundamental principles of Sāṃkhya (**अर्थवत्त्वम्**).

This end is two-fold. One belongs to the *prakṛti*, and the other to the *puruṣa*. The end of *prakṛti* is fulfilled when she becomes the object of enjoyment of *puruṣa* (**तदर्थ एव दृश्यस्यात्मा**, Y. S. II. 21). But *puruṣa* is a passive observer, so he cannot directly enjoy her. This is done when he experiences the pleasurable and painful images presented to him by the *buddhi*. This is called '*bhoga*'. And this becomes possible only when *prakṛti* reveals herself to the *puruṣa* in and through her various manifestations. This revealation of her own self to the *puruṣa* is the end of *prakṛti*. Puruṣa's end, on the other hand, is to free himself from the clasp of *prakṛti*. Though he is undefiled and without any attribute, yet he ascribes pleasure, pain and such other properties of *prakṛti* to his own self, and thus becomes affected by them. Really speaking, he is not to be touched by these attributes. But due to his constant association with the *prakṛti*, he fails to discriminate his own self from that of her. But when this non-discriminative knowledge ceases to function, he can differentiate himself from the *prakṛti*,

and thus regains his true nature. He is no longer afflicted by pleasure and pain. He thus withdraws himself for ever from the province of *prakṛti*. This is liberation, called *apavarga*. These two ends cannot be achieved unless *prakṛti* manifests herself, and this manifestation in its turn necessitates her conjunction with *puruṣa*.

This doctrine of two-fold end has been severely criticised by the Buddhists. The Yukti-dīpikā (p.107) points out in this connection the carcastical remarks levelled against Sāṃkhya by a quotation which in every possibility seems to have been taken from the Paramārtha-Saptati of Vasubandhu[1]—a treatise which was composed with a view to refuting the Kārikā of Īsvarakṛṣṇa. The opponent here urges : You Sāṃkhya are of opinion that *puruṣa* by his very nature is free and that he ascribes happiness, misery and such other properties of the *guṇas* to his own self and thereby brings his bondage during the course of metempsychosis. If there would be no evolution, there would not be any manifestation of the *guṇas*, and consequently no question of bondage would ever arise. Hence it becomes evident that the bondage of *puruṣa* is ultimately brought about by the process of evolution. But it is indeed peculiar to notice that in your opinion the same course of evolution proceeds also for the sake of liberation of the *puruṣa* ; for you are found to hold the view that *prakṛti* is urged to activity for this end (cf. **प्रतिपुरुष विमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः**, kā, 56; also, **पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य**, kā, 57). Hence it becomes clear that according to your system the same cause can bring about two ends in the shape of 'bondage' and 'libèration' which are contradictory to each other—a conception which is illogical. This is what is reflected in the following couplet quoted therein :

विना सर्गेण बन्धो हि पुरुषस्य न युज्यते ।
सर्गस्तस्यैव मोक्षार्थमहो सांख्यस्य सूक्तता ॥

But the author of the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 107/6-22) clarifies here the view of Sāṃkhya and refutes the misconception of the

[1] For a fuller discussion on 'Paramārtha-saptati, see above, pp. 147-153.

opponent. He points out that evolution proceeds from the conjunction of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Even before this conjunction, *puruṣa*'s existence as a separate entity free from the fetters of *prakṛti* is not questionable. He then existed as consciousness abiding in itself. But pure consciousness must require a vehicle to express itself. Just as the act of burning on the part of fire, and that of hewing on the part of axe cannot be revealed without fire or wood, similarly a vehicle is required for the conscious reflection of *puruṣa*, and it is *prakṛti* which is to be regarded as that vehicle. Again, the unconscious *prakṛti* also in its turn cannot function for bringing out a systematic and coherent cosmos unless it receives help from the *puruṣa*. Even the *sattva* element in *prakṛti* is after all unconscious. It is illuminated by the reflection of *puruṣa*. Without this help of *puruṣa* there would not be any conscious regulation and adaptation in the activity of *prakṛti*. In that case it would become nothing but a blind force acting in a haphazard manner. Hence both of these two entities are inter-dependent for all practical purposes. It is true that there is polarity in these two entities, which appears in consciousness and unconsciousness, mobility and immobility, productivity and non-productivity, and so on. Still they are inter-related. One cannot serve its own purpose without the help of the other. The relation between them is that of the knower and the known. Speaking more clearly, it is like that of the spectators and the dramatis personae. Both these knower and the known are eternal. Hence their connection is also without any beginning[1]. The seed of this connection exists even at the state of dissolution when *prakṛti* is at rest. Otherwise further evolution could not be explained. If the connection of a particular *puruṣa* with *prakṛti* any how discontinues, he is then liberated. And for him *prakṛti* does not operate any more. But for others, her service is not yet terminated. They are still within her jurisdiction. So this connection continues to exist even at the state when *prakṛti* is at rest. This connection

1 दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योर्नित्यत्वादनादिः संयोगो व्याख्यात इति, Y. Bh. II. 22.

of *puruṣa* with *prakṛti* at this stage was technically called '**अधिकारबन्ध**'[1] by the ancient teachers.

The commentator then brings out the philosophical significance of the simile of 'the lame and the blind.' The former can see, but he cannot walk. The latter can walk, but fails to see the way. So none of them can reach the destination independent of the other. Both of them are in need of each other's service. The unconscious *prakṛti* also is like the blind. It can move out of its own accord, but cannot experience the result of its activity. If left entirely to itself, it would continue to proceed blindly and would never turn back. It can proceed directly towards the goal only when it receives conscious reflection of the *puruṣa*. Similarly *puruṣa* is like the lame. It is the knower, but has got no activity of its own. In its empirical existence it experiences pleasurable and painful cognitions. But what would it experience unless there would be any object of cognition ? The knower's end is fulfiled when it can realise the true nature of the object of knowledge, and ultimately that object is the *prakṛti*. As both of these two entities are in need of mutual service, hence their union is due to sheer necessity.

The author now goes to dispel the misconception of the opponent who finds fault with Sāṃkhya on the ground that bondage is not intelligible without creation. He urges that this is not the position of Sāṃkhya. The fact is this : *prakṛti* is the object to be known, while *puruṣa* is the knower. Hence these two entities are complimentary. So long as this relation of knower and the known goes to continue, one cannot be detached from the other. This is what is called 'bondage'. It is not an effect of creation. According to genuine Sāṃkhya view, the existence of such a relation is without any beginning. Bondage on the part

1 This 'अधिकारबन्ध'is refuted by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in the following couplet :—

तस्मान्नैषोऽधिकाराख्यो बन्धहेतुः प्रकल्प्यते ।
योग्यत्वेऽप्यधिकाराख्यो विप्रयोगो न युज्यते ॥

—*Śloka-vārttika, sambandhākṣepa-parihāra, 99.*

of the *puruṣa* is to be entangled within the *guṇas* of the *prakṛti*, and this is due to his beginningless correlation. This does not necessitate any previous creation. Let thus the evil intention of M a n o r a t h a[1] be frustrated. This is what the author of the Yukti-Dīpikā (p. 107) intends to say in the following two couplets :

दृश्यदर्शनभावेन प्रकृतेः पुरुषस्य च ।
अपेक्षाशास्त्रतत्त्वज्ञैर्बन्ध इत्यभिधीयते ॥
एवं विनाऽपि सर्गेण यस्माद्बद्धः पुमान् गुणैः ।
तस्माद् विफलतां यातु म नो र थ-मनोरथः ॥

It has been already observed that *prakṛti* does not function aimlessly. Its intention is to fulfil the purpose of the *puruṣa*. But such a view appears at the first instance to be contrary to reason. *Prakṛti* is unconscious ; and an unconscious entity is not expected after all to work for an end which it does not itself understand. This urge to activity on the part of an unconscious entity for the sake of a conscious one has been explained in the Kārikā by the simile of milk and the calf (kā, 57). Just as milk in the cow is secreted for the nourishment of the calf, similarly the unconscious *prakṛti* also functions for the purpose of *puruṣa*. The problem has also received attention of the followers of V ā r ṣ a g a ṇ y a[2]. In their opinion it is like the excitement of the physical body of a male and that of a female for each other. None of these explanations is so sound as it ought to be. This is rather drifting the system towards the theory of spontaneous origin of the universe (स्वभाववाद). However, the Sāṃkhya always insists that the unconscious *prakṛti* proceeds for the cause of the conscious *puruṣa*, and in this case the former cannot be expected to understand the end for which it works. Viewed from this aspect, evolution may be held to be mechanical.

On the other hand, we find that the world-order is not hap-

[1] For details about Manoratha, see above, p. 152.

[2] वार्षगणानां तु—यथा स्त्रीपुंशरीराणामचेतनानामुद्दिश्येतरेतरं प्रवृत्तिस्तथा प्रधानस्येत्ययं दृष्टान्तः, *Yukti-dīpikā*, p. 170 *infra*.

hazard. The whole process of evolution has got a purpose to serve[1]. Every thing whether great or small has got its respective part to play. Nothing comes out at random. Everywhere there is selection of means for a definite end. The course of evolution and change follows a definite law. There is a sequence in the successive appearance of numerous accessories in the order of becoming (क्रमानतिवृत्तेः, Y. Bh. II.19). Taking every thing into consideration it is found that the whole process of evolution, even with an unconscious principle at the back-ground, presupposes an order, adaptation of definite means, a value and a system. Otherwise it cannot move towards a definite end. This end is two-fold—one is to experience pleasure and pain, while the other is dissociation from them. The latter is achieved when the *puruṣa* completely withdraws himself from the worldly objects, and this becomes possible only when discriminative knowledge prevails. This is liberation—a stage from which nobody returns. *Prakṛti* ceases to function any more for him who has attained this stage. This is the final end of life, and the whole world-order is ultimately moving towards it. Viewed from this aspect, evolution may be regarded as teleological.

Though *prakṛti* does not function any more for the particular individual who is liberated, but its functioning is not thereby totally stopped. It continues to do so for those who are still associated with the world of objects[2]: Now what will finally happen to the *prakṛti* if one by one all the individuals are liberated ? The problem has been raised by the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya (IV. 33). He puts the question as such : Is there any end of transmigration or is it without an end (संसारोऽयमन्तवानथानन्त इति) ? But his reply is not very satisfactory. He only attempts to avoid the dilemma by simply stating that such a question cannot be answered as such. So far it can be stated that it is totally stopped for those who have attained discriminative knowledge ; but for others

[1] तत्तु नाप्रयोजनमपि तु प्रयोजनमुररीकृत्य प्रवर्तते, *Y. Bh.* II. 18.

[2] See 'कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात्, *Y.S.* II. 22.

it will continue as usual. This very question was also put to Lord Buddha[1]. But in reply to this he simply stated that this was a matter upon which he had expressed no opinion. Though the problem is an intricate one, yet the Sāṃkhya-yoga commentators make an attempt to arrive at a solution. They are of opinion that *prakṛti's* functioning will never come to a stand-still. Firstly, from time without any beginning an infinite number of individuals have settled into the jurisdiction of *prakṛti*. Of this vast multitude, a very negligible fraction is only heard to be liberated. Hence *prakṛti* shall have to continue its functioning for the remaining overwhelming majority. Secondly, as everybody's liberation is beyond expectation so there will never appear a period when *prakṛti's* stock will be completely exhausted. Consequently the world-process will continue for ever. It will not totally stop. Briefly speaking, the consensus of opinion is that the world-process has neither any beginning nor any end. It is always revolving like a wheel, and each round is technically called one *kalpa* or a cycle of creation.

By this conception of cyclic process, the Sāṃkhya teachers go to point out the fact that evolution is not a continuous progress in one direction only. Just as each point in a revolving wheel reaches its zenith as well as nadir alternately, similarly evolution and involution are alternately going on in the activity of *prakṛti*. Here involution speaks of the fact that the universe is subject to periodical dissolution. In the Tantric literature the process has been compared to the state of 'sleep and awakening.' Just as the state of awakening is naturally followed by that of sleep and vice versa, similarly the forward movement of *prakṛti* also after proceeding ahead to a certain extent is overpowered by an inherent resisting factor that drags it back to its pristine state. The thing is that *prakṛti* has a persistent tendency to revert back to its state of rest, and then again to

[1] See above, p. 85.

move onward. Thus evolution and involution are continuously recurring as an eternal rhythm of awakening and sleep—the two phases of a single process.

This evolution and involution or in other words emergence and absorption have a terminus—one in the descending order and the other in the ascending order. The latter culminates in *prakṛti*, and this has been already pointed out above. The former, *i. e.*, the order of evolution now requires explanation. But the subject cannot be thoroughly grasped unless the Sāṃkhya conception of evolution is properly understood. Evolution according to Sāṃkhya is the gradual development of what existed inherently within the primary cause in a diffused state. It is the process which makes the undeveloped or less developed one more developed, the integrated or the less differentiated one more differentiated. Like Spencer's conception of civilization it is "a progress from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity towards a definite, coherent heterogeneity." The author of the Yoga-bhāṣya clearly brings home its significance by the expression '**तत्र तत् संसृष्टं विविच्यते क्रमानतिवृत्तेः**' (II. 19). The whole process is confined within the primary cause itself ; it cannot overstep it. That which evolves stays within the cause. It is not detached from what gives rise to it. It is immanent therein. Still it is differentiated from the cause as its effect. It is nourished and brought up to its fullest extent[1] therein by following a definite order of sequence which cannot be violated. This fact warrants us that the Sāṃkhya evolution is not an emergent one ; it does not include any sudden jump. The entire operation passes in quick succession. So the order of appearance in all of its varying stages cannot be always fully visualised. Vācaspati is found to elucidate the point in his commentary by way of illustration. He states that the seed of the banyan tree does not bring out all on a sudden the full-grown tree with its thick setting of leaves capable of protecting from the scorching rays of the sun. The tree comes out gradually in the ordered appearance

1 विवृद्धिकाष्ठामनुभवन्ति, *Y. Bh. II. 19.*

of root, stem, leaves and branches brought about by contact with earth, water and heat. Similarly the evolutes do not appear suddenly. They follow a definite order of succession.

The central conception of evolution from the standpoint of Sāṃkhya lies in the expression '**संसृष्टं विविच्यते**' as pointed out above. Roughly speaking, it is the gradual unfoldment of the differentiated within the integrated. The full significance of this '**संसृष्टविवेक**' is very ably elucidated by Dr. B. N. Seal[1] in the following lines :—"Evolution (**परिणाम**) in its formal aspect is defined as differentiation in the integrated (**संसृष्टविवेक**). In other words, the process of Evolution consists in the development of differentiated (**वैषम्य**) within the undifferentiated (**साम्यावस्था**), of the determinate (**विशेष**) within the indeterminate (**अविशेष**), of the coherent (**युतसिद्ध**) within the incoherent (**अयुतसिद्ध**)."

At the advent of a new cycle of creation, *prakṛti* is roused from her slumber by the transcendental influence of the *puruṣas* who are confined within her jurisdiction. As a consequence of this there occurs a disturbance within the *guṇas* that breaks up the equipoise of *prakṛti* and results in the relative preponderance of one *guṇa* over the other. This loss in the balance gives rise to peculiar collocation of the minute units of *guṇas* from where occurs the first start in the process of becoming. At the first stage of evolution it is the *sattva* element that predominates over the other two. For it is the special feature of Sāṃkhya evolution that it starts from the finest and proceeds towards the grossest.

From *prakṛti* evolves *mahat*[2] or the great cosmic principle. It is also called *buddhi* as it is held to be the cosmic matter of experience. The reason of calling it *mahat* lies in the fact that it

1 *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 7.*

2 From the reference in the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 108 *supra*) we know that there are some teachers who are in favour of maintaining the view that a vague and indistinct principle first of all emanates from ***prakṛti***, and from this nebulous stuff evolves ***mahat*** (केचिदाहुः प्रधानादनिर्देश्यस्वरूपं तत्त्वान्तरमुत्पद्यते, ततो महानिति). But this view could not gain currency in the orthodox Sāṃkhya.

is great in space as well as in time ; for there is no other evolved principle which is so extensive and durable as this is. This significance of the term has been expressed in the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 108 *infra*) in the following lines :

स तु देशमहत्त्वात् कालमहत्त्वाच्च महान्। सर्वोत्पाद्येभ्यो महापरिमाणयुक्तत्वात् महान्।

In the Yogabhāṣya it is described as an extensive transparent stuff like the bright sky[1]. This is due to predominance of the *sattva* element in it. The text also states that in the physical body, its centre is in the lotus-like cavity of the heart[2] wherein it resides in union with the *puruṣa*. In some of the Tantric and Pauranic texts the equipoise of *prakṛti* is compared to night, and *buddhi* is described there as the rays of the sun after the end of nocturnal darkness.

From *mahat* evolves *ahaṃkāra*. It consists of the notion of self or 'I-ness' in every form of cognition. It is more developed than the former both from objective as well as subjective point of view. This is due to its further differentiation within *mahat*, the less differentiated one. As differentiation and further differentiation go on according to a series in the descending order what happens is that the effects one after another become more and more developed and intelligible while their bulk gradually goes on diminishing. Just as 'time' in its undifferentiated state as '*mahākāla*' cannot be clearly conceived ; but when it continues to be differentiated into year, month, fortnight, week, days and so on we find that its extensity goes on reducing while its conception is becoming more and more developed and intelligible. And in this descending order it is found that the subsequent ones develop within the preceeding ones, while the whole series finally remains within one '*mahākāla*', the undifferentiated whole. This view is expressed in a nut-shell in the following lines of the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 114/14-15) :

1 बुद्धिसत्वं हि भास्वरमाकाशकल्पम्, *Y. Bh. I. 36.*

2 हृदयपुण्डरीके धारयतो या बुद्धिसंवित् *ibid* ; also see, यदिदमस्मिन् ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेश्म तत्र विज्ञानम् , *ibid*, III. 33.

स च मूर्त्तिप्रत्ययाभ्यां महतः स्थूलतरः। कस्मात्? अविभागात् विभाग-निष्पत्तेः कालादिवत्।

The process is, to speak according to the scientific conception of physical evolution, like the formation of a physical system through nebula and stars; it is like the gradual thickening of extremely diffused stuff that pervades the vast expanse of unbounded space.

The Sāṃkhya authorities speak of three-fold *ahaṃkāra* :—(I) वैकारिक, (2) तैजस and (3) भूतादि. The first one abounds in *sattva,* the second in *rajas* and the third in *tamas.* This division has been planned with a view to explain the sixteen evolutes of *ahaṃkāra* which are bifurcated into two series—subjective and objective. The former comprises the eleven organs. These are the five organs of sense, five of action, and the *manas.* The latter comprises the five subtle elements, called *tanmātras* in the Sāṃkhya literature. Upto the evolution of *ahaṃkāra,* the subjective and objective aspects are not differentiated. They are so far held up together in one principle. But with the forward progress in evolution, the integrated state of these two aspects needs differentiation. And this differentiation is actualised in the evolutes of *ahaṃkāra.*

The subjective series comprising the eleven organs emanates from the *vaikārika* form of *ahaṃkāra.* This speaks of the fact that the organs also like their cause abound in *sattva.* On the other hand, the objective series comprising the five subtle elements emanate from the *bhūtādi* form, and consequently these abound in *tamas.* *Taijasa* does not give rise to any new evolute exclusively by itself. It only excites the other two to function. The differentiation in the evolute is brought out either by *tamas* or by *sattva* according as the primary cause abounds in *sattva* or in *tamas.* The topic has been nicely dealt with by the author of the Yuktidīpikā (p. 116 *infra*) while explaining the expression 'तैजसादुभयम्' (kā,25). He States that whenever the *vaikārika* gives rise to the eleven organs, it looks forward to the *taijasa* for excitement and also to the *bhūtādi* for bringing out differentiation in its evolutes. Just

as 'fire' thrown into fire or 'water' poured into water cannot be differentiated, similarly *sattva* within *sattva* cannot be differentiated if left entirely to itself. But according to the law of evolution the *sattva* element in the shape of the organs necessitates differentiation within the *sattva* element of *vaikārika,* the immediate primary cause. And this differentiation in the organs is brought out by the *bhūtādi.* This is what is expressed in the following lines :—

यदा हि वैकारिकोऽहंकार इन्द्रियभावेन प्रवर्तते तदा निष्क्रियत्वात् तैजसं प्रवर्त्तकत्वेनाकांक्षति, भूतादि भेदकत्वेन। कस्मात्? तेनैव तद्भेदात्। तद्यथा—अग्निरग्नौ प्रक्षिप्तोऽग्निरेव भवति, आपो वा अप्सु प्रक्षिप्ता आप एव भवन्ति। एवं सत्त्वमेव सत्त्वेन भेदं जनयति गुणान्तरसंसर्गमपेक्षते।

Similarly the *bhūtādi* also in its turn looks forward to the *taijasa* for excitement and also to the *vaikārika* for bringing out differentiation in its evolutes. Without interference of the *vaikārika,* the *tanmātras* could not be differentiated within the *bhūtādi,* their immediate primary cause. The author finally substantiates his own statement by the following quotation from an authoritative Sāṃkhya work :—

शास्त्रञ्चैवमाह—"तदेतस्मिन् वैकारिके स्रक्ष्यमाण एष भूतादिस्तैजसेनोपष्टब्ध एतं वैकारिकमभिधावति। तथैव तस्मिन् भूतादौ स्रक्ष्यमाण एष वैकारिकस्तैज-सेनोपष्टब्ध एतं भूतादिमभिधावति।"

Some of the ancient teachers of Sāṃkhya are found to differ in their conception of the order of evolution. According to Vindhyavāsin, *ahaṃkāra* as well as the five subtle elements evolve from *mahat.*[1] Such a view is also expressed in the Yoga-bhāṣya (II. 19)[2]. But elsewhere in I. 45, the Bhāṣya describes the subtle elements to be the evolutes of *ahaṃkāra.* Again, Yukti-dīpikā refers to one Patañjali who is not in favour of counting

1 महतः षडविशेषाः सृज्यन्ते, पञ्चतन्मात्राण्यहंकारश्चेति विन्ध्यवासिमतम्—*Yukti-dīpikā* p. 108/6-7.

2 षडविशेषाः। तद्यथा—शब्दतन्मात्रं स्पर्शतन्मात्रं रूपतन्मात्रं रसतन्मात्रं गन्धतन्मात्रं चेति, एकद्वित्रिचतुष्पञ्चलक्षणाः शब्दादयः पञ्चाविशेषाः षष्ठश्चाविशेषोऽस्मितामात्र इति। एते सत्तामात्रस्य महतः षडविशेषपरिणामाः।

ahaṃkāra as a separate category. In his opinion egoism or the notion of 'I-ness' belongs to *mahat*. This teacher[1] is different from the author of the Yoga-sūtra.

The number of organs also are differently held by early teachers of Sāṃkhya. According to Īśvarakṛṣṇa there are thirteen organs. Of these intellect (*mahat*), individuation (*ahaṃkāra*) and mind (*manas*) are called internal organs (*antaḥkaraṇa*). The remaining ten which comprise the five sensory organs and the five motor organs are called external organs. As Patañjali disregards *ahaṃkāra*, so in his opinion there are only twelve organs. Pañcādhikaraṇa goes a step further. In his opinion there are only ten organs. The characteristic features of the organs, their functions and also the conflicting views held by the early teachers of Sāṃkhya in this connection have already been discussed in detail in course of explaining the Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge. So it is useless to treat these topics here again.

So far about the numerous apparatus of thought that constitute the psychical aspect of reality. Let us now turn our attention towards the physical side of evolution. The *bhūtādi* form of *ahaṃkāra* which dominates in *tamas* generates the five subtle elements of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. In the Sāṃkhya literature these are called (1) शब्दतन्मात्र, (2) स्पर्शतन्मात्र, (3) रूपतन्मात्र, (4) रसतन्मात्र and (5) गन्धतन्मात्र respectively. As regards their respective properties, the Sāṃkhya teachers are found to differ in their opinion. In this connection, reference is made to two divergent schools of Sāṃkhya in the Yukti-dīpikā (एकरूपाणि तन्मात्राणीत्यन्ये, एकोत्तराणीति वा र्ष ग ण्यः, p. 108/8-9). There are some teachers who hold that every *tanmātra* has got only one property, and not more than one as such. For instance, in शब्दतन्मात्र heret is only sound, in स्पर्शतन्मात्र there is only touch, while in रूपतन्मात्र there is only colour, and so on, But V ā r ṣ a g a ṇ y a differs here in his opinion. Like others he also holds that in शब्दतन्मात्र there is only sound. But in स्पर्शतन्मात्र there is not only touch ;

1 For further about this Patañjali, see above pp. 133-134.

the property of the previous element also accompanies it. So it has got both sound and touch. Similarly in रूपतन्मात्र there are sound, touch and colour, and so on. In this way the number of. their properties gradually goes on increasing by one, and finally in गन्धतन्मात्र there are all the five properties of sound, touch colour, taste and smell. This view is also accepted by the author of the Yogabhāṣya. In II. 19, he expressly states that the five subtle elements of sound and the like are endowed with one, two, three, four and five properties respectively (एकद्वित्रिचतुष्पञ्चलक्षणाः शब्दादयः पञ्चाविशेषाः).

Prof. Radhakrishnan[1] states in this connection that "according to the Vyāsabhāṣya, the tanmātra of sound is produced from ahaṃkāra, and from the tanmātra of sound accompanied by ahaṃkāra is produced the tanmātra of touch with the attributes of sound and touch, and so on." This view appears to be more philosophical ; this helps to explain the addition of one attribute to the *tanmātras* at each succeeding step. But the author of the Yogabhāṣya himself is not found anywhere to express such a view. It is Vijñāna Bhikṣu who in his Yogavārttika (II. 19) explains the above mentioned expression of the Yogabhāṣya in such a way.

These subtle elements are the rudiments of all sorts of physical realities. These are inert, but possess quantum or mass. And this is due to preponderance of *tamas* element in them. Ordinary beings cannot perceive them, but they are open to the yogins and such other superior beings. These are stated as 'अविशेष' (non-specific) in the Sāṃkhya literature. In this connection Vācaspati (kā, 38) is found to state that these are called as such because the different aspects of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in them cannot be distinctively experienced by us. The reason of calling them *tanmātras* lies in the fact that they do not reveal the specific characteristics of their inherent properties. The author of the Yuktidīpikā (p. 140/20-24) elucidates the facts by way of illustration. For instance, the subtle element of sound only possesses

1 *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 271.

sound-potentiality. But the peculiarities of sound as stress accent, pitch accent, nasalisation and the like are not manifested herein. Similarly in the subtle element of touch there is only touch-potentiality. But touch as rough or smooth is not revealed therein Such is the case with the other subtle elements also. As the specific characteristics of their respective properties are not manifested in them, this is why these are also called'अविशेष'(non-specific).

From these subtle elements evolve the five gross elements of ether, wind, fire, water and earth having one, two, three, four and five attributes respectively. Thus the gross element of ether with its attribute of sound evolves from the subtle element of sound. Similarly the gross element of wind with its two attributes of sound and touch evolves from the subtle element of touch, and so on. Finally, the gross element of earth having all the five attributes of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell evolves from the subtle element of smell. Speaking briefly, everywhere it is found that a gross element inherits the respective property or properties of the *tanmātra* from which it evolves, and that one *tanmātra* independent of another *tanmātra* gives rise to a gross element. This is the view which is accepted in the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 141 *supra*) and also in the Yoga-bhāṣya (I. 45).

But those who hold the view that every *tanmātra* possesses only one attribute, and not more than one as such, cannot accept this account of the evolution of the gross elements. The reason is that it is one of the fundamental principles of Sāṃkhya that the effect inherits the property of the cause, and what did not primarily exist in the cause cannot be contained by the effect (कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्य,kā, 14). Of course, there is no difference of opinion with regard to the view that the subtle element of sound exclusively gives rise to the gross element of ether. Here both the cause as well as the effect possess only one attribute of sound. The difference between the subtle element of sound and the gross element of ether lies in the fact that the former is non-atomic and more extensive, while the latter is atomic and less extensive The distinction is like that of the *kāraṇākāśa* and *kāryākāśa* of the Vedānta.

But according to the school referred to above, the gross element of air can on no account be held to be the exclusive product of the subtle element of touch. In that case, air would have got only the attribute of touch and not of sound. Similarly the subtle element of colour cannot exclusively give rise to the gross element of fire. If this would be the case, then the fact that fire possesses the three attributes of sound, taste and colour could never be explained. By the law of causality it would inherit only the attribute of colour from its respective cause, while the remaining two attributes of sound and touch would be lacking in it. The same anomaly would arise with respect to all other gross elements having more than one attribute. In order to get rid of this difficulty the upholders of this school maintain that the subtle element of touch accompanied by the subtle element of sound gives rise to the gross element of wind with the result that the effect has got both the attributes of sound and touch. Similarly the subtle element of colour accompanied by those of sound and touch gives rise to the gross element of fire having the three attributes of sound, touch and colour. The subtle element of taste also in its turn being accompanied by those of sound, touch and colour gives rise to the gross element of water which is equipped with the four attributes of sound, touch, colour and taste. And finally, the subtle element of smell in combination with the four other subtle elements of sound, touch, colour and taste generates the gross element of earth wherein there are all the five attributes of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. In this way everywhere the particular *tanmātra* is accompanied by the preceding *tanmātras* in giving rise to the respective gross element. The result is that the particular gross element thus evolved gets the specific attribute from the principal *tanmātra* with the addition of one subsidiary attribute from the accompanying *tanmātra* at each successive step.

The various properties of the gross elements are stated in detail in the Yukti-dīpikā (pp. 141-142). In this connection,

it is stated therein that touch of wind and water is cool, while that of fire is hot. Earth is neither cool nor hot. Further, both fire and water are white and bright, while earth is dark. Taste also is not same everywhere. Water is sweet, but no special taste is appreciated in the earth-element. Smell is the exclusive property of earth, but it is sometimes appreciated in other elements also through the admixture of earth atom therein.

A detailed list of the properties of the elements appear in a quotation in the Yukti-dīpikā[1] (p. 141). The same quotation with slight alterations in reading appears also in the Tattva-vaiśārdī (Y. S. III.44) of Vācaspati Miśra. But nowhere the commentators are found to mention the source. Evidently it has been quoted from some ancient text. In this quotation we find that the properties belonging to earth are :—Form, weight, aridity, resistance, stability, position, divisibility, sustenance, dark shade and usefulness to all. Those of water are :—Liquidity, thinness, brilliance, whiteness, softness, weight, coolness, protectiveness, purification and cohesion. The properties of fire are :—Upward movement, purification, burning, cooking, lightness, brilliance, destruction, power and lustre. Those belonging to wind are :—Horizontal motion,

1 "आकारो गौरवं रौक्ष्यं वरणं स्थैर्यमेव च ।
स्थितिभेदः क्षमा कृष्णच्छाया सर्वोपभोग्यता ॥
इति ते पार्थिवा धर्मास्तद्विशिष्टा स्तथाऽपरे ।
जलाग्नि-पवनाकाश-व्यापकास्तान्निबोधत ॥
स्नेहः सौक्ष्म्यं प्रभा शौक्ल्यं मार्दवं गौरवञ्च यत् ।
शैत्यं रक्षा पवित्रत्वं सन्तान (सन्धान ?)श्चौदका गुणाः ॥
ऊर्ध्वगं पावकं दग्धृ पाचकं लघु भास्वरम् ।
प्रध्वंस्योजस्वि च ज्योतिः पूर्वाभ्यां सविलक्षणम् ॥
तिर्यग्गतिः पवित्रत्वमाक्षेपो नोदनं बलम् ।
रौक्ष्यमच्छायता शैत्यं वायोर्धर्माः पृथग्विधाः ॥
सर्वतोगतिरव्यूहो विष्कम्भश्चेति ते त्रयः ।
आकाशधर्मा विज्ञेयाः पूर्वधर्मविरोधिनः ॥
संहतानां तु यत् कार्यं सामान्यं ते गवादयः ।
इतरेतरधर्मेभ्यो विशेषान्नात्र संशयः ॥

purification, pushing, impulsion, power, dryness, casting no shadow and coolness. And finally the etherial properties are the following : Pervasiveness, interpenetration and unobstructiveness. All these constitute different specific characteristics of the elements. Again, a minute observation of the characteristic features of these properties reveal the fact that some of these are tranquil, some are dynamic, while others are obstructive. This is why the elements which are possessed of these properties are called specific (**विशेष**, kā, 38).

By virtue of these properties the elements can serve the manifold purposes of the embodied beings. It is one of the fundamental conceptions of Sāṃkhya that all collocations are for the sake of *puruṣa*. And the author of the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 142) has spared no pains in this connection to show the way as to how the different elements through their respective properties serve the various purposes interests, needs and welfares of the created beings. This service is not only external, but it is internal as well. The different organisms, as it is well-known, are made of five elements. Of these, it is the earth material that brings out the respective configurations of these bodies. Even in artificial constructions, as in the case of a pitcher or some other earthen pot, it is due to the presence of earth material that the potter can give them their respective forms and shapes. This is why 'form' is stated be one of the properties of earth. Again, existence of 'weight' in the earth material helps mankind as well as animals to hold up their physical bodies. Due to natural 'aridity' belonging to the said material, the different organic bodies can absorb water with the result that both mankind and animal can thereby acquire some degree of tenderness in their persons (**तत्राकारात् तावत् गवादीनां घटादीनाञ्च आकारनिर्वृत्तिः । गौरवादेषामवस्थापनम् । रौक्ष्यादपां संग्रहो वैशद्यञ्च भूतानाम्**), and so on with the remaining earthy properties. Let us now take up the case of the water element. Liquidity of this element brings out beauty in the created beings. This property also heals wind, subdues heat and brings out cohesion in the earth material that

forms the major portion in such organic bodies (स्नेहाद् रूपसम्पत्, वायुप्रतीकारोऽग्निशमनं संग्रहश्च पृथिव्याः). In this way the author goes to speak of the fact that the different organisms look forward to these five elements for their nourishment, and the efficiency of each and every property of the elements to serve that end is very clearly pointed out in the text.

The different aspects of the elements are also dealt with in the Yoga-sūtra and specially in the Bhāṣya. The authour of the Bhāṣya is of opinion that all elements have got two-fold characteristics—one specific (विशेष) and the other non-specific (सामान्य). The former comprises the five attributes of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. In the Yoga-sūtra (III. 44), these five attributes together with 'form', 'weight', 'aridity' and such other properties as stated above are technically called to be the gross aspect (स्थूलरूप) of the elements.

The non-specific characteristic of an element comprises its essential feature. This is called स्वरूप in the Yoga-sūtra (III. 44). The term is explained as 'स्वसामान्य' in the Bhāṣya. This is illustrated by hardness in the earthelement, liquidity in water, heat in fire, motion in wind and pervasiveness in ether.[1] Speaking more clearly, 'सामान्य' with reference to the elements constitutes nothing but their different substantive aspects.

From a few stray references that are found here and there, it appears that 'सामान्य' formed an important topic of discussion in the ancient works of Sāṃkhya. In the Yuktidīplkā (p. 76/14-15) it is stated that 'सामान्य' has got no separate existence apart from the substance ; it means only the similar or common characteristic of the individuals belonging to the same class or community. This is what is expressed in the following line :

नहि वः सामान्यं द्रव्यादर्थान्तरभूतमस्ति, सारूप्यमात्रे सामान्यपरिकल्पनात् ।

The aforesaid view was originally held by Vindhyavāsin. And this is referred to in the following couplet of the Śloka-vārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (*ākṛtivāda*, 65) :—

1 Cp. खरद्रवचलोष्णत्वं भूजलानिलतेजसाम् ।
आकाशस्याप्रतीघातो दृष्टं लिंगं स्वभावजम् ॥—Caraka on *Śārīra*, I. 29.

सारूप्यमेव सामान्यं पिण्डानां येन कल्प्यते ।
तेन सारूप्यशब्देन किं पुनः प्रतिपद्यते ॥

According to Kumārila 'सामान्य' means 'universal'. He makes no distinction between 'सामान्य' and 'जाति'. While propagating his doctrine of universal, he incidentally refers to the view of a teacher (finally stated to be V i n d h y a v ā s i n) according to whom 'सामान्य' means 'पिण्डसारूप्य'. He now urges as to what is actually meant by 'सारूप्य' by that teacher. If it be maintained that the term means 'sameness of form' then it does not differ from our conception of 'जाति'. If on the otherhand the term speaks of 'similarity', then the question naturally arises as to whose and with whom and how this 'similarity' occurs. Thus he is found to argue in the next couplet :—

समानरूपभावश्चेज्जातिः साऽस्माभिरिष्यते ।
सादृश्यमथ सारूप्यं कस्य केनेति वा कथम् ॥

Finally he comes to the conclusion that V i n d h y a v ā s i n in his own work has used 'सारूप्य' to mean 'sameness of form', and it is an entity which is not to be treated as absolutely different from the individuals that comprise a class. It is due to ignorance that 'similarity' has been asserted here by others. This is what is expressed in the following couplet occurring at the end of *ākṛtivāda* :—

तेन नात्यन्तभिन्नोऽर्थः सारूप्यमिति वर्णितम् ।
ग्रन्थे वि न्ध्य नि वा से न भ्रान्तेः सादृश्यमुच्यते ॥

But it is difficult to ascertain whether Kumārila could maintain fair justice in his exposition of Vindhyavāsin's view. The plausible view is that Vindhyavāsin was regarded as a high authority even at the time of Kumārila, and it is not unlikely that the author made here an attempt to explain the term 'सारूप्य' in such a way as may be helpful to support his own doctrine of universal. However, the Sāṃkhya conception of 'सामान्य' differs fundamentally from Kumārila's conception of the same. For 'सामान्य' in Sāṃkhya has got no separate existence of its own apart from the substance—a view which Kumārila cannot accept at any rate. The fact is that its notion is based upon 'सारूप्य'

that means similarity of forms belonging to the same class, community or genus. Again, viewed from the standpoint of Sāṃkhya **'सारूप्य'** cannot even ultimately mean **'जाति'** as Kumārila prefers. This is evident from a statement in the Yoga-bhāṣya (**'तुल्ययोर्देशलक्षणसारूप्ये जातिभेदोऽन्यतायां हेतुः, गौरियं वडवेयमिति'**, III. 53) where both the terms **'सारूप्य'** and **'जाति'** are occurring side by side. Here **'सारूप्य'** means 'exactness' or 'similarity' while **'जाति'** means 'genus'. Kumārila may not prefer that **'सारूप्य'** means 'similarity'. But even an ancient authority like Uddyotakara makes no distinction among **'सामान्य'**, **'सारूप्य'** and **'सादृश्य'**. This is what we know from his statement in the Nyāya-vārttika[1].

The two aspects, one generic and the other specific, are relative. The same entity may be generic with reference to some other entity, and it may as well become specific with reference to another. Further, these two aspects are not confined to the world of material objects only. A careful study of the Yoga-bhāṣya and the Yukti-dīpikā reveals the fact that their sphere is extended to all manifested entities—physical as well as psychical. The expression **'सामान्यविशेषात्मनोऽर्थस्य'** found in a few instances in the Yoga-bhāṣya, bears evidence to this. Even the attributes of sound, taste and the like are said to be possessed of these two aspects. This is what we get from the statement of the Yoga-bhāṣya (**सामान्यविशेषात्मा शब्दादिर्ग्राह्यः**, III. 47). Again, from a quotation in the Yukti-dīpikā[2] we know that *ahaṃkāra* also has got these double aspects. The notion of 'I-ness' constitutes its non-specific characteristic, while the idea that I am involved in sound,

1 See, प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनमुपमानम्, NS I. i. 6. Here Vātsyāyana makes no distinction between 'साधर्म्य' and 'सामान्य' (प्रज्ञातेन सामान्यात्......). The author of the Vārttika goes a step further. He states 'भूयस्तु सारूप्यं गवा गवयस्य इत्येवं प्रतिपद्यते, indicating thereby that सामान्य, सारूप्य and सादृश्य do not differ from one another. Finally Vācaspati states--'न सामान्यातिरिक्तं सादृश्यं नामार्थान्तरमस्ति'.

2 तथाच शास्त्रमाह—एतस्माद्धि महत आत्मन इमे....भूतादयोऽहंकारलक्षणाः। अहमित्येवैषां सामान्यं लक्षणं भवति, गुणप्रवृत्तौ च पुन र्विशेष लक्षणमिति, *Yukti-dīpikā*, p.114 ; also see एषा गुणप्रवृत्तिर्व्याख्याता यस्यामस्मिप्रत्ययस्य विशेष ग्रहणं भवति—शब्देऽहं स्पर्शेऽहं रूपेऽहं गन्धेऽहमिति, p. 115 *supra*.

I am in touch, I am in colour, and so on is what is said to be its specific characteristic. Even *buddhi* is not exempted. The fact that this entity has also got these two aspects is hinted in the expression **'प्रकाशात्मनो बुद्धिसत्त्वस्य सामान्यविशेषयोः'** occurring in the Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 47).

The fact that all manifested entities are possessed of these double characteristics is further corroborated by the conception of 'substance' (**द्रव्य**) as found in the Yoga bhāṣya (III. 44). It is emphatically stated there that a substance is an aggregate of generic as well as specific characteristics (**सामान्यविशेषसमुदायोऽत्र द्रव्यम्**). This aggregate is again two-fold :—(1) where the parts can be separated from the whole (**युतसिद्ध**) and (2) where the component parts are inseparably connected with the whole (**अयुतसिद्ध**). The author finally states that in the opinion of Patañjali a substance constitutes an aggregate whose component parts are inseparably connected with the whole (**अयुतसिद्धावयवभेदानुगतसमूहो द्रव्यमिति पतञ्जलिः**). This is the substantive feature of an entity, and it is called **'स्वरूप'** in the *Sūtra* (III. 44). This conception of 'substance' of the philosopher Patañjali differs fundamentally from that of the grammarian Patañjali. According to the grammarian a substance is distinct from its quality and genus[1], while the philosopher does not assign any separate existence to them apart from the substance itself. His approach here is synthetic. This conception of substance is not confined to the material objects only. Even a sense-organ also comes within the range of this definition. It is also regarded as a substance whose component parts are inseparably connected with the whole. This is clearly expressed in a statement of the Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 47) itself.

Our main interest was centered upon the discussion on the

1 See, अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः। किं यत्तत् सास्नालाङ्गुलककुदखुरविषाण्यर्थरूपं स शब्दः? नेत्याह—द्रव्यं नाम तत्। यत्तर्हि तदिङ्गितं चेष्टितं निमिषितं स शब्दः? नेत्याह—क्रिया नाम सा। यत्तर्हि तच्छुक्लो नीलः कृष्णः कपिलः कपोत इति स शब्दः? नेत्याह—गुणो नाम सः। यत्तर्हि तद्भिन्नेष्वभिन्नं छिन्नेष्वछिन्नं सामान्यभूतं स शब्दः? नेत्याह—आकृतिर्नाम सा।—*Mahābhāṣya*, p. 1.

characteristic features of the gross elements. And in this connection we have spared no pains to discuss other relevant topics associated with them. All these find a detailed treatment in the Vaiśeṣika system also. But the doctrine of Sāṃkhya should not be confused with that of the Vaiśeṣika. In several instances these two systems are found to differ fundamentally. Let us take up the case of 'atom' (परमाणु) that forms one of the main topics of discussion in the Vaiśeṣika system. An atom, to speak according to this system, is the smallest hypothetical unit that cannot be further subdivided into any part. In the Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 52) also it is stated that an atom constitutes the smallest unit of substance[1]. But the difficulty lies in the fact that according to Sāṃkhya-yoga view a substance however minute it may be, must constitute an aggregate whose component parts are inseparably connected with the whole. And it is indeed strange to notice that in the Yoga-bhāṣya, the case of an atom also like that of an organic body and a tree, has been furnished as an illustration of the particular aggregate where the parts are inseparably connected with the whole (अयुतसिद्धावयवः संघातः—शरीरं वृक्षः परमाणुरिति, III. 44). This fact at once suggests that according to Sāṃkhya-yoga an atom also has got its component parts—a conception which cannot be accepted at any rate by the Vaiśeṣika teachers. Further, an atom in its turn constitutes a component part of the *tanmātras* (पृथिवीपरमाणु स्तन्मात्रावयवः, Y. Bh. IV. 14). This is due to the fact that according to the law of evolution it develops within the *tanmātra* ; it cannot transgress it. But Vaiśeṣika's approach is quite different. This is not all. According to Sāṃkhya-yoga there are five kinds of atoms. These are : (1) earth-atom, (2) water-atom, (3) fire-atom, (4) wind-atom and (5) ether-atom (Y. Bh. I. 47). But Vaiśeṣika teachers never speak of so many classes of atoms.

Our discussion on the evolutionery series of Sāṃkhya has now been brought to a close. In this chapter we have dwelt upon

1 अपकर्षपर्यन्तं द्रव्यं परमाणुः ।

the twenty-four principles of Sāṃkhya beginning with *prakṛti* and ending in the gross elements. We have also made an attempt to discuss here other connected topics with special reference to the gross elements. *Puruṣa*, the twenty-fifth, will be treated later on. All these principles pass under the general name of *tattva* in the Sāṃkhy literature. But the reason as to why these are called as such is not stated anywhere by the ancient authorities whose works have come down to us. Ordinarily the term means nothing but what constitutes the essence of an entity. And this meaning of *tattva* can be found even in the Mahābhāṣya (I. i. 1, p. 7)[1]. But the idea of *tattva* in Sāṃkhya conveys something more. A quotation from the followers of Vārṣagaṇya as found in the Yukti-dīpikā sheds some light in this connection. While speaking on the Sāṃkhya view of destruction they state that it is nothing but the disappearance of the manifested form of an entity, while the substance itself is not affected thereby at all. This disappearance of manifestations is two-fold. With reference to the *tattvas* it may be stated that they retain their manifested forms intact from creation upto dissolution of the world of cosmos, while the other manifested entities disappear after retaining their existence for some period. This is what we find in the following lines (p. 67):—तथाच वा र्ष ग णाः पठन्ति—तदेतत् त्रैलोक्यं व्यक्तेरपैति......स्तस्माद् व्यक्त्यपगमो विनाशः । स तु द्विविधः—आसर्गप्रलयात् तत्त्वानां किञ्चित्कालान्तरावस्थानादितरेषामिति ।

Similarly Bhojadeva also in his Tattvaprakāśikā (VI. 3) states :—That which retains its existence upto the period of dissolution, which forms the object of enjoyment of all the beings, is called *tattva*. This is why organic bodies, jars and similar other entities of short duration are not regarded as such. This is what is stated in the following couplet :—

आप्रलयं तिष्ठति यत् सर्वेषां भोगदायि च भूतानाम् ।
तत् तत्त्वमिति प्रोक्तं न शरीरघटादि तत्त्वमतः ॥

1 तदपि नित्यं यस्मिंस्तत्त्वं न विहन्यते। किं पुनस्तत्त्वम् ? तद्भावस्तत्त्वम् ।

The commentator sheds here further light by a quotation from some other text wherein an attempt has been made to furnish the derivative meaning of the term. Thus he states (p. 174) :—

तदुक्तं गुरुदेवाचार्येण—

> ततत्वात् सन्ततत्वाच्च तत्त्वानीति ततो विदुः ।
> ततत्त्वं देशतो व्याप्तिः सन्ततत्वञ्च कालतः ॥
> लक्षादियोजनव्यापि तत्त्वमाप्रलयात् स्थितम् ।
> अन्यथा स्तम्भकुम्भादिरपि तत्त्वं प्रसज्यते ॥

The term *tattva* is derived from the root तन् (तनु विस्तारे —to extend). Owing to extensity and long duration (सन्तत, सतत), these are known to be *tattvas.* Extensity speaks of pervasiveness with reference to 'space', while duration does so with reference to 'time.' A *tattva* which extends upto lacs of *yojanas* exists upto the period of dissolution. Otherwise even a stump of a tree or a pitcher and similar other entities would come under the province of *tattva* This definition is specially meant for the twenty-three evolutes. Both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are eternal principles; these do not disappear even in dissolution. Evolution of the *tattvas* terminates in the gross elements.

Time and Space

Time and space are regarded as substances in the Vaiśeṣika system. But these are viewed otherwise in the Sāṃkhya-yoga literature. 'Time' according to Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 52) forms a successive series of moments. A moment is the minutest limit of duration, called *kṣaṇa.* In other words, it is the time taken by an atom in motion in leaving its former position in space and reaching the next point. The uninterrupted flow of moments constitutes an order of succession, called *krama* in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga literature Speaking from the Sāṃkhy-yoga point of view, the sum-total of these moments as well their sequences do not actually form any aggregate of reals. All that are conceived as hours, days, nights and such other aggregates of moments have got no substantive existence of their own. These are superimposed by the intellect

for the sake of practical purpose. Though these are outcome of fanciful imagination, still all these have got their corresponding terms that find expressiou in ordinary usage. From the trend of this discussion it appears that the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya intends to include 'time' within *vikalpa*[1] which is held to be one of the five-fold modifications of the thought-stuff.

But the moment which is conceived as the minimum unit of infinite duration and hence atomic[2] in nature is itself real, for the idea of succession is based upon it. This succession is a sequence whose existence rests upon the continuous flow of moments, and this is called 'time' by the authorities. Really speaking, moments cannot be stung together in a linier arrangement. This is due to the fact that it is the present moment that alone exists. The previous and the succeeding moments have no independent existence of their own. Hence there cannot be any actual continuity. Two moments cannot co-exist. In that case there cannot be any succession. The reason is not far to seek. For, succession implies that one event is to be followed by another. This being the case there cannot be any succession of two events appearing simultaneously. In that case there may be a combination of them, but no succession. A time-sequence also is a succession wherein an earlier moment is followed by a later moment, and that again by another, and so on without any break of continuity. Thus it is obvious that the moments do not appear simultaneously. As a consequence of this it can be safely stated that it is the present moment that alone exists, past and future moments have got no independent existence of their own, and consequently there cannot be any combination of moments.

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1 'शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः', *Y.S.* I. 9; also see, स खल्वयं कालो वस्तुशून्योऽपि बुद्धिनिर्माणः शब्दज्ञानानुपाती लौकिकानां व्युत्थितदर्शनानां वस्तुस्वरूप इवावभासते',—*Y. Bh.* III. 52.

2 Idea of 'time' based upon such a conception of moment is also hinted in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, 'सर्वमपि तु खल्वेतद् गुणोपादानमणुना कालेन भवति', *śārira,* IV. 8.

By this it should not be meant that the past and future moments are absolutely non-existents. The fact is that these cannot exist exclusively by themselves. These are inherent in the changes undergone by the manifested entities. Speaking more clearly, past and future refer to the different stages of an entity[1]. Of these, the entity which has retired from the field of operation is called past, and that which has not yet commenced its function is called future. It is one of the fundamental doctrines of Sāṃkhya that a manifested entity undergoes change in every succeeding moment. Past and future constitute nothing but the two different aspects of the ever changing entity. The change does not occur all on a sudden. It passes through each and every moment. But it is so rapid that the ordinary people fail to perceive all of its minute stages. In fact it is the one single moment upon which the whole world of cosmos completes one round of change. But the change brought out by a single moment is extremely subtle. It can be perceived only by the *yogins* of superior power[2].

The author of the Yukti-dīpikā also criticises the view of those who are in favour of maintaining the view that the universe owes its origin from 'time' (p. 88 *infra*). In this connection he boldly asserts that there is no such entity as 'time'. It is conceived for the sake of marking a particular limit in the continuous flow of an activity, such as in the movement of the luminaries or in the beating of pulse etc. Hence it does not essentially differ from actions. Now, actions according to Sāṃkhya are held to be the functions of the organs. In other words these constitute one or other of the numerous fluctuations of the organs, called *vṛttis*. But these fluctuations also, to speak from the standpoint of Sāṃkhya, do not essentially differ from their so called substratum, the organs themselves. Thus 'time' ultimately falls within the jurisdiction of the organs. This view is expressed by the author of the Yukti-dīpikā in the following lines (p. 158/10-12) :—

1 अतीतानागतं स्वरूपतोऽस्त्यध्वभेदाद्धर्माणाम्, Y. S. IV. 12.

2 क्षणभेदस्तु योगिबुद्धिगम्य एव, Y. Bh. III. 53.

प्रागेवैतदुपदिष्टं न कालो नाम कश्चित् पदार्थोऽस्ति, किन्तर्हि क्रियासु कालसंज्ञा[1]। ताश्च करणवृत्तिरिति प्रतिपादितम्। न चान्या वृत्तिर्वृत्तिमतः। तस्मात् करणचैतन्यप्रतिज्ञः कालात्मक इति।

But what was the attitude of the most ancient Sāṃkhya teachers towards '*kāla*', specially at the time when Sāṃkhya was promulgamated as a system, cannot be definitely stated. From the evidence of the Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā we know that 'time' formed one of the sixty topics of the Ṣaṣṭitantra (त्रीणि तन्त्राण्यथान्यानि शक्तेर्नियतिकालयोः). In another place (51. 42) the text is found to state that 'time' is regarded in Sāṃkhya and Yoga as one of the aspects of the Supreme power. Devala also in his exposition of Sāṃkhya (Mbh., xii. 275. 5) assigns a prominent place to 'time' that plays some parts in cosmogonical affairs. These have been already pointed out by us[2]. In some allied schools of thought '*kāla*' is regarded to be the main cause of integration (संकलन) and disintegration (व्यवकलन) of the entire cosmos. But the author of the Yukti-dīpikā totally disregards this view. He states that 'time' is not the factor that brings out modification in an entity ; it only renders some assistance by means of its mere relation (कालस्तु सम्बन्धमात्रोपकारी, न विक्रियाहेतुः, p. 89/7-8).

'Space' also has got no seperate existence of its own in Sāṃkhya and Yoga. It is also hypothetically constructed for the sake of practical usage. Conception of space is relative. What is 'east' to one may be 'west' to another. But it is strange to notice that in the Sāṃkhya-Sūtra[3] both 'time' and 'space' have been mentioned to be the products of ether. Such a view is not even hinted anywhere in the more authentic texts of Sāṃkhya and Yoga.

1 Cp. नान्तरेण क्रियां भूतभविष्यद्वर्त्तमानाः काला व्यज्यन्ते,—*Mahābhāṣya* I. iii. 1/11, p. 258.

2 See above p. 120.

3 दिक्कालावाकाशादिभ्यः, II. 12.

DOCTRINE OF CHANGE

Though the gross elements do not give rise to any new evolute or *tattva* still these are in a state of constant change. It is one of the characteristic features of the *guṇas* that they are dynamic ; they do not rest even for a single moment without undergoing any change. This is why their different manifestations also are ever changing. Now, what is to be meant by change ? Here the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 13) replies that "change is the disappearance of the previous aspect and appearance of another aspect of a substance, while the substance itself remains constant"[1]. This is what is also echoed in the following couplet, probably quoted from some earliar text in the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 90):—

जहद्धर्मान्तरं पूर्वमुपादत्ते यदाऽपरम् ।
तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो[2] धर्मी परिणामः स उच्यते ॥

1 अथ कोऽयं परिणामः ? अवस्थितस्य च द्रव्यस्य पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः परिणाम इति ।

2 Cp. 'विपरिणमत इत्यप्रच्यवमानस्य तत्त्वाद् विकारम्,' *Nirukta*, I. 2.

The different stages through which an entity passes in the course of its modifications have received careful attention of even the most ancient thinkers. In this connection, the six-fold analyses of modification by V ā r ṣ y ā y a ṇ i deserves special attention. From a reference to his views in the Nirukta (I. 2), we know that according to this teacher there are six modifications of becoming. These are :—(1) Genesis, (2) existence, (3) transformation or change, (4) growth, (5) decay and (6) destruction or disappearance. Of these, 'genesis' denotes only the beginning of the first stage of appearance ; it neither affirms nor denies the succeeding state. 'Existence' affirms a being that has been manifested. 'Transformation or change' speaks of the modification of an entity which is not detached from its essence. 'Growth' denotes the development of one's own limbs or of objects with which one is associated, as one grows with victory or one grows with his body. 'Decay' constitutes the counter-proposition of the preceeding one. 'Destruction or disappearance' speaks of the beginning of the next state ; it neither affirms nor denies the previous state. Other modifications of becoming are only further developments of one or other of these stages as enumerated here. For a better understanding of these modifications, we quote below the entire extract from the Nirukta (I. 2):—

षड् भावविकारा भवन्तीति वा र्ष्या य णिः—जायतेऽस्ति विपरिणमते वर्धतेऽपक्षीयते

विनश्यतीति । जायत इति पूर्वभावस्यादिमाचष्टे ; नापरभावमाचष्टे, न प्रतिषेधति । अस्तीत्युत्पन्नस्य सत्त्वस्यावधारणम् । विपरिणमत इत्यप्रच्यवमानस्य तत्त्वाद् विकारम् । वर्धत इति स्वाङ्गाभ्युच्चयम्, सांयौगिकानां वाऽर्थानाम् । वर्धते विजयेनेति, वर्धते शरीरेणेति वा । अपक्षीयत इत्यनेनैव व्याख्यातः प्रतिलोमम् । विनश्यतीत्यपरभावस्यादिमाचष्टे ; न पूर्वभावमाचष्टे, न प्रतिषेधति । अतोऽन्ये भावविकारा एतेषामेव विकारा भवन्तीति ह स्माह ।

Some portion at the beginning of this extract is also quoted in the Mahābhāṣya (I. iii. 1/11, p. 258). But Patañjali himself does not explain these modifications. However, the doctrine of modification is reflected in a few instances here and there in his work. In one place he is found to state that a substance, such as clay or gold, may assume different forms which in their turn appear and disappear ; but the substance itself remains as it is (I. i. 1, p. 7). In this connection he also speaks of two-fold eternity which has got a striking similarity with the Sāṃkhya doctrine of immutable eternity and eternity-in-mutation (For comparison, see below p. 264, n 2). In another place he states that nothing within its own self is at rest even for a single moment. Either it is continuing with its growth onward upto the extent it can reach or it is going on decaying (न हीह कश्चिदपि स्वस्मिन्नात्मनि मुहूर्तमप्यवतिष्ठते । वर्धते यावदनेन वर्धितव्यमपचयेन वा युज्यते, I. ii. 64/53, p. 216). Here we find a glimpse of the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution and involution.

The author of the Nirukta might have introduced these different modifications to explain *'bhāva'* which forms an intricate topic of grammatical speculation. But it is interesting to notice here that Vārṣyāyaṇi himself recognises even 'destruction' (विनाश) as one of the aspects of modification. Moreover, the particular line containing the explanation of 'विनश्यति' towards the end of the above quoted extract tentatively suggests that 'destruction' does not mean annhilation. It is not the denial of the very existence of an entity. It only speaks of giving up its previous state and landing into the beginning of another state.

In fact these six modifications speak of the sequence through which an entity passes from its future state to the present, and from the present to the past. In the Sāṃkhya account of the *Mbh.*, some of these modifications are stated to be the characteristic features of a manifested entity. "That which is subject to birth, growth, decay and death is called *vyakta* (manifest) while the reverse is known to be *avyakta* (unmanifest)". This is what is stated in the following verse (XII. 236. 30-1) :—

प्रोक्तं तद्व्यक्तमित्येव जायते वर्धते च यत् ।
जीर्यते म्रियते चैव चतुर्भिर्लक्षणैर्युतम् ।
विपरीतमतो यत्तु तदव्यक्तमुदाहृतम् ॥

An attempt has been made in the above couplet to define 'change' which is called *pārināma*' in Sāṃkhya. When the *dharmin* or the substance itself without losing its very essence assumes another aspect by giving up the previous one, it is then said to have undergone a 'change'. Thus 'change' implies passing out of the existing manifestation and appearance of a new one while the very essence of the substance is not disturbed thereby at all. The Yukti-dīpikā illustrates the process as follows (p. 90) ;— Just as the *palāśa* leaf being affected by heat and such other efficient causes gives up its greenness and becomes yellowish, but it has not thereby assumed any other characteristic other than that of *palāśa*—its palāśahood remains intact always while its different aspects only appear and disappear ; similar is the case with all other changes. The underlying substance that remains uneffected is called *dharmin* while its varying aspects are called *dharmas*. The *dharmin* is an abiding principle manifesting itself in and through the *dharmas*[1].

Likewise Aśvaghoṣa also in his exposition of the philosophy of Arāḍa states (Buddha-carita, XII. 22) :—

जायते जीर्यते चैव बाध्यते (वर्धते ?) म्रियते च यत् ।
तद्व्यक्तमिति विज्ञेयमव्यक्तं तु विपर्ययात् ॥

Here म्रियते (death) is not different from विनश्यति (destruction or disappearance) of Vārṣyāyaṇi. Similarly जीर्यते is equivalent to अपक्षीयते.

We do not intend to prolong our discussion further. In our opinion there is a clear reflection of the tenets and doctrines of Sāṃkhya in this passage of the Nirukta. Our suggestion is also corroborated by the evidence of the commentary of Skanda-Maheśvara (pp. 29—30) wherein an attempt has been made to explain the passage in the light of the Sāṃkhya theory of causation (सत्कार्यवाद). The question does not arise here as to whether Sāṃkhya attained a developed stage at the time of Yāska. However, in the *Pariśiṣṭa* portion of the Nirukta we find a brief discussion on the three *guṇas* (xiii. 16). Most interesting is to notice that in a couplet which possibly has been quoted from some other source, reference is made to Sāṃkhya, Yoga and *puruṣa*—the twenty-fifth (सांख्यं योगं समभ्यसेत् पुरुषं वा पञ्चविंशकम्, XIII. 19). But this *Pariśiṣṭa* might have been appended to the Nirukta at a later stage.

1. For a fuller treatment of *dharmin* and *dharma*, see above pp. 198-206.

This doctrine of change should not be confused with the Buddhistic doctrine of universal flux. The advocates of this Buddhistic school of thought maintains that the *dharmas* are momentary units, retaining no exisience of their own in the succeeding moment. They reject the idea of any *dharmin* or abiding principle, apart from the *dharmas*, that remains constant in the midst of changes. The topic has been already discussed above (pp. 93-94). Hence it does not require any further elaboration here.

In the Yoga system of Patañjali (Y. S. III. 13), 'change is stated to be three-fold :—(1) **धर्मपरिणाम**, (2) **लक्षणपरिणाम** and (3) **अवस्थापरिणाम**. These are examined in detail in the Bhāṣya. Of these, '**धर्मपरिणाम**' speaks of the change that an element undergoes through its various manifestations. It is a change of aspect while the original substance remains constant. Just as a lump of gold when turned into bracelets, rings or bangles, what happens is that it assumes different shapes in passing through its different aspects while gold itself remains intact. '**लक्षणपरिणाम**' speaks of the change of an aspect in a time series ; it is not the change of the original substance. Thus an aspect when it enters into its present stage from the future one has undergone a change. At that stage its present aspect only becomes prominent while it is not altogether detached from its past and future stages. These two stages then remain latent in it. Similarly when it enters into its past stage, it is not severed from its present and future stages, and so on. This is illustrated by the simile of a passionate man who when attached to a particular woman is not absolutely free from his passion towards other women. The fact is that his passion towards the particular woman becomes prominent at that time while it becomes latent towards other women for the time being. '**अवस्थापरिणाम**' is the change of state that an aspect undergoes in every succeeding moment in any of its particular stage in a time series. Thus an aspect when exists in its present stage is generally held to be new. But even its newness begins to diminish in every succeeding moment. Thus what was brand

new becomes new, from new it becomes old, from old it turns into older, and so on. Thus everywhere the aspect remains the same, but it looks different with the changes in its states. This is illustrated by a line which becomes ten when marked in the place of tens, becomes hundred when marked in the place of hundred, and so on. It is also illustrated by the case of a woman who becomes mother in relation to her son, becomes sister in relation to her brother, and daughter in relation to her father. Finally the author of the Bhāṣya in his concluding remark states that ultimately there is only one change which is differently described under different circumstances[1]. Thus he states that the earth material when giving rise to a pot is first of all turned into a lump. From lump it assumes another shape, and then another. In this way it passes through different aspects till it is turned into a pot. This is what is called change of aspect. The pot again in its turn reaches its present stage by giving up its future stage. This is called the change of stage in a time-series. Then again the pot changes showing comparctive oldness and newness in every succeeding moment, and this is called a change of state. Thus everywhere it is the object that changes, while the substatum always remains constant.

This change cannot be haphazard and arbitrary. It follows an unviolable order of succession called '**क्रम**' in the Sāṃkhya-yoga literature. Diversity in the order of succession is the cause of diversity in change[2]. Let us take up the case of a water-jar. We see it appearing and disappearing. But in the midst of change it has to follow an order of succession. Thus the clay material is first of all powdered, then it is formed into lump, then it assumes the form of a water-jar, then comes the stage of its disappearance when it is reduced into pot sherds, small bits and so on. From this it is clear that an aspect follows a sequence in its order of

1 For a comparative study of the different theories of change of the four Buddhist teachers of the Sarvāstivāda school, see above pp. 95-98.

2 'क्रमान्यत्वं परिणामान्यत्वे हेतुः, *Y S.* III. 15.

appearance and disappearance. Thus '**क्रम**' is a relative sequence between one aspect that is present and the other which is immediately contiguous to it.[1] The lump of clay disappears and the water-jar appears. Here we get an instance of '**क्रम**' with referenee to 'change of aspect' (**धर्मपरिणाम**). Like wise, 'change in time-variatien (**लक्षणपरिणाम**) also follows a sequence. The future becomes present, and the present becomes past.[2] Everywhere the aspect passes through a sequence in its transition from one stage to another. This happens so because there is a relation of antecedent and consequent between the previous stage and what follows it. But the sequence followed by the future in manifesting itself into the present is not visible by the ordinary beings. However, it is open to the Yogins of superior power of vision.

'**अवस्थापरिणाम**' (change of state) also follows '**क्रम**'. But sense-perception of ordinary beings cannot penetrate into it. Thus a brand new water-jar when becomes old what happens is that oldness is first marked in its rim. Then by degrees it attacks the entire phenomenal appearance of the jar. Even a new garment when kept up in a sealed box for a long time, automatically becomes old. It is a persistent tendency with all sorts of manifestations to become old. But this oldness does not appear all on a sudden. It is arived at through a sequence whose different stages are extremely subtle. Thus what was brand-new becomes new, what was new becomes oldish, what was oldish becomes noticeable old, what was noticeable old becomes old, what was old becomes older, and so on. But we ordinary beings cannot perceive the sequence through which an aspect passes in the course of its transition from one state to another.

The idea of '**क्रम**' is based upon an uninterrupted series of moments ; it is cognised at a particular point in the series when a

1 यो यस्य धर्मस्य समनन्तरो धर्मः स तस्य क्रमः, *Y. Bh.* III. 15.

2 The past has got no sequence, as there is no immediate contiguity after it. For a fuller discussion, see above pp. 200-202, n 1.

unit of change has entered into its final limit[1]. When the change is rapid, consequently 'क्रम' also becomes of short duration, and it is then treated as subtle. However, even the subtle units of 'क्रम' should not be ignored. Their cumulative effect is indeed surprising. The geometrical point, however, may be insignificant. But it is these points which well-knit together make up lines, planes and solids. Similarly it is the subtle units of 'क्रम' through which appears this grand and stupendous universe from its primary cause and finally reverts back into it.

This 'क्रम' is not confined to the world of limited entities only. Its scope extends even to eternal realities. Eternity in Sāṃkhya is two-fold—one is immutable eternity (कूटस्थनित्यता), the other being eternity in mutution (परिणामिनित्यता). The former speaks of an eternal principle which is not subjected to change or decay, and this is no other but the *puruṣa* The latter is also eternal ; it undergoes change but even in the midst of change its very essence is not lost[2]. And it is the *prakṛti* of Sāṃkhya. Now with regards to the non-eternal entities beginning from *buddhi* and ending downwards to the various manifested aspects of the gross-elements, this 'क्रम' is found to have reached finality. But no such finality can be achieved with respect to *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Of course 'क्रम' in the case of *puruṣa* is nothing but a mere abstraction. However, in the opinion of the Sāṃkhya teachers there will never appear any such stage when the order of succession with reference to these two particular principles will come to a standstill. In that case the world of cosmos cannot function any longer—a stage which Sāṃkhya is not prepared to admit[3].

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1 See, 'क्षणप्रतियोगी परिणामापरान्तनिर्ग्राह्य: क्रम:, *Y.S.* IV. 33.

2 द्वयी चेयं नित्यता, कूटस्थनित्यता परिणामिनित्यता च। तत्र कूटस्थनित्यता पुरुषस्य, परिणामिनित्यता गुणानाम्। यस्मिन् परिणम्यमाने तत्त्वं न विहन्यते तन्नित्यम्, *Y. Bh.* IV.33. Also compare, अथवा नेदमेव नित्यलक्षणं ध्रुवं कूटस्थमविचाल्यनपायोपजनाविकार्यनुत्पत्त्यवृद्ध्यव्यययोगि तन्नित्यमिति। तदपि यस्मिंस्तत्त्वं न विहन्यते, *Mahābhāṣya*, I. i. 1 (p.7).

3. For further about the discussion on the qnestion whether the world order will ever come to a standstill or not, see above pp. 235-236.

THE FIVE VITAL BREATHS

The characteristic feature of an organic body lies in the fact that it is fitted for carrying on a vital operation. Vitality according to Sāṃkhya rests upon the joint working of the organs[1] The organs function in two ways, externally as well as internally. The external function is indicated by the cognition of colour, touch and the like. Here each organ plays its own part seperately. The internal function, on the other hand, is confined within the frame work of the body. Here all the organs work jointly for a common end—an end by which the physical body is sustained and becomes fit for self-propagation. This end is life. It manifests itself through the operation of the five breaths called (1) **प्राण**, (2) **अपान**, (3) **समान**, (4) **उदान** and (5) **व्यान** respectively. These breaths are different modifications of the element of wind (**वायुतत्त्व**)[2] which is incited to function by the joint operation of the organs. The functions of these breaths are indicated by the different motive forces working

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1 सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च, Kā, 29. Also see, समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः प्राणादिलक्षणा जीवनम्, Y. Bh III. 38. Elsewhere 'vitality' is stated to be one of the seven substantive aspects of the thought stuff (*citta*). These aspects are :—(1) supression, (2) merit and demerit, (3) impression, 4) modification, (5) vitality, (6) movement and (7) power. All these are latent, and this is why these cannot be perceived. But their existence is established by means of inference. These are enumerated in the Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 15) by the following couplet which is probably quoted from some other earlier source :—

निरोधधर्मसंस्काराः परिणामोऽथ जी व न म्।
चेष्टा शक्तिश्च चित्तस्य धर्मा दर्शनवर्जिताः ॥

Now, vitality (जीवन) is an effort to sustain the breath. Though it is not open to perception, still it can be inferred from expiration and inspiration. The remaining six also can be similarly inferred.

2 This view is expressed by Vācaspati in his Tattva-vaiśāradī, Y.S. III. 39. But such a view is refuted in the Brahma-sūtra, 'न वायुक्रिये पृथगुपदेशात्', II. iv. 9. However, Śaṅkara in the introductory remark in his *Bhāṣya* on this *sūtra* is found to quote a *śruti* which goes to substantiate the statement of Vācaspati. See, एवं हि श्रूयते—यः प्राणः स वायुः। स एष वायुः पञ्चविधः—प्राणोऽपानो व्यान उदान समान इति।

within the organic body. These breaths are briefly described in the Yoga-bhāṣya, and to a greater length in the Tattva-vaiśāradī (Y. S. III. 39). Of these, *prāṇa* is located within the heart. But it extends upto the mouth and the nose through which air is drawn and then expelled from the lungs. From a physiologist's point of view it may, however, be stated that this particular breath is to a certain extent associated with the 'respiratory system' which is primarily concerned with the oxygenation of the blood and the removal of carbon dioxide. *Samāna*'s[1] sphere of activity is down from the heart upto the naval. It is called so because it carries equally (समं नयतीति समानः) the juice of food and drinks to different parts of the body for proper adjustment. It is thus partially associated with the 'digestive' and specially with the 'circulatory system' which is concerned with the distribution of blood, lymph and other substances transported therein. *Apāna*'s sphere is down from the naval and upto the soles of the feet. It is called so because it carries away urine, stool, foetus and similar other substances downward (अपनयनादपानः). It is thus primarily associated with the 'excretory system' concerned with the removal of wastes, and to a certain extent with the delivery of the child from its mother's womb. *Udāna*'s sphere is extended from the fore-part of the nose upto the head. It is called so because it carries upwards chyle and such other fluids (उन्नयनादुदानः). It is thus connected with the arterial pulsation in the higher members of the body. *Vyāna* is called so because it pervades the entire physical body (व्यापी व्यान इति). It is thus associated with the 'nervous system'. Of these, *prāṇa* is stated to be the chief. Because whenever *prāṇa* passes out of the body, the remaining breaths also follow it. This is also stated in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka (IV. iv. 2).

1 The enumeration of the five breaths is not uniform everywhere. In the Yoga-bhāṣya *prāṇa* is followed by *samāna*. Even in the Upaniṣads, these are differently enumerated. In one place *samāna* appears last (Br.Up. III. ix. 26) while elsewhere in Chh. Up., it is *udāna* which is enumerated last (*prāṇāgnihotra* section, v).

The author of the Yukti-dīpikā (pp.125-127) furnishes an elaborate treatment of these vital breaths. He states that each of these breaths has got double functions—one internal and the other external. Now, the functioning of the *prāṇa* through the mouth and the nostrils as stated above is what is known to be its internal function. Its external function is manifested in an individual when he is in a mood of acting in subservience to some other agency. Etymologically speaking, *prāṇa* means *praṇati*. It means obedience, subordination or susceptibility to something. For instance, obedience on the part of a soldier towards the general or tendency to bend downward as in the case of a tree by the weight of its fruit or susceptibility on the part of an individual to virtue, wealth, enjoyment and wisdom as well as their reverse—all these are due to external manifestation of *prāṇa*.

The function of *apāna* is to carry downward (अपक्रमण). Its internal function is to carry urine and such other substances downward, and this has been already stated above. Its external function is perceived in an individual when he is in a mood of reverting from some lower or higher ideal, such as reversion from vice or virtue. In the physical body, its seat is underneath *prāṇa*. Still it is stronger than *prāṇa*. This is so because its nature is to drag *prāṇa* downward with the intention of keeping it confined therein, and so on.

Samāna is situated between *prāṇa* and *apāna*. Any pleasure derived from functioning jointly along with others is due to prevalence of this breath. This particular breath incites an individual to make others as sharers of his pleasure and pain. Any joint activity, such as making of gifts jointly, sacrificing jointly, performing penance jointly, living jointly with other members of the family, and so on—all these are the results of the external manifestation of *samāna* (सहावस्थानात् सहभावाच्च समानः). This breath is stronger than *prāṇa* and *apāna*. As it is situated in the middle of those two breaths, hence like a middle man it attempts to keep them in proper balance. Just as an ox with a loaded cart does not lose its balance, or an wild antelope when severely afflicted by the

scorching rays of the sun gives up its fickleness and thus prefers to rest, similarly it is *samāṇa* under whose pressure the two opposing breaths of *prāṇa* and *apāna* become balanced.

That motive force which reaches higher upto the brain, which drags the spirit from the lower level to the higher, is called *udāna*. Surpassing the zones of *prāṇa*, *apāṇa* and *samāna* it pushes upwards fluids and semen up to the brain. And receiving obstruction therefrom it recedes and thus becomes the cause of releasing letters, words, sentences, verses, and such other compositions through the mouth. This is what is known to be its internal function. Any superiority complex that appears in an individual is due to external manifestationof this breath. For instance, I am superior to one who is inferior, I am equal to my equals or I am even greater than them, I am more qualified than others—such a notion of superiority arises due to manifestation of this particular breath. It is stronger than the three other breaths as mentioned previously. This is due to the fact that it drags those breaths upwards. This can be noticed in the case of a man when his body is sprinkled with cold water. What he then does is that he all on a sudden jumps up, and this happens so owing to the activity of *udāna*. The superiority of *udāna* over other three breaths can also be illustrated by the posture that a man takes up whenever he draws up a sword from its sheath. In that case the activities of all the other three breaths are subdued, and that of *udāna* becomes manifested.

Vyāna is diffused throughout the system. Through its instrumentality blood and such other fluids are circulated even upto the extremity of nails and pores. This shows that this breath is particularly associated with the nervous system. This is its internal function. Any acute feeling of inseparable connection or strong union between different individuals arises as a result of external manifestation of this breath. The author illustrates this by the case of a devoted woman who ascends the funeral pyre of her deceased husband with the idea that he may be her husband even in the next birth. Such a deep bond of unity expresses itself due

to external manifestation of *vyāna*. It is the strongest[1] of all the breaths.. As long as the bodily frame is pervaded by this breath, the other subordinate breaths work in perfect harmony with it. Their equilibrium is then not at all disturbed. But whenever *vyāna* discontinues to function, the result is that the entire system gradually begins to collapse. The fact that this particular breath is associated with the entire bodily frame and keeps the system working can be realised specially at the time of death when the different limbs of the body gradually become cold and thus cease to function. Consequently, this brings out a serious disturbance in the harmonius working of the other breaths. And finally there is a complete deadlock in the working of the system.

These five breaths together with the sensory organs, the motor organs and individuation, are collectively called **'प्राणाष्टक'**[2] (the eight constituents of vitality) in the ancient literature of Sāṃkhya. The term occurs in some instances in the Yuktidīpikā. In one place, the author furnishes an enumeration of these eight constituents by the following sentence quoted from some authoritative text of Sāṃkhya :—

शास्त्रं चैवमाह—**"प्राणापानसमानोदानव्यानाः पञ्च वायवः षष्ठं मनः सप्तमी पूरष्टमी वाक्"** (p. 127/23-24). Here **'वाच्'** includes the entire set of motor organs, and **'मनस्'** the sensory organs. **'पुर्'** is *ahaṃkāra*, the cosmic principle from which proceeds the bifurcation of the realities into two heads, one psychical and the other physical. It is the fount of all psycho-physical impulse. Whenever the bodily system in

1 In the Prāṇa-episode of the Upaniṣad (Br. UP. IV. iv. 2), it is *prāṇa* which stated to be the chief of the breaths. Whenever *prāṇa* passes out of the body, other breaths also follow it. Also see, 'एषां प्रधानं प्राणः', *Y. Bh.* III. 39. But it is the author of the Yuktidīpikā who states *vyāna* to be the strongest, and this he does from a different angle of vision.

2 Elsewhere these eight constituents are called पूर्यष्टक. See,

तथाच स्मृतिः— पुर्यष्टकेन लिङ्गेन प्राणाद्येन स युज्यते ।
तेन बद्धस्य वै बन्धो मोक्षो मुक्तस्य तेन च ॥
—quoted by Śaṅkara in his *Bhāṣya* on B.S.II.iv.6.

its natural course is going to be exhausted of any such impulse, it then refills the same from the back-ground. This is why it is called 'पुर्' (पूरयतीति पूः, that which refills). Unlike the material body, these eight constituents (प्राणाष्टक) are not subject to penetration, combustion or decay. They retain their existence upto the end of a cycle of creation. They transmigrate. They are to be treated as the supports of the *puruṣa* in the course of his migration from one body to another.

THE FIVE SPRINGS OF ACTIVITY

The aforesaid vital operations proceed from the five springs of activity called *karma-yonis*[1] in the Sāṃkhya literature. These are धृति (tenacity), श्रद्धा (faith), सुखा (desire of bliss), विविदिषा (yarning to know) and अविविदिषा (incapacity of knowing anything). Briefly speaking, all these constitute different motive forces that stimulate an individual from the back-ground to work[2]. From the statement of the author of the Yuktidīpikā (p. 128 *supra*) we know that these springs are generated by the *rajas* element discharged from the *buddhi* when the latter is in the course of its modification into knowledge. Though knowledge is held to be the *sattvic* modification of *buddhi*, still the *sattva* element in the latter cannot exclusively by itself give rise to the former without being excited to do so by the *rajas*. And it is this *rajas* element, thus discharged from the *buddhi*, that generates in the midway these springs of activity before *buddhi* itself has been finally modified into knowledge. In other words, these are more or less may be regarded to be the bye-products of *buddhi*. Briefly speaking, these springs hold an intermediate stage between the initial excitement of *buddhi* and its final modification into knowledge. This is why these have been compared to the eggs of the hen in the ancient literature of Sāṃkhya. Just as eggs hold an intermediate position between

1 See, कुतः पुनरियं प्राणादिवृत्तिः प्रवर्तत इति । उच्यते—सा कर्मयोनिभ्यः, *Yukti-dipikā*, p. 127 *infra*.

2 See, तत्र फलेच्छया: योनी: प्राणादींश्च सम्मुखीकृत्य क्रियामारभते, *ibid* p.147.

impregnation of the hen and the release of the chickens, similar is the case with these springs of activity. This is what is briefly stated by the author of the Yukti-dīpikā in the line :—'महतः प्रच्युतं हि रजो विकृतमण्डस्थानीयाः पञ्च कर्मयोनयो भवन्ति' (p. 128/1). He further corroborates his statement by a metrical stanza which he quotes from some earlier text of Sāṃkhya without mentioning the source. It runs thus (p. 128 *supra*) :—

प्रच्युतो महतो यस्तु न प्राप्तो ज्ञानलक्षणम् ।
व्यापारो ज्ञानयोनित्वात् सा योनिः कुक्कुटाण्डवत् ॥

All these *karma-yonis* are briefly explained by the author of the Yukti-dīpikā[1]. He first of all defines them. Then he speaks of their scopes. This is not all. He also points out the dominating *guṇas* that influence each of these *yonis* from the background. This he does in accordance with the ancient tradition.[2] Of these, 'धृति' means adherence to purpose. It is due to this factor that an individual becomes keen to keep up his promises made in words, deed or in aim. At this stage, he wholly sticks to his promise and determines to carry it out. In other words, this factor refers to energy that prompts an individual to activity. Its scope extends to all sorts of physical and mental activities. It is dominated by *rajas* and *tamas*. 'श्रद्धा' or faith inspires one to his keen sense of duty towards religious observances without hankering after the reward to be derived therefrom. These observances mainly include non-injury to others, practice of *brahmacarya*, performances of sacrifices for one's own sake as well as for the sake of others, making of gifts as well as receiving the same according to the prescribed injunctions and maintainance of external and internal cleanliness. Its sphere extends to such duties as are set apart for the different stages of life, called *āśramas*. Both *sattva* and *rajas*

1 The Tattvasamāsa-sūtras also speak of these *karma-yonis*. See, 'पञ्च कर्मयोनयः'. In the Krama-dīpikā, these are explained by some metrical stanzas evidently quoted from some other ancient source. It is interesting to notice that these very couplets are also quoted in the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 128) with slight alterations in reading.

2 For further discussion on this point, see below p. 277.

become manifested in those who follow these rules of conduct. 'सुखा' is the desire of bliss. An individual under its inspiration strives to attain bliss by the application of both the ordinary and the Vedic means. He thus takes up the study of the Vedas, performs good deeds, practises penance and also regularly observes other religious austerities solely with a view to attain bliss which may be fruitful in the present as well as in the next birth. Its scope is extended to both the ordinary and the Vedic processes. *Sattva* and *tamas* become manifested here. 'विविदिषा' is the desire for true knowledge. It inspires an individual to know the real nature of an entity as to whether it is single or diverse, eternal or noneternal, conscious or unconscious, and so on. It is also due to this quest of knowledge that he becomes keen to know whether the effect is existent even before its production or it was nonexistent. The nature of acquiring true knowledge is thus in keeping with the Sāṃkhya theory. Its sphere extends to all the manifested entities, and it is the *rajas* element that becomes prominent here. 'अविविदिषा' is the reverse of the preceding state. It is a state of ignorance when an individual becomes indifferent to all higher pursuits and prefers to accept sensual pleasure as the end of life. Such a state becomes specially manifested in an individual when he is effected by any intoxicating drug, liquor or deep sleep. To him all phenomena remain under darkness ; for his intellect under that state fails to proceed upward. Such a state is totally enveloped in *tamas*. This state is diametrically opposite to 'विविदिषा'. Both of these are described side by side by the following quotations in the Kramadīpikā :—

विषयमधुमिश्रितान्तःकरणत्वमविविदिषा ।
विविदिषा च ध्यानिनां प्रज्ञानयोनिः ॥
एकत्वञ्च पृथक्त्वञ्च नित्यं चैवमचेतनम् ।
सूक्ष्मं सत्कार्यमत्तोभ्यं ज्ञेया विविदिषा च सा ।
कार्यका(क)रणत्रयकरी विविदिषा प्राकृतिकी वृत्तिः ॥

These couplets are also quoted in the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 128). But the text as well as the order of the quotation vary there to a certain extent. For the sake of comparison we are quoting below the same :—

द्वित्वैकत्वपृथक्त्वं नित्यं चेतनमचेतनं सूक्ष्मम् ।
सत्कार्यमसत्कार्यं विविदिषन्तथ्यं विविदिषायाः ॥
विपरीतसुखमसवद्विविदिषा, (विविदिषा) ध्यानिनां सदा योनिः ।
कार्यकरणत्रयकरी प्राकृतिका गतिः समाख्याता ॥

According to Kramadīpikā, it is *vividiṣā* that leads one to emancipation, while the remaining four bring out bondage. These *karma-yonis* and the eight vital constituents (प्राणाष्टक) as have been already explained above (p 269), correspond respectively to the power of will (इच्छाशक्ति) and that of action (क्रियाशक्ति) as propagated in the other schools and systems of orthodox thought.

But these *yonis* as well as the five vital breaths are viewed more philosophically in the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 129). An attempt has been made there in this connection to show that all these entities can help to attain liberation provided their currents be diverted towards the right course and receded from the wrong one. The author first of all deals with the vital breaths. Now these breaths, as already stated above, function in two ways—internally as well as externally. Of these, the internal functions do not require any stimulus ; these proceed automatically from within. Hence the question of their diversiou or retraction does not arise at all. But the case is otherwise with the external ones where the agent can exert his own influence. And if their course be well regulated then what happens is that the *sattva* element of the *buddhi* begins to flow increasingly with the result that the individual is then gradually dragged towards liberation. For instance, the external functioning of *prāṇa* is stated to be 'प्रणति' which means susceptibility, indulgence or bending. If this functioning be not let loose and confined solely to virtue, wisdom, and the like, then automatically there will proceed an increasing flow of *sattva* with the result that the *sattvic* modifications of the *buddhi* will be manifested more and more. Similarly, 'disinclination' (अपक्रमण) with reference to *samāna* should be confined to 'vice', 'ignorance', and such other *tāmasa* modifications of the *buddhi*. As a result of this, there will be a check in the flow of the *tamas* element and consequently the bondage of the self will be

gradually slackened. Likewise 'co-operation' (साहचर्य) with reference to *vyāna* should be maintained as far as possible with the *sattvic* modifications of *buddhi*. This being done, "the individual will for ever find his abode in *sattva*; he will become consort of *sattva*" (यस्मात् शास्त्रमाह—"सत्त्वारामः सत्त्वमिथुनश्च सदा स्यात्" इति). Let us now turn our attention to *udāna* whose external functioning finds expression through self-aggrandisement (आत्मोत्कर्ष). But this claim of superiority also becomes fruitful if it be applied rightly. And its right application lies in the fact when the individual thinks of his superiority in the terms of 'I am above ignorance', 'I am above delusion', 'I am above attachment', 'I am above bondage', and so on. He thus paves his way towards liberation. Lastly, absolute concomittance (अत्यन्ताविनाभाव) with reference to *vyāna* should also be applied wholly to wisdom and nothing else. The individual should thus think that he is inseperably connected with wisdom, he manifests himself in and through wisdom, he is one with wisdom, and so on. In this way, the author attempts to explain the fact as to how the external functionings of all the breaths can bring out satisfactory result, when their currents are diverted towards the right course. As a consequence of this, the evil propensities will gradually cease to get any response from the agent, and will thus no longer be able to play their foul games. The individual will thus be swept away towards liberation.

The author then turns his attention towards the *yonis*. In this connection he states that except *avividiṣā*, the four other *yonis* are apparently found to generate merit (*dharma*). But this merit also should be looked at with contempt; for this is also regarded as the seed of the next birth. By knowing this, the individual should not indulge in these *yonis*. *Avividiṣā* (unwillingness to know anything) also can help the agent to traverse along the right path, provided it is solely applied to such activities as produce evil results. In this way, it can save the agent from being carried away by wrong current. If the individual continues to pursue such a course what happens is that the *yonis* become purified, and consequently these cease to produce any such result as may become an obstacle

towards his progress along the right path—the path that leads towards liberation. The author finally puts the sum and substance of his statements in the line "सोऽयं धर्मादिषु प्रवणस्तत्प्रतिपक्षापक्रान्तः सत्त्वारामो विनिवृत्ताभिमानो ज्ञाननिष्ठः सविशुद्धयोनिरचिरेण परं ब्रह्मोपपद्यत इति." This speaks of the fact that the individual thus being inclined to the *sattvic* modifications of the *buddhi* and disinclined towards their opposites takes absolute delight in the element of *sattva*, and thus becomes freed from egoistic tendencies. He now gives himself solely to the pursuit of wisdom, makes the *yonis* purged of all impurities, and thus attains to the supreme *brahman* without delay. This view is substantiated by a metrical quotation,[1] but unfortunately the source is not mentioned in the text.

Though these *karma-yonis* are not even touched in the Kārikā or in the Yoga-system of Patañjali, still we have sufficient ground to believe that these formed an important topic of discussion in the ancient literature of Sāṃkhya. In course of elucidating them we find that the author of the Yukti-dīpikā furnishes a few quotations, metrical as well as prose, to substantiate his own statement. But unfortunately he does not mention the source from where he quotes. However, important light is shed by the expression 'पञ्चयोन्युग्रवक्राम्' occurring in the Śvet. Up. (I. 5) which explicitly speaks of the fact that these five *yonis* or springs of activity are not the invention of the later writers. These were popular in the circle of the seekers of truth even at the time of an earlier Upaniṣad like the Śvetāśvatara.

It has been already stated above that it is some one or other of these five *karma-yonis* that lies at the root by which the agent is inspired to undertake a particular course of activity. But it is strange to notice that even *karmans* or activities themselves are not elaborately treated in the majority of the existing texts of Sāṃkhya, and what to speak of the *yonis*—their fountain sources. However, from the evidence of the

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1 बाह्यां प्राणविवृत्तिं सम्यङ्मार्गे बुधः प्रतिष्ठाप्य
विनिवृत्तविस्वरकलुषो ध्रुवममृतस्थानमभ्येति ।
पञ्चानां योनीनां धर्मादिनिमित्ततश्च संस्थाप्य
परिपक्वमित्यथरताश्च पुनस्तज्ज्ञावितो गच्छेत् ॥

Such a view is also expressed in the following couplet quoted elsewhere in the *Yukti-dīpikā* (p. 163) :—

योनीनां सप्रमाणानां (सह प्राणानां ?) सम्यङ्मार्गे नियोजनात् ।
स्रोतसाञ्च विशुद्धत्वात् निरासङ्गमतिश्चरेत् ॥

B. Gītā it can be stated without any hesitation that *karman* and other allied topics found a detailed treatment in the ancient authoritative texts of Sāṃkhya. The following couplets occurring in xviii. 13—15 shed important light in this connection :—

पञ्चैतानि महाबाहो कारणानि निबोध मे ।
सां ख्ये कृ ता न्ते प्रोक्तानि सिद्धये सर्वकर्मणाम् ॥
अधिष्ठानं तथा कर्त्ता करणञ्च पृथग्विधम् ।
विविधाश्च पृथक् चेष्टा दैवञ्चैवात्र पञ्चमम् ॥
शरीरवाङ्मनोभिर्यत् कर्म प्रारभते नरः ।
न्याय्यं वा विपरीतं वा पञ्चैते तस्य हेतवः ॥

Here the Lord speaks of the five causes that are held in the Sāṃkhya doctrine to be indispensable for the accomplishment of all works. These five are, first, the physical body which is the standing ground of the unliberated *puruṣa*, next comes the doer, the personal ego, third, the various instrumentations of *prakṛti*, fourth, the various kinds of efforts which make up the force to act, and the fifth, fate, the invisible power that paves the way from the back-ground. These five make up all the efficient causes that determine the whole process involved in a work beginning from its shaping and till its accomplishment. Whatever work man undertakes with mind, speech and body, these five are the indispensable requisites.

The expression 'सांख्ये कृतान्ते प्रोक्तानि' (lit. as laid down in the Sāṃkhya doctrine) deserves special attention. This clearly speak of the fact that the different factors connected with the execution of *karman* had been minutely discussed in some authoritative text of Sāṃkhya even at a period earlier than the Gītā. This is not all. A little after this, the Lord is found to state that "knowledge, the object of knowledge and the knowing subject—these three go to constitute the mental impulsion to action ; there are again three factors, the instrument, the action and the doer that make up the composite action" (xviii. 18). This again is followed by the statement that each of knowledge, action and doer is threefold, and it is the difference of the three *guṇas* that determines the character of each of them. This is what is expressed in the following *śloka* (xviii. 19) :—

ज्ञानं कर्म च कर्ता च त्रिधैव गुणभेदतः ।
प्रोच्यते गुणसंख्याने यथावच्छृणु तान्यपि ॥

The expression 'प्रोच्यते गुणसंख्याने' refers to the Sāṃkhya system, for it is this particular system wherein the science of the *guṇas* has received an elaborate treatment.

Then follows the threefold description of 'knowledge', 'action' and 'doer' respectively. These again are followed by a similar description of

'*buddhi*' (understanding), '*dhṛti*' (steadiness) and '*sukha*' (happiness) respectively. One thing that strikes here a critical reader is that unlike other factors as stated above, these three are found to step in here without any preliminary introduction. So the question naturally arises here as to what should be their relation or connecting link with *karman* which forms the main theme here. To us it appears that these three refer to some of the *karma-yonis* as discussed above. Now the *sāttvika* and *tāmasa* forms of *buddhi* as described here in in the Gītā (xviii. 30&32) correspond to a considerable extent to *vividiṣā* and *avividiṣā* of Sāṃkhya. *Dhṛti* appears both where. *Sukha* of *Gītā* and *sukhā* of Sāṃkhya slightly differ in name only, but not in essence. *Śraddhā* alone does not find its place here in the Gītā, but it has been already described there in detail in the previous chapter.

From a careful perusal of the descriptions of these factors as found in the Gītā as well as in the Yukti-dīpikā, there reveals one important point of difference that cannot be overlooked. Gītā's interest is centered upon exhibiting the difference in *guṇas* of each of these factors. This is clearly expressed in the following couplet (xviii.29) :

बुद्धेर्भेदं धृतेश्चैव गुणतस्त्रिविधं शृणु ।
प्रोच्यमाणमशेषेण पृ थ क् त्वे न धनञ्जय ॥

The term 'पृथक्त्वेन' deserves special attention here. It clearly speaks of the fact that the Gītā is keen to point out the three-fold division of each of these factors, and the differentiation in each case is brought out by the prevailing *guṇa*. But the author of the Yukti-dīpikā does not analyse these factors on the basis of the *guṇas*. On the other hand, he is found to possess a synthetic attitude. Unlike the Gītā, he states that *dhṛti* is dominated by *rajas* and *tamas*, *śraddhā* by *sattva* and *rajas*, *sukhā* by *sattva* and *tamas*, *vividiṣā* by *rajas* and *avividiṣā* by *tamas*. This is what is stated by him in the following lines (p.128 *infra*) :

गुणसमन्वयस्तु—रजस्तमोबहुला धृतिः, सत्त्वरजोबहुला श्रद्धा, सत्त्वतमोबहुला सुखा, रजोबहुला विविदिषा, तमोबहुला अविविदिषेति ।

He further goes to substantiate his own statement by the following quotation without mentioning the source wherein it is stated that 'him I think to be the foremost of ascetics who is aware of the characteristic feature, scope and synthesis of the three *guṇas* prevailing in the five *yonis* :

उक्तञ्च—'लक्षणविषयसतत्त्वं त्रैगुण्यसमन्वयञ्च पञ्चानां योनीनां यो विद्यात् यतिवृषभं तं त्वहं मन्ये' ।

This fact at once suggests that up to the time of the Gītā, the Sāṃkhya teachers were keen to analyse each and every *yoni* on the basis of the *guṇas*, and subsequently when a prominent teacher felt the necessity of reconstructing the older text, the spirit became synthetic. The expression 'त्रैगुण्यसमन्वय' itself of the above quotation hints at this suggestion.

EVOLUTION OF EMBODIED BEINGS

Puruṣa adopts an organic body whenever he enters into becoming. Such a body is usually found to be emanating from the sexual intercourse of father and mother. But the question naturally arises here as to how does such a body come into existence at the beginning of creation when there was no extra stock of parents left at the disposal of *prakṛti*? Then again, who is the first embodied self and with what end in view he apeared into the universe? Whether the process of entering into becoming is always uniform throughout the beginning and end of a cycle of creation or it is also subject to modification. These are some of the questions that naturally strike an inquisitive mind. Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself does not explicitly state anything in this connection. But his commentator, the author of the Yuktidīpikā, does not leave these questions untouched. He raises the problem in the introduction of his commentary on the kā.52, and makes an attempt to elucidate the view held up by the teacher. He states (p.164) that there are some Sāṃkhya teachers who hold that merit and demerit are at the root of the conjunction of *prakṛti* ahd *puruṣa* from which proceeds creation. Now, merit and demerit cannot be acquired without a physical body, and a physical body also cannot come out without merit and demerit. So their relation is like that of the seed and the sprout, and this speaks of the fact that both of them are without any beginning. This being the case, it may be said that the process of becoming is always uniform. Just as in our time we know that a *puruṣa* enters into the womb and becomes released therefrom by acquiring a physical body through whose instrumentality he reaps, on the one hand, the harvest of merit and demerit acquired during his previous lives, while on the otherhand he performs fresh deeds for whose fruition he has to take up another physical body in another life; similar was the process in the previous cycles of creation, and the same will continue for future cycles also. But Īśvarakṛṣṇa cannot entertain such a view for the simple reason that merit and demerit cannot be held responsible for the conjunction

of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. These two are stated to be the properties of *buddhi*, and as such their very existence is even impossible at the time of the initial start of *prakṛti* when *buddhi* itself has not been evolved. This clearly proves that *prakṛti* does not initially start functioning for the purpose of fruition of the accumlated results of good and bad deeds performed by the migratory *puruṣa* in his previous births. It is motivated into activity at the outset for serving two purposes of the *puruṣa*—one being the cognition of sound, taste, colour, and the like, while the other lies in discriminating his own self from non-self. It is with these two ends in view that the *guṇas* at the beginning of creation having been modified into the various *tattvas* beginning from *buddhi* and ending into the five gross elements generate the physical bodies of Kapila, Hiraṇyagarbha, and such other supreme personalities as are abnormally endowed with *sattva*. The course of metempsychosis which dominates in *rajas* and *tamas* appears after the loss of the six varieties of spiritual power, called 'षट्सिद्धि'[1] in the ancient literature of Sāṃkhya. This is what is expressed by the author of the Yuktidīpikā (p.164) in the following passage :—

एवं यत् पुर्वमपदिष्टं 'संयोगकृतः सर्ग' इति तद् व्याख्यातम् । अत्रेदानीमाचार्याणां विप्रतिपत्तिः—धर्मादीनां शरीरमन्तरेणानुत्पत्तेः, शरीरस्य च धर्माद्यभावे निमित्तान्तरासम्भवादुभयमिदमनादि ; तस्मादेकरूप एवायं यथैवाद्यत्वे तथैवातिक्रान्तादिषु कालकोटिषु सर्ग इति । आचार्य आह—नैतदेवम् । किं तर्हि प्राक् प्रधानप्रवृत्तेर्धर्माधर्मयोरसम्भवो बुद्धिधर्मत्वात्, तस्याश्च प्रधानविकारत्वात् । ततस्तद्व्यतिरिक्तं शब्दाद्युपलब्धिलक्षणं गुणपुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिलक्षणं चार्थमुद्दिश्य सत्त्वादयो महदहङ्कारतन्मात्रेन्द्रिय-भूतत्वेनावस्थाय परमर्षि-हिरण्यगर्भादीनां शरीराण्युत्पादयन्ति, षट्सिद्धित्तयकालोत्तरं तु गुणविमर्दवैचित्र्याद् रजस्तमोवृत्त्यनुपाति संसारचक्रं प्रवृत्तम् ।

From the evidence of the passage quoted above, it appears that the personalities that enter into becoming at the beginning of a cycle of creation are no other but Kapila, Hiraṇyagarbha, and the like, and that their physical bodies are generated by the *prakṛti* itself. This clearly speaks of the fact that the physical bodies of such supreme personalities do not come into existence

1 This will be treated in a subsequent section.

through normal course. Elsewhere also it is expressly stated that the physical bodies of the divine personalities that enter into becoming at the begining of a cycle of creation do not emerge from the womb.[1] Owing to preponderance of *sattva* elment in them, such personalities are naturally equipped with supernatural power by means of which they can adopt a physical body according to their own sweet will. And whenever there arises any necessity on their part to enter into becoming what they do is that they call up a physical body to appear before them, and it is everywhere *prakṛti* which readily supplies the same from the background. Such a physical body does not require gradual development in the womb. It appears simultaneously with the desire of the supreme personality who intends to adopt it, and this happens so due to the *sattva* element which manifests itself specially at the primary stage of creation. This is also hinted in the expression **"गुणानां प्राधान्यात् तन्निमित्तानि शरीराण्यादिसर्गे सांसिद्धिकान्युत्पद्यन्ते"** occurring elsewhere in the Yukti-dipikā (p.88/21-22).

The first personality that enters into becoming at the start of creation is Kapila, the revered sage. Such a view is not only expressed in the passage quoted above, but is more definitely known from another evidence of the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 174)[2] where he is stated to be the eldest of all beings that have ever appeared into the universe. Virtue, wisdom, dispassion and power are innate in him, and with their help he can easily adopt a physical body befitting his own self. He is followed by Hiraṇyagarbha, Maheśvara, Prajāpatis, and such other divinities of supreme order, called *māhātmya-śarīras* in the ancient literature of Sāṃkhya. Now, these *māhātmya-śarīras* found the universe empty. So they felt a desire to procreate with the intention that the universe may be filled up with their progenies. With this end in view, the lord Brahman created Sanaka, Sanandana, and such other divinities. Similarly Maheśvara created crores of Rudras,[3] and so on. These personalities of the supreme order do not beget their offsprings

1 See, प्रतिज्ञायते चायोनिजत्वमीश्वरशरीराणामादिसर्गे च, *Yukti-dipikā*, p. 88/12.

2 परमर्षिर्भगवान् सांसिद्धिकैर्धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यैराविष्टपिण्डो विश्वाग्रजः कपिलमुनिः ।

3 See the extract from the *Yukti-dipikā* as quoted above in p. 228.

through sexual intercourse—a process which according to the doctrine of 'षट्सिद्धि' evolved at a later stage. Being actuated by a desire to procreate what they do is that they by dint of their superior power of will call up some personalities to appear, and it is everywhere *prakṛti* which from the background readily generates the physical bodies of these new comers. But no such creation proceeds from Kapila for the simple reason that the element of *rajas* which is held to be an indispensable factor of creation does not manifest in him even to the slightest extent. In him there exists the highest flow of *sattva*, whereas there is intensity of both *sattva* and *rajas* in Hiraṇyagarbha and such other *māhātmya-śarīras*.

Divine embodiments are asserted to be of four different kinds. The first kind is made possible by direct causality of *prakṛti*, as in the case of Kapila[1] and Brahman. The second is due to spiritual power, as in the case of the sons of Brahman. The third is generated by the combination of parents, such as the sons of Aditi and Kaśyapa. The fourth is from either of the parents singly—from male member only, as in the case of Vaśiṣtha who is said to have born of Mitra and Varuṇa[2]. Human creation as a matter of general rule, is due to the joint cooperation of the male and the female partners both. Of course, there are exceptions, as in the case of Droṇa, Kṛpa, Dhṛṣṭa-dyumna and such other personalities who are said to have born out of the sacrificial fire altar, and this was made possible due to the instrumentality of

1 From the evidence of the Yuktidīpika, we have already in numerous instances pointed out the fact that the physical body of Kapila is directly generated by *prakṛti* at the beginning of creation ; it does not come out of parents. Hence, the orthodox Sāṃkhya cannot accept the account of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (iii. 24. 6) where Kapila is stated to have been begotten by the sage Kardama in the womb of Devahūti.

2 The case of reproduction from the female member singly is not illustrated in the Yuktidīpikā. But there are cases of reproductions in the lower order of lives without impregnation by a male, as in aphids or plant-lice, &c. This is called parthenogenesis by biologists.

Also see, 'the female crane conceives from hearing the roaring of thunder' (बलाका च स्तनयित्नुरवश्रवणाद् गर्भं धत्ते), *Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya*, B. S. II. i. 25.

special spiritual power arising out of the performances of religious rites. All these are pointed out by the author of the Yukti-dipikā in the following lines (p. 143/12-16) :—

तत्र देवानां चतुर्विधं शरीरम्। प्रधानानुग्रहाद यथा—परमर्षेर्विरिञ्चस्य च। तत्सिद्धिभ्यो यथा—ब्रह्मणः पुत्राणां तत्पुत्राणाञ्च। मातापितृभ्यो यथा—अदितेः कश्यपस्य च पुत्राणाम्। केवलाद् वा यथा—पितृतो मित्रावरुणाभ्यां वशिष्ठस्य। मनुष्याणान्तु जरायुजम्। धर्मशक्तिविशेषात् कस्यचिदन्यथाऽपि भवति, यथा द्रोण-कृप-कृपी-धृष्टद्युम्नादीनाम्।

Now, regarding the possibility of the creation of the supreme order of beings without sexual intercourse, it has been already pointed out above that there had been a class of thinkers even among the Sāṃkhyas who raised grave objections and maintained that the inclusion of this order in the evolution of embodied selves is irrational and unwarranted. Their view is that the creation of individuals must have been possible exactly in the way and order in which we see them happening in the present time. The course of nature must be uniform and any departure from it would be an inexplicable freak of chance. The creation of embodied selves is due to personal merit and demerit acquired by them in their previous lives. There can be no creation without the moral and spiritual niches derived from the moral values acquired before.

Adhikāra-sarga

The author of the Yukti-dīpikā maintains that this attitude smacks off empiricism of a dogmatic character. There is no absurdity in the theory that the creation of the gross biological order was preceded by that of a higher order of personalities who were not determined by their personal merit and demerit. Thus the evolution of such divine personalities as the supreme sage, Hiraṇyagarbha, and the like, was possible owing to the self-determined activity of *prakṛti* at a time when the evolution of other categories could not take place due to inoperativeness of the moral value. The individuals of this order of creation are not born to enjoy the fruits of their previous activities. They are said to possess perfect wisdom, and so the potentiality of their activities is completely destroyed. Of these, some are born with an impersonal disinterested mission of their own in order to render selfless

service to the individual selves that would come later on. The case of the revered sage Kapila may be furnished here as an illustration. Thus it is stated in a quotation in the Yoga-bhāṣya (I. 25) that the revered sage, the first among the wise, took pity upon Āsuri, the seeking disciple, and appeared before him by assuming a 'निर्माणकाय', and imparted to him the teachings of Sāṃkhya. Other personalities of this order are entrusted with certain administrative duties (अधिकार)[1] which are conducive to the subsistence of the universe. Thus Brahman or Hiraṇyagarbha is vested with the lordship of the universe, while Maheśvara is associated with destruction. Both of them also procreate. But the duty of procreation is specially assigned to the Prajāpatis who are also included within this order. Then again, the lordship of heaven is allotted to Indra, that of the deads to Yama, and so on. The creation of this order of personalities to whom any such office is allotted is called 'अधिकारसर्ग'. Though the expression does not occur anywhere in the Kārikā, still it finds its place in a few instances in the Yuktidīpikā[2] from which it appears that the ancient teachers of Sāṃkhya might have dwelt upon the topic in greater length. Reference to this office bearers is also made in the Brahmasūtra (III. iii. 32)[3] where it is stated that "the body

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1 See, 'इदानीमपि चादिसर्गेऽधिकारमात्रवशात् शरीरोत्पत्तिः स्यात्', *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 88/14-15.

2 See, 'तस्माद् द्विधा सर्गोऽधिकारलक्षणो भावाख्यश्च, p 164/15-16 ; also, तस्मादधिकारभावनिमित्तो द्विधा सर्गः', p. 164/21.

3 'यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम्', III. iii. 32.

Here Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya refers to Apāntaratamas, the sun god Savitṛ, Vaśiṣṭha, Sanatkumāra, and such other high personalities who are stated to have assumed new bodies although they are possessed of perfect wisdom. By this the validity of the statement that 'wisdom when reaching its perfection brings about complete isolation of the self from all embodiments' should not be questioned. Such personalities assume a new body for the simple reason that they are entrusted with certain offices, such as the promulgation of the Vedas and the like, and they continue their bodily existence as long as their office lasts, after which they attain final release. Thus Apāntaratamas, an ancient sage and teacher of the Vedas, was born

of those who have a certain office subsists as long as their office lasts". All these personalities to whom any such office is allotted are not of equal status. Hence, the duration of their office also varies. Some retain their existence up to the end of one *kalpa* or cycle of creation, some for thousand *kalpas*, some still more, and so on. The period of duration of the different order of divinities is also stated in the Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 25).

These office bearers enter into becoming at the primary stage of creation when the *guṇas* of the *prakṛti* do not function for any other purpose but to serve the double interests of *puruṣa*—one being the enjoyment of sound, touch, colour, and the like, while the other lies in the discrimination of his own self from the *guṇas*. The course of metempsychosis does not proceed at this stage; it depends upon *liṅga-sarga* and *bhāva-sarga* which again manifest themselves after the loss of the six varieties of spiritual power, called 'षटसिद्धि'[1]

Doctrine of ṣaṭ-siddhi

The expression 'षट्सिद्धि' is little known to the students of Sāṃkhya. Barring a few instances in the Yukti-dīpikā, it does

as Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipāyana. Similarly, Vaśiṣṭha by the order of Brahman was procreated by Mitra and Varuṇa. Likewise, Sanatkumāra also was born as Skanda. This is not all. Several other instances of this kind are recorded in the Smṛtis and the Purāṇas. Śruti also states that the sun god Savitṛ having performed the office of watching over these worlds for thousands of *yugas* enjoys the condition of release at the end of that period when he neither rises nor sets. Thus it is stated in Chh. Up. (III. 11. 1)—"When from thence he has risen upwards, he neither rises nor sets; he is alone standing in the centre." Śaṅkara further states that these high personalities in order to discharge the duties of their offices can pass by their power of will from one body to another as if from one house to another, all along retaining the memory of their identity. Through their power they can create for themselves new physical bodies and adopt them all at once or in succession. In doing so, they never forget the sense of their individuality. All such personalities are called 'आधिकारिकपुरुष', and they are called so because they are entrusted with certain 'अधिकार' or office to function.

1 सोयं लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यश्च षट्सिद्धिक्षयकालादूर्ध्वं भवति, गुणसमनन्तरं तु अधिकारलक्षणः, *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 164/14-15.

not occur anywhere else in any other existing treatise of Sāṃkhya. It refers to six kinds of spiritual power, and these are:— (1) power of will (संकल्पसिद्धि ?), (2) power of vision (दृष्टिसिद्धि ?), (3) power of speech (वाक्सिद्धि), (4) power of touch by hand (हस्तसिद्धि), power of clasping (आश्लेषसिद्धि), and (6) power of mutual friction (द्वन्द्वसिद्धि). At the primary stage of creation when the element of *sattva* was abnormal what happened then was that an embodied self of that period used to be naturally equipped with the spiritual power of will (सङ्कल्पसिद्धि) by the application of which he could produce an offspring or any other else as he desired. The progeny at that time was born by a mere fiat of will without having recourse to any sexual commerce. Numerous instances of this type of creation are also recorded in the Vedas, Purāṇas, and other scriptural texts. With the progressive deterioration of spiritual excellence, the creation of embodied beings was determined by less subtle and more gross activity. Thus in the next stage, an offspring was produced by mere wistful amorous glances of the parents. This still survives even in the biological order. For instance, the female tortoise conceives by casting a glance at the male partner without recourse to any gross sensual combination. In the third place, with the loss of this power an issue was born by mere utterance of an expression like 'let us have a child'. This also survives in the lower biological order, as the female conch conceives an issue by uttering a shrill sound. Even in the higher order of biological creation we see that a glance at the beloved and consequent conversation on an object of love cause delight. In the fourth place, with the loss of spiritual power implied in the former activities, creation was made possible by mere touch of the hand of the male partner. This is illustrated by the fact that when after a long separation the couple meet and touch each other with the hand, they derive exquisite pleasure from the act. With the loss of this power, the origination of progeny was made possible merely by the mutual embrace of the partners. This is attested by the fact that embracing of each other by the lovers yields special gratification. Lastly, in the sixth place with the loss of this power the origination of progeny is made possible by gross sexual intercourse

which is found to be the pre-eminent means of creation. All these six ways of creation were invariably and infallibly effective owing to preponderance of *sattva*. With the loss of spiritual power presupposed by this six-fold creation and with the preponderance of *rajas* and *tamas*, the present day mode of origination by means of gross sexual act which is by no means an infallible cause of production of issue has gained currency. In this stage, there prevails the egoistic notion of 'this is mine, this is mine' which results in the migration of the *puruṣa* from one body to another, and this state of affair continues until he is released. This is what is furnished by the author of the Yuktidīpikā in the following passage (pp. 143-144) :—

पूर्वसर्गे प्रकृतेरुत्पन्नानां प्राणिनां सत्त्वधर्मोत्कर्षादन्तरेण द्वयसमापत्तिं मनसैव-अपत्यमन्यद् वा यथेप्सितं प्रादुर्बभूव,……तदेतदद्यापि चानुवर्त्तते, यत्तु (क) च्छपिका निरीक्षितेनाण्डधारणं (?) करोति ; प्रियं खल्वपि चक्षुषा निरीक्ष्य कृतार्थमात्मानं मन्यते। तस्यामपि क्षीणायां वाक्सिद्धिर्बभूव। अभिभाष्य प्राणिनो यदिच्छन्ति तदापादयन्ति। तदद्याप्यनुवर्तते, यच्छंखी विरुतेनापत्यं बिभर्ति ; प्रियं खल्वपि सम्भाष्य महतीं प्रीतिमनुभवति। तस्यामुपक्षीणायां हस्तसिद्धिर्बभूव ; संस्पृश्य पाणिमीप्सितमर्थमुपपादयन्ति। तदेतदद्याप्यनुवर्तते, यत् प्रियं चिरादालोक्य पाणौ संस्पृश्य प्रीतिर्भवति। अस्यामुपक्षीणायामाश्लेषसिद्धिर्बभूव, आलिङ्गनेन प्राणिन ईप्सितं लभन्ते। तदेतदद्याप्यनुवर्तते, यत् प्रियमालिङ्ग्य निर्वृतिर्भवति। तस्यामुपक्षीणायां द्वन्द्वसिद्धिरारब्धा। स्त्रीपुंसौ संघृष्यापत्यमुत्पादयेताम्, ममेदं ममेदमिति च परिग्रहाः प्रवृत्ताः। एतस्मिन्नेवावसरे संसारो वर्ण्यते।

The passage quoted above unfortunately contains a lacuna, and it is probable that the names of the first two *siddhis* have been left out therein. However, we have suggested their names as 'संकल्पसिद्धि' and 'दृष्टिसिद्धि' respectively. And this has been done on the basis of the following couplet occurring in the Mbh., (XV. 30. 22) :—

सन्ति देवनिकायाश्च संकल्पाज्जनयन्ति ये।
वाचा दृष्ट्या तथा स्पर्शात् संघर्षेणेति पञ्चधा॥

Here Vyāsa is found to state before Kuntī the fact that there are personalities of divine order who beget offsprings by will, by speech, by sight, by touch, and by sexual intercourse. It is interesting to note that barring 'आश्लेषसिद्धि', all the remaining five *siddhis* are hinted in this couplet.

The expression 'संकल्पसिद्धि' is also found in the statement 'ते सर्वे सं क ल्प सि द्धा अणिमाद्यैश्वर्योपपन्नाः कल्पायुषो वृन्दारकाः कामभोगेन औ प पा दि क दे हाः…occurring in the Yoga-bhāṣya (III. 25) where it has been used as an epithet to the divine order of beings residing in the Mahendra-loka. The expression 'औपपादिकदेहाः' also is very significant here. It speaks of the fact that these personalities can assume a physical body according to their sweet will, and this fact fully coincides with the conception of the first of the six *siddhis* as we find in the Yuktidīpikā.

This doctrine of 'षट्सिद्धि' helps us to a certain extent to trace some of the chapters of the history of evolution. By the way, it also seeks to establish the fact that the process of becoming is not constant. It is also in a state of change. It also in strict conformity with the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution starts from simplicity and proceeds gradually towards complexity. The fact is that at the dawn of creation when the *sattva* element was unusually predominant everything was simple, fine and huge. With the advent of time, all these attributes began to deteriorate. As a result of this what was originally simple began to become complex, that which was fine began to become coarse, and that which was huge began to become limited, The following couplet of Nyāya-Kusumāñjali (II. 3) throws interesting light in this connection :—

जन्मसंस्कारविद्यादेः शक्तेः स्वाध्यायकर्मणोः।
ह्रासदर्शनतो ह्रासः सम्प्रदायस्य मीयताम्॥

In elucidating the couplet, the author himself in his own commentary states the fact that at the primary stage of creation, progenies were created by mere mental exertion. After this stage, there appeared the process of sexual intercourse, and even that was committed solely for the sake of an issue. This very process later on developed entirely for the gratification of the senses, and there would be little harm in regarding the progenies generated therefrom as bye products. Now a days there is no restriction of time and space in the process, and it has thus surpassed even the behaviour of the beasts. The author then speaks of the progressive deterioration of the ceremonial purifications.

In this connection he states that originally it was the custom that the food of the parents was ceremonially purified, at a subsequent period the child in the womb was done so, now a days it is done after the child is released from the womb. Similar is the case with learning. Originally the students used to study the whole of the Veda with its thousand branches, then some of those branches, then one branch with the six *aṅgas*. Now a days only one branch has survived and that is even hardly studied. The author thus seeks to establish the truth that everything in nature moves towards degeneration.

(पूर्वं हि मानस्यः प्रजाः समभवन् । ततोऽपत्यैकप्रयोजनमैथुनसम्भवाः । ततः कामावर्जनीयसन्निधिजन्मानः । इदानीं देशकालाद्यव्यवस्थया पशुधर्मादेव भूयिष्ठाः । पूर्वं चरुप्रभृतिषु संस्काराः समाधायिषत, ततः क्षेत्रप्रभृतिषु, ततो गर्भादितः । इदानीन्तु जातेषु लौकिकव्यवहारमाश्रित्य । पूर्वं सहस्रशाखो वेदोऽध्यगायि, ततो व्यस्तः, ततः षडङ्ग एकः । इदानीन्तु क्वचिदेका शाखेति ।)

We have dealt with the doctrine of 'षट्सिद्धि' as far as our resources allowed us to do so. In doing so, the fact has been revealed to a certain extent that this six-fold *siddhi* is generally confined to the superior order of creation where the element of *sattva* is naturally predominant. Human beings who are dominated by *rajas* are not naturally equipped with any such divine power ; they are created at a stage when the sexual appetite develops after the loss of all these spiritual powers[1].

The subtle medium of migration

The physical bodies of human beings are derived from the sexual intercourse of parents. Such types of bodies are said to be possessed of six sheaths (षाट्कौशिक). Of these, hair, blood and flesh are derived from the mother, and the arteries, bones and marrow from the father. Now, *puruṣa* is not subject to any change or modification. So the fact must be explained as to how he adopts a physical body and thus migrates from one state of existence to another. Different teachers of the Sāṃkhya school have propounded different theories on the problem. Unfortunately, we are not acquainted

1 See, 'अनैश्वर्यं षट्सिद्धिक्षयकालोत्पन्नानां मानुषाणाम्', *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 148/24.
Progressive deterioration of *siddhis* is also referred to in the Vāyu Purāṇa, viii. 72-88.

with any such text as contains a detailed exposition of their views. All that we can know in this connection is contained in a brief statement of the Yuktidīpikā and the Prapañcasāra Tantra and its commentaries. However, we shall make an attempt to elucidate their views as far as possible in the light of these statements.

According to Pañcâdhikaraṇa, *puruṣa* in his migratory state is associated with a subtle medium which he calls वैवर्तशरीर. Unfortunately, we have failed to trace any such text as explains the constitution of such a body. However, from the evidence of the Yuktidīpikā we know that the different organs become integrated with this वैवर्तशरीर at the time when *puruṣa* through its medium enters into a new birth. Now, the organs according to Pañcâdhikaraṇa are ten[1] in number, and not thirteen as enumerated in the Kārikā. Further, he does not regard them as the products of *ahaṃkāra* as other teachers of Sāṃkhya do ; in his opinion these are elemental products[2]. As the organs (five cognitive and five conative) are separately stated to be integrated with the वैवर्तशरीर, the latter must be supposed to be constituted of *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, *manas* and the subtle elements. The individual personality of the *puruṣa* can be affected only by means of a differentiating medium, and this is stated to be the 'वैवर्तशरीर' plus the organs integrated with it. It enters into the blood and semen of the parents at the time of their sexual intercourse. As a result of this, the parental seed reaches into the womb and thus forms the embryo which again in its turn gradually begins to develop as ovum, foetus, and the like. In this way when it has attained full development and becomes sensitive, the result is that it is then released from the womb as a child. The physical body, thus derived, retains its existence as long as the fruition of merit and demerit acquired during the period of 'षट्सिद्धि' is not completely exhausted. The subtle medium after its separation from the gross physical body at death migrates to heaven provided virtuous deeds have been performed all along throughout

1 See above, p. 133, n 1.

that embodiment and consequently merits acquired therefrom leave their impressions upon the organs integrated therein. If, on the other hand, the organs retain the impressions of demerits, the migration takes place into hell or into the world of plants or animals. By an admixure of both merit and demerit, the migration occurs into the world of human beings. The subtle medium or intermediate body thus serves as the vehicle of *puruṣa* in his migration from one embodiment to another. It has got the capacity of holding and seizing the sense-organs. The relation between this medium and the gross physical body lies in the fact that the former is enveloped by the latter at the time of a new birth and is forsaken by the same at death. Again, the subtle medium comprising *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, *manas* and the subtle elements with the ten organs integrated in it should on no account be regarded as the effect of merit and demerit. It is generated by *prakṛti* at the beginning of creation. It lasts till final release is attained, while the gross physical body perishes after death.

According to Patañjali (he is different from the author of the Yoga-sūtra), the subtle body varies with each birth. It is not one single constant associate of the *puruṣa* throughout the length and breadth of his different embodiments. At the period of enjoying the benefits of the six *siddhis*, this body transmits the ten organs, five cognitive and five conative, into the seed of *karman*. This results in the integration of the organs with the merit and demerit of the individual. At the termination of *siddhi* when death becomes inevitable what happens then is that this body pushes the integrated organs from behind in order that the latter may get themselves in touch with the parental seed of the next birth. As soon as this is accomplished, the said subtle body automatically disappears. All these happen simultaneously with death. The migration into the higher or lower world is determined by the merit and demerit of the individual acquired during the period of *siddhi*. In the next life also, another fresh subtle body is derived by the individual due to operativeness of his good or bad *karman*. The newly generated subtle body also in its turn transmits the organs in a similar

manner into the seed of *karman* of the individual and pushes them from the background to get in touch with the parental seed of the next birth. And as soon as this conjunction takes place, the former disappears simultaneously with death. In this way, the series of subtle bodies continues till the entire stock of merit and demerit of the individual is completely exhausted. And this is possible when liberation is imminent.

This process of migration from one body to another can be better explained by the simile of the movement of a leech upon a bed of grass. Just as a leech in moving from one leaf of grass to another, first of all stretches the upper portion of its body to catch hold of another leaf, and as soon as conjunction with another leaf takes places it automatically withdraws its hinder half from the particular leaf to which it was so long clung ; similar is the process of death and rebirth. There is no gap between migration from one body to another. Kāśyapa also advocates such a conception of migration. According to this teacher of medical science, forsaking of the former body by the individual self and its consequent entering into a new one occur simultaneously. There is no intermediate station between death and rebirth.[1]

As regards the constituents of such a subtle body according to the school of Patañjali, nothing can be definitely known from the scrappy account of the Yuktidīpikā. However, it is evident that the ten organs cannot form constituents of this body. Otherwise, their transmission by the subtle body to the seed of *karman* becomes meaningless. The internal organs also are to be eliminated for similar reasons. This is due to the fact that the subtle body according to this teacher is not permanent ; it disappears after death making room for another fresh one for the future embodiment. But the internal organs, on the other hand, retain their

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1 "जीवस्तु खलु भो सर्वगतत्वादीश्वरगुणसमन्वितः पूर्वशरीराच्चावक्रामति परशरीरं चोपक्रामति युगपत्, न कदाचिदपि बीजशोणित-वाय्वाकाशादिमनोबुद्धिभिर्वियुक्तपूर्वः सर्वगतत्वाच्च न कस्याञ्चिद् योनैा नोपपद्यते स्वकर्मफलानुभावादिति" ।

—*Kāśyapa Saṃhitā, Śārīra 4, p. 47*

existence till final release is attained after which they are re-absorbed into the *prakṛti*. Taking everything into consideration, it appears that the subtle body of Patañjali comprises the five subtle elements and the vital breaths.

Such a conception of subtle body having the subtle elements and the life forces only as its constituents is not usually found to occur anywhere else except to a certain extent in some of the medical texts. According to Caraka, the subtle body is the effect of the previously acquired merit and demerit; it is formed of four subtle elements.[1] In his opinion, the subtle element of sound does not form its constituent. Suśruta does not definitely speak of the constituents of such a body. But in one place, he states *bhūtātman* as one of the constituents of life force while his commentator Dallana explains the term to be the subtle body formed of the subtle elements.[2] A similar conception occurs also in the Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya[3] (II. 2).

In the Prapañcasāra Tantra, Śaṅkara refers to the conceptions of various teachers as regards the process of the descent of *puruṣa* into the womb. In this connection reference is made to one school according to which it is the individual self of the father that is ultimately born as the child. The doctrine as briefly stated there is what as follows. The pure self is ubiquitous. So its connection with everything whether remote or near is not questionable. At the time of cohabitation of the parents, the individual self of the father in association with the pure self is impelled by the life breath to descent into the womb of the mother in and through the semen discharged during the process of intercourse. This has been explained by the simile of transmission of light from one lamp to

1 भूतैश्चतुर्भिः सहितः सुसूक्ष्मैर्मनोजवो देहमुपैति देहात् ,
also, भूतानि चत्वारि तु कर्मजानि यान्यात्मलीनानि विशन्ति गर्भम् ,
—*Caraka Saṃhitā, Śārīra, II. 29 & 33.*

2 भूतात्मना भौतिकशरीरेण सूक्ष्मेण लिङ्गशरीरेणेत्यर्थः, II. iii. 2.

3 बीजात्मकैर्महाभूतैः सूक्ष्मैः सत्त्वानुगैश्च यः ।
मातुश्चाहाररसजैः क्रमात् कुक्षौ विवर्धते ॥

another. Such a view has also gained currency in the Smṛti literature. The name of the school to which this doctrine is ascribed is not mentioned in the text. But Padmapāda in his commentary states this to be the doctrine of the school of Patañjali and Dhanvantari. He further comments here that it is not only the individual self of the father that descents into the womb, but that of the mother also does so through her menstrual blood discharged at the time of sexual operation. However, it is indeed peculiar to notice that such a doctrine is not found to occur in the medical text of Suśruta which is said to have represented the school of Dhanvantari. In the absence of any other data, it is futile to make any attempt to proceed further with Patañjali's conception of the process of migration from one embodiment to another.

Vindhyavāsin[1] does not admit of the existence of any subtle intermediate body. According to him, the sense-organs being directly derived from *ahaṃkāra* are naturally ubiquitous, and as such there can be no movement of them from one embodiment to another. What is meant by fresh birth happens only by the manifestation of the sense-organs in a particular bio-physical medium in the shape of the parental seed. And whenever this manifestation is withdrawn, the result is death.

According to the followers of Vārṣagaṇya, *puruṣa* does not enter directly into the parental seed; it enters into the foetus through the chyle generated by the fermented food assimilated by the mother.

According to Āpadya(Āvaṭya ?) and such other teachers, the entry of the *puruṣa* into the womb takes place due to pious hankering of the parents for a child and their consequent

1 For further references to the denial of a subtle intermediate body, see above, pp. 141 (n 2) & 142; also see the following couplet occurring in the *Mbh.*, (III. 193. 77) where the existence of a subtle intermediate body is denied:

आयुषोऽन्ते प्रहायेदं क्षीणप्रायं कलेवरम् ।
सम्भवत्येव युगपद् योनौ नास्त्यन्तराभवः ॥

observance of restriction in food and movement in conformity with the religious injunctions.

[प श्चा धि क र ण स्य तावत् वैवर्तं शरीरं मातापितृसंसर्गकाले करणाविष्टं शुक्रशोणितमनुप्रविशति। तदनुप्रवेशाच्च कललादिभावेन विवर्धते। व्यूढावयवं तूपलब्धप्रत्ययं मातुरुदरान्निःसृत्य यौ धर्माधर्मौ षट्सिद्ध्युपभोगकाले कृतौ तद्वशादवतिष्ठते। यावत तत्क्षयात् शरीरपातस्तावत्। यदि धर्मसंस्कृतं करणं ततो द्युदेशं सूक्ष्मशरीरेण प्राप्यते, तद्विपर्ययात्तु यातनास्थानं तिर्यग्योनिं वा, मिश्रीभावेन मानुष्यम्। एवमातिवाहिकं सूक्ष्मशरीरमिन्द्रियाणां धारणप्रापणसमर्थं नित्यं वाह्येनापायिना परिवेष्ट्यते परित्यज्यते च। पा त ञ्ज ले तु सूक्ष्मशरीरं यत् सिद्धिकाले पूर्वमिन्द्रियाणि बीजदेशं नयति। तत्र तत्कृताशयवशात् द्युदेशं यातनास्थानं वा करणानि प्रापय्य निवर्तते। तत्र चैवं युक्ताशयस्य कर्मवशादन्यदुत्पद्यते यदिन्द्रियाणि बीजदेशं नयति तदपि निवर्तते, शरीरपाते चान्यदुत्पद्यते, एवमनेकानि शरीराणि। वि न्ध्य बा सि न स्तु विभूत्वादिन्द्रियाणां बीजदेशे वृत्त्या जन्म। तत्त्यागो मरणम्। तस्मान्नास्ति सूक्ष्मशरीरम्। तस्मान्निर्विशेषः संसार इति पक्षः।—*Yuktidīpikā*, p. 144/10-22.

अत्रापि चेतनाधातोरागतिं बहुधा विदुः।
रेतःशोणितजं प्राहुरेकेऽन्ये मातुराहृतात्॥
आहाराद् रसजं प्राहुः केचित् कर्मफलं विदुः।
केचिदस्य परं धाम्नो व्याप्तिमेव प्रचक्षते॥
कश्चित् कर्मप्रकारज्ञः पितुर्देहात्मना सकृत्।
सम्वध्य मथ(द)नोद्रेकविलीनाच्छुक्रधातुतः॥
तत् परं धाम सौजस्कं संक्रान्तं मारुतेन तु।
ब्रूते रक्तव्यतिकृताद् दीपाद् दीपान्तरं यथा॥

—*Prapañcasāra Tantra*, I. 94-97.

तत् कथं क्षेत्रज्ञप्रवेश इति। तत्र मतभेदं दर्शयति—अत्रापीति, चेतनाधातुश्चिदेकरसः पुरुषः। अपिशब्देन विरोधार्थेन पक्षाणामनुपपत्तिर्दर्शिता। नहि चिदेकरसस्य पुरुषस्य एवंविधाः प्रवेशा उपपद्यन्त इत्यर्थः। रेतःशोणितजमिति प श्चा धि क र णा नां पक्षः। मातुराहृतादाहाराद् यो रसः पाकजः तद्द्वारेण गर्भशरीरं विशतीति वा र्ष ग णाः। कर्मफलमिति अपत्यार्थिनां यथोक्ताहारविहारश्रद्धाद्यतिशयाद्

गर्भं प्रविशतीत्यापद्या[त्रेया]दयः[1]। परं धाम्नो व्याप्तिमिति वि न्ध्य वा सि-पक्षः। सर्वगस्येन्द्रियाभिव्यक्तिनिमित्तं परिच्छेद इत्यर्थः। दीपाद् दीपान्तरमिति प त ञ्ज लि-धन्वन्तर्यादिपक्षः। तत् परं धाम तस्य पितुरात्मा कश्चिदेवं ब्रूत इत्युत्तरत्रान्वयः। रक्तव्यतिकृतादिति स्त्र्यात्मनोऽपि संक्रान्तिर्दर्शिता। – *Commentary of Padmapāda.*

पतञ्जलि-धन्वन्तर्यादिपक्षमाह—कश्चिदिति द्वाभ्याम्। कश्चिद् विचक्षणमतिराचार्यः कर्मप्रकारज्ञः वेदोक्तानेकविधक्रतुविज्ञाता पितुर्जनकात्मकचैतन्यदेहात्मना शरीराभिमानिजीवचैतन्येन सकृत् एकदा संवध्यमथनोद्रेकविलीन-मैथुनप्रकर्षप्रच्युतात् शुक्रधातुतो रेतसः तद्बिन्दुद्वारा तन्निखिलाभासप्रसिद्धं परं धाम संविद्रूपं तेजः सौजस्कं त्वजादिधातुविनिर्मुक्त-रससमाकलितं संक्रान्तं मारुतेन सुविशिष्टतरेण प्राणवायुना रक्तव्यतिकृतात् ऋतुकालोद्भवशोणितबिन्दुसहितात् दीपज्वालायाः अन्यदीपज्वालोत्पत्तिवत् शरीरे संक्रान्तमिति कथयतीत्यर्थः। तथा च श्रुतिः—
पतिर्जायां प्रविशति गर्भो भूत्वा स मातरम्।
तस्यां पुनर्नवो भूत्वा दशमे मासि जायते॥" इति।

—*Commentary of Bodha Bhārati.*]

Let us now turn our attention towards Iśvarakṛṣṇa's conception of subtle body (kā, 40). He states that at the beginning of creation *prakṛti* itself provides each unliberated *puruṣa* with a subtle body. This body serves as the medium of *puruṣa* in his migration from one embodiment to another. Its movement is not obstructed anywhere ; it can penetrate even a solid block of rock. Except in the case of those who have attained liberation, such a body lasts from the beginning of creation till dissolution of the world-process when it is reabsorbed into the *prakṛti*. Īśvarakṛṣṇa thus goes to discard the view of Patañjali according to whom the previous subtle body disappears and a fresh one appears at each migration of the *puruṣa*. As regards the constituents of this body also, he differs from other teachers. In his opinion, such a body is composed of *buddhi ahamkāra*, *manas*, five organs of perception, five of action and the five subtle elements, He thus goes to maintain this subtle medium as a psycho-physical entity. A purely psychical

1 The reading 'आपद्यादयः' appears to be corrupt. So the editor goes to suggest 'आत्रेयादयः'. But the reading as found in the manuscript belonging to the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal (G. 8543, fol. 17b, *l* 5.) is 'आवद्यादयः' It is not unlikely that the actual reading may even be आवट्यादयः For, the name of Āvaṭya occurs along with that of Jaigīṣavya in the Yoga-bhāṣya, III. 18.

apparatus which is to pass from one physical body to another can not stand by itself without a support, as a picture without a canvas. The inclusion of the subtle elements remedies this defect.

The different *bhāvas* or pre-dispositions comprising virtue, wisdom, dispassion, spiritual power and their opposites leave their impressions upon the subtle body as a result of which it is destined to migrate into higher or lower plane of existence. But this body cannot by itself enjoy the fruits of previous *karman* for which a gross physical body is required. The latter is derived from parents and is perishable after death.

We have thus briefly described Īśvarakṛṣṇa's conception of subtle body. He deviates here in many important respects from other teachers whose views we have treated previously. Unlike Patañjali, he advocates one subtle body for each *puruṣa* which is competent enough to migrate into various planes of existence. Further, the subtle body as conceived by him can exist independently by itself between death and subsequent rebirth. But no such gap can exist according to Patañjali. Then again, by combining the thirteen organs (three internal and ten external), the five subtle elements and the impressions of the previous activities into one single fold, he has been successful in tackling the problem of migration in a more efficient way than Pañcâdhikaraṇa and Patañjali. Besides these, it also speaks of the fact that his approach is synthetic.

Vindhyavāsin's view is totally different from that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In refutation to the view of the former, the following arguments have been advanced by the author of the Yuktidīpikā (pp. 145/18-25). Firstly, the sense-organs cannot be regarded as all-pervasive. If this would be the case, then anything and everything, whether near or remote, would always come under the range of the sense-organs as a result of which perception would never be obstructed. Secondly, in that case perception of all objects would be simultaneous For, an all-pervasive entity is simultaneously contacted with all objects even though these are variously scattered in different regions of the globe. Thirdly, even those objects

which are situated at the farthest region of the globe would be adjacent to the sense-organs. As a result of this, there will not be any difference of cognition whether derived by perception or inference or valid testimony. The opponent may urge here that the difference of cognition is achieved due to the special manifestation of the sense-organs. But such an assumption is illogical. He is not found to assign any reason here in support of his assumption that an all-pervasive entity can manifest itself differently under different circumstances. So Vindhyavāsin's conception of all-pervasiveness of the sense-organs and consequent disapproval of a subtle intermediate body cannot be logically established.

The author of the Yuktidīpikā spares no pains to plead the case of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In the concluding portion of the commentary on *kā*. 41, he makes an attempt to show that the different problems connected with the process of migration of the *puruṣa* from one embodiment to another cannot be satisfactorily solved unless a subtle intermediate body be maintained apart from the gross physical one. Both these two bodies are equally indispensable. It is not always the case that the entire stock of previously acquired merits and demerits is exhaustively fruitioned in a particular embodiment. And it is the subtle body which retains the surplus stock of unfruitioned merits and demerits. If it be, however, insisted that the stock of merits and demerits acquired during the immediately preceding embodiment is completely fruitioned in the present embodiment and what is acquired in the present embodiment will be fruitioned in the next succeeding embodiment, and so on, then the question of surplus stock does not arise at all and consequently the supposition of a subtle intermediate body retaining the traces of previous *karmans* may be altogether done away with. But the complexity cannot be averted thereby. If it happens that the foetus itself is anyhow disintegrated in the course of its development, then the question of acquiring any fresh merit and demerit will be automatically sealed up for ever, and consequently no future embodiment. Hence, the particular incident will indirectly bring out liberation of the individual. But this is

absurd. Then again, if the individual during his present embodiment pursues such course of activity as will determine his future life into the world of plants or such other immobiles, then ultimately it would be rather a sort of blessing to him. The reason is not very far to seek. It is well known that migration into the world of immobiles is destined absolutely for the fruition of previously acquired demerits. No fresh merit and demerit can be acquired in such lives. Consequently, there will not be any possibility of future birth. All these defects can be remedied if a subtle intermediate body be resorted to. It is the subtle body which inheres the impressions of previous activities and mirgates from one embodiment to another. It is generated by the *prakṛti* at the beginning of creation to serve the purpose of the *puruṣa* and retains its existence until that purpose is fully served.

Similar notions of subtle body is not foreign to western thinkers also. The early Greek philosophers also entertained the notion of a subtle body which was inseparably connected with the soul until the latter was finally released from future transmigration. The astral body of the theosophists also resembles to a certain extent with the subtle intermediate body as propagated by Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Corporeal creation (भौतिकसर्ग)

The subtle body plays the distinctive role in biological evolution. Such a body can assume any form accordingly as it is destined to do so. Like an actor, it plays the parts of different personalities under different robes. It is competent to enter into all possible corporeal forms comprising three orders of divine, human and inferior beings distributed respectively in the higher, middle and the lower planes of existence. The divine order is further classified into eight heads. According to Māṭhara and Vācaspati, these are :—(1) ब्राह्म, (2) प्राजापत्य, (3) ऐन्द्र, (4) पैत्र, (5) गान्धर्व, (6) याक्ष, (7) राक्षस and (8) पैशाच. But the author of the Yukti-dīpikā differs here slightly (p. 165). He reads 'नाग' in the place of 'याक्ष'. In his opinion, the latter does not form a separate class ; it is included within 'राक्षस'. He further goes to point out the fact that all supe-

rior forms of creation are included within one or other of these eight classes. For instance, Asuras though not classified separately, are to be included within 'ऐन्द्र'. This is due to the fact that they are stated to be the earlier gods. So goes the *Śruti*—'पूर्वे देवा ह्यसुराः'. Then again , due to similarity of nature, Kinnaras and Vidyādharas are to be included within 'गान्धर्व'. Similary Pretas are included within 'राक्षस', for both these two classes have got Yama as their common lord. This classification of the divine beings into eight heads has been done according to their order of superiority. Thus it is 'ब्राह्म' which ranks foremost of this order. Lower than this is 'प्राजापत्य', and so on, Then again, it is the element of *sattva* which predominates in the superior order. But the degree of *sattva* is not equally distributed throughout the different classes. It is highest in 'ब्राह्म', and begins to decrease comparatively in the remaining classes.

Human beings form a separate class. In them there exists preponderance of the element of *rajas*. They are located in the middle plane. Inferior beings are classified into five heads. These are—(1) herbivorous beasts (पशु), (2) carnivorous beasts (मृग),[1] (3) birds, (4) reptlies and (5) immobiles. All of them are distributed into the lower plane. In them there exists preponderance of *tamas*. But the degree of *tamas* is highest in the immobiles. It then begins to diminish gradually in the remaining classes till it becomes comparatively less in the carnivorous beasts.

Speaking briefly, the entire biological world has been classified into fourteen heads—eight of divine order, one of mankind and five of inferior order. Any embodied being is included under one or other of these fourteen classes. This is what is known as 'भौतिकसर्ग' (corporeal creation) in the Sāṃkhya literature (kā, 53). As long as the *puruṣa* remains associated with the subtle body, he becomes encaged in one or other of these classes of embo-

1 The distinction between 'पशु' and 'मृग' is not very clear. Here Jayamaṅgalā states 'तत्र गवाद्या रासभान्ताः पशवः, सिंहाद्या विड़ालान्ता मृगाः'. Also see, 'गवादिमूषकान्ताः पशवः, सिंहादिश्रृगालान्ता मृगाः'—

Sāṃkhya-saṃgraha, p. 137.

diments as a result of which he has to experience misery arising out of decay and death (kā,55), and whenever he is dissociated from the same, he becomes free and never re-enters into the whirlpool of existence.

The subtle body and the bhāvas

The *bhāvas* constitute eight aspects of *buddhi.* These are :— (1) merit, (2) wisdom, (3) dispassion, (4) spiritual power, (5) demerit, (6) ignorance, (7) attachment and (8) lack of spiritual power. Of these, the first four are *sāttvika* aspects while the remaining four of opposites are *tāmasa* aspects. The classification of these *bhāvas* into three heads, such as 'सांसिद्धिक' (innate) and the like, as well as the divergent views of other Sāṃkhya teachers in this connection, have been already discussed above in detail (pp. 181-185). Hence it is needless to repeat the same here.

The subtle body and the *bhāvas* are inter-related. The former serves as the vehicle of *puruṣa* in his migration from one embodiment to another, while the latter determine the form of future embodiment. Thus 'merit' gives rise to higher birth, while 'demerit' drags towards bondage. 'Wisdom' leads towards liberation and 'ignorance' towards bondage. 'Dispassion' brings out absorption into one or other of the eight forms of *prakṛti* for a specified period, while 'attachment' leads to rebirth. Lastly, 'spiritual power' removes obstacles to attain perfection while 'lack of such power' impedes the individual in his forward march. The *bhāvas* are antecedents (निमित्त) and the higher birth, degradation, and the like are consequents. It is due to these antecedents and consequents that the subtle body has to play the parts of different actors under the cover of different robes. Without the *bhāvas*, the subtle body cannot assume the form of a god or a human being or an inferior being. On the otherhand, if there were no subtle body, the *bhāvas* would also find no substratum to stay. The reason is not far to seek. The *bhāvas* are located in the organs (करणाश्रयिण:, kā. 43) which again in their turn form constituents of the subtle body. Moreover, these are to be acquired by acts which cannot be accomplished without a

gross physical body, and even that again cannot function independently by itself without a subtle body. Hence, both the subtle body and the *bhāvas* are equally indispensable without which biological evolution cannot be explained. It is due to this inter-dependence that Īśvarakṛṣṇa goes to introduce two aspects of evolution, one 'लिङ्गसर्ग' and the other 'भावसर्ग' (kā. 52). Both of them manifest themselves after the loss of six spiritual powers, called 'षट्सिद्धि'.[1]

Pratyaya-sarga

After describing the *bhāvas* and their consequence, Īśvarakṛṣṇa then goes to introduce another aspect of psychical evolution which he calls 'प्रत्ययसर्ग'. This comprises erroneous view, infirmity of the organs, contentment and achievements. Owing to difference in *guṇas* it has got fifty sub-divisions. Thus he states :—

एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः ।
गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात् तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥ (kā. 46)

Of this four-fold 'प्रत्ययसर्ग', 'erroneous view' is further classified into five heads, 'disability' into twenty-eight, 'contentment' into nine and 'achievement' into eight—thus making the total fifty. These are more or less discussed by the different commentators. So we do not intend to proceed here with their details.

Now the question naturally arises here as to what is the relation existing between the *bhāvas* and this new set of four. Apparently, we do not find here any connecting link. The statements made in this connection by the ordinary commentators do not seem to be very convincing. This has led Keith to make the following remark :—

"It seems hopeless to try to reconcile these two lists of states : they are too much alike to be regarded as radically different, and the obvious solution of the problem is to assume that they represent views which were held in the school, and which developed the matter in different ways. It is, however, so strange that Īśvarakṛṣṇa should have introduced the matter without any hint of the relation of the two sets of the states—except the wholly misleading one that they are the same thing—that conjecture is

1 सोऽयं लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यश्च षट्सिद्धिचयकालादूर्ध्वं भवति,
—*Yuktidīpikā*, p. 164/15.

justified that the verses (46-51) which deal with them are a later interpolation, added at or before the time when the last three verses were added and the statement made that the tract numbered seventy verses.

—The Sāṃkhya system, pp. 96-97.

However, the author of the Yuktidīpikā is found to shed some important light here. Unlike other commentators of the Kārikā, he states that 'प्रत्ययसर्ग' forms the ultimate result brought out by the evolved, called *vyakta*. According to him the evolved has got three aspects. These are :—(1) form (रूप), (2) undertaking of initiatives (प्रवृत्ति) and (3) the result to be obtained therefrom (फल). Of these, forms of the evolved have been already explained by 'तत्त्वसर्ग' which deals with the evolution of the *tattvas* beginning from *mahat* and ending in the five gross elements. The second aspect is also explained by 'भावसर्ग' which deals with the eight aspects of *buddhi* and their consequences. The third aspect, called 'result', now remains to be done. And it is this four-fold 'प्रत्ययसर्ग' which forms the result of the evolved. Thus we find him stating (pp. 151-152) :—"एवमेष तत्त्वसर्गो भावसर्गश्च व्याख्यातः। एतच्च व्यक्तस्य रूपं प्रवृत्तिश्च परिकल्प्यते। फलमिदानीं वक्ष्यामः। आह—किं पुनस्तत् फलमिति। उच्यते—यः खलु 'एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः' तत् फलमिति वाक्यशेषः"।

These three aspects of *vyakta* need further clarification. So far as we know, no other text of Sāṃkhya is found to introduce them. Elsewhere in his explanation of the expression 'व्यक्ताव्यक्त-ज्ञ-विज्ञानात्' occurring in *kā*. 3, the author of the Yuktidīpikā is found to offer a brief exposition of these aspects of *vyakta* in the following lines (p. 24/24-29) :—

"तत्र रूप-प्रवृत्ति-फललक्षणं व्यक्तम्। रूपं पुनर्महानहङ्कारः पञ्चतन्मात्राण्येकादशेन्द्रियाणि पञ्चमहाभूतानि। सामान्यतः प्रवृत्तिर्द्विविधा—हितकामप्रयोजना च, अहितप्रतिषेधप्रयोजना च। विशेषतः—पञ्चकर्मयोनयो धृत्याद्याः प्राणाद्याश्च पञ्चवायवः। फलं द्विविधम्—दृष्टमदृष्टञ्च। तत्र दृष्टम्—सिद्धितुष्ट्यशक्तिविपर्ययलक्षणम्। अदृष्टम्—ब्रह्मादौ स्तम्बपर्यन्ते संसारे कर्मप्रतिलम्भ इत्येतद् व्यक्तम्। एषां सत्त्वरजस्तमसामङ्गाङ्गिभावगमनाद् विशेषगृहीतिः"।

In this passage, the author goes to speak of the fact that 'व्यक्त' or the evolved principle manifests itself in three ways—through its form (रूप), initiation (प्रवृत्ति) and result (फल). Of these, 'रूप' or form of *vyakta* constitutes *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, eleven organs, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements.

'प्रवृत्ति' is synonymous with 'आरम्भ', It means initiative to work, endeavour, effort etc. It is usually undertaken for the purpose of attaining what is agreeable and averting what is disagreeable. Its special manifestation is noticed in the working of the springs of activity (*karma-yonis*) and the life forces. The springs, as already stated above, constitute different motive forces that incite the ordinary individual to undertake such endeavours as give rise to merit, demerit, and the like. The life forces also stimulate the agent for similar purposes.

It is interesting to notice that 'प्रवृत्ति' finds a prominent place in the Nyāya system. It is defined there as 'an initiative undertaken either by speech or mind or body'[1] The initiative comes from passion, aversion and such other inciting factors, called *doṣas* [2](defilements), which impell the agent towards virtue or vice. The purpose of undertaking such initiatives lies in attaining what is agreeable and averting what is disagreeable[3]. The author of the Nyāya-bhāṣya sheds further light in this connection. While speaking of the cause of the cycle of rebirth, he states that from false conception of objects there arise inclination towards what appears to be agreeable and disinclination towards what appears to be disagreeable. These inclinations and disinclinations give rise to falsehood, malice, delusion, greed and such other defilements as incite the individual to undertake various sorts of endeavours, numbering twenty in all—ten pious and ten vicious. Of these, the pious endeavours lead to the acquisition of merit and the vicious ones to that of demerit. He further states that 'प्रवृत्ति' in this system means merit

1 'प्रवृत्तिर्वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भः', NS. I. i. 17.

2 'प्रवर्तनालक्षणा दोषाः', *ibid* I. i. 18. Also see the *Bhāṣya*—ज्ञातारं हि रागादयः प्रवर्तयन्ति पुण्ये पापे वा.

3 'यमर्थमधिकृत्य प्रवर्तते तत् प्रयोजनम्', *ibid* I. i. 24. Also see the *Bhāṣya*—यमर्थमाप्तव्यं हातव्यं वा व्यवसायस्तदाप्तिहानोपायमनुतिष्ठति प्रयोजनं तद्वेदितव्यं प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वात्। इममर्थमाप्स्यामि हास्यामि वेति व्यवसायोऽर्थस्याधिकारः, एवं व्यवसीयमानोऽर्थोऽधिक्रियते। Cp. 'हितकामप्रयोजना च, अहितप्रतिषेधप्रयोजना च' of the passage quoted above from the *Yuktidīpikā*.

and demerit. Though it constitutes the means of acquiring merit and demerit, still the means and the end are not to be treated here as different. This he explains by the analogy of the expression 'अन्नं वै प्राणिनः प्राणाः' where food itself is equated to life, though actually speaking, the former constitutes the means of sustaining life. This endeavour or initiative to work is the cause of higher or lower birth. From birth proceeds misery. He then summarises his statements and says that false conception, defilements, endeavour, birth and misery in their uninterrupted course consitute what is known to be the cycle of rebirth.

(एतस्मान्मिथ्याज्ञानादनुकूलेषु रागः प्रतिकूलेषु द्वेषः। रागद्वेषाधिकाराच्च असत्येर्ष्या-माया-लोभादयो दोषा भवन्ति। दोषैः प्रयुक्तः शरीरेण प्रवर्तमानो हिंसास्तेयप्रतिषिद्धमैथुनान्याचरति, वाचाऽनृतपरुषसूचनाऽसम्बद्धानि, मनसा परद्रोहं परद्रव्याभीप्सां नास्तिक्यञ्चेति। सेयं पापात्मिका प्रवृत्तिरधर्माय। अथ शुभा—शरीरेण दानं परित्राणं परिचरणञ्च, वाचा सत्यं हितं प्रियं स्वाध्यायञ्चेति, मनसा दयामस्पृहां श्रद्धाञ्चेति। सेयं धर्माय। अत्र प्रवृत्तिसाधनौ धर्माधर्मौ प्रवृत्ति-शब्देनोक्तौ, यथाऽन्नसाधनाः प्राणाः—'अन्नं वै प्राणिनः प्राणा' इति। सेयं प्रवृत्तिः कुत्सितस्याभि-पूजितस्य च जन्मनः कारणम्। जन्म पुनः शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धीनां निकायविशिष्टः प्रादुर्भावः, तस्मिन् सति दुःखम्। तत् पुनः प्रतिकूलवेदनीयं बाधना, पीडा, ताप इति। ता इमे मिथ्याज्ञानादयो दुःखान्ताः धर्मा अविच्छेदेनैव प्रवर्तमानाः संसार इति।—*N. Bh.* I. i. 2).

By comparing this conception of 'प्रवृत्ति' of the Nyāya system with that of the Yuktidīpikā, the difference appears to be slight. According to the ancient teachers of Nyāya, 'प्रवृत्ति' refers to merit and demerit. But Sāṃkhya goes a step further. According to this system, the entire set of 'भावसर्ग' comprising not only merit and demerit but all the eight aspects of ***buddhi*** as well as their consequences are referred to by 'प्रवृत्ति'.

The author of the Yoga-bhāṣya also pays due attention to 'endeavour' its cause and after-effect. Speaking of the cause of the cycle of rebirth, he states that merit gives rise to happiness and demerit to misery. From happiness comes passion and from misery aversion. These are followed by endeavour (प्रयत्न) [1] as a consequence of which the individual takes up some

1 'प्रयत्न' does not practically differ from 'प्रवृत्ति'. In the Vaiśeṣika system, it is read as synonymous with 'संरम्भ' and 'उत्साह'. It therefore means 'effort', 'endeavour' or 'inspiration'. It is two-fold—one springing from the vital energy and the other from desire or aversion. The former regulates the vital breath at the time of sleep. The latter constitutes the means of attaining what is agreeable and averting what is disagreeable. It also balances the physical body. (प्रयत्नः संरम्भ उत्साह इति पर्यायाः। स द्विविधो जीवनपूर्वक इच्छाद्वेषपूर्वकश्च। तत्र जीवन-पूर्वकः सुप्तस्य प्राणापानसन्तानप्रेरकः...। इतरस्तु हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थस्य व्यापारस्य हेतुः, शरीरविधारकश्च—Praśastapāda's exposition of *prayatna*). For 'जीवनपूर्वकप्रयत्न', see *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 127/10-15.

initiative either by mind or speech or body, and thereby favours or injures others. Then again follow in their cyclic order merit and demerit, happiness and misery, passion and aversion, and so on. Thus revolves the six-spoked wheel of rebirth whose driver is false conception—the root cause of all afflictions (iv. 11).

(धर्मात् सुखमधर्माद् दुःखम्। सुखाद्रागो दुःखाद् द्वेषस्ततश्च प्रयत्नस्तेन मनसा वाचा कायेन परिस्पन्दमानः परमनुगृह्णात्युपहन्ति वा। ततः पुनर्धर्माधर्मौ सुखदुःखे रागद्वेषाविति प्रवृत्तं षडरं संसारचक्रम्। अस्य च प्रतिक्षणमावर्तमानस्याविद्या नेत्री मूलं सर्वक्लेशानामित्येष हेतुः।)

In the Caraka-saṃhitā also it is stated that delusion, desire and aversion work at the root of all initiatives (मोहेच्छाद्वेषकर्ममूला प्रवृत्तिः, *Śārīra,* v. 12). It is further stated in this connection that as long as the individual abides within the fold of defilements, he cannot transcend 'प्रवृत्ति'—the root cause of all sins and sufferings. It is 'निवृत्ति' or abstention from all egoistic endeavours that brings out perfect bliss.

In the B. Gītā, 'प्रवृत्ति' is not equated to 'आरम्भ' as done in the Nyāya system. Both the terms find their place in their sequential order in the following couplet (xiv. 12):

लोभः प्रवृत्तिरारम्भः कर्मणामशमः स्पृहा।
रजस्येतानि जायन्ते विवृद्धे भरतर्षभ॥

Greed, impulsion, initiative of actions, unrest and desire—all these spring up when *rajas* increases. Here 'प्रवृत्ति' means impetus to action ; it is the force of desire which motives all personal initiatives. The central interest of the Gītā lies in depicting the fact that the pure self is not associated with any work ; nor it makes any scheme or project. All egoistic commencements and their accessories originate from the rising *rajas*. He who initiates no action, but leaves all works to be accomplished by the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, is said to have transcended the *guṇas* (सर्वारम्भपरित्यागी गुणातीतः स उच्यते, xiv. 25).

From the evidence of the Gītā, we know that action and its various accessories formed an important topic of discussion in the ancient literature of Sāṃkhya. Thus states the Lord (xviii. 13-15) :—'Here from me, oh mighty armed, the five causes that are stated in the Sāṃkhya system (सांख्ये कृतान्ते प्रोक्तानि) to be indispensable for the accomplishment of all sorts of actions. These five are the physical body, the agent, the various organs and other instruments, various sorts of efforts and destiny. Whatever action, whether just or unjust, man undertakes by means of his body, speech or mind, these five are the indispensable rquisites. ([1] शरीरवाङ्मनोभिर्यत् कर्म प्रारभते नरः। न्याय्यं वा विपरीतं वा पञ्चैते तस्य हेतवः॥—xviii. 15).

1 Cp. प्रवृत्तिर्वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भः, NS. I. i. 17 ; also, ततश्च प्रयत्नस्तेन मनसा वाचा कायेन परिस्पन्दमानः परमनुगृह्णात्युपहन्ति वा, *Y. Bh.* iv. 11.

These couplets have been already referred to in the course of discussing the *karma-yonis* (pp. 276-277). Gītā's interest lies here in pointing out the fact that the pure self is undefiled ; it does not take up any initiative of action which proceeds from the *guṇas*. He who is of perverted intelligence looks upon the pure self as the doer.

We have traversed a long way off in the course of elucidating the brief statement of the Yuktidīpikā. The view point of Sāṃkhya lies in pointing out the fact that the tendeney of all the manifested entities is to proceed ultimately towards the acquisition of merit, demerit, and the like. This is what is meant by **'व्यक्तस्य प्रवृत्ति'**. Evidently, this culminates in **'भावसर्ग'**.

Let us now turn our attention towards the result of the evolved. This result, as we know from the statement of the Yuktidīpikā, is two-fold, visible as well as invisible. Of these, the visible result comprises achievement, contentment, disability and wrong notion. All these constitute what is called **'प्रत्ययसर्ग'**. The invisible result lies in reaping the harvest of *karman* during the cycle of rebirth.

The relation of **'प्रवृत्ति'** and **'फल'** deserves special attention. In the Nyāya system **'फल'** is defined to be the outcome of initiatives and defilements ; it means experience of happiness and misery[1]. The Sāṃkhya authorities also more or less advocate the same view. But the whole thing is viewed by them on the basis of their doctrine of causality. According to them, the result does not constitute an entirely new phenomenon ; it is already existent in the *vyakta* which is characterised by pleasure, pain and delusion. The efficient causes in the shape of merit, demerit, and the like that owe their origin to **'प्रवृत्ति'**, only help to manifest the result lying already in its dormant state in the *vyakta* or the evolved. In other words, these constitute means that help to bring the latent result into its present state ; these do not generate something new[2]. Likewise, 'result' also in its turn constitutes that

1 'प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितोऽर्थः फलम्', NS. I. i. 20 ; also see the *Bhāṣya*—'सुखदुःख-संवेदनं फलम् .

2 See, सतश्च फलस्य निमित्तं वर्त्तमानीकरणे समर्थं नापूर्वोत्पादने, सिद्धं निमित्तं नैमित्तिकस्य विशेषानुग्रहं कुरुते, नापूर्वमुत्पादयति, *Y. Bh.* iv. 12.

with a view to which appropriate merit, demerit and the like are brought about, meaning thereby that these are also present and not produced. Both the means and the result follow a sequential order[1]

We have thus made an attempt to show the connecting link between the *bhāvas* and **'प्रत्ययसर्ग'**, and in this connection we have spared no pains to tap the different sources. Of the *bhāvas*, it is ignorance which acting in association with demerit, attachment and lack of power gives rise to wrong notion or error. Similarly, lack of power in association with demerit, ignorance and attachment gives rise to disability of the organs. Merit and spiritual power acting in subservience to dispassion generate contentment. And finally it is wisdom which exclusively gives rise to achievement. Of these, it is achievement or *siddhi* that leads the individual towards liberation, while error and the like only create obstacles to its attainment.

An interesting account of this four-fold **'प्रत्ययसर्ग'** has been furnished by the author of the Yuktidīpikā. In course of suggesting various etymological meaning of the expression **'प्रत्ययसर्ग'**, he finally states that it is called so because it results from special deliberation (**अथवा प्रत्ययपूर्वकः सर्गः प्रत्ययसर्गः, बुद्धिपूर्वक इत्युक्तः**). He then goes to substantiate his view by the following quotation (p. 112/9-16) from Śāstra—an ancient authoritative text of Sāṃkhya :

एवं हि शास्त्रम्—"महदादिविशेषान्तः सर्गो बुद्धिपूर्वकत्वात् । उत्पन्नकार्य-करणस्तु माहात्म्यशरीर एकाकिनमात्मानमवेक्ष्याभिदध्यौ—हन्ताहं पुत्रान् स्रक्ष्ये ये मे कर्म करिष्यन्ति, ये मां परं चापरं च ज्ञास्यन्ति । तस्याभिध्यायतः पञ्चमुख्यस्रोतसो देवाः प्रादुर्बभूवुः । तेषूत्पन्नेषु न तुष्टिं लेभे, ततोऽन्ये तिर्यक्स्रोतसोऽष्टाविंशतिः प्रजज्ञिरे । तेष्वप्यस्य मतिर्नैव तस्थे । अथापरे नवोर्ध्वस्रोतसो देवाः प्रादुर्बभूवुः । तेष्वप्युत्पन्नेषु नैव कृतार्थमात्मानं मेने । ततोऽन्येऽष्टावर्वाक्स्रोतस उत्पेदुः । एवं तस्माद् ब्रह्मणोऽभिध्यानादुत्पन्नस्तस्मात् प्रत्ययसर्गः । स विपर्ययाख्यः, अशक्त्याख्यः तुष्ट्याख्यः सिद्ध्याख्यश्चेति ।"

1 See, फलं तु यमाश्रित्य यस्य प्रत्युत्पन्नता धर्मादेः, न ह्यपूर्वोपजनः, *Y. Bh.* IV. 11,

Māhātmya-śarīra[1], as it is clear from the concluding portion of the passage, refers here to Brahman or Hiraṇyagarbha, the lord of the universe. Having derived his physical body well equipped with the organs (**उत्पन्नकार्यकरण**) from *prakṛti* at the beginning of a cycle of creation, he found himself alone. He then thought within himself—"Let me procreate progenies that will serve my purpose, and will also feel for myself as well as for others". Thus being called up by his power of will, there appeared five gods indulging in extreme *tamas*. But he could not rest content by their evolution. So there appeared another batch of twenty-eight dominating in *tamas*. He was not satisfied even with them. Then appeared another batch of nine dominating in *sattva*. Still he could not think himself successful. And finally, there appeared another batch of eight dominating in *rajas*. In this way, these four batches became manifested at the call of Brahman. As this type of creation proceeds from power of will, so it is called '**प्रत्ययसर्ग**'. It should be always remembered that according to Sāṃkhya, the Lord Brahman or such other supreme personality cannot directly create anything. Whatever is called up by such a personality to come into existence is readily generated by the *prakṛti* from the background. The four batches of gods refer here to five erroneous conceptions, twenty-eight disabilities of the organs, nine contentments and eight achievements. Such a type of creation is also described in some of the Purāṇas[2].

1 For Māhātmya-śarīra, see above p. 222.

2 See the following couplets of the Vāyu-Purāṇa (vi. 35-64) :—

ब्रह्मा स्वयम्भूर्भगवान् सिसृक्षुर्विविधाः प्रजाः ।
ससर्ज सृष्टिं तद्रूपां कल्पादिषु यथा पुरा ॥
तस्याभिध्यायतः सर्गं तदा वै बुद्धिपूर्वकम् ।
प्रध्यानसमकालं वै प्रादुर्भूता स्तमोमयः ॥
तमो मोहो महामोहस्तामिस्रो ह्यन्धसंज्ञितः ।
अविद्या पञ्चपर्वैषा प्रादुर्भूता महात्मनः ॥
पञ्चधा चाश्रितः सर्गो ध्यायतः सोऽभिमानिनः ।
सर्वतस्तमसा चैव दीपः कुम्भवदावृतः ।
बहिरन्तः प्रकाशश्च शुद्धो निःसङ्ग एव च ॥

The different kinds of '**स्रोतस्**' or streams occurring in the passage need some clarification. In this connection it is stated in the Yuktidīpikā (p. 165/14-15) that '**ऊर्ध्वस्रोतस्**' abounds in *sattva*, '**अर्वाक्स्रोतस्**' in *rajas*, '**तिर्यक्स्रोतस्**' and '**मुख्यस्रोतस्**' in *tamas*. This is also corroborated by the account of the Vāyu-Purāṇa and Mārkaṇḍeya as referred to above. The main difference in every case is thus brought out by the prevailing *guṇa*. The entire biological order of creation is classified into four heads according to difference of *srotas*. The etymological meaning of the expression '**मुख्यस्रोतस्**' cannot be precisely stated. In this connection it is stated in the Vāyu-Purāṇa (vi. 39-40) that intellect and other principal organs (**मुख्यानि करणानि**) of the beings belonging to this *srotas* are totally enveloped by darkness. These are like burning lamps inside a jar. So these cannot manifest themselves at all. This is why plants and such other immobiles

यस्मात्तैः संवृता बुद्धिर्मुख्यानि करणानि च ।
तस्मात्ते संवृतात्मानो नगा मुख्याः प्रकीर्तिताः ॥
मुख्यसर्गं तथाभूतं दृष्ट्वा ब्रह्मा ह्यसाधकम् ।
अप्रसन्नमनाः सोऽथ ततोन्या (ततोऽन्यं ?) सोऽभ्यमन्यत ॥
तस्याभिध्यायतस्तत्र तिर्यक्स्रोतस्ततः स्मृतम् ।
तमोबहुत्वात्ते सर्वे ह्यज्ञानबहुलाः स्मृताः ।
उत्पथग्राहिणश्चापि ते ध्यानाद्ध्यानाभिमानिनः ॥
तिर्यक्स्रोतस्तु दृष्ट्वा वै द्वितीयं विश्वमीश्वरः ।
अहंकृत्य अहम्माना अष्टाविंशद्विधात्मकाः ॥
एकादशेन्द्रियवधा नवधा चोदयस्तथा ।
अष्टौ च तारकाद्याश्च तेषां शक्तिवधाः स्मृताः ॥
अन्तप्रकाशास्ते सर्वे आवृताश्च बहिः पुनः ।
यस्मात् तिर्यक् प्रवर्तेत तिर्यक्स्रोताः स उच्यते ॥

....

मुख्यसर्गश्चतुर्थस्तु मुख्या वै स्थावराः स्मृताः ।
तिर्यक्स्रोताश्च यः सर्गस्तिर्यक्योनिः स पञ्चमः ॥
तथोर्ध्वस्रोतसां षष्ठो देवसर्गस्तु स स्मृतः ।
तथाऽर्वाक्स्रोतसां सर्गः सप्तमः स तु मानुषः ॥

For similar description, also see Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāṇa, 47. 14-35.

are included within this particular *srotas*. The five kinds of 'विपर्यय' are innate in this degreaded order of creation. Animals, birds and reptiles are classified under 'तिर्यक्स्रोतस्'. Here also the element of *tamas* is predominant. But it is not so intense as in the immobiles. Different kinds of organic disabilities are innate in them. The trend of the stream of their life is horizontal (तिर्यक् प्रवर्तते). This speaks of the fact that the movement of their inner life is neither upward nor downward; for no merit and demerit can be acquired in these lives. Under 'ऊर्ध्वस्रोतस्' come the gods. The trend of their stream of life is upward (ऊर्ध्वं प्रवर्तते) ; for they always aspire after heaven. Here the element of *sattva* is predominant. Different kinds of contentment are innate in them. Lastly, mankind is classified under 'अर्वाक्स्रोतस्'. The trend of their stream of life is downward. Here the element of *rajas* is predominant. Achievement is possible only in these lives.

Nothing more can be known of the different kinds of *srotas*[1] from the existing texts of Sāṃkhya. Of the four-fold 'प्रत्ययसर्ग', it is *siddhi* which alone leads an individual towards liberation. It can be attained by human beings only. And even of them, an infinitesimal fraction is fit to pursue its course. Though the current of *siddhi* is perpetually flowing from *prakṛti* which is its fountain source, still its flow is obstructed by the remaining three other aspects of 'प्रत्ययसर्ग'. This is why *siddhi* is not possible in all the orders of creation. Thus states the author of the Yukti-dīpikā (p. 163/4-9) :—"नित्यप्रवृत्तस्यापि प्रधानात् सिद्धिस्रोतसो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिप्रतिबन्धात् सर्वप्राणिष्वप्रवृत्तिर्भवति । विपर्ययात् तावत् स्थावरेषु, ते हि मुख्यस्रोतसो विपर्ययात्मानः । अशक्तेस्तिर्यक्षु, ते हि तिर्यक्स्रोतसोऽशक्त्यात्मानः । तुष्टेर्देवेषु, ते

1 The different kinds of *srotas* are also referred to in the dialogue between Janaka and Yājñavalkya occurring in the *Mokṣadharma* section of the *Mbh.* (xii. 310. 23-24). But 'मुख्यस्रोतस्' does not find its place there. Again, in the *Anugītā* section, description is made of the three kinds of *srotas*. These are :—(1) अवाक्स्रोतस्, (2) अर्वाक्स्रोतस्, and (3) ऊर्ध्वस्रोतस्, Of these, अवाक्स्रोतस् includes plants, animals, birds, reptiles, worms, insects and even men who are naturally dumb, deaf, blind or suffering from any other organic defect (Mbh. xiv. 36. 25).

ह्यूर्ध्वस्रोतस स्तुष्ट्यात्मानः । मानुषास्त्वर्वाक्स्रोतसः संसिद्ध्यात्मानः । तस्मात् त एव तारकादिषु प्रवर्तन्ते । सत्त्वरजस्तमसां चाङ्गाङ्गिभावनियमाद् विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिभिः प्रतिहन्यन्त इति न सर्वेषां सर्वदा सिद्धिर्भवति"

Now, *siddhi* is stated to be eight-fold. It comprises :—(1) reasoning, (2) oral instruction from the preceptor, (3) study of philosopical texts, (4,5 & 6) suppression of three-fold misery, (7) acquisition of friends for guidance towards spiritual upliftments and (8) purification[1] to be attained by discriminative knowledge. All these result from wisdom. So none of these can be attained by those who indulge in erroneous views. Consequently there cannot be any *siddhi* in the world of immobiles where 'विपर्यय' is innate.

Similarly, the twenty eight disabilities also obstruct *siddhi*. Now, if we turn our attention to the eight *siddhis* as enumerated above, it becomes evident that these specially depend upon hearing, reasoning, concentration of mind, grasping and pursuing some rules of conduct and discipline. So these cannot be practised by those who suffer from organic incapacities. Then again, the highest *siddhi* rests upon discriminative knowledge. This is possible only when the *buddhi* reaches the highest degree of development. Such a stage cannot be attained by those who suffer from intellectual incapacities ; such beings are always carried away by the current of *tamas*, and consequently their intellect remains blunt for ever. This being the case, no *siddhi* can be expected in animals, birds and such other lower lives indulging in *tamas*. These are naturally equipped with dull organs and stupified intellect.

Likewise, the nine *tuṣṭis*, four internal and five external, are also looked upon by the wise as barriers to *siddhi*. Of these, the first four rest upon the belief that liberation can be attained through the grace of *prakṛti*, asceticism, time or good luck. The external five depend upon the renunciation of the sensations of colour, taste, odour, touch and sound.

1 'दानञ्च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ'. Here 'दान' does not mean 'charity'. It is derived from the root दैप् शोधने, and hence means 'purification'.

This absence of attachment to sense data arises due to the defects involved in their earning, saving, wastage, enjoyment and killing. The gods and some yogins generally rejoice in these *tuṣṭis*. They think that the highest end can be attained by depending entirely upon them, and so they do not care to acquire discriminative knowledge by which the *puruṣa* can be differentiated from the *prakṛti*. The result is that they remain absorbed in one or other of the eight *prakṛtis* for a certain period and when the time limit is exhausted they are turned out of their celestial abodes, and are forced again to share the miseries of the world. This being the case, *siddhi* cannot be expected even in gods, demi-gods and such other higher lives as naturally rejoice in contentments. Consequently, liberation is beyond the reach of even the heavenly bodies. The value of *siddhi* is much higher than that of *tuṣṭi*. Now, *tuṣṭi* is to rest content with less than what ought to be achieved ; *siddhi*, on the otherhand, lies in achieving the desired end. Again, the former proceeds from dispassion, while the latter does so from wisdom. And it is wisdom through which final release can be attained.

Human beings are best suited for practising *siddhi*. They occupy the middle plane where the *rajas* element is predominant. Now, it is well known to the students of Sāṃkhya that all activities proceed from *rajas*. *Siddhi* also depends upon pursuing some regulated course of activity. So the *rajas* element cannot be totally neglected by those who intend to proceed along the path of *siddhi*. Then again, speaking with reference to *siddhi*, the value of the physical body of a human being is immense ; it is really an asset. Here all the organs can function equally. So the question of organic disability which obstructs *siddhi* does not naturally arise here. Further, the migrants who are placed in the higher and the lower planes of existence are naturally provided with a **'भोगदेह'** which speaks of the fact that their physical bodies are specially suited for enjoying the fruits of merits and demerits acquired in their previous lives. These bodies are not capable of undertaking any such new activity as will yield further result to

be enjoyed in future. But the case is otherwise with respect to human beings occupying the middle plane. They aquire a **'कर्मदेह'** which is distinct from the **'भोगदेह'** as mentioned above. Their physical bodies are not only capable of enjoying the fruits of their past deeds, but also are fit to pursue new course of *karman* whose harvest is to be reaped later on. All other beings occupying higher or lower planes of existence are naturally deprived of this privilege. Now, if an individual is really bent upon achieving *siddhi*, he can conquer all the obstacles that may stand in his way. In order to achieve that end, his first duty should be to divert his downward course of activity towards some higher end. He should no longer hanker after the reward of his own *karman*. He should take up such course of activities as may help to open the barricaded door of wisdom. In this way he is sure to achieve different *siddhis* one by one. And finally with the appearance of discriminative wisdom, he attains supreme perfection that brings out complete and final suppression of the three-fold misery.

It has been already pointed out above that erroneous notion, organic disability and contentment are impediments to *siddhi*. Conversely, these three impediments also are undermined at the rise of *siddhi*. Now, *siddhi* starts from 'reasoning' (**ऊह**). And correct reasoning is possible only when the mind is keen to find out the truth whatever that truth may be. The mind at this stage should be absolutely free from any bias. Such is the mind of the true philosopher. His mind approaches all objects without being obscured by any emotion. His only aim is to attain correct knowledge of the objects. The result is that erroneous notion begins to vanish gradually.

Even such a mind is not always free from error, because it has to depend upon the sense-organs for the supply of the premises. It has no other avenue to derive knowledge. If the defective sense-organ offers a wrong premise, then the conclusion cannot be right however acute the reasoning may be. Then again, what will the reasoning mind alone do if the disabled organ fails to offer any premise at all ? In that case no knowledge can be acquired. This

dependence upon the organs can be averted if the mind attains further liberation. When that stage is attained, it no longer needs the services of the sense-organs. It then knows everything directly. Such is the mind of the seer. It is superior to that of the philosopher. One knows everything by intuitive wisdom, while the other knows by reasoning. The mind of the seer is purged of all impurities; it is evershining and is unbounded like the sky (बुद्धिसत्त्वं हि भास्वरमाकाशकल्पम्, Y. Bh. i. 36). All knowables whether past, present, future, distant, near, intercepted, subtle or gross are reflected herein. Wisdom attained at this stage always bears truth; there is not even a trace of falsehood in it (ऋतम्भरा तत्र प्रज्ञा, Y. S. i. 48). It refers to particulars, and so it is distinct from inferential and verbal cognitions which have got only the generals for their objects (श्रुतानुमानप्रज्ञाभ्यामन्यविषया विशेषार्थत्वात्, Y. S. i. 49). This stage is attained only when discriminative wisdom prevails. It is the highest *siddhi*. Cognition derived at this stage is intuitional; its sphere extends everywhere; it operates under all circumstances; it produces knowledge of all objects simultaneously (तारकं सर्वविषयं सर्वथाविषयमक्रमञ्चेति विवेकजं ज्ञानम्, Y. S. iii. 55). When this *siddhi* is achieved erroneous notions are automatically vanquished like the nocturnal darkness by the rising sun. Organic disabilities also can no longer create any obstruction at this stage. For, the mind then knows everything by intuition, it no longer needs the assistance of the organs. When such a stage is achieved, liberation becomes imminent. Having attained this stage, the individual no longer rejoices even in different contentments. Thus from the dialogue of Āvaṭya and Jaigīṣavya as found in the Yoga-bhāṣya (iii. 18), we know that even the mastery over the *prakṛti* which forms the highest form of contentment is placed to the credit of pain by the wise. The joy of contentment is invaluable only in comparison with the pleasures of sensation. Compared to the bliss of liberation it is nothing but pain only. Briefly speaking, if the current of *siddhi* finds a channel to flow, the three other currents of wrong notion, organic disability and contentment are automatically dried up. The individual then freely moves without being touched by pleasures and pains of the world.

PURUṢA

Puruṣa of Sāṃkhya constitutes nothing but pure consciousness. It is the soul of all living beings. It is that principle which breathes life into matter. It is postulated to account for the intetlligent order of the manifested entities, and also to account for the subjective aspect of reality. It is pure, undefiled, uncaused, eternal, immutable, inactive, unqualified, and without any part. It is the silent spectator of the workings of *prakṛti*. Ordinarily it finds expression in a physical body having life in it. The difference in the degree of expression is due to the nature of the physical body which constitutes its substratum. It is obscure in the world of plants and resplendent in the superior order of beings.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa and his commentators advance the following arguments in support of the existence of *puruṣa* (kā, 17). (1) Since all composite bodies are for the use of some one other than themselves, so *puruṣa* exists. For instance, a bed which forms an assemblage of pillow, blanket, mosquitocurtain and such other things, is meant for the purpose of some one who sleeps upon it. Similarly, the physical body consisting of the organs and the elements is a composite one and as such it is meant for the sake of some one who is nobody but *puruṣa*. The fact is that the products of the *guṇas* are not for their own sake; they are to serve the purpose of something other than themselves. (2) Since all manifestations of *prakṛti* are objects forming different permutations and combinations of the *guṇas*, there must be a subject, a knower of these manifestations, who should be devoid of the *guṇas*. (3) Since there must be a presiding entity for which *prakṛti* produces this variegated universe, and that is no other but *puruṣa*. (4) Since there must be some one to enjoy the products of *prakṛti* which are either agreeable or disagreeable, and that is none but *puruṣa* who exists for the sake of enjoying them. (5) Since there is a tendency towards liberation, *purusa* must exist. Now, liberation consists of the absolute and final cessation of pain, and as such it cannot be attained by *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* and such other principles for the simple reason that they by their very nature contain pain as one of their integral components and so there is no

chance on their part to be absolved of their constituent. The conclusion is therefore that there must be some entity other than *buddhi* and such other products of *prakṛti* that is capable of attaining liberation, and this is no other but *puruṣa*. By these sets of arguments, Īsvarakṛṣṇa and his commentators go to establish *puruṣa* as distinct from *prakṛti* and its products.

Patañjali and specially the author of the Yogabhāṣya are also found to marshall similar arguments against the Buddhists who are not prepared to maintain the separate existence of the self apart from the mind (*citta*). Thus it is argued in the Yogasūtra[1] (iv. 24) that the mind[2] diversified with innumerable impressions of *karman* exists for the sake of some one other than itself because it is a composite body and as such it works in association with others. Here the author of the Bhāṣya states that just as a house which has been brought into existence by various materials put together is for the sake of another who dwells in it, so also the mind diversified with innumerable impressions is possessed of aggregates and as such it cannot exist for its own sake The fact is that the mental phenomena of pleasure and pain do not exist for their own sake, nor does knowledge which also is an aspect of the thinking faculty exist for its own interest ; all these serve the purpose of another who is none but *puruṣa*. It is he who experiences the pleasurable and painful cognitions presented by the mind. Similarly, knowledge is also meant for his sake, for it brings out his emancipation. In this way, the mind serves the double purpose of *puruṣa*—one being enjoyment and the other emancipation. It may, however, be argued that the mind also is for the sake of another of the same nature. But this would ultimately involve *regressus ad infinitum*. All these can be avoided by postulating the existence of *puruṣa* who is not a composite body and so does not function in association with others. Hence it is

1 'तदसंख्येयवासनाभिश्चित्रमपि परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वात्' ।

2 ***Manas*** (mind) and *citta* are not differentiated in the Yoga-bhāṣya (iv. 23). This view fully tallies with that of Vindhyavāsin according to whom everything is experienced in the mind.

futile to maintain by reasoning, however subtle it may be, that the mind can be made to displace its everpresent cogniser, the *puruṣa*. Briefly speaking, there exists a knower apart from the knowables, a seer apart from the objects to be seen, an experiencer apart from the cognitions to be experienced. But the Buddhists strive to disregard altogether the separate existence of a knower or a seer or an experiencer. Their view is criticised in Y. S. iv. 16-24.

The relation of *puruṣa* with *buddhi* has been already treated in detail (pp. 185-189). Conjunction of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* also has been explained above (pp. 220-236), and in doing so several points as regards *puruṣa* have received our careful attention. One important point in this connection now remains to be discussed, and this is plurality of *puruṣa*. From common experience it is found that the world is experienced by different beings in different ways. The same element appears to be agreeable to one while it turns to be disagreeable to another. This tends to suggest that there are many *puruṣas*. The following stock argument is avdanced in the Sāṃkhya texts in support of this doctrine of plurality. If there were one and the same *puruṣa* existing in all the bodies, then on the birth of one all would be born, on the death of one all would be dead. Then again, one becoming blind all would be blind, one becoming mad, all would be mad, and so on. All these difficulties can be averted by maintaining plurality of *puruṣa*.

However, these arguments may appear to be sound at the first instance. But if minutely examined, these cannot be said to be based upon solid foundation. Such arguments may be applied with reference to the empirical selves as are not still freed from the chain of *prakṛti*. Birth, death and disability of organs occur in the kingdom of *prakṛti*, but the pure self is not to be touched by them. The difference among pure selves cannot be established by these lame arguments. It reminds us of the following observation made by Vārṣagaṇya in refuation to the doctrine of plurality of *prakṛti*: **"मूर्तिव्यवधिजातिभेदाभावान्नास्ति मूलपृथक्त्वम्"**. . Herein the revered Sāṃkhya teacher goes to speak of the fact that there are no different

1 Quoted in the *Yoga-bhāṣya* iii. 53 ; also see above, p. 228 *infra*.

units of primordial *prakṛti* as there cannot be observed any difference of form or of intervening space or of genus among them; for the notion of distinction among several entities arises only when one or other of these differentiating factors exists. This very argument can be equally applied against the doctrine of plurality of *puruṣa* also. The notion of plurality must depend upon some differentiating factor. But there cannot be any difference of form among several units of pure self; nor can this difference be brought out by intervening space, for all selves are held to be ubiquitous; nor can this distinction be brought out by difference in genus, for all pure selves belong to one genus. Indeed, the doctrine of plurality of *puruṣa* is a drawback of the Sāṃkhya system.

Misery and its source

Sāṃkhya is a speculative science; it aims at liberating man from his worldly existence. In no other system except Buddhism, does the pessimistic view of the universe find such a distinct expression as in Sāṃkhya. This system seeks to establish the fact that everything in the kingdom of the *guṇas* is painful. An object may appear to be pleasant at the outset, but if it is perfectly analysed it is found that it contains the seed of misery in its womb. When one enjoys an object what happens ultimately is that the very experience creates a burning desire for more with the result that instead of bringing out gratification of the senses, it only adds fuel to the flame. And whenever that desire is unfulfilled, as is often the case most likely, it leads to uneasiness, disappointment and affliction. Even in the course of enjoying an object, there is always an apprehension of some antagonistic element that may disturb it, and so it is not unalloyed. Then again, he who hankers after the objects of pleasure cannot enjoy them without favouring some and afflicting others. As a result of this he acquires merit and demerit, and thereby adds more to his accumlated stock. Finally, all manifestations are the workings of the *guṇas* which are hostile to one another. So they cannot always afford pleasure to all. This is why Patañjali emphatically states that all is accounted to be pain by the wise (ii.15). However, the ordinary people who are

accustomed to get themselves plunged into the whirl-pool of metempsychosis are not so much affected by these painful objects. But the case is otherwise with the wise man. He cannot endure even the negligible fraction of misery. He is very sensitive. This is why the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya compares him to an eye-ball (अक्षिपात्रकल्पो हि विद्वान्, ii. 15). Just as the eye-ball cannot tolerate the touch of even a fine thread of wool, but the coarser part of the body is very little affected by such a touch; such is the distinction existing between the wise and the common people. This is why the wise man is very keen to free himself from all sorts of sorrows and sufferings.

Puruṣa is everpure and free. But it experiences misery due to its conjunction with *prakṛti*. So long as this conjunction exists, it thinks itself to be one with *prakṛti* and thereby attributes to its own self miseries and such other properties which actually belong to the latter. Just as the transparent crystal is contaminated by the red flower lying very close to it, similarly the *puruṣa* also becomes contaminated by its close association with the *prakṛti*. The cause of conjunction of these two distinct and separate principles is 'अविद्या' (nescience). Patañjali defines it as 'cognising the non-eternal as the eternal, the impure as the pure, the painful as the pleasant and the non-self as the self' (Y. S. ii. 5). Speaking of its characteristic feature, the author of the Bhāṣya observes that it should be regarded as real (वस्तुसतत्वं विज्ञेयम्). It is neither valid cognition, nor absence of valid cognition; it forms a kind of knowledge which is opposed to right knowledge (एवमविद्या न प्रमाणं न प्रमानाभाव:, किन्तु विद्याविपरीतं ज्ञानान्तरमविद्येति).

Avidyā is classified into five heads. These are—तमस् (darkness), मोह (delusion), महामोह (deep delusion), तामिस्र (gloom) and अन्धतामिस्र (dark gloom). Vācaspati attributes the doctrine of five-fold *avidyā* to Vārṣagaṇya (*Tk*, 47). Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not use the term '*avidyā*' anywhere in his Kārikā. In his opinion, bondage is brought out by '*viparyaya*' (विपर्ययाद्दिष्यते बन्ध: *kā*.44). It constitutes false conception of a thing whose real form does not correspond to such conception. Thus states Patañjali—'विपर्ययो मिथ्याज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम्' (*Y.S.* i.8). It has also got five aspects (पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा:, Kā.7), and these fully correspond to those of *avidyā*. This goes to show that the two entities do not differ fundamentally. The author of the Yoga-bhāṣya also

makes very little distinction between *avidyā* and *viparyaya*. In ii. 24, he explains *avidyā* as potency which is left out by false conception (अविद्या—विपर्ययज्ञानवासनेत्यर्थः). Again in iv. 30, he explicitly states *viparyaya* as the cause of worldly existence (यस्माद् विपर्ययो भवस्य कारणम्). Further interest is created in ii. 23, where he states that it is *'adarśana'* (non-discrimination) that brings out the conjunction of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. He opens here a symposium to explain this *'adarśana'*, and in this connection he puts forward several alternative conceptions of the term as offered by different authorities of Sāṃkhya. However, all these conceptions form common ground of the conjunction of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Even Vātsyāyana also in his Nyāya-bhāṣya (III. ii. 68) criticises this doctrine of *adarśana*. It thus goes to show that the doctrine found a prominent place in the circle of the ancient teachers of Sāṃkhya. Īśvarakṛṣṇa also hints at this doctrine in one place (न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य, kā. 61). Thus we find that the cause of conjunction is somewhere stated to be *avidyā*, somewhere *viparyaya* and elsewhere *adarśana*. All these terms, however, differ very little fundamentally.

This non-discriminative knowledge whether it is called **'अविद्या'** or **'विपर्यय'** or **'अदर्शन'** leads to the fatal confusion between the self and the non-self. So long as this erroneous notion is not removed by discriminative wisdom, liberation from the trap of *prakṛti* is beyond expectation.

Such a kind of error involves two entities. It arises due to failure of noticing the distinction between them and thus virtually identifying one with the other. Both the entities that are involved here are reals. But it is their fancied relation which is erroneous. This conception of error held by Sāṃkhya is also referred to in the Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa[1]. Error is also explained in the Sāṃkhya-Sūtra[2]. According to it the illusion of redness in the transparent crystal involves two objects, the crystal and redness. Both of these two are given there. But the relation between them is fancied; it is not given. Thus error involves what is given as well as what is not. This is what is called **'सदसत्ख्याति'**.

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1 See, 'ननु अतत्त्वे तत्त्वज्ञानमिति शास्त्रकारेणैव दर्शितः संसर्गभ्रम इति'. Śāstrakāra here refers to Sāṃkhya, and this can be known from the statement of the Tattva-dīpana 'शास्त्रकारेण सांख्येनेत्यर्थः'—*Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣyam*, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, part I, p. 166.

2 'सदसत्ख्यातिर्बाधाबाधात्', V. 56.

Scholars are generally of opinion that the early Sāṃkhya advocated 'अख्याति'. This view does not seem to be plausible as in the case of 'अख्याति' nothing of what was cognised before is sublated (बाधित). The school of Prabhākara in expounding this doctrine maintains that further knowledge of the object involved in error does not supplant but only supplements what is given before. But this view is not whole-heartedly supported by the author of the Yoga-bhāṣya. Thus in explaining 'विपर्यय' he states that false knowledge is sublated by right one. This he illustrates by the case of the visual perception of two moons which is contradicted by the right perception of one moon (तत्र प्रमाणेन बाधनमप्रमाणस्य दृष्टम्। तद् यथा—द्विचंद्रदर्शनं सद्विषयेणैकचंद्रदर्शनेन बाध्यत इति, *Y.Bh.* i. 8). In explaining 'अदर्शन' also, he resorts to this view. Here also he is found to state that 'discrimination contradicts non-discrimination' (दर्शनमदर्शनस्य प्रतिद्वंद्वीति, *Y.Bh.* ii. 23). But in अख्याति, the previous knowledge is only supplemented and not contradicted by further knowledge. However, some light may be obtained from his conception of 'अविद्या' where he is found to state that it constitutes a sort of knowledge which is opposed to right knowledge. Thus he states—विद्याविपरीतं ज्ञानान्तरमविद्येति (ii. 5). The term 'विपरीत' is significant here. It goes to indicate that 'विपरीतख्याति' has been advocated in the Yoga-bhāṣya Further, it is interesting to note that Udayana makes no distinction between विपरीतख्याति and अन्यथाख्याति. Thus he states in the Ātmatattva-viveka—'तथाहि विपरीतमवगतं मयेति लौकिकी प्रतिपत्तिः, अन्यथाख्यातिरिति च वैनयिकी' (pp. 662-663, Bibliotheca Indica edition). In his Tātparya-pariśuddhi also he reiterates the same view by the following line:—एवं सिद्धे कृत्वा विपर्ययमन्यथाख्यातिरूपमिति शेषः (p. 406, Bibliotheca Indica edition). The fact is that the explanations of these two *khyātis* may differ in matters of detail, but their underlying principle is the same. However, the term (अन्यथाख्याति) does not appear anywhere in the Nyāya-bhāṣya or the Vārttika. It first of all occurs in the Tātparya-ṭīkā of Vācaspati. The author of the Sāṃkhya-sūtra does not go to any extreme. He takes a synthetic attitude, and so he advocates 'सदसत्ख्याति'. Udayana also refers to such a view in his Tātparya-pariśuddhi, but he totally disregards the same (सदसत्त्वेन गृह्णातीति न विकल्पितमतिनिर्देशत्वात्, p. 413).

Liberation

At the rise of discriminative wisdom, the paradox by which *puruṣa* thinks itself to be one with *prakṛti* comes to an end. But mere glimpses of discrimination cannot wipe out the seed of misery for ever. In order to attain full freedom, its flow must be undisturbed and should admit of no intermission even for a moment (**विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः** Y. S. ii. 26). The seven stages of

enlightenment are perceived at this state one after another. These are as follows (Y. Bh. ii. 27): (1) Misery to be escaped from has been known, and nothing further remains to be known of it ; (2) the cause of misery has dwindled away, and nothing remains to be dwindled away of it ; (3) removal of misery has been directly perceived by means of inhibitive trance ; (4) the way to escape misery by means of discriminative wisdom has been contemplated. These four constitnte the freedom of wisdom from external phenomena. The remaining three refer to the freedom of the mind. These are : (5) The *buddhi* has served its final purpose ; (6) The *guṇas* are hurriedly disappearing like supportless blocks of stones rolling down from the mountain peak, never to rise up again ; (7) being void of the *guṇas*, *puruṣa* then shines forth in its own lustre and becomes stainless and isolated.

Bondage and liberatien actually belong to *buddhi*. These are only ascribed to the *puruṣa* who is without any attribute, just as defeat and victory belonging to the soldiers are ascribed to the king. But *buddhi* cannot be said to have attained full liberation until it reaches the highest elevation. This is possible only when there is non-attachment even to illumination of wisdom. The result is that there arises a constant flow of discrimination culminating in the trance known as 'धर्ममेघ' (Y. S. iv. 29). By its attainment, the different kinds of afflictions and the potentialities of good and bad actions are uprooted for ever. Like seeds baked on fire, these are no longer capable of sprouting up again. *Buddhi* at this state becomes purged of all inpurities ; various defilements and obscuring elements existing therein are washed away by the incessent shower of the undefiled water of 'धर्ममेघ'. It then becomes serene and tranquil like a sea without any wave. Its range becomes unbounded. Wisdom is then infinite. And in comparison to this infinity, that which is regarded as knowable by the ordinary people appears to be most insignificant to the wise, just as the glowing worm in the unbounded space. In this state, *buddhi* shines like a transparent mirror, but the owner cares very little to see his face reflected anymore upon it.

This trance of 'धर्ममेघ' is most appraised in the system of Patañjali. This is the result of dispassion (वैराग्य) of highest order. This dispassion should not be confused with the ordinary one which refers to that state of mind when there arises aversion towards the worldly objects of enjoyment because of the defects involved in their earning, saving, decaying, and the like. Such a state of aversion results in 'contentment' (तुष्टि) which again in its turn brings out absorption into the eight-fold *prakṛti* for a specified period (वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः, kā. 45). This state also is considered to be a sort of bondage, and it is what is called 'प्राकृतिकबन्ध'. It is connected with the belief in one or other of the eight aspects of *prakṛti* as the highest reality. Evidently, it is ignorance which works at the root of such a kind of dispassion and this is why it is not much estimated by Īśvarakṛṣṇa and his commentators. Real dispassion steps in when there arises consciousness of freedom from attachment not only towards worldly objects of enjoyment but also to spiritual ones, such as heaven, abnormal power. absorption into *prakṛti* and the like. Such a stage is attained when the individnal by virtue of intellectual entightenment becomes fully conscious of the defects of the objects of the senses. But the highest order of dispassion prevails when there is absolute non-attachment to the entire kingdom of the *guṇas*, and such a state is achieved only when there arises a constant flow of spiritual illumination (तत् परं पुरुषख्यातेर्गुणवैतृष्ण्यम् , Y.S.i. 16). Evidently this refers to धर्ममेघ which arises due to aversion even to intellectual enlightenment called wisdom. (प्रसंख्यानेऽप्यकुसीदः) ; for, wisdom also forms an aspect of *buddhi* and as such virtually belongs to the province of the *guṇas*. When such a stage is attained *buddhi* becomes absolutely taintless. It becomes intensely illuminated, and nothing but spiritual entightenment shines forth therein. At the rise of such a type of dispassion, the blessed one reflects within himself thus : "Whatever was to be obtained has been attained ; the afflictions that should have dwindled have now dwindled ; the closely inter-locked joints of the successive worldly existences which so long remain unshattered involving death after birth and birth after death, have now been shattered" (प्राप्तं प्रापणीयम् , क्षीणाः क्षेतव्याः क्लेशाः, छिन्नः श्लिष्टपर्वा भवसंक्रमो यस्याविच्छेदाज्जनित्वा म्रियते मृत्वा

च जायत इति—Y. Bh. i, 16). Really speaking, dispassion is the highest consummation that can be reached by wisdom, and isolation is inseparably connected with it (ज्ञानस्यैव पराकाष्ठा वैराग्यम्, एतस्यैव नान्तरीयकं कैवल्यमिति, *ibid*).

This superior order of dispassion is not referred to anywhere in the Kārikā. However, the author of the Yuktidīpikā does not leave it unnoticed. He speaks of two-fold dispassion, one ordinary and the other uncommon. The former is nourished by ignorance, and as such it is disregarded by those who strive to attain final release. The latter is nourished by wisdom, and so it is highly estimated. Thus he states--'dispassion belonging to the wise can not bring out absorption into *prakṛti* (नहि ज्ञानिवैराग्यम् अलं प्रकृतिलयाय, p. 151/16). Otherwise, even that type of dispassion which is innate with Kapila would also ultimately bring out bondage. But this is absurd.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa holds wisdom to be the exclusive means of liberation. Thus he states---'*prakṛti* binds herself by the seven aspects and liberates herself by the one (kā. 65). Evidently, this one is no other but wisdom. By its constant culture, *puruṣa* can realise the fact that he is not the empiric individual, that nothing of the world of *prakṛti* belongs to him and that he is distinct from *prakṛti*[1]. This discrimination gives rise to pure and absolute wisdom. Hearin ceases for ever the creative activity of *prakṛti* with reference to the particular individual who has attained such a stage. *Puruṣa* also at this stage becomes serene and tranquil. Being aware of the fact that *prakṛti* is not in a position to bind him further, he beholds her with indifference. *Prakriti* also in her turn realises that she has been understood by the *puruṣa*, and so becomes disinterested to him for ever. Speaking of her nature it has been already pointed out by the author of the Kārikā that '*prakṛti* is like a bashful maiden ; whenever she can understand that she has been seen by the *puruṣa* what happens is that she ceases to expose herself anymore to his sight' (kā. 61).

1 See, 'नास्मि न मे नाहम्' (kā. 64). This is variously explained by different commentators. The explanation occurring in the Jayamangalā has been adopted here.

Though their union does not break up forthwith even after the attainment of discriminative wisdom, still there remains no possibility of further evolution.

The physical body of the individual continues to exist for some time even after the attainment of this state. It is not forthwith dissolved. Just as the potter's wheel by reason of its acuqired velocity continues to revolve for some time even after finishing the earthen pot, so also as long as the impressions left by previously acquired merit and demerit are not completely exhausted the individual has to retain his physical body even after the attainment of supreme perfection. This continuity of physical body for a time is called 'शेषवृत्ति' in the Sāṃkhya litereture. It constitutes one of the ten fundamental principles of Sāṃkhya[1]. Afflictions are uprooted at this stage, good or bad *karman* cease to operate anylonger, and consquently the wise man becomes liberated at this state even when alive (क्लेशकर्मनिवृत्तौ जीवन्नेव विद्वान् विमुक्तो भवति, Y. Bh. iv. 30). Such a state is necessary for imparting perfect wisdom to the seeking disciple. The person who has attained this state is really fit to be a spiritual guide. Otherwise, the process would be the same when one blind man leads another blind man, and consequently the result would be disappointing.

When the previous stock of merit and demerit is completely exhausted and no trace of them is left upon the *buddhi*, the physical boody has got no necessity of retaining its existence any longer. And with the separation of the physical body, the *puruṣa* attains final and absolute release, and never returns to the whirlpool of existence.

1 The author of the Jayamangalā enumerates these ten fundamental principles by a quotation from someother earlier text of Sāṃkhya. Thus he states :—तथा चाह संग्रहकारः—

अस्तित्वमेकत्वमथार्थवत्त्वं पारार्थ्यमन्यत्वमतो निवृत्तिः ।
योगो वियोगो बहवः पुमांसः स्थितिः शरीरस्य च शेषवृत्तिः ॥

But the author of this Saṃgraha (compilation) whom he refers to is not named anywhere. Paramārtha also quotes this couplet in his Chinese version.

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ABBREVIATIONS

B E F E O.	Bulletin de l' Echole Francaise d' Extreme—Orient
B. Gītā	Bhagavad-Gītā.
Bṛ. Up.	Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad
B. S.	Brahma-sūtra
Ch. Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
D.	Dīgha Nikāya
I. H. Q.	Indian Historical Quarterly
J. R, A. S.	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland
Mbh.	Mahābhārata
N. Bh.	Nyāya Bhāṣya
NG.	Nachrichten von der Königliche Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen
NS.	Nyāya Sūtra
Sk.	Sāṃkhya Kārikā
Śvet. Up.	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
Tk.	Tattva Kaumudī
Y. S.	Yoga Sūtra
Y. Bh.	Yoga Bhāṣya

INDEX

PROPER NAMES AND SCHOOLS

1 Mādhava is also referred to by Karṇakagomin in his sub-commentary on the Pramāṇa-vārttika of Dharmakīrti. See, "यथा सांख्यनाश(य?)क-माधवेन सांख्यसिद्धान्तस्यान्यथारचनं कृतम्', p. 595, *l.* 21-2,—ed. Rahula Sankrityayana, Allahabad, 1938.

TECHNICAL TERMS AND EXPRESSIONS

ALPHABETICAL INDEX OF SANSKRIT TERMS AND EXPRESSIONS THAT APPEAR IN THE BOOK IN DEVANAGĀRĪ SCRIPT

Additions and Corrections

Printed	Page	Read
sāṃkhya	2	*saṃkhyā*
mahān-ātman	15 & 16	*mahadātman*
Jāvāla	37	*Jabāla*
Śvet. Up[1]	40	Śvet. Up[2]
XII. 209	43	XII. 219
See p.	45n1	see p, 128
see pp. 77.	57n2	see pp. 80-81
Bibhāṣā	80	Vibhāṣā
Ibid	84n1	Keith, *Sāṃkhya System*
inexplainable	95	inexplicable
descrimination	104	discrimination
The Yukti-dīpikā	130	The author of the Yukti-dīpikā
pertaing	139	pertaining
than in the	147	than the
(p. 39)	149	(p. 24)
Monoratha	152	Manoratha
is made of	153 & 193	is made to
Udayana in his commentary on the same	163	Vardhamāna in his Pariśuddhi-Prakāsá (p.671 Bib. Ind.edition)
प्राप्यकारि	176	प्राप्यकारिन्
external organs	177 (paragraph 2)	sensory organs
वर्तमाचे	181	वर्तमाने
means end and	216 (*infra*)	means and end
and Brahman is not even mentioned anywhere in it.	225, *l.* 7	and except in Kā, 54, Brahman is not elsewhere mentioned in it.
carcastical	231	sarcastical
samāna	273 (infra)	*apāna*
vyāna	274 (supra)	*samāna*

N. B. The following two sentences appearing respectively in pp. 157,n1 & 163,n2 are to be deleted :
(i) For further about this Ms., see appendix. (ii) An account of the said Ms. is furnished in the Journal of the Vaṅgīya Sāhitya Pariṣat.